-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-04696 to 363-04703.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-04696 to 363-04703
-
Title
-
Third article about Khe Sanh, focusing on IEDs
-
Description
-
Original title: "Diversion", Keever's title: "'People-Sniffers', Electronic Sensors Seed 'Mc Namara Line' near Khe Sahn." Article draft about IEDs used by Communist forces around Khe Sahn and how the US and Allies deal with them, for the Christian Science Monitor
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
Beverly Deepe
33, Vo Tanh, Sargon
Diversion-third of a three-part series
Page 1
(This is the third of a three-part series on past and present
developments in Khe Sanh).
KHE SANH, SOUTH VIETNAM, JUNE 13-Clothbound, granulated land mines,
resembling square, olive-green powderpuffs and sunburnt, triangular Ritz
crackers, were seeded amidst electronic sensors around Khe Sanh, as they
have been for sometime along the seabord side of the "McNamara Line."
out
Portable radar sets, four feet high, were staked out around Khe Sanh
and monitored by ground surveillance teams; they are now being funneled
to other units in Vietnam--and may possibly be used in Thailad Thailand.
"People-sniffers" were employed to detect chemicals emitted by human
thef
were
bodies, and then electronically magnified them onto measuring dials.
Starlight scopes, resembling elongated, olf old-fashioned binoculars,
issued to low-flying forward air controllers in mid March;
instruments magnified moonlight so the navigators could take a good look at
potential targets in the darkness. Scores of reconnaissance aircraft flew
XV
over Khe Sanh--some carrying metal-detecting infrra-red cameras, some
carrying black-and-white films and some employing color photography--which
distinguished between natual natural jungle and day-old camouflage.
"Precce" returns, a ma miniature Khe Sanh was built in a sandbox in Saigon,
where American generals deduced where the North Vietnamese were most likely to
concentrate their supplies, troops and equipment.
accompanying transports in order to "pickle"
From these
Fighters aircraft began
instantly any Communist that
presented itself by firing.
--more
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
Deepe
Diversion-page 2
None
Detection
SIEGE
Noon of these exotic/devices were innovations in the bro
battle of Khe Sanh; all had been employed singularly in Vietnm, but in
less concentrated dosages. Mass deployment of them reflected the thinking
of Arc American commanders that target selection--or detecting the NVA-
S
was more significant than simply dropping overwhelming tonnages of bombing int
the jungle wilderness.
The mechanics of the sophisticated devices are veiled behind top-secret
the specific results accruing from the accuracy
military classification;
of them seems
masked not only behindmilitary security, but also behind the
difficulties in assessing their contributions to
lifting the Khe Sanh siege.
Clearly though, the confidence of senior American commanders did not rest
on these " secret weapon si "to pivot the battle of Khe Sanh.
"We remained confidence simply because we knew Marines were Marines,"
that
A
one informed source explained. "We knew what had to be done, the Marines
were going to do it."
Some,
In general,
assessments of the value of these devices were mixed.
such as the portable radar sets, gave "good results" in detecting NVA
movements within limited distances,
including some American generals,
One source explained:
one source reported.
reported. But, others,
believe the gagetry is generally overated.
more
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
Deepe
Diversion page 3
They're all
either American
"Frankly, we can't get over-enthused with these gadgets.
aids, but they're no substitue substitute for eyewitnesses,
patrols or Communist prisoners.
We need all these means of gathering
intelligence, but you can't just sit back and look at electronic devices."
Another explained: "I know, some think the 'people-sniffer' is a big
thing. I got a briefing on it on the U. S.--the briefer said we'd fly
out with this gadget and it would sniff out the enemy and then we'd fire
artillery in there and the sniffer would end the war for us. But, actually,
on the battlefield, it isn't even the beginning of an answer.
Another said:
"Don't tell me about those electronic sensors forming
the McNamara line. An NVA regiment came across the DMZ, straight through
the McNamara line and stopped us cold during the Tet offensive,"
Another said: "Frankly, no one knew how many NVA were around Khe
We kept getting these wave of the hand'
Sanh most of the time.
intelligence briefings;
But, to be really effective,
the briefer would wave his hand over a big chunk
of the map around Khe Sanh and tell us that's where the enemy was.
