Second article about developments since the beginning of the Tet Offensive

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Title

Second article about developments since the beginning of the Tet Offensive

Description

Keever's title: "Allies Suffer Political Setback from Communist Blitz", Article draft about the effects of the Tet Offensive on the Allies, for the Christian Science Monitor

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

Transcript

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Page one-Deepe
(This is the second of a three-part series appraising
the many-spectrumed developments of the Communists' blitzkrieg
criss-crossing South Vietnam. This article assesset
assesses the initial
impact on the South Vietnamese government army and people).
SAIGON, February 4-The Communists' blitz war into
major BBBBBBBBBBBBBBBB cities, towns and military installations is
regarded here at this time as a political-psychological setback
of unpred unprecedented magnitude for the American-supported
South Vietnamese government.
The initial assessments of knarinngenham the political
dege by knowledgeable Vietnamese is that the political damage
is of such an order of magnitude that it has changed the entire complexion
and character of this many-faced war in the South.
The war in the South, formerly viewed mainly in terms of
Allied armies contesting Communist forces, has now been extended to the
which is now considered the heart of this war within
political arena,
a war. The Communist military rampage has definitely, in the eyes of
reliable Vietnamese sources, suf surfaced, accelerated and emphasized
the political character of this conflict as it never has been before--
and has opened the possibility it, rather than conventional military
power, may become the decisive dimension of the war.
Beverly Deepe: RCA Card no. 78903
Benn
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Page two--Deepe
The political damage is not yet considered * here to
match that of a full-scale, enmamma catastrophere, however,
and
with decisive leadership and swift action,
the Vietnamese government could
Mgainst at least cushion,
and possibly even reverse,
the initial trends,
American Embassy sources here believe.
The Communist military offensive is regarded here as
a crucial launching pad for a prolonged, slow-motion attack designed
to destroy the constitutional government of President Nguyen Van Thieu-
to which the American government is so heavily committed. Clearly,
if the Thieu government is destroyed, the American government would
be considered on the verge of a politico-military defeat, observers
here believe, or else would be forced to negotiate on Communist
a face-
saving
which would include an ungracious exit of American troops and
political power
terms,
Beverly Deepe; RCA Card no. 78903
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Deepe-page three
the Communist blitz Wo Seems to Have dropp
The political an administration and military
the Vietnamese government
control would
od to its all-time
low. Even during the previous rock-bottom low of late 1964 and early
1965, before American troops were committed, the Viet Cong did not
attempt to launch major attacks into the cities..
Chronologically, the all-time high of prestig
a political-It military prestige and presence was in late 1962
when the government of President Ngo Dinh Diem considered 8000 of the 1
12,000 hamlets in the contr country pacified.
After Diem's overthrow
in 1963, the Communists rolled back the government authority towards
the cities and by the time American troops arrived in 1965 they had
encircled the cities up in virtually up to the city limits.
rather
"Now with this onslaught, the Communists have moved into
the cities--and they have encircled the cities from the suburbs,
than the countryside," one
operating with snipers in the cities. They are applying their teeth
one reliable source explained.
"And they
are still
of the comb tactic in the cities as they successfully did in the countryside.
This means they are inter-locked, and
government controlled zones."
And
interspersed in thee gon
form
Beverly Deepe; RCA Card no. 78903
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Page four-Deepe
The blitz war marked the beginning, militarilyk
militarily, of the "general offensive" in Viet Cong parlance or
of the "counter-offensive"
in Mao Tse Tung guerrilla warfare
terminology, by carrying armed attacks from the top of the republic
to its southernmost tip and, sideways, from the countryside into the
cities.
But,
the parallel chain reaction to this blitz is
considered by Vietnamese sources here to launch, politically, the
beginning of the
"general
uprising."
This
means to Vietnamese
sources the Vietnamese population overthrowing the current anti-Communist
elected President and entire governmental apparatus in a manner described
by Western-educated Vietnamese as reminescent of the bloodbath of the
French Revolution of 1789.
Beverly Deepe; RCA Card no. 78903
Bendy poepe
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While the American officialdom here has publicly said the
Communists have failed to receive the support of the Vietnamese people
in order to launch their "general uprising," (xxxxxim
