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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04447 to 363-04461.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04447 to 363-04461
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Title
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Article about captured Communist plans
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Description
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Original title: "attack", Keever's title: "Captured Communist Documents Reveal an Attack Saigon Battle Plan that Disturbs [?]." Article draft on documents captured by the American "little boat navy" (Brown-Water Navy) that reveal plans for an offensive by Communist forces. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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attack 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, AUGUST 17-Om July 21, America's little boat Navy raided the
headquarters of the 1st Viet Cong Regiment hiding in a nearby mangrove
swamp--and hauled in a treasure of documents, including detailed Communist
battle plans to attack Saigon in August..
If the Communist battle plan had been successfully executed, the
heart of downtown Saigon (Precinct 1), including which includes the
American Embassy and Vietnamese Presidential Palace, would have been
(PRECINC 4) its
4d
rocketed to smithereens.
The crucial Saigon port/and nearby auxiliary
called Newport would have been assaulted, sabotaged and demolished by
two Viet for the sapper units argest American
One of the
ammunition depot in Vietnam, situated at Long Binh outside the city,
and the Vietnamese government's largest ordnance depot,, situated at
Thanh Tuy Ha, would have exploded like giant strings of king-sized firecrackers.
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attack 2 (normass/deepe)
The Nha Be tank farms south of Saigon,
for
petroleumn supply conducting the war,
supplying much of the
MUSHRooms
would have spewed-mmelp
of flames and smoke over and around the capital. Many strategically
important economic and military lines of communications would
have been interdicted by the Communists. The four-lano, super-highway
from Saigon
leading to Bien Hoa would have been disrupted, with its long-spen
AmoR AND TROOP_
bridges riddled, thus cutting off Americal reinforcements.
ROAD
Four other
The
major raods raons leading out of Saigon would have been blockaded.
Long Tau shipping channel, Saigon's only link with the sea for military
and economic supplies, would have been disrupted by Communist
SAMPAN-guNbact
The frognon, underwater demolition experta FIND SAMPAN- guNbast.
at
Saigon would have been a city in flames and a capital detached
from its own country..
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WAS
the
The collection of documents captured by the U. S. Navy were the most
valuabe a valuable ones containing precise tactical information to be seized
by the Allies to date in the war. And, more than anything else,
documents seem to be the basis of official predictions--including those
of President Lyndon Johnson--that the Communists have withdrawn their
major units from the South only as a prelude to re-winding for another
mammoth offensive either against Saigon itself or cross-country as in the
va case of Tet.. The seizure of the documents was roughly comparable to--
and only slightly less helpful to the Allies-the
defection of Colo.
Viet Cong lieutenant colonel Tran, Van Dac,, who tipped off the Allies
to Assault
about the Communist battle plan around Saigon during their May offensive.
With Dac's information, the Allies squelched the May offensive most of
the May offensive outside of Saigon proper, killing an estimated 16,000
Communists from early May to mid-June..
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The Communist documents, dating from early June to mid-July,
detailed clearly the Communist plans to attack Saigon in late July or
early August.
pertained to the attack plans of Viet Cong Sub-Division 4,
military
five sub-en regions which the Communists have used to t divide
These documents seized from the headquarters indeed
Region,
one of the
PIE-SLICE
asset
the countryside around Saigon. As early as mid-June, the documents
indicated, the Viet Cong were formulating