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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04429 to 363-04439.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04429 to 363-04439
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Title
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Article about rocket attacks in Saigon
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Description
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Original title: "salvo", Keever's title: "Communists Signal More War, Not Peace, with 19-Round Rocket Salvo in Saigon." Article draft about Communist rocket attacks on Saigon. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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zcze sag
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salvo 1 (normass/deepe)
NINETEEN
SAIGON, AUGUST 22-The Communist guns of August--the twenty-round
rocket salvo on Saigonp-marks the beginning of a most decisive phase in
the Vietnam war.
The intermittent, 45-minute rocket attack on the capital seems here
to be a pivotal point-of-no-return in which the Communists have committed
themselves to an evolving, climactic military confrontation on the battlefield--
rather than coaxing out Americam concessions in the teacup negotiations"
in Paris.
(1
The well-aimed salvo seemed to unveil the shape of the great drama
that lies ahead for Vremam South Vietnam;
the tempo and tactics of the events
are still hidden.
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The rocket attack on Saigon is considered decisive here for two
reasons the first international, the second internal.
First, the rocket attack shattered the paper framework and
diplomatic climate of the Paris peace talks. During the past two-month
lull, the Communists had de-emphasized their military actions. Their
refraining from rocketing Saigon was regarded as a signal of military
restraint which produced a conducive climate in Paris. Now, this has
been shattered with 122 mm.
Also, world public opinion was believed to have turned against the
Communists enough during their June rocket attacks for to to force
them to forsake this course of action. In the South, even Viet Cong
HE JUNE SHELL.ngs.
symphati sympathizers ha here resented that attacks. Reliable, but
unconfirmed reports suggested that even pro-Communist elements had told
Allied officials where the Communist rocket oliac caches were hidden in
order to spare the capital. Now, like the Russian use of force in
Czeckoslovakia, public opinion--internal and international-has bee cast
aside. Mao Tse-Tung's operative adage is implemented: Political power
comes out of the barrel of a gun. "
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salvo 3 (normass/deope)
In short, the Communists for the past two months had been
maintaining a well-balanced, parallel policy of "fighting while
peace
negotiating." Paris/was coordinated with their military war.
Now,
they have shifted predominantly to fighting rather than talking. The point
of decision is the battleground in South Vietnam-not Paris or Washington.
The battlefield determines the terms of the peace; Paris simply
formalizes the fact.
"The Chinese Communists said in the negotiations on Laos that
you can not expect to win at the conference table what you've lost
on the battlefield," one informed source explained." Now, the
Vietnamese Communists are implementing the corollary:
you can expect
to win at the conference table what you win on the battlefield.
OBJECAVE then
AND
the
The great, final battlefield is then Saigon, specifically,
Vietnamese Fresidential Palace and National Assembly, which symises
and embodies the constitutional government.. The fact that two of
Alti-CommuniST
Build N
Redonn.
Shelling
the 122 mm. rockets hit the national assembly/during the current attack
seemed especially symbolic, if not foreboding for the Vietnamese
nationalists.
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Internally,
the second reason the current phase is considered
decisive hinges on the pivotal question of whether the Communists
succeed or fail in their military ambitious military aims of climaxing a
general offensive and general uprising. The corollary of the question--
perhaps more significant--is whether the American policymakers and world
Communis73
opinion
have en psychologically think they have won, even
though they may have suffered staggering military losses-as in the case
of the Tet offensive.
Within the military sphere, the Communists are attempting to
strike a new balance, a new
their all-out military offensive,
unsuccessfully
op parallel policy of coordinating
with armed political insurrection--
a feat they tried during both Tet and the May offensive.
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If the Communists succeed in their mannnng objectives during the
then, they believe
general offensive and general uprişompletely defeat the they can name
--or press on to
Allies.
their terms at Paris--something close to the Allied surrenderà If they
succeed partially,
but not all of them.
then they can name alot of the terms of the on peace,
If they fail militarily--or the Vietnamese and world public opinion
things they have failed--then three courses of action seem open to them!
two
to
de-escalate and protract the war,
either reverting to Phase
Two activities or simply fading away. Already the Communists are known
OR,
to be making contingency planning for this. Second, they will have to
sign a peace treaty much less favorable to them than they originally hoped.
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salvo 5 (normass/deepe)
some Vietnamese
At this point the Allied commands and the Vietnamese government
remains confident of repulsing the attacks. In fact,
officers and officials tended to welcome the idea of a Communist ground
offensive, thinking it would strengthen the Allied position in Paris.