knowledgeable Vietnamese sources see the blitz as only the beginning
(ital) of several phases leading to the climax of an all-out popular
insurrection.
15,000
And claims made by the American command here that more than
12,000 Communists have been killed has initially brought little consolation
who simply looked out their balconies to see a
to the Saigonese,
Vietnamese military compound in the city in fx flames,
Vietnamese
and head the C heard the
skyraiders rocketing a Buddhist pagoda,
Communist machinegun fire pasting a police precinct in the city limits
where seven Vietnamese government policemen were besieged by the Viet
Cong and attempts by the Vietnamese airborne to rescue them failed.
Even five days after D-Day, sizeable Vmhm Communist
elements are known to swirl around the environs of the Vietnamese
high military command,
American airstrikes are still being launched
me on the outskirts of Tan Son Nhut, the district tommofimfhumm capital
of Thu Duo, a satellite city of Saigon, was under "heavy attack"
and all major roads and bridges leading to the city are cut or under
sniper, if not platoon, siege.
Beverly Deepe; RCA Card no. 78903
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D
Page six-Deepe
In many ways, the Vietnamese people sat on the sidelines
as spectators during the blitz, except where ground fighting zm and
aerial rocket bombardments forced them to evacuate by the undre hundreds.
Most
Saigonese outside the battle zones remained at home,
Other Vitaminim
to celebrate Tet with their families; all shops, theatres and government
offices were closed THX for these holidays, and later the curfew
extended the time in which each family was bottled up at home. fitam
Once the Saigonese begin circulating in the city and talking with each
More Severe &
other, the impact of the events will probably be both heavier but also
Beverly Deepe/ RCA card no. 78903
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Page seven--Deepe
The most serious impact of the Communist blitz is
government and armed forces circles;
expected to come inmham within the
the blitz hit the government's administration and military chain of
command from its highest level to kax its lowest.
At the Saig
central central government level, the attacks on the Presidential
Palace and the Vietnamese High Command, while of little military
significant, were symbolic in nature and hgih high-impact in
psychological value. Next down the ladder adminstrative ladder, at the
regional level, all four of the corps headquarters towns were hig hit
in one form or another:
nd Can Tho.
Danang Pleiku, Bien Hoa
at the provincial level, 27 out of 45 provinces have been either
assaulted, under siege or mortared.
Next
Seven Several such as Ben Tre in
Kien Hoa province and My Tho in Du Dinh Tuong and Kontum in Kmx the
province of the same name and Ban Me Thuot in Darlac have suffered
considerable destruction.
Beverly Deepe; RCA card no. 78903
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Page eight-Deepe
Below that, the effects of the war on all 250 districts
Hmerican OR VIETNAMESE
has yet to be ascertained even by the officialdom.
this time ha
An American Mission spokesman said the American Embassy at
no count of the number of Vietnamese government officials,
province chiefs and districts chiefs that have been killed or wounded-nor
any order of the magnitude of these losses. He also said there is no
official American assessment of how the onslaught through the cities has
Vietnamese sources note a
affected the village pacific tion program.
concerted Communist effort to subvert the government apparatus and troops.
"The Hanoi and Liberation Front broadcasts consistently
government retroops, police and admnsorst civil servants to
Woo E
side with them," one informed
officine explained. "They say time is
running out for these people that have supported the government and the
in the PAS
Americans. They are telling
Hanoi is telling them they have to make
a decision--to be with the Americans or be with the people, and if they
stick to the Americans they'll be destroyed by the people. I the radio
emphasizes you have a weapon in your hand--point tax it to th at the
Americans instead of your own people."
While the Communist radio broadcasts claim government
there
will never
police and troops have supported them against the Americans,
is no official (confirmation of this--and perhaps in the facts,
be adequately sorted out. For, some of the Viet Cong were dressed in
government uniforms as a ruse to enter installations;
some of the
cluding.
Communist dead carried as many as five national identity cards,
and some security
all Torged
national security passes that may have been forged.
R
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Page nine-Deepe
Captured Communist doctumon documents indicate the Communists
still consider the Vietnamese apparatus, rather than Americans, as their
prime target, on the assumption the Vietnamese government is simply a
"leaning point" for the entire American political positions if the
Vietnamese government administration and army is subverted,
them or neutralized,
the American
prooed over to
Americans will be politically and
militarily isolated in the country.
027155
On February 1st, the Viet Cong military command made a
