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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06416 to 363-06435.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06416 to 363-06435
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Title
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Article about spending the Tet ceasefire with Communists
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Description
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Keever's title: "Communists views victorious coaltion government", Article draft about an interview of Việt Cộng troops shortly before the Tet Offensive, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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This two-part report on spending the short-lived lunar
new year ceasefire with Viet Cong oadre and guerrillas was gathered
as the Communist general offensive began in the northern provinces.
day later,
Saigon and other major provincial axx towns were attacked.
In the light of this affi offensive,
this article details the Viet
Cong holiday celebration, organization, activities, policies-and
thoughts of victory against the American forces).
A FRENCH RUBBER PLANTATION, SOUTH VIETNAM.
The Communists believe they will achieve victory
in Vietnam during 1968, a veteran Party a member told this
correspondent.
"The Central Committee (of the National Liberation Front)
has given the order 1968 will be a decisive year," he said, matter-of-
factly. "We will achieve victory in 1968."
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Then asked if the battle this year would lead to
Bev
oge
negotiations, he replied: "Following the Central Committee decision,
we are gaining vito victory. Once there, we can have pence and talks."
His detailed explanation about the conditions for
negotiations indicated peace talks would also give the Communists a victory,
in their eyes.
The Communist Party member imam did not seem
authorized to act as a spokesman for the National Liberation Front,
nor did he indicate his view was a shift in Communist policy. "I'm
only telling you what every Party cadre should know," he said.
octherbbgniinnn
The interview was also the most open, public admission
that North Vietnamese were involved in the war in the South; yet,
paradoxically, he bluntly reiterated the necessity of the American
government to recon recognize the South- Southern-borne National Liberation
Front to arrive at a peaceful settlement.
Other significant points in the interview revealed:
1. The Communists would not hold peace talks with the
present elected government of President Nguyen Van Thieu, but iix they
might talk with an anti-American government in Saigon.
2. The Nate-National Liberation Front has been applying
a lenient policy in dealing with the French-run plantations in South
Vietnam.
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three
The inte interview was conducted through an interpree
interpreter on a French plantation outside Saigon, which was an oasis
year.
of tranquility during the lunary new year ceasefire. The plantation workers
reported the vast plantation was also an oasis of serenity throughout the
They said American planes did not bomb the area because "they know
no Viet Cong guerrillas are around here; only political cadre are
around." They said Vietme Vietnamese government troops or officials
rarely passed through the area because it was French-owned.
number of young men lived in at least one of the plantation villages; most
villages are conspicuously absent of them.
A noticeable
The veteran cadre said the request for the interview
was approved by the Central Committee of the National Liberation Front
on the samingan condition the security of the correspondents could be
guaranteed. He said 13 days after he made the main request, he
received word of the approval.
The cadre wore black pajamas and a red-and-white checkered
soarf casapally flipped around his neck. The 3-38-year-old oadre was
number of
of medium height and carried a curly toplaneek topknot of jet black hair, which
bobbed about as he poured tea from a canteen or smoked a
cigarettes, including American menthols when offered him.
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Be- Page 4
He said his job was to work specifically with rubber
plantations and the trade unions. He said he joined the Communist
Party when he was 19 to fight against the French in the French Indo-China
War for the first three years he served as a sniper. then he joined the
regular army until 1954, after which he served as a provincial cadre.
Then he specialized in trade unions and plantations.
The son of a
tenant farmer, he said he owned a house in the western part of
the South, where his wife grew rice.
A paraphrase of the interview is presented by topic,
rather than in squeno sequence.
Qe What is your life like?
A.
We must reconiz recognize sincerely we have suffered
alot. We have nothing materially, but we have the spirit of patriotism.
That gives us courage to work for the country. We don't get any salary.
Each soldier has one litre of rice a day. Also seven piastres a day
for food, that is, for those who are far from the population. If we are
near villages, the inhabitants give us things. But we rely on our own
efforts before asking for aid from the people. We are afraid the people
will become poor if we rely on them. Therefore, we kill deer and
other wild animals. As for clothes, the regulars get them from
the Front, but regional forces get them from the people.
