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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06561 to 363-06578.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06561 to 363-06578
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Title
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Third article about developments since the beginning of the Tet Offensive
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Description
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Original title: "strategy", Keever's title: "Communist Blitz Shatters U.S. War Strategy", Article draft about the effects of the Tet Offensive on the American war effort, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2020 sag
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strategy 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the last of a three-part series appraising the
many-spectrumed developments of the Communists' blitzkrieg criss-crossing
South Vietnam. This arte article reviews the military implication
of the blits).
thirteen-year presence,
SAIGON, February 5-Even with half-million troops, a
and e/$ a day war expenditure, American
has sensationally demonstrated not one square inch of South Vietnam
has been secured.
And An American Embassy spokesman has admitted it still is not.
American generals believe the Communists could launch a repeat performance--
and half expect them to at any time.
more reuter
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strategy 2 (normass/deepe)
weeks
serious.
Even without asecond blitz ambhima in the next several
the military situation in Saigon and its suburbs is increasingly
After one week of fighting, organized Communists units
are still hitting politice police stations, warehouses and bridges
in the city limits, Nomor and the longer significant military contact
continues the more demoralised the Saigon population becomes. More significant,
however, reliable sources report that the Viet Cong have won to thier
thor support numb individual Saigonese who have jun joined in alliance
with them as "Forces for a Just Causo." These would presumably mean the
colonies of hooligans, "cowboys", draft-dogor dodgers and criminals
evading the law who inamin inhi inhabit the slum alloys of the city.
In short, they have stopped up their recruitment of military supporters
SERIOUS FOR.
in Saigon. And even more greve to the Vietnamese government, the
Kovown to BE
Communists are considered leaving behind scores of propaganda cadre
and political agents to format of
emotions of the Saigonese during this
hmm further arouse the
bitter period.
Government outposts
surroudn surrounding the capital are boein being overrun and uprooted; all
roads leading out of the city are either barricaded or out by the Communists.
more router
Saigon is an island.
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strategy 3 (normass/deepe)
During the past week, midaxonnxnyalmenizensnem
the Communist blits, in one synchronized swoop, was launched into
Saigon against the most prestigious chunks of real estate in the republic.
months
The dazzling white American Embassy, dedicated a few weeks ago,
was rocketed and assaulted by enough Communists to demand helicoptering
the
in a platoon of the elite U. S. 101st airborne. Tan Son Nhung
world's busiest and best-defended airport was nearly captured--and with
multi-million-dollar
it the brand-new American military command, ofton called Pentagon East.
The Vietnamese High Command was infiltrated by Communists wearing government
soldiers' fatigues; the well-armed assaulting forces ne rly captured
some of the wives of Vietnamese generals living there and the compound
repeated my daisy-chains of
was saved antyx only by American helicopter rocket attacks.
And the
modernistic & Vietnamese Presidential Palaco, dedicated only
three months ago, would have been atomized bo Communaues if the
Communist
driver of a truckload of explosives had not beon shot by a passing
police vehicle.
-more reuter
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strategy 4 (normass/deepe)
Transposing this into an American setting, it would be
an enemy forces'
roughly equivalent to failing by a hair to blow up the White House,
Rushing
saving the Pentagon by using in elite forces and rocketing with
f one's own friendly aircraft, high heaving fighting heavy fighting
at the military airport outside the city for days, and seeing
E half dozen sections of the eapftin capital in faimos flamos,
rocketing
either from enomy attacks or from the over-reaction of bombing with
Be
Periodicall
the Suburbs wor
The latest comparable event in American history
friendly airpower.
might be considered as the War of 1812 when the British forces razed
portions of the city and some government buildings.
more reuter
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strategy 5 (normass/deepe)
states,
With
If the cross-country blitz had bean launched In the United
the nation would look something like this:
Hue in Vietnam,
In Rants the old cultural center of Boston, comparable to
Sommerinzmin enemy regiments would have controlled
the heart of the city for several days.