special appeal for government troops to desert defect to the newly-formed
Revolutionary Armed Forces Command, urging them to help the Viet Cong
attack, destroy and pursue the American and "puppet" forces and to
help capture "all enemy agents left behind."
"The Communists are ty trying to uproot the government fabric
at all levels-- local, regional and central government," one informed source
explained. "They areal calling the people to revolt to topple the Thieu
government and if it is not toppled, it will exist only as a corpse
without a spirit
"Phase one of this political upsurge is to soak all the
areas under government control and to make malleable all those who still
trust and hope in the Americans and the Vietnamese government.
They want
to destroy the government administration and military chain of comm nd.
"Do you think a little outpost of militiamen or even a
revolutionary development team in a pacified area are going to feel secure
when the Communists can seize a part of the Vietnamese high command and
hold out for six hours next door to the In
COMMUNISTS
this
up presidential Palace?
Softening
up
After
they have finished that, /they will organize the masses in the city."
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Communists
SIDE
"While they are operating so close to the cities and in them,
then the countryside is at tummy their mercy and they have freedom
of movement anywhere in the provinces. Now they are uprooting s many
government outposts and police stations hugging the cities--then they
will organize the masses there and set up their own administration.
OR Hrother
Then, they will laten launch Phase 2--another punch of a th
major, spectacular thrust into the cities, and then they will move
der deeper into them and stay longer."
Beverly Deepe; RCA card no. 78903
Bene
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Page eleven--Deepe
the CommisT BL, 12 HAS R
D
the high-octane emotional arguments among the population,
but on balance, more
Some o
include
hich favor the Thieu government,
working against him.
The first issue working in hi
to Thieu's advantage
at this time involves the high proportion of North Vietnamese Army
forces in assaulting Saigon. Traditionally, the Southern-born
Vietnamese regard the Northerners as "foreigners," and this could
strengthen the for of a Northern-mmmmmm domination of any
future government.
However, the Communists are quickly neutralizing
this issue with powerful propaganda doese doses of Vietnamese nationalism
and anti-Americanism.
Beverly Deepe/ RCA card no, 78903
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Page twelve--Teepe
The second issue working for Thieu involves the Communists
launching such a massive onslaught during the Tet truce period which
they themselves had promised. This argument now appe ra to carry
much more freight in American circles here--and internationally-but it's
imp ot de diminishing quickly among the Vietnamese population subjected
to Hanoi propaganda.
The third issue work helping the Allied side is the
official claims of a significant military victory. Among some
circles here the official casualty losses to the Communists are
considered exaggerated. But, to most Vietnamese many Vietnamese sources,
even if true, the hun axix devastation of such wide portions of a number
of oitles
mmmmar is considered to be too high s prios,
The other arguments at this time would seem to favor
the Communist side, but are considered reversible by the Thicu
One is the impact of the civilian casualty losses,
officially, predicted to be high.
government.
which are,
An American spokesman
said there is no current estimate of these casula casualties, but many
Hospitals are known to be
filled with the wound od and reliable reports indicate the morgue is
sections of the city are known to be high.
refusing to take any more of the cond.
In the provinces the
figures would reflect three or four days of continuous, heavy contact
between the two armies.
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Page thirteen-Deepe
CASUA
Associated with this x emotional issue is the
BACKLASH
effects of the Allied airplane and helicopter rocket attacks into
some of the populated sections of the city. Several square blocks
officially called the Communist
eround the An Quang pu pagoda,
headquarters for the assault,
skeletons of homes;
hammmhmmm are now but the charred
sections of around the Tan Son Nhut airport were
rocketed by scores of American hero helicopters. PREVIOUSLY,
The net impact would seem to strongthen in domr dormant
RS APPEARS
or unexpressed anti-war sentiment rising in Vietnam, which would scen
to be the importance of the Communists/setting up another front
organization in Saigon and one in Hu Hue. The one in Saigon is
called "All the forces for Nationalism, Democracy and Peace." In
Hue,
the front is called the front coalition for Nationalism, Democracy
and Peace." The identity of the leader in Hue is reported by Liberation
Radio to be Professor Le Van Hao. American Mission psoko spokesmen
He SA
spokesman said they see "no evidence"
organization.
there
of any shape or form to the
t
However, in captured documents, the Communists
have long maintained their "revolution" can succeed in only with
