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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06370 to 363-06384.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06370 to 363-06384
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Title
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First article about revamping the South Vietnamese armed forces (ARVN)
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Description
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Original title: "avrn", Keever's title: "Revamping South Vietnamese Force in Limbo", Article draft about attempts to revamp and revitalize the AVRN, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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ZCZc sag
yy-1.jp
arvm 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the first of a two-part series about revamping the 50700-
Vietnamese armed forces, the effects of which will partly determine
whether American combat troops can begin their withdrawal in at least
two years as General William C. Westmoreland has predicted).
MAN
SAIGON, January 22-A coalition of American and Vietnamese
generals has indirectly blocked, at least temporarily, the much-
promised radical reform of the ten-divisions of the South Vietnamese
regular army.
Informed Vietnamese and American sources report any major
revamping of the Vietnamese armed forces in 1968 will be concentrated-
Ground
not in the 300,000-man regular forces, as was expected--but instead
in the 300,000-man provincial militia, called Regional and Popular
Forces. The other 70,000 men comprising the armed forces serve in the
Vietnamese Air Force, Navy, Marines and a defense group lead by Special Force
(More Reuter)
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ZCZC sag
yy-1.jp
arvn 2 (normass/deepe)
650,5
Discussions on the radical reform program have in the past
few months become snarled in a complex crossfire of in-fighting and
disagreement within the Vietnamese command, within the Vietnamese
government, within the American military command, and between the
American and Vietnamese establishments.
In broadest terms, the radical reform program would have
shifted the Vietnamese army of 300,000 men from a traditional,
conventional-type structure of organization to a more progressively
organized and operated force structure. It would have streamlined the
and facilitated
Vietnamese decision-making and implementation of the crucial pacification
program. This has currently been vetoed.
"All this talk about the re-organization and reform of the Vietnamese
army means simply means the mountain give birth to a mouse,
one
iNFORMED
middle-level Vietnamese officer explained.
(More Reuter)
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zczc sag
yy-1.jp
arvn 3 (normass/deepe)
The coalition of some American and some Vietnamese generals indirectly
vetoed the heart of the radical maskar reform progra
proposal--the abolition of the ten regular Army divisions (ARVO (ARVN)
and the simultaneous reduction of the politico-military power of the
ten Vietnamese division commanders.
This would have also significantly
reduced the power of the four corp Vietnamese corps commanders, commonly
and even officially) called the "warlords"
of Vietnam.
(More Reuter)
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zcze sag
yy-l.jp
arvn 4 (normass/deepe)
R
The Vietnamese division and corps commanders were opposed to this
proposal because they had the most power to lose immediately; their political
power based on the raw power of the guns and troops they command--is substantial
though somewhat reduced from previous coup-happy days. Also, President Nguyen
Van Thieu was reportedly opposed to the proposal, because this political
base of support within the Vietnamese armed forces lies with these army generals.
Other Vietnamese were for the proposal, however, principally, the
more impatient, middle-level officers, Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky and
Maj. Gen. Nguyen Due Thang.
On the Vietnamese side, the conflicting
views somewhat reflect the continued state of conflict between Fresident
Thieu and Vice President Ky; the proposal was drawn up and approved),
by Ky when he was primi prime minister. However, the decision was overruled
by Thieu and the field generals army division and corps commanders in the field,
thomhaishem These generals had been the key decision-makers in giving the
nominating Thieu, instead of Ky, to run as President in the September elections
last year.
(More Reuter)
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ZCZC sag
yy-1.jp
arvn 5 (normass/deepe)
On the American side, reliable sources reported influential U. S.
generals in the American command under General William C. Westmoreland were
also opposed to abolishing the divisional structure because they wanted to
continue patteming the Vietnamese army
the American army.
along the conventional lines of
Some sources speculate that underlying the Nx
reasoning of the U. S. generals is the assumin assumption that in the
future--in the years following a peace settlemnt settlement or even
a victorious American troop reduction0---the main threat to Vietnam
which needs to be met by conventional
is still a Korean-styled invasion,
divisions, rather than the fear or of continued re insurrection within
the country, which would demand a non-conventional armed forces.
(More Reuter)
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zczc sag
yy-1.jp
arvn 6 (normass/deepe)
Civilian elements within General Westmoreland's command
in favor of the abolition of the conventional divisions.
were reportedly
In particular,
Westmoreland's deputy commander for pacification, Ambassador Robert Komer
was known to favor the move because the reduction in the influence of the
division commanders would have steamlined the decision-making process in the
pivotal pacification program.
(More Reuter)
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ZCZC sag
yy-1jp
arvn 7 (normass/deepe)
By r vetoing the radical reform plan, the generals have in effect
cemented in place the past cumbersome decision-making process for the
pacification program,
which will continue to flow from the Saigon level
to the corps commanders, to the division commanders and then to the province
chiefs, numbering 44 throughout the country. As in the past, the province
chief ultimate responsibility for the implementation of the pacification
NECESSARILY
program--but has bm they have not been delegated all the authority
for implementing it. In some cases, the division commanders--not the province
chiefs-retain control of the regular ARVN battalions assigned to pacification
missions within a given provinces.
(More Reuter)
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zczc sag
yy-1.jp
arvm 8 (normass/deepe)
Had the reform measures been approved, the division and corps
commanders would have lost thi their power in the pacification program
and the line of decision-making would have run directly from the Saigon
level to the province chiefs.
(More Reuter)
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zcze sag
yy-1.jp
arvn 9 (normass/deepe)
One significant, but sideways compromise was enfentiedn made within
American official circles. Both American generals and civilians withing
the command agreed thatbham on the abolition of the Vietnamese division
These are the geographical provinces in which the Vietnamese
tactical zones.
divisions had been assigned to 01 operate and for which the division
commander was held responsible for military affairs as well as pacification.