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Be
you apport by your personal history?
Can you
A. I live far from here. I have one boy and a girl. I
was young when I followed the oall of the Motherland.
I love my
wife and children like everyone else, but because my country is in
danger I must give up these feelings. If I am sentimental, my family
will be destroyed. I joined the guerrillas in 1949 when I was 19.
After the 1954 Geneva accords, I refused to see my family because I
* thought my job wasn't finished. The Americans came in and I could
see my country was only half free. So I had to fight the Americans.
My boy is 16. He too will join the Front. My girl is 12. My
wife came to see me in the maquis in 1954. I haven't seen her since then.
I have had two letters from her. My daughter wrote me saying I have
never seen your face. I don't know you. It is because of the Americans.'
My family lives in a liberated area; my son is at secondary school.
difficulties.
Q. Do you have moments of homesickness?
A. No. I must admit that I havem met with many
But I am a revolutionary.
overcomes all difficulties.
The spirit of a revolutionary
of your Communist Party careerr
Qo Would you describe the development of a revolutionary.
A. It is very diffioult to say exactly. It is a delicate
question. You must understand that I'm a revolutionary. My ideal is to
defeat the imperialists.
As a revolutionary revolutionaries,
we have
self-criticism. We educate each other to become revolutionaries. It is
the self-oriticism that is important.
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Would you deporte you 1fving conditions.
They are not like you think. We lead a very simple
life. We only have hammocks.
When a regular regiment comes we have
theatre or cinema. Perhaps six times a year. But we sing everyday.
(Asked to detail his personal possessions, he pulled
out his green toothbrush;
a small lamp made from an American insect
repellent bottle full of oil with a wick set in an empty cartridge
casing; hammock; documents;
water canteen; toothpaste; rapeer
razor; nail clipper; comb; 1 change of clothes;
three meters of
plastic for covering; one and half mter meters of plastic as a rain
cape;
an American tin spoon. Total weight
medicines against malaria;
of pack was nine pounds; whether he carries a rife rifle depends on
his work. However, the next morning he was also wearing a dark
blue sweatshirt similar to those worn by North Vietnamese troops).
Q. You've been in the maquis almost twenty years.
you last another five or ten years?
A. If the war lasts, we must continue on. The GI
But Vietnamese
wearing a flak jacket considers his life valuable.
consider themembamimfom their lives to be as nothing.
Could
I.
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D
Bro you Po & 14pxt be/0?
have
A.
It is mobile.
Themeding Your truce is seven days. Saigon'
has a 36-hour one.
What do you think about the truce?
Ao
If the government allowed a long truce, flude its
soldiers would be able to go back to their families. This would give us
a chance to talk to them and make propaganda. The government doesn't
like that.
plantation.
Q. What do you say to the government soldiers?
A. Recently we met som government soldiers on this
We asked them why are you in the Army? Do you think
Then we went away. A first they were
you're saving your country?'
scared, but later no. (Tx (A second carde cadre, who sat passively
and quietly through most of the interview, poured tea and added that
the Viet Cong also educated the parents of soldiers first.).
Q. Have you heard of the Korean crisis?!
A. Yes. We heard about it on Radio Hanoi.
Q. Do you think it's linked to this war? Rumors
say
Hanoi wanted a second front?
A. I don't think so. We would not want to open another
war front which would cause another fraternal people to suffer.
But,
it shows that the North Koreans have the same difficulties with
thetx, Americans as the South Vietnamesef.
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Bev Page 8.
Q. What would happen if the Americans recognized the Front?
An That would be alright if they accepted our five points.
(The second cadre added, that if the Americans recognized the Front
there would be no more Thieu and Ky, the presidnet and vice-president
of South Vietnam. That would be a contradiction).
What are the five points?