the participation of
the intellectuals and middle-class elements
Thi These front organizations--a Ix To Iront
in the urban centers.
for the National Liberation Front itself-would presumably attempt to capture
the support of non-Communista elite.
kes.
Beverly
res card no. 78903
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The initial impact of the Communist blitz was to spread
a blanket of terror and fright countrywide among both the
Victimese population and government employees.
This reaction was summed up by one anti-Communist
Catholic who said: "At first everyone in Saigon thought it was another
coup d'etat with Ky (Vice President Nguyen Cao Ky) trying to
overthrow Thieu (the President).
"Then the population realized it was the Communists.
The
typical reaction among the working class people was the V. C. are much
stronger than we thought'. And the typical reaction of the upper class
people was this government (of President Thieu) is incapable of
protecting us xxx anymore'."
30003
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Page fifteen--deepe
A Vietnamese-speaking American, living with a Vietnamese
shopkeeper family, explained: "My Vietnamese friends are terrified
and think the government is weak and incapable. And the longer the
Viet Cong stay in the city, the more frightened they become."
Beverly Deepe/ RCA card no. 78903
Bender Preſ
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Page sixteen--Deepe
anti-Communist
Upper-class Vietnamese were especially terrified of
developments. One Vietnamese lawyer personally acted as his own doorkeeper
OVE
to be sure the grilled gate leading to his home was constantly locked.
A Vietnamese lawyer, who had studied in the United States, talked during
the fix first day of attacks of where he should te his family if they need
evacuate Saigon; two days later, as rumors of a coalition government
swirled through the city, he wondered where he could go to a flee
Vietnam.
B
на
Beverly Deepe roa card no. 78903
Beverly Deepe; RCA card no. 78903
16
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Prelimary reports filtering in from the suburbs and fringes
of Saigon jettisoned far over the American-termed credibility gap into
a realm of macabre incredibility.
One housewife in a Saigon suburb told of hearing a noise
in her kitchen during the night, and thinking it was rats, she investigatd
only to see a Viet Cong sitting in a tunnel that exited in front of
her kitchen stove.
Another housewife told her neighbors of her fright when
the Viet Cong first entered her suburban a quarter. "But, the
Viet Cong reassured me, they wouldn't come into my house," she muttered
in sobs to her neighbor.
"They went into my front yard--and then an
American helicopter started firing into my house and killed three
of my children."
Beng
Beverly deepe/ roa card no. 78903
Beverly Deepe; RCA card no. 78903
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Page
eighteen-Deepe
One Vietnamesein intellectual told of returning to his
suburban home to retrieve his television set, which he forgot when
he evacuated--only to find two Viet Cong guerrillas in foxholes by his
front door. Beside them lay two dead a black-jajamaed Viet Cong with
bandeliers of anti-aircraft ammunition around their chests. (The guerrillas
told the intellectual to be quick in guix recovering his television
set).
Beverly doepe roa card no. 78903
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Page nineteen-Deepe
In the Chinese twin-city of Cholon, one woman told friends
of her watering her new year's chrysanthemums on her front balconey--only
to peer over and see Viet Cong guerrillas drinking coffee in the cafe
below. The guerrillas had stacked their arms in front of the open-air shop.
In saigon, a Vietnamese government employee at the
Bregmann Ministry of Defense recalled to a friend he was eating breakfast
in a cafe with a dozen Vietnamese soldiers.
"I felt a tap on my shoulder and thought it was a friend,"
he said. "I looked up and there were six Viet Cong who held up a
banner and started to give us all a propaganda lecture. None of the
government soldiers moved.
Fortunately, a police wagon approached with
a siren and the guerrillas loft. "
Beverly Deepe- CA card no. 78903
Banch
terex to 94521 Alphomega Boston
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Page twenty--Deepe
From the provinces,
FIRST PERSON
the fragmentary, il reports are
even more unreal. In the rest resort city of Nha Trang, American sources
reported the Communists infiltrated the provincial headquarters wearing
and killed the Vietnamese and
Vietnamese government army uniforms
American night duty officers before anyone knew what had happened.
American planes later rocketed the government headquarters to shambles.
ENTERED
In a large Allied compound there, the Communists ented the house of a
Korean general--presumably through the sewer--and were latter decid
decimated by Korean troops. The general was reportedly uninjured,
Held
bands of Viet Cong hold a nearby house for twelve hours.
but
The province chief there was reporged reportedly startled to
find the Communists in his private home, dived into a bunker, held
them off for avahile and then escaped.
Also, American sources reported the Viet Cong in Nhatrang