Locate the ENEM
emy
the i intelligence has to be dom
w. the
couple of grid squares--down to several thousand meters,"
Critics of these electronic devices--and of the overall offICTal
publicized view that the NVA were "bombed out of the hills"
expressed the
belief that the Communists used, Khe Sanh as a strategic diversion,
while
their actual objective was the fet military offensive against the Vietnamese
cities.
-more
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
Deepe
Diversion-page 4
This school of thought is also base) on evidence,
conclusive,
although not
and from this, xxxxxx deductions were made piecing together
MAINTAN
the Communist strategy.
These sources say that based on captured documents
as early as June last year, the Hanoi high command mapped out its grand
strategy for the Communist drive into the cities. Hanoi then prese
persuaded the Moscow-bloc countries to support their masterplan with
sophisticated weaponry. Evidence: material captured in the Ashau Valley--
franging from canned Hungarian ghoulash to Soviet trucks, tracked vehicles,
field artillery pieces, and Bulgarian medicines.
By the fall of 1967, the Communists were building elaborate road
networks to throughout Laos and into the Ashau Valley, leading to Hue,
designed to transport their escalating heavy weaponry--and to create a
high-speed system for logistics and troop movements. Evidence: the
increased Communist emphasis on road networks, including those an
fragments of an asphalt one forty miles north of Saigon.
"Everything the Communists did from mid-1967 had to fit into his plan
"And Khe Sanh had to
to hit the cities, I figure," one source explained.
fit into that strategy too. Unless Khe Sanh 1 was an extremely easy
diversionary for the Communists.
target to take, it was
credible diversion, he had to creat
But, to be a
create a real and serious threat around Khe Sanh
and there's no question but what there was a real threat there. But,
the
His
enemy created that threat to draw friendly forces away from the coast.
main objective was Hue and his secondary one was Quang Tri city. If one
accepts this view, then the Marines assessed the situation well and were
very wise in deciding to hold Khe Sanh with only 6,000 men, without
major reinforcements.
The NVA put heavy pressure on Khe Sanh--and then star
pulling them out, transporting them down his high-speed highway in January
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
Deepe
Diversion-page 5
These sources then look at what intelligence officers calleⓇ the
"enemy order of battle"--what NVA units were "confirmed" to or "believed
probable" at a given location at a given time Confirmation is based on
a
OI
at least two items of separate, first-hand evidence--such as two prisoners,
within military channel
There is still considerable disagreement
a prisoner and a captured document.
HAD
HA
on what NVA units surrounded Khe Sanhat a given time.
officers at Khe Sanh during the siege, and other commanders now,
maintain two cric
Marine
consistently
NVA divisions--the 304th and 30-had
surrounded the combat base until mid-March.
there is disagreement on whether
☑
the Khe Sanh area in March-and hav
However,
BJ
Even among Marine field commanders
11 Communists units withdrew from
tile
OPERAHM
the U. S. Army field commandors inverted
in the northern provinces hold a different view. The Army's 1st Air Cavalry
Division in early February was rushed towards Hue to reinforce the Marines
battling at least a Communist division there. The 1st Cavalry was stopped
cold several miles from the Huc imperial citadel in the village of La Chau,
one of the showplace pacification projects in the vish Vietnam. For two
from February 3 to 15, the sky troopers battled Communists in the
while intelligence officers were perplexed as to which NVA units
they were fighting. Finally, on February 21, the intelligence officers had
"confirmed" through prisoners and documents the units: 29th Regiment of the
3250 Division and 24th Regiment (sometimes
weeks,
village,
also numbered 57)
BE
of 304th Division--two regiments that before had been presumed besieging
--more
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
Diversion-page 6
The 1st Cav elements cabled this information to its division hosuquier
headquarters;
the division replied it "completely discounted" the information
AROUND
because the two regiments were i Khe Sanh. One staff officer retorted,
"But I'm eyeballing the prisoner now and I interrogated him while rocket
rounds were coming in. I've got prisoners to show those regiments are
in La Chau--what's your evidence they're in Khe Sanh?" By late February,
however,
#S
General Creighton Abs Abrahms,
N
then representing General
Westmoreland in the norther provinces, accepted the i "prof" that the
two regiments were outside of Hue, instead of around Khe Sanh. Other
prisoners captured later around Khe Sanh when the siege was broken also
said part of their divisions had deployed for Hue in early January.