A. 1. The American forces must withdraw, 2. must
recognize the Front as the sole representative of the Vietnamese people
3. let the Vietnamese organize their own affairs, 4. re-establishment
of contacts with the North 5. and afterwards, reunification between North
and South. (There was some hesitation as he enumerated these and the second
cadre prompted him on the last point).
There's alot of talk now about a political settlement
of the war. What do you think of a coalition government?
A. First, our ideas are in the new Manifesto (the 14-point
program issued in September). A aux coalition government is alright,
but it must be the result of the elections. The people in the Viet Cong
zones and in the government areas must come together to elect a new
government. It would be impossible to have a coalition as long as the
Americans remain here. When (President Lyndon B.) Johnson talks of a coalitic
it is only tactics.
I must recognize the Americans are very rich and have a huge
logistical means. But they can't last out this year. They are using
tanks to try to kill ants. You can't kill ants that way.
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Before President Johnson went to Australia, he
proposed the principle of one-man, one-vote in South Vietnam. Is
that acceptable?
Aa Johnson has no right to confer on the Vietnamese
the ff gift of one-man, one-vote.
Qe
But who then has that right on the Vietnamese side?
A. Well, not Thiu Thieu and Ky. The Front will talk
only with the Americans, not Thieu and Ky.
Q. IN Paris, the Hanoi representative said they
Could talks take place now?
would start discussing.
A. In principle, it is the Front that must speak with
the Americans. But, first the Americans must indicate when they
will withdraw their troops. Then the Front will talk.
Q. In Paris, the Hanoi representative said it
would talk with the Americans. Would the Front follow if this
happened?
A. North or Sourt South--we are all Vietnamese.
The
moment the Americans stop bombing the North, they can talk with
Hanoi. But if they want to talk about Southern affairs, they must
talk with the Front. American propaganda says the Front is the tool
of Hanoi. This is not so. It is the southerners whx led by the
Front who are fighting the Americans. It is the Front who is
responsible for the South.
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PAGE
Q.
There's supposed to be alot of North Vietnamese
tro ops in Quang Tri province along the Demilitarized Zong. If the
Americans stop ti bombing North Vietnam and there are American-Hanoi
talks, might not Hanoi withdraw its troops from the South?
A. This will take some time to explain. The Southerners
were the first to rise up against the French after 1945. The 1954
problem of independence was solved for the North. It is not aid from the
North now. It is the duty of the North to help the South. The Americans
make bad propaganda against the Northerners saying they're invaders. They're
no. Vietnam is both North and South. The South is now under the
imperialista.
Therefore there can be no question of withdrawing Northern
troops until the South is liberated.
It is the common duty of all 31 million Vietnamese to fight.
The Americans think the NWS NVA is a foreign army. No. The Americans,
Koreans and Australians are the foreign soldiers. (The second card cadre
added: You must know that Vietnam is one. Rivers may run dry and rooks
Therefore we have the
wear away,
but not the Vietnamese fatherland.
Northern troops--but not Chinese or any other foreigners Later, on questionin
the first cadre said he had not seem/Chinese Communist advisors)in
What then can the Americans discuss with Hanoi?
A.
When the Americans stop bombing the North, the North
must tell the Americans to talk with the Front and to recognize it.
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Q. Must American forces withdraw from Vietnam before they
can talk to the Front?
A.
talk
During
But
These could be the stages: 1. stop bombing 2.
with the North 3. tik recognize the Front and talk with it.
talks the Front will make its demands of whioh withdrawal is one.
both Thieu and Ky must leave thepolitical stage once the Front is
Thieu and Ky have been reconi recognized by the Americans
recognized.
and by Sato in Japan, but not by the Vietnamese people.
Then there would be elections?
A.
The important question is recognition of the Front.
Then the Americans and Front can sit down to arrange conditions. Only
condition for starting talks is recognition of the Front.
Q. Can the withdrawal be in stages?
A.
It will need time. It could be like the Geneva accords.
The material guarantee
It would not be necessary to withdraw all at once.
must be that the U. S. troops won't fight.
of the Front?
