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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04612 to 363-04616.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04612 to 363-04616
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Title
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Article about Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
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Description
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Original title: "clifford", Keever's title: "Khaki-Clad Secretary of Defense Clifford says "some" [of] Hanoi's Troops Withdraw along DMZ." Article draft about Secretary of Defense Clifford's leadup to the Second Honolulu Conference. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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clifford 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, JULY 17-Against the jet-boom backdrop of combat-bound, fighter-bombers,
American Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford began setting the stage for the
week-end Honolulu Conference between Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Nguyen Van Thieu.
And, in turn, the Honolulu session began shp shaping up as a momentously
pivotal Allied sixax meeting, wi weighing the great issue of war or peace in Vietnam.
The stagemanship of the khaki-clad Defense Chief consisted of:
1. Revealing that the North Vietnamese had withdrawn "some" of its
divisions out of South Vietnam across the demilitarized zone. He did not
specify the number. This statement was a distinct "row-back" from his
official assessment made in Washington last weekend before beginning the
his Vietnam visit that the Communists were escalating their strength in
the five northem provinces to eight divisions and possibly more."
weeks,
Listed on theilt In recent Rolls
the U. S. Marine command here has confied five North Vietnamese divisions
- more reuteron SA at bast
in the vi five northern provinces; sources here said that one of these--the 320th,
once around Khe Sanh--had moved back across the DMZ line.
--more reuter
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clifford 2 (normass/deepe)
In Saigon, informed sources calculate that Hanoi has withdrawn between
one-quarter and one-third of its 80,000 North Vietnamese main-force troop
strength from the South Vietnamese countryside.
In Honolulu, the pivotal decision would seem to be whether this North
Vietnamese de-escalation meets the American demands in Paris to a great enough
extent for President Johnson to stop bombing North Vietnam.
2. The Secretary declined to discuss the possibility of stopping the
bombing of North Vietnam, saying it was involved in the Paris peace talks and
he did not wish to prejuidice the negotiations.
Obviously, however,
the question of stopping or continuing the
bombing of the North is also connected with Mr. Clifford's assessment of
the ground war just south of the DMZ.
"The level of fighting in I corps and the northem provinces (bordering
the DAZ) has lowered," he said. The military analysis of senior American
Army and Marine commanders who briefed him today was "this is merely the lull
before the storm," he said.
--more reuter
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clifford 3 (normass/deepe)
"We can
Or as one informed American officer described the northern zone:
can't find the war and the we can't find the enemy. We're down to platoon
and squad sized contacts now--even around Khe Sanh."
3. The Secretary reiterated he would not predict when any American troops
HAS
might possibly begin withdrawing from South Vietnam. He previos previously
the deveopme
cited three "unknowns" on which this question rested:
developments in the Paris peace talks, the long-term level of Communist military
activity and the progress of the South Vietnamese armed forces in improving in
fighting effectiveness/ so that they could replace American troops.
wwwwwww
Mr. Clifford's refusal to many make any "timetable" predictions
seemed to indicate a st stiffening of the American position just before
Honolulu over President Thieu's statement five days eater
e artier--when
the three "unknowns" also existed--that American troops might begin withdrawing
in 1969 and General William C. Westmoreland's estimate a few weeks earlier
that they might begin in late this year.
--more reuter
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clifford 4 (normass/deepe)
Bepert No
The tall Defense chief also repeated that no more American troops
would be sent to North Vietnam- above the present level of 537,000--and
that none of the senior field commanders here had indicated to him they
intented to request more.
Mr. Clifford highly praised the First Vietnamese Army Division, which has
fought hard and continously along the DMZ and which he waxonomxmxxxm
said he was told in a briefing was equal in fighting effectiveness to one
American Army division. He subtly suggested however that this was an exceptio nal
He also
division, not typical of the none other regular Vietnamese divisions.
refused to predict when these divisions might be effective enough to permit
the beginning of an American withdrawal.
In fact, when asked if his field trip in the northern provinces had
encouraged him to believe more and more fighting could be turned over to
the Vietnamese, he replied: "This has been the outstanding fact of my
morning briefings."
He subtly suggested however that this was an exceptional
division, not the typical of the nine other regular Vietnamese divisions.
He also refused to predict when these divisions might be effective enough to
permit the beginning of an American withdrawal.
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clifford 5 (normass/deepe)
5. Mr. Clifford reiterated the view that he and American field
commanders anticipated the North Vietnamese units which had withdrawn from the
South would return to combat "with greater force and effectiveness.
#8
He said he expected a major attack by the end of July, in August or
early September.) Although "some contiuing contacts with opposing forces" might
occur at any time. He said he proceeded on the assumption that Communist
military plans are coupled with their desire to make an impression on the
Paris peace conference. If they achieved some "spectacular accomplishment,"
this could affect the negotiations in Paris. But, he said the Allied
commanders were prepared to meet the offensive to prevent that happening.
He said he was unwilling to predict specifically whether the Communists
would attack Saigon, but he said there was an "increase in their forces around
Saigon and continuing movement of men into III Corps," the eleven provinces
surrounding Saigon. He said he believed the Communists would mount some
type of assault on Saigon but the degree or extent was unknown.
His net conclusion at the big-picture level was summed up: "I don't
know what lies ahead. We will watch the intelligence information with care."
The former head of a Presidential intelligence board, he referred to the future
plans and potential surprises a from the Communist camp. And, he neatly
left dangling any reference to crucial decisions to be made in the Allied
WEAR
Peide during the weakpe week-endsat Waikiki.
-end reuter
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Date
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1968, Jul. 17
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Subject
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Clifford, Clark M., 1906-1998; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Vietnam--Foreign relations--United States
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F38
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