But,
the rocket attacks are a different thing. They are much more
difficult for the Allies to counter-despite electronic gaged try and
nino Allied divisions around the capital. Also, they are the cheap
way for the Communists to fight-without having to commit huge numbers
of men for high-impact effects. And, psychologically, they are much
more depressing for the Saigonese, who have no place to hid to escape
the split-second rocket impact.
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The American Embassy here made no official comment on the rocketing
of the capital. Nor had the Embassy received any official commentary
In private,
from Washington, as of twelve hours after the t shelling.
gifter
however,
AD
one American official explained,
"This attack obviously
refutes those people who said the lull was some sort of political signal
of military restraint.
The gener (U. S.) generals now look right in saying
the lull was just the preparation for a bigger offensive."
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AN
SPOKESMAN.
On the military side, the American command-expressing the
CONTINUE. to S
explicit view of General Creighton W. Abrams-still-believes the
military lull ended August 18, but that the third general offensive
this, However,
has yet to begin. Pe
his depends on the definition of "offensive."
The American command he is currently defining it in terms of a carbon-copy
of Tet-with a coordinated, countrywide drive including big units such
as battalions and regiments, if not divisions. This has yet to unravel
here but both the Vietnamese and. American commands believe it will happen.
However,
the Communist definition seems to be different at this
Captured
time. In a document, the Viet Cong high command even criticized its
own cadre for misinterpreting the meaning of the general offensive and
"We did not fully understand the characteristics of the
uprising.
new phase (the second offensive).
From the basic assumption that the
General Offensive/General Uprising was a
'one blow affair"
to the
there was a
realization that it was a phase (of open operations),
tendency to consider it as a "protracted" struggle and a failure to
view it as a phase of continuous offensives and uprisings which require
a positive urgency in gaining success every hour and
every minute."
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Radio Hanoi in commenting on the August 18th ground attacks
PED
in Tay Ninh province refer to the "historic days of August"
POKE
and
talks of the "most eloquent vision of the offensive and uprising
spirit of our a fed armed forces and
people."
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Coming on the heels of the Communists'
display of military force
in the Czeck crisis, the Saigonese were not repeat not surprised at the
rocketing of the capital. Nor was there any panic--just the resignation of
the foreboding that all had long expected.
one businessman explained.
Sixty NiNE
"We are sitting on the fire,"
NINETEEN.
SEVENTEEN. mostly Civilians.
The anty rounds killed teen Vietnamese
and wounded forth fite at five others. A Japanese newsman, Tatsuo Sakai,
representing Nihon Keizai--the Wall Street Jounra Journal of Japan-was also
There Were No
killed. American casualties.
If of the rocket rounds landed across Saigon the main river from
Saigon proper, impacting near--but not in--the strategic Saigon-pret.
Five others landed near near the heart of town,
•port.
one of them ripping orner
off a corner of the tin roof of the Vietnamese National Assembly; another
landing at the base of the building spewing up bricks, debris and metal
fragments. Another impacted near a French-owned garage on Nguyen Hue street,
commonly known as "The Street of Flowers."
Five other rocket rounds
Saigon Military
landed in the Chinese section called Cholon. No
nstallations.
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2
The salvo on Saigon was the first since June 21-am two months
Capital.
and one day I ago-when ten rounds impeded impacted in the Saigon area.
the August Shilling
was the biggest attack since June 11, when at 6:10 a.m., nearly thirty
rounds impacted in the a Saigon city limits.
The Saigon rocketing came on the Fifty fifth is consecutive day
SCATERED, UNEVEN
of the Communists' syncopated, oven, yet cross-country
On August 22
drive of
increased military action, which varied in scope from an a six-hour,
battalion-sized attack on American-Vietnamese positions defending the
district town of Di a Linh in Lam Dong province,
to rocket-mortar
provincial city and My The provincial aital,
firing in Tay Ninh city, five American artillery fire support bases,
NAORI motallet
the Nha Be ea near the strategic petroleum reserves outside Saigon,
BEN HA ARGASE FAND
100-round tar barrage on an isolated company-sized
Popular Forces outpost.
(Hank: have you published the Saigon mood zeepager and the Sargon
attack on Saigon piece sent over the weekend? Regards Bev).
the
END
more reuter
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Date
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1968, Aug. 22
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Saigon (Vietnam); Bombardment; Bombing, aerial; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Rockets (Aeronautics)
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F38
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