What about Thieu's idea of talking to single members
A. He has no right taxafting to make this declaration.
He is the instrument of the Americans and we want to talk to his master.
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cooperate?
Qe
Are there politicians in the South with whom you could
Such as Tra Truong Dinh Dzu or Tran Van Huong,
A. If there was a new government following a coup that
was clearly anti-American, we could and would talk with it. But I can't
go deeper into this question.
Q. Could the battles this year lead to negotiations?
A. Following the Central Committee decision, we are
Once there, we can have peace and talks.
gaining victory.
Q.
And yourxnammmxxxamamimamany will not
compromise on any of these positions?
A. No. We'll fight to the very end.
Qe
What is the situation in this region?
A.
We think this is a half-controlled region.
The
pep people have much sympathy for the Front, but at times the
enemy makes operations and then the people are very afraid. Then the
enemy comes here the people stay in their houses and the young people
flee to escape the army. Because it's half-controlled we don't have an
administrative system. That is only when the people are full sympathizers.
We already foresaw that in 1967 the enemy would try to come here.
think we're too far from the road for them to put down roots here.
But we now
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We don't force anyone to join us. We have some young
men in the village. We have some with us. Their families are still
here. These young men have difficulties with the government because
their families are with the Front. Families suffer from government
suspicion. (Requests to interview the young guerrillas were denied).
Q. Have you any fully controlled villages?
A. No. By full control I mean that we have organized
area was fully controlled.
an administrative system. In the past this
But we don't want to now because it would be against our interests.
Five years ago it was oontrolled.
A.
Why against your interests?
This is to avoid causing the people difficulties. If we
were to organise, the government will consider it really Viet Cong
and would try to liquidate the region.
Q. What does you work consist of in that regard?
A. First, to protect the population.
Then to fight
against those who are against the coolie's interest. We help the trade
union. We also help the people to go produce food-in their gardens to
and to plant manioo and maize. The Front explains what they can produce and
how because there is no rice here.
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BEV
Q. Do you buy what the peoplex produce?
A. From time to time, when there's suprlus production. But
this is rare.
Q.
How often do you come to this village and what do you
do here?
A.
We can not say exactly when we come to the village.
We come at no set time. We visit each house to talk about the
political situation, to teach people hygience, to educate and to
regulate affairs.
Q. Regulate affairs?
each other,
A. Yes, when families are fighting, we try to step in.
We don't interfere inside the families. But there is discipline
here now.
We also tell them how to discover government spies.
Q. Have there been spies recently?
A.
Q.
Very rare. Each time the people have warned us.
When was the last time?
A. Security agents don't dare come hre. But because of our
we are warned within two days of their arrival, There
have been two or three cases like that.
security network,
A.
Are the Front's orders effective with the people?
A. Very effective.
weapons?
What about aid from other countries, like these
A.
I don't want to be precise. The fraternal countries,
like China and Russia, are the same as Vietnam.
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Q. Can you describe your recent military experiences?
A. One month ago we attacked a hamlet. The Vietnamese
We killed him and captured the
army fled except for a machinegunner.
hamlet chief and his deputy. The peasants condemned them to death and
But we released the soldiers we caught.
we killed them on the spot.
The battle last quarter an hour.
two of them.
innocent.
Q. Have you met U. S. troops?
A. Recently we attacked a convey of 113 tenke. We burnt
It was 9 p.m. and we did it with mines.
Q. What do you think of U. s. soldiers?
A. The Americans are easy to attack because they're too
They don't know hot fight guerrilla war.
But isn't U. S. firepower dangerous?
A. The artillery and planes have made difficulties. But
it's not too serious for us because my group here is small.
Ge What are the U. S. technical faults?
A. First, they're so big they're easy to aim at. We
call them flesh flesh targets. Also the Americans don't have the habit
of withdrawing. They always go on attacking head-on. The Americans
are more dynamic than the Vietnamese army, which retreats when attacked.
It has no morale.
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7
Qe
How do the Americans compare with the French?
A.
