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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04904 to 363-04917.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04904 to 363-04917
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Title
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Second article about military developments in South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "war", Keever's Title: "U.S. Combat Units Shift from Search-and-Destroy Sweeps to Clear-and-Hold to Snare Guerillas", Article draft about new counter-gureilla tactics, for the Christian Science Monitor, page 1-14
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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20 20 sag
Jy nnm
war 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the last of a two-part series on military developments in
South Vietnam as the new peace talks are scheduled to begin in Paris).
SAIGON, DECEMBER 3-The large and small-unit military war continues
to churn steadily in favor of the Allies here.
Just how long it will continue to do so before the Communist side
attempts to counter, or reverse, this trend is a matter of speculation here.
as the new expanded peace talks open in Paris in the near
future,
Certainly,
an intensification of violence across the board is expected here.
== more reuter
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- Page 2
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zozo sag
Jy nnm
war 2 (normass/deepe)
Just what form the increased violence may take is currently unknown?
Communist-initiated activity is currently expected to range,
however,
at the most violent end of the spectrum, to a Tet-styled, cross-country
fourth offensive-which is predicted by American military officials--to a
lesser form of multi-pronged ground attacks designed to overrun isolated
provincial and district capitals, to spectacular, but stratog
politically spectacular, but strategically indecisive big-unit pitched
battles. Others predict a sort of low-grade guerrilla warfare of suicide
attacks and sniper terrorism in the major Vietnamese cities, or a
dramatic upsurge in politica Communist political and economic/warfare
initiatives.
SUBVERS VE
==more reuter
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zcze sag
yy nnm
war 3 (normass/deepe)
The Allied commands here are confident that they can, at the least,
smash any Communist big-unit offensive, if not repeat not pre-empt it
from even unrolling. Some senior Vietnama Vietnamese officers are indeed
hopeful that the Communists do attempt another systemmatic offensive-and
they are confident the Allies will inflict such heavy casualties
that the Communist bargaining position will be substantially weakened
at the conference table in Paris.
==more reuter
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- Page 4
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zozo sag
Jy nnm
war 4 (normass/deepe)
Most informed assessments here give the Communists the military
capa b capability of launching only one more cross-country,
Tet-styled
massive offensive in the next year-and the Allies are considered in a
FAR
farbe better military posture to prevent much of the all-round success
the Communists accrued derived t from their Tet bli blitz.
==more reuter
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- Page 5
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zcze sag
yy nnm
war 5 (normass/deepe)
One informed source explained the future battlefield-conference
table relationship this way:
"Unless (President Lyndon B. Johnson tries something dramatic at
Paris, which is possible, but not probably nothing significant can be
expected at the conference table before January 20th (the inauguration of
Richard M. Nixon into the White House). It is important to both Saigon
and Washington to go into the next phase of the Paris talks with an
administration that will have to live with a Vietnam solution for the next
four years-rather than an administration that does not repeat not have to
suffer the consequences of a Vietnam solution for more than two months.
==more reuter
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ze zo sag
Jy nnm
war 6 (normass/deepe)
"Then after January 20thm 20th, what will happen is something not
the talks will drag on and on, maybe at
repeat not happening. That is,
a lower level, for months and months.
"Hanoi's military position will go from bad to worse--and they will have
The thing is now we (the Allies)
to pull the fade-out technique.
to
are winning on the battlefield--and Hanoi will not repeat not allow itself to
be defeated in negotiations. Obviously Hanoi will negotiate to win--not
repeat not to lose. Im And, the damm heart of what Hanoi
wants to win is a coalition government in the South with Communist
dominance and this Saigon is not repeat not going to give them at the
on conference table nor can they win it now by fighting.
Hence,
if Hanoi
can not negotiate to win, it will not repeat not seriously negotiate. It
will filibuster.
If Hanoi can not repeat not negotiate,
repeat not win on the battlefield,
and it can not
SADRAWAY
to
the only thing left is to remove itself
from the battlefield, lick its wounds and life to fight another day."
==more reuter
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- Page 7
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zcze sag
yy nnm
war 7 (normass/deepe)
9
it must be viewed on
At this moment, the military war in the South has a strategic
split-level characteristic about it, and hence,
mos
two-organizational planes-big-unit and small-unit wars.
In t
In the big-unit war, the Allies have since Tet evolved into a posture
of the strategic defensive--a very active defensive generally designed to
protect the huge perimeters of South Vietnamese populatQUE, CONVERtionFlye
is often called clear-and-hold,
as distinct from the gym search-and-
_ destroy strategy of a year ago this time.
==more reuter
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zo zo sag
yy nnm
war 8 (normass/deepe)
Throughout 1968, the Communist big-unit formations have been on
the strategic it offensive in late January, durin during Tet in late January,
in May-and to a far lesser degree-in August, but, in the eyes of
Military
ican specialists, because the Communists failed in these offensives,
they have now been forced to assumed the posture of a strategic retreat.
More than 50 of their main-force battalions are now pulled out of South
and other
Vietnam into safe-haven sanctuaries across the borders,
big-unit formations in remaining in the South are eva largely evading
their
contact, and some of the lage to local-force units have been atomized
into squads or smaller
groups.