The Vietnamese officialdom agreed in form with this all-American
compromise, but the substance was in effect negated by a recent decree
signed by President Thieu, which provided that the division commanders
end would be responsible for deciding if and when their own tactical
zones would be abolished. The effect of this decree, as one source explained,
was like "handing the Vietnamese division commanders their own death sentences and
saying they could execute them when they felt like it."
(More Reuter)
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zczc sag
yy-1jp
arv 10 (normass/deepe)
al
While some American officials are visibly unhappy about that Vietnamese
decree, some Vietnamese officers including the division commanders--are
disgusted with the Americans on another score--the formation of the
Vietnamese light brigades.
According to the reform proposal, the most aggressive battalions
within each division--about per cent of the 12,000 man divisional strength--
were to have been organized into highly mobile strike forces, comparable
to the American brigades. The remaining battalions were to be detailed
for counter-guerrilla and
These proposed
"territorial" defense.
Vietnamese brigades, averaging four thousand men," would have been
reinforced in strength, from three to four battalions per brigade and
from four to five companies per battalion.
Even the division commanders
were enty enthusiastic about this aspect of the proposal, but Vietnamese
sources say the American command blocked it. The current modest decision
has been made to assign only a max maximum of three battalions-and maybe
even fewer to each brigade, and none of these battalions will be heavily manned
as five companies.
(More Reuter)
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ZCZC sag
yy-1jp
arvn 11 (normass/deepe)
Also, each Vietnamese brigade, technically called "divisional strike force,"
would have been assigned much more, fixenxaxmadmanla kimembra khath kumfimm better
Each GADE
and newer equipment to increase its firewpo firepower and mobility. The
CUPS to ch
proposal called for one battalion of sixteen howitizers, one squadron of
seventeen armored personnel carriers and one transportation company of fifty trucks.
Well informed sources said the American command told the Vietnamese command
to "wait until next year to get this equipment. " Each of these brigades
was also to be trained and organized to fight and maneuver as an integrated
as American brigades do, but the Vietnamese sources also say this
has yet to take place and there areno no plans in the offing to effect it.
unit,
(More Reuter)
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zczc sag
yy-1jp
arvn 12 (normass/deepe)
One Vietnamese officer, now frustrated after working so hard
on the entire reform po proposal, explained:
"The Americans are very tricky. They talked alot about helping us
reform the Vietnamese army; they asked us to make a study and we produced
a practical one. Then the Americans amended it and they agreed only to the
minor points--yet they steal our ideas and use them for the American troops."
One of the ideas he claimed the Americans stole from the Vietnamese proposal
was
to increase the strength of each battalion, by a
WAS Recen
Yoadding
adding one more
line company--or more riflemen--which has been done in the American army)
for
resently, but has not been approved on the Vietnamese army.
(More Reuter)
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zczc sag
yy-1jp
arvn 13 (normass/deepe)
Some of the younger, middle-level American officers, in sympathy
with their impatient Vietnamese counterparts, aremaidsom often agree with
the Vietnamese viewpoint; some of these call their more traditional-minded
"Neanderthals" when discussing the lack of
American superiors
progress in improving the Vietnamese army.
In abolishing the ten divisions, the propsoa pros proposal specified
that the remainingxtwaban
e least aggressive battalions
in each division would have been re-trained and "red "redeployed" as a
counter-guerrilla security force protecting the pacification program
in the villages. This "redeployment"-even officially it is not called
reform or reorganization--was initiated last year and will be accelerated
this year until between 50 and 60 of the total 120 regular army battalions
are assigned to this mission. The current decision that is that these
regular army battalions are "on loan" for pacification duties, rather
than becoming a permanent counter-guerrilla force, and they will be returned
to their conventional division status when the situation permits.
(More Reuter)
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ZCZC sag
yy-1.jp
arvn 14 (normass/deepe)
The radical proposal for transforming the Vietnamese army was d
first made by the Vietnamese high command in 1965, but it was pigeonholed
by the American military command until the July visit of Secretary of Defense
Robert S. McNamara last year. When McNamara made critical, public remarks
about both the Vietnamese and American command decisions, the American command
agains studied the Vietnamese proposal and then agreed i "in pron principle"
to the propsal proposal. This proposal had the backing of General
Nguyen Cao Ky--then prime minister and now vice president;
General Nguyen
Duc Thang then minister of revolutionary development and now no. 2 in the
Vietnamese high command;
General Cao Van Vien--head of the Vietnamese high
V
command; General Nguyen Van Vy, then deputy to Vietnam and now minister of
defense.
(More Reuter)
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zczс sag
yy-1jp
arvn 15 (normass/deepe)
Then,
the opposition began to snowball-first from the Vietnamese
division andxcarps commanders,
who had the most power to lose by being effect
demoteda only to brigade commanders, and then from the four corps commanders.
After the September elections, G General Nguyen V Thieu was elected
President, replacing Ky as the most important policymaker,
and Thieu,
rejected the Ky-sponsored
in conflict with Ky on a wide range of points,
proposal. Thieu moved somewhat towards the view of the corps commanders,
had supported him in outmaneuvering Ky for the Presidential nomination.
Negative
The view of the Vietnamese division and corps commanders was in turn
supported by their American counterparts in the field, and by the American
military command in Saigon whimprimamity
who
in which the key posts are
The
hold
End
(More Reuter)
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Date
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1968, Jan. 22
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực; Vietnam (Republic)--Armed Forces--Reorganization
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B9, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