The French had much more experience
because they lived
longer in Vietnam.
What are your biggest problems?
A. Politics. This means marching in step with the people.
The Americans have done much for the people. They have given out medicines,
food and sweets to the children.
Q.
Why?
control
But they can not the people.
A. Because they are Americans.
Here they distribute
medicines-but over there they are bombing and killing people. The U. S.
doesn't have a uniform policy here.
Have you suffered from defoliation?
A. Yes. A maize field has been defoliated. It is
difficult to take counter-measures.
The people have lost alot because of it.
It has caused a heavy load for the Front. We must explain and try to
help the people.
Are there any government Revolutionary Re Development
teams around here.
Yes,
one team in one section of the plantation. They
aren't liked by the people and don't have influence. I must recognize that thes
cadre have done much for the people--built schools, houses etc. But they
are not of the people. They're strangers. Most are ex-soldiers and
there are many young people who didn't want to join the army...We go
and look at the R. D. teams, but we don't stay there. It was ax/strategic
hamlet in 1963. We destroyed this: now the government is back.
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Q. Will you try to re-enter when the R. D. # people go?
A. We have contacted the coolies there and they say they
hope the Front will come back. We have much information from the coolies.
Is it possible for Saigon to create cadres who can win
the sympathy of the people?
A.
Impossible. The government cadres earn a salary.
We earn nothing. If they are really for the people, the government
must follow that path. The people judge them like that.
Q. Could Saigon follow policies for the people like the
Front's?
A. Impossible.
Even if Saigon adopted policies like
the Fronts, it would not succeed because they are not of the people.
Before they collaborated with the French.
Now they're valets of
the Americans.
These are not my ideas.
This is what the people say.
The people ask why there have been so many different governments
in Saigon that it's like changing shirts. But the Front has only
onqa government under Nguyen Huu Tho. It's always the same.
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Pe1-17
Q. What can the Front give the people in terms of material
progress and programs?
A. In areas we control we've redistributed land and
educated the people to live a really new life, based on social
organization and collective planning,
as f in agriculture. The poor
are really helped. In these half-controlled areas we haven't helped
materially, but we ory with the people, we suffer with the people
and we rejoice with the people.
Q. How will this half-controlled area be different when
the Front has full control?
A. If we can control it, we must improve the people's
life, have schools to teach the way of the Front and improve agriculture.
Q. Will you take the French land?
A. No, we must respect the Front program.
Q.
A.
You won't expropriate French land?
That's right. (second cadre said: we can aid the
people to sit increase their famrs from land that doesn't belong to the
plantations.).
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Will this be the same for all foreign owners?
A. There is a big difference.
We respect the property
property of those who don't collaborate with the enemy. We shall not
respect the ownership of those who do cooperate with them.
Q. What effect will the U. 3. elections have on Vietnam?
A. The elections are the Americans business.
peace is not a real peace. It's a cover-up.
Johnson's
What about the differences between the hawks and doze
doves in the U. S?
A. It is not important whether someone is a hawk or a dove.
What matters is takin talking to the Front and recognizing it.
Q.
Many
difficulties Would you comment?
say you arek having more recruitment
A. The more the Americans bomb the villages, the more it
pushes people into the Front.
But we thought all the young men were already committed
to one side or the other?
A. That's a strange question. You might think that
because of bombing we would lose the masses. But in fact because of our
spiritual contact with the people, we are moving into the towns with them
where they take refuge and we are now stronger there. The bombs are a
blood debt which must be paid. (The secondadded: The Front is everywhere,
like god).
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Bu- PREZI
Q.
MES is the beginning of the new yar year.
What do you
think will happen during 1968?
A. We are going to have victories over the American troops.
1968
The Central Committee has given the order that it will be a decisive year.
We will achieve victory in 1968.
End.
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Date
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1968, Jan. 30
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tet Offensive, 1968; Soldiers
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Location
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French Rubber Plantation, near Dầu Tiếng District, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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11.3489; 106.4641
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B9, F8
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