An enemy flag would have flown
atop Independence Hall, Saxxx As the national guard and allies swo
swan warmed in to retrieve control, portions of the city would have been
bombed, including the historical buildings. A Harvard professor would
have sided with the enemy forces to set up a yet another front organization
Students, beatniks and the city's
for "democracy, nationalism and peace,"
poorer riffraff would have joined the enemy in "liberating" the city.
==more router
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strategy 6 (normass/deepe)
In the nation's second largest city of Chicago, like
Can Tho, the enemy forces would have seized control of the airport and
radio station; all the state's national guard would have been unable to
Propaganda sessions would have
bring the state under control for days.
been held in the Loop.
of the most prominent state capitals in
the wheat-bowl our surrounding Chincago would have come under
enemy bombardment or else enemy assault, siege or several day's rulo.
All airports in the area, including the x Strategio Air Command base
in Omaha, would have been immobilized by bombardment or sniper siege.
major
All roads and railroads between capital state capitals would have been out.
Several of the state cap capitals would have been devastated with
by flames, shot and shell and lay in ruins after days of frantic
fighting.
portions or all of
The three most significant border cities,
such as Seattle,
Portland and Gal Oakland would be completely destroyed after as many as
five days of fighting, comparable to Pleiku, Ban Me Thuot and Kontum
in the central highlands, In the x famous resort city of Colorado Springs,
comparable to Dalat, the athymnonim enemy would have xüsennupxinaxm
emerged from within the city, held the central marketplace and resort
hotels, bus station, airport terminal,
shot the state police commission and
two of his staff eating in a restaurant and executed the governor in his home.
SAQUAGE
Provisional companies of Air force academy cadets were formed to save the
city and Inter/reinforced
More Reuter
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strategy 7 (normass/deepe)
Many county beats would also be assaule assaulted, overrun and
held for hours. The isolated outposts of mix national guardsmen in
Topeka, Kansas, would be thinking, "If the enemy can assault the Pentagon,
they can certainly overrun these sandbangs surrounding me whenever he wants,
more reuter
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strategy Normass/doope)
The momentous impact of the Communist blitz into
Bu
Vietnamese cities and towns, and their continued, general offensive
nation-wide, has reverberated with these crucial military effects:
1. In glaring and sensational terms, raised the
specific question of the effectiveness of General William Westmoreland's
"forward strategy."
And in
2. In subdued, more nobuo nebulous terms, raised the
issue of how the war in Vietnam is being waged.
3. Graphically etched for the whole world to see the
effectiveness of Communist revolutionary warfare concepts frustrating,
if not momentarily defeating, the conventional might of the most
powerful nation in history.
==more reuter
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strategy 9 Normass/deope)
While the outside world is debating whether General
Westmoreland' s command had accurate and timely enough intelligence
int information about the attacks; whether he misjudged the tempo,
intensity and vast panoramo panorama of the of Communist offensive,
the heart of the debate here is whether the military command has
Ex ever understood the nature of the entire conflict.
Pockets of this eric criticism has existed in the American
community since the arrival of U. S. combat troops in 1965. Ruk These
critics consistently maintained a pessimistic view of the situation
because they were much more in stop with the reactions of thin
wide cross-sections of the Vietnamese population. These critics were
almost always hooted down. Some left Vietnam in frustration.
Some of those Americans spoke Vietnamese, or Oxenstickhamtonm had
lived in Vietnam for some time; some were members of off the official
#voices in the wilderness" since
or quasi-official establishments here, but they were never amalgamated
enough to
enough into one office or agency a to maintain
the bureaut bureaucratic institutions
tout enough in volue
== more retex.
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strategy 10 (normass/deepe)
The criticism of the official decisions has never yet taken
the form of the hawk va, dove debate in the United States. Most fr officials
and their orities agree that an American defeat in Vietnam, on the battlefield
or at the conference table, before China has developed her nuclear
umbrella would tend to catapult Asia into the Communist orbit. Hence,
all were hawks in one this sense, but there were various nuances of criticism
co the critics were politico-hawks, while the military command here were
conventional-power hawks. All agreed any solution to the problems of South
necessitated American military power, but the critics maintain
Vietnam
military power alone could not solve thom.