fired indiscrimately at both the civilian population and military personnel-
the whole division-headquartes
"at anything that moved," and in Ban Me Thuot,
headquarters city was reported engulfed in flames,
with hundreds of
civilian population "decimated" by both Communist firing and
Allied #
airpower.
Добро
W
94521
Alphomega Bostor
Beverly Deepe/ rca card no. 78903
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Page twenty one--Deepe
On the psychological and propaganda side during at least
the first 72 hours, the Communists seemed tem have scored a decisive
victory by being about much more efficient in informing the Vien Vietnamese
THE NEWS
of
population Part of this was by default--all the Vietnamese newspapers
Zu Tuyen"
were closed because of Tet, except for the Vietnamese military paper "Tien
which began pus publishing a one-per pager the XX Dp
D-Day plus 1. Part of this was by design-government radio stations were
Communis
a specific target of their military attacks; the Saigon radio station
was knocked out during the first day of attacks with Vietnamese troopers
chasing the Viet Cong up the stairs, killing each other inside the building.
"95 "ninety five per cent of my equipment is damaged and the building
is in shambles," one Vietnamese officer at the station told this
correspondent.
"We're just lucky the Viet Cong didn't figure out how to
use our frequency." The Saigon radio broadcasts were later transmitted
from a station outside the city, the coverage of developments was limited.
The American military station also gave limited news coverage of events!
the station for American servicement, but listened to by many Vietnamese,
gave their regular five-minutes on the hour of news, with 15-minute
Pe
newscasts at 7 a.m. and 10 x p.m.--but much of this was limited to
Eventso
non-Vietnam co
Ben
E
Beverly Deeperea card no. 78903
Beverly Deepe; RCA card no. 78903
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Page twenty two--Deepe
Hence, meny Vietnamese learned of devel military
attacks in the provinces through Radio Henoi or Liberation Radio of
the Viet Cong, which presumably had tapped the redio transmissions of
Western press dispatches. Sophisticated Vietnamese also constantly
switched to short-wave stations--VOA, BBC, Cambodian radio and
a otsmine French station in Brazaville A
More significent, however, was the face-to-face
messages emite emitted by roving Viet Cong propagande teams,
had well-tailored speeches to make.
which
The Their first wave of
propaganda neutralized! the attack during the top Tet holidays-
A
which is somewhat comparable to a hurricane hitting Miami during
Christmas.
"And
"The Vietcong said the Americans and Thiou don't
respect the Vietnamese tradition of Tet, which Vietnam has enjoyed
for thousands of years," one anti-Communist source reported.
they said they had to attack /during the holidays because the
Americans and saigon cancelled their truce. Frankly, I think
they scored better with the Vietnamese people using that argument
then Saigon did by saying they broke it. (The Allied side
cam cancelled their a 36-hour unilateral truce after 21 hours
hed passed because of hard intelligence of Xe Communist offensive--
but an offensive they expected only in the demilitarized zone area,
rather than an in the urban centers).
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Page twenty-three-Deepe
Their second powerful argument in their propaganda
barrage portrayed the American officialdom as insive end confused,
which was apparently designed to suggest Washington was withdrawing
its support from Thieu. This argument was embroidered and transmitted
to other Vietnamese by pro-Buddhist, anti-American nationalists who
expressed the view the Americans had deliberately allowed the Communists
into the city as a means to force the Thieu government to negotiate
Other Vietnanese added fuel to the firex
Commandos
with the Communists.
PROPAGANDA
fire flames by saying the Viet Cong/had actually
gotten inside the American Embassy) read secret cables--
and hence were better informed about American policy id
than the Vietnamese government. This propaganda wiped swirled around
Saigon with enough intensity and volume that even close associates of
Ranking
Vienam eding government officials inquired whether the
Americans would really fight for Saigon
and Ambassador Ellsworth
Bunker took the unusual step to deny this on both American and
Vietnamese television.
D
Beverly Beepes RCA Card no. 78903
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on January 30,
Page twenty-four-peepe
During the hectic hours of the first day of attacks
one Vietnamese rushed up to another on a street
in Saigon and explained, "I just saw a well-informed friend who
said the Americans cooked the whole affair andt let the Viet Cong
into the city so they could set up a coalition government."
The other Vietnamese laughed. "The only trouble
with that argument," he sia said, "is the Americans are in this stew
too.
xx End Reuter
Beverly Deepe; RCA Card no. 78903

Date

1968, Feb. 4

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tet Offensive, 1968; Strategy; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B9, F13

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English