(MAY GEN, R. M.
PERMING All
Tompkins, commanding general of the Third Marine Division
Now Promoted to
along the DMZ during the Khe Sanh siege and later surremby deputy
commanding general of the senior Marine command headquarters, in Deungy
said at a press conference in Danang on May 24 t it was "absolutely
ating NEAR
incorrect" that elements of the two divisions were actually in Hue.
"Until mid-March, both divisions were around Khe Sanh).
By late February, only four of the dx NVA regiments infantry regiments
BELIEVE b
were still poised around Khe Sanh. All sources tend to agree that by mid-March
Regimen
no specific date is available from any--the remaining two CIVISIONS of
3250 Division deployed southwards.
Prisoners from this division were
captured in the Ashau Valley operation and later near Kontum and Dak To.
Seize
Intelligence sources said they have yet to find a prisoner of enough
RAN
to explain whey the two regiments moved south.
--more
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
Deepe
Diversin--page 7
This left, then, two regiments of the 304th Division around Khe Sanh--
and there is still disagreement whether these actually ever withdrew
although they did evade contact withr
IN Early
from the greater Khe Sanh ge area,
the 1st AirCavalry and Marine units der April.
their hill positions in something close to a rout,
Feed
Some of these units loft
EUA DE
leaving behind
weapons and supplies over large areas as they red the 1st Air Cav.
But by
mid-March, four or five,
of extensive treetop, helicopter
reconnassiance reconnaissance identified not more
than nine Communist
infantry battalions around Khe Sanh (three bal battalions to a regiment);
IN
actuall contact during Operation Pegasus,
American units made onbe
with and identified only seven battalions-three from the 66th Regiment and
three from the 9th Regiment, plus one sapper battalion.
The Marines
These intelligence discrepancies still continue today.
still list all three regiments of the 304th Division around Khe Sanh,
well as the 68th Artillery Regiment and "possibly"
Division.
as
a regiment of the 308 th
But, the Army headquarters in the northern provinces
lists the 24th Regiment--which the 1st Cavalry fought at La Chau-as
"location unknown.
Certainly no one has annhiliated it,"
one source
explained.
-moe more
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
Deepe
Diversion--page 8
11
A footnote:
Some Air Force officers who participated directly in the
and ground officers who inspected
the Communist bunkers once the siege of lifted, believe the NVA
neutralized much of the effectiveness of American firepower with
the Khe Sanh air war during the siege,
sturdy shovels,
barely bigger than a child's toy sandbox toy.
An Air Force officer explained: "The type of bunkers the Communists are
using is very difficult to rout them out of.
hit on their za zigzag trenchlines,
in a hole."
Eva Even with a direct
RATS
they're still like rus buried
A staff officer who had inspected the Communist trenchlines:
The B-52 raids could have put bombs on tope of them and annhiliated them,
but our intelligence isn't that good.
Bom B
even with a direct hit in the opening,
Looking at their bunkers, I think
someone could have lived through
a tactical air strike. In fact, I the think the Communists were dug in
will enough at Khe Sanh to survive a tactical nuclear strike."
-end
-
Date
-
1968, Jun. 13
-
Subject
-
Khé Sanh (Vietnam); Khe Sanh, 2nd Battle of, Vietnam, 1968; Tet Offensive, 1968; Improvised explosive devices; Vietnam War, 1961-1975
-
Location
-
Khe Sanh, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
16.6193; 106.7323
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B10, F38
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English