Their specific criticism has consistently been directed
at Westmoreland's "forward strategy," and the Communist blitz has
olimaxed their critic this minority view. The criticism was that
positioning American troops in the "forward" or border areas was ineffective,
if not disasterous. First, because, American EX battalions were
fighting simply the Communist main force units, rather than the whole
spectrum of Communist military organisation--guerrilla, regional forces
and main forces, Second, because the Vietnamese army was ineffective
in aning "scouring" the rear of the American operational bases, fixxx
This ineffectiveness resulted not only from mit lack of military discipline,
but also because of the rampant corruption of the Vietnamese officers and units.
#more router
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strategy 11 (normass/deepe)
Hence, while American troops had taken the offensive in
the jungles to secure the rear, the Vietnamese troops presumably
holding off the regional and local guerrillas irritated the Vietnamese
urban population by shakedowns, bribery, embezzlement, nepotism and
by getting rich on authorizing the mushroom of bars and brothels,
which seem immoral and un-Vietnamese on such a wide scale to the
townspeoples.
sense,
The Communist blits, hus has thus, in a conventional
outflanked the American troops maximxhomme along the borders
JEEP
with a lightning, and a gigantic maneuver into the an urban centers
in the rear. Also, the Communist strategy was to disperse their
forces in sizable blobs all over the count countryside and the towns,
easily squeezing through the massive concentrations of American forces.
more reuter
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strategy 12 (normass/deepe)
But, these criticism were much more substanti substantitive
The criticisms assumed
than simply the search-and-destroy operations.
a whole hooly wholly different set of premises and hypothesis from those
of Westmoreland, In simplies simplest terms, the Westmoreland strategy
assumed that Vietnam was a second Korea, Even the first day of the
1ighn lightning assaults into Saigon,
Westmoreland viewed the vlit blitz
as a diversion from the Demilitarized Zone,
which he termed is "another
Korea.
10
The anti-Westmoreland criticism maintained Vietnam was
a new kind of war which the United States must learn to mass master,
and that the heart of the conflict was the Vietnamese people-not theh
main force battalions of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese.
==more router
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strategy 13 (normass/deepe)
They believed the American public, intelligensia and military
could
leadership visuta visualized global or world wars of their past experience;
these wore essentially one-dimensional wars. But, b in the
command circles horo all have failed to grasp the totality of the war
within tiny Vietnam; this is essentially a two-dimensional war,
This second dimension--the heart of the war-is the Vietnamese people,
a fact the Communist recognized long ago by calling it a "people's war."
The people furnish the guerrillas with the food, intelligence information,
sampans, beds which enables the movement to gain momentum.
Their second criticism was that the over-riding official
American rationale for involvement in Vietnam is essentially to stop
the tide of Communist aggression, which is in the American self-interest.
This is viewed as essentially a defensive and negative strategic posture.
To project the idea of the Communists simply as the "badnicks" without
offering a visible alternative of why America is the "goodnick" is a
dismal advertisement for the hungry millions of the emerging nations.
Hence, America must be pro-something.
more router
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strategy 14 (normass/deepe).
Honce,
this line of reasoning maintained that the concentration
of American military power should have been used since 1965 as a
simply
also
means to defond-not thou urban centers--but the wide stretches of populated
rice paddy lands, particularly from Saigon north, in which the bulk of
people in the
the northern half of the countryside livod. Montagnards in the contral
highlands would have been regrouped into huge perimeters. One of the
sophisticates of this view adapted the electronic barrier of the "MoNamara
along the
Line" along the Domilitarized zone.
wackiest, yet most ingenuous proposals yet to come to Vietnam.
He viewed the barrier as one of the
To
him, it illustrated the proper equipment being strung out like Christmas
tree lights--but in the wrong place. By stretching it along the DMZ,
the militarily command is "detecting Communist infiltration but defending
only trees; it is not defending the Vietnamese people who are the
quni quintessence of the conflict.