==more reuter
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- Page 9
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2020 sag
yy nnm
war 9 (normass/deepe)
Now, the question in military circles, is whether or not these
Communist mein force units will again swing into a dramatic offensive,
particularly in the o greater Saigon area, for these officers,
including Cheral Creighton Abrams, reason that ultimately and finally,
the Communists, if they are to succeed, must so militarily disrupt the
capital that they can accompl achieve their long-term objective of
sparking the downfall of the elected South Vietnamese government.
If they should succeed in this this--which is currently assessed to be
highly unlikely then the next step for them would be a coalitiong
government with Communist domination. And, the Paris peace table would
then simply formalize and ratify this process which is what the
Communists refer to th as their "complete victory."
==more reuter
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2020 sag
yy nnm
war 10 (normass/deepe)
While some Western specialists are beginning to espouse the view that
the Communists will eventually just fade-out, with or without another
some indication for this in public
Communist pronouncements. In mid-September,
R
offensive thrust, these is also
Radio Hanoi broadcast
In it,
a lengthy and highly significant report by Truong Chinh, the a
third-ranking member of the Communist Party Politburo in the North.
he talked of reverting to "protracted war" until political, diplomatic
and military preparations can ensure a successful general offensive and
revolt in the South. "...We must attack the enemy with determination
to fight and win," Radiomfamim Truong Chinh said ± in the broadcast
under certain circumstances,
report.
defensive to gain time,
"But at times,
we must shift to the
dishearten the enemy and build up our forces
for a new offensive."
==more reuter
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zo zo sag
yy nnm
war 11 (normass/deepe)
At the small-unit level--the Communist guerrilla warfare and
Most
infrastructure level--the Allies have made the spectacular attempts to
fight the war non-conventionally, although x any assessment of their
over all success is difficult to measure, even for American officials
in the provinces.
Compared to a year ago, however, there has been a visible and
dramatic change of attitude in field commanders in the use of American
tactical units to fight the war. A year ago,
when the Communists were
largely on the strategic defensive, American battalions and regiments
scoured remote jungle Communist base areas without much success in finding
the ous their elusive enemy. Now, however, General Abrams uses massive
firepower of B-52 raids and a concentrations of artillery to batter
consistently these base areas and uses his combat line units to secure
populated areas,
including WEEDING OUT COMMUNIST
guerrillas HND political
cadre.
more reuter
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- Page 12
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zcze sag
yy nnm
war 12 (normass/deepe)
A year ago, American field commanders launched mainly, if not solely,
conventional-styled big-unit operations, occasionally even of multi-division
strength. Now, nearly all American unit commanders talk of "catching the
guerrillas. One guerrilla out of action is more important than killing
five NVS NVA (North Vietnamese Army). It's the tax collectors, guerrillas,
porters and local agents that makes the NVA invasion possible."
Even for American Marine Regiments,
conventionalized portion of the Vietnam war,
once engaged in the most
it was not repeat not
uncommon to pull companies down from the tum demilitarized zone
and place them into a village cordon to wedd out the local Viet Cong
guerrillas and political cadre.
==more reuter
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- Page 13
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zozo sag
Jy nnm
war 13 (normass/deepe)
One American staff officer, who had just relinquished his position
as a battalion commander outside of Saigon, expressed the changing
attitude and tactical deployment of American units--which have resulting
to the currentRa
root resulted in a whole new tone during this period of the war.
"I'll tell you what I was going to do with my battalion,
He said:
since I'm
no longer commander and the new commander will do things differently.
.
unit had been hopping all over the Cambodian border area,
Then,
Our
sometimes
spending only one or two nights in one base area.
we got orders
go to
to this little speck of a village in Hau Nghia province. We were to stay
there at least three months--just to help get the pacification program
Away WAS
going. Three villages over is another clean, pretty little town that we
ca 11 Dodge City--the Viet Cong own it, and everytime we went in there
they'd come tumbling out of hotels and end cafes to fight us.
fight every time we went in there and it is still not ours.
fighti
We had a
==more reuter
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- Page 14
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ZCZC sag
yy nnm
war 14 (normass/deepe)
though
"Basically,
to the longer we sit in an area,
the more the people
get to know us and then they start talking. What we try to do is to get
a breakthro breakthrough. Now, the breakthrough is simply getting one
guerrilla or member of the Viet Cong x infrastructure.
Then, he takes
yet to the weapons caches and tells us who just a couple of his buddies
were. Those two or three Viet Cong take us to their buddies. Then, things
start rolling and pretty soon you have captured or killed = the Viet Cong
honchos that set up the caches and provided the intelligence whenever the
big units came through the area. Once you get the breakthrough with the
first couple of Vi V. C., then the main-force is isolated the if it does
come pass through. It is difficult to get the breakthrough,
units are finding it slowly and surely throughout the country.
what the war is all about these days."
Whether this
but American
That's
the decisive breakthrough will be twoerde
towards victory will be made in the little Vietnamese villages before the
or after the break through towards peace if at the conference table will remain
AND CAUCA
a tantalizing/question of the future.
== END Ratx.
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Date
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1968, Dec. 3
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Subject
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Guerilla Warfare; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Tactics; United States. Army
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F39
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
