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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06214 to 363-06217.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06214 to 363-06217
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Title
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Article about the defensive posture of South Vietnam, pages 1-2
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Description
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Original title: "situationer", Article draft about the South Vietnamese situation following the Tet Offensive, for the Christian Science Monitor, pages 1-2
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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ZCZC sag
Jy 1jp
situationer 1 normass/john hughes
saigon, february 15 - south vietnam is waiting for the other communist shoe to
drop.
following the surprise tet offensive by the viet cong and north
vietnamese, the posture of the allies is a defensive one. though south
vietnamese and american troops are trying to winkle out stubborn communist
units in hue and the cholon quarter of saigon, no major offensive sweeps
are under way, or apparently in early prospect.
for the moment, at any rate, the initiative appears to lie with the
communists. the allies are waiting to see where and when the communists
will strike next. and there is not x repeat not a little puzzlement
in saigon as to why the communists have not repeat not yet moved.
in the american military command, the view is predominant that the
lonely marine base at khe sanh is to bear the brunt of an assault by the
three north vietnamese divisions which intelligence sources say are poised
around it.
more
ZC2C sag
yy 1jp
situationer 2 normass/john hughes
just why the base has not yet been hit by a fullscale ansault, nobody is
sure. the area around it, in which the communist troops are believed to be
concentrated, is being kit plastered daily by american b-52 bombers. military
men hazard the guess that the bombing may have set the communist timetable back.
if,
for instance, a divisional commander has been killed in one of those
raids, or a major ammunition dump destroyed, then the north vietnamese might
need time to recoup.
other observers speculate that the communists' next move will not repeat
not be an attack on the sanh, but a second assault wave against south vietnam's
towns and cities, especially saigon. from interrogation reports mr of captured
prisoners and intelligence sources it certainly does appear that the enemy
has forces in reserve sufficient to launch such an attack. deployed around
saigon, for instance, are units which have not repeat not yet been committed
to the current offensive.
more
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ZCZC sag
yy 1jp
situationer 3 normass/john hughes
but as each day passes without such a second wave, it seems to grow
less likely. to be most effective, it should logically have been unleashed
soon after the first, thus capitalising on the confusion and shock caused
by the first series of raids.
then again, there is one school which fears a communist strike neither
against khe sanh zor saigon, but in the highlands where american forces
are particularly vulnerable. some observers have long suspected the
communists are tempted to seize kantшxx a town like kontum. there has
been vicious fighting in the past at nearby dak to. intelligence sources
place the first north vietnamese division, of about seven battalions,
in the area and concede it poses a "strong threat."
many experts are convinced that the whole muthlessly brillianix ruthless
and meticulously coordinated communist tet offensive bears the distinctive
stamp of north vietnam's general vo nguyen giap.
ZCZC sag
more
yy 1jp
situationer 4
normass/john hughes
if this be true, then it is difficult to believe that the attack on
south vietnam's towns was a maskoizaffairgx one-shot affair. it must be
viewed as but one phase in the whole communist winter-spring offensive.
if this, in turn, be true, then clearly more is planned to come.
but it is possible that giap is having to amend or re-schedule his
plans in the wake of his tet attacks. for though there were undoubtedly
gains for theex communists, there were also xezinsziassesxx heavy losses.
the attacks made a tremendous impact on world opinion. they destroyed the
credibility of much optimistic official reporting on the war in washington.
they shook the confidence of many city-dwellers in south vietnam in their
government's ability to protect them. they have undoubtedly set back the
pacification program, which is likely to be further slowed as resources
in the countryside re diverted towards reconstruction in the towns.
more
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ZCZC sag
Jy 1 jp
situationer #5 normass/john hughes
yet some observers believe the viet cong and north vietnamese failed
to fulfill their real objectives. this, of course, is the line of the
official american establishment which, in its analysis of the offensive, is
setting communist objectives high in order to underline the distance by which
the communists failed to reach them.
but eschewing the compax "company line," there are some grounds for
belief that the communists had higher expectations than have been realized.
the viet cong attack order clearly set the neutralization of south vietnam's
army as one of the offensive's goals. the organizers of the offensive had
apparently been led to believe that the south vietnamese army would not repeat
not fight, would be demoralized by the attacks, and that substantial portions
of it might rally to the communists. it is possible that hanoi read too
much into anti-american sentiment which has been mounting in south vietnam
in recent months.
more
ZCZC sag
Jy 1jp
situationer 6 normass/john hughes
this anti-americanism is certainly a fact. but it was not enough to
subvert the south vietnamese army.
many units in that army had been given leave for tet in spite of
recommendations to the contrary by the american military command. in the
delta, for instance, the south vietnamiese 7th, 9th and 21st divisions were
all at around half-strength. normal combat strength of battalions in thesex
divisions is about 450 men. but on the night of the offensive, battalions in
the 7th division stood at an average of 200 men apiece, battalions in the
9th division at 300 men, and battalions in the 21st division at 250 men.
notwithstanding this, soldiers who were at their posts fought well.
american military men at various levels and in various parts of the country
confirm this.
more
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ZCZC sag
yy 1jp
situationer 7 normass/john hughes
american military authorities say they have no evidence of any unit
defections in the south vietnamese army, nor of any major unit being overrun.
the commanders of two divisions, the 22nd and 23rd, had in fact taken
seriously the warnings of impending trouble. they canceled leave and deployed
their forces and their men took heavy toll of the viet cong attackers.
the communists also appear to have miscalculated the extent to which
eivilians would support them in cities like saigon. there was no
popular uprising. there was undoubtedly submission, but most of this
seems to have been in a passive rather than active sense. ninety per cent
of prisoners interrogated so far say they received no aid from the public.
only 2 per cent say they received unsolicited assistance.
more
ZCZO sag
Jy 1jp
situationer 8 normass/john hughes
another factor which the communist strategists must now be pondering
is their own heavy losses. american military sources claim some 30,000
viet cong and north vietnamese killed in the fighting. objective observers
consider this figure inflated. but even if 15,000 were killed out of the 60,000
troops the communists are believed to have used in the campaign, this would
still hit them hard.
some of these losses may have been recouped through the freeing of vict
cong prisoners in south vietnamese gaols. two thousand prisoners were released
in hue, some observers say the total throughout the country could run as high
as 6,000. not all of these, of course, would be viet cong troops or agents,
but many undoubtedly have gone to ground with the viet cong.
also lost to the viet cong are many key agents and cadres who have been
infiltrated into cities like saigon over a period of years, but who now have been
rooted out and killed. endit hughes.
reuter
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Date
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1968, Feb. 15
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Tet Offensive, 1968; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B11, F4
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