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strategy 15 (normass/doope)
He advocated stringing McNamara's electronic barrior,
not along the DMZ, but between the foothille foof foothills and huge
rice paddy plains along the northern half of the country in order
to defend the populationl population. This would form an
impenetrable barrior, fortified with counter-artillery batteris
batteries, to seal out the Communist main force units,
of Americans have died fighting--but which did not secure the villagers
from the guerrillas units in the rear.
which thousands
Semehemme
walorming this
DEITIOF
In front of this barrior,
two-man American teams, equipped
ith highly sensitive, people-sniffing gear would become the geur guerrilla,
not to fight theeemmmun North Vietnamese regiments, but simply to sight
thom for air and artillery bombardments.
The ciri critics have
such as at
consistently maintained that outpost American outposts,
The sonh, were out-dated in ineffective--and were going to end up
as amerikmi a defeat for the Americans similar to the Dion Bien Phu
defect of the French 13 years 14 years ago.
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strategy 16 (normass/deepe)
Bohind this "made-in-America"
A
screen, aided by Vietnamese
counter-insurgency forces, a much six more dynamic approach
would be mado to allow positive programs to flourish; in short, the
critics wanted a much more integrated approach to the war, in which
politics, nationalism, economics as well as bombs and bullets were moving
in parallol.
They wanted to demonstratex American democracy, in
on the assumption
not in the strict form of elections, but in it's substance,
that illiterate peasants and wealthy Vietnamese war profitt profie
profiteers,
never having lived or seen democracy, didn't have the least
notion of what it was Washington said they were fighting for. They
wanted to open land development schemes--a sort of Vietnamese Homestead
Act-aix rather than building airbases. They wanted low-cost
housing units milk instead of milkinx plush military cantonments.
They wanted to change the economic nature of the society in closer to
that within America, with prof- profit-sharing schemes and rice cooperatives,
econono economically "a one percent minority no longer ruled a
mayouty
so that
99 per cent m
myfority
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strategy 17 (normass/deepe)
And, most important, they wanted a sharp crackdown on
corruption and lack of discipline in the Vietnamese government, which
is largely the Vietnamese armed forces, with the American military
advisors in the provinces counseling and urging the Vietnamese
officialdom not simply on the maneuver of local battalions, but also
on political honesty in dealing with the peasant population.
In short,
the critics wanted to meet the Communist
Whether it is too late to change the entire direction
rovolutionary challenge across the spectrum-militarily/// on their
of the war
terms, politically, economically and socially.
American officials horen have thus far ex
said the Communist blitz will not change the American strategy
to stop in line with the radical approach of the critics here. And,
even some of the critics, believe it may be too late to implement any
radical approach on a significant scale.
For,
now the Communists have double-tracked the war,
with
the "invasion" forces General Westmoreland fears already poso posi
poised along the demilitarized zone, and other foc forces outflanking
him into the cities. And the next step is predicted here to be
the people spectrum of the conflict--the popular uprising in the cities.
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strategy 18 (normass/deepe)
Honco, the Communist blitz has clearly demonstrated
revolutionary-styled
to nhamenninmamm the long-time orities here that the war in Vietnam
mm has frustrated, if not defeated, penndumombem in the first
round of dramatic, face-to-face contact countrywide contact, the
conventional forces and the conventional stingem Korean-styled strategy
of Gonoral Westmoreland. For the Allies are fighting a conventional-styled
war of annhiliation, in which the classical objective is to kill the
enemy and destroy his bases. The Communists, however, are fighting an
unconventional war of at attrib attrition, in heih which politics,
economics, propaganda, psychology and xenophobia as well as bullets
are inter-wovon to erode the Allies' will to resist.
In short,
the Communists and the Allies are fighting two
different wars. The & American command here has computerized the
minutae of their war of annhiliation without comprehending the critical
substance of the Communist war of attrition.
end router
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Date
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1968, Feb. 5
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tet Offensive, 1968; United States. Armed Forces
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B9, F14
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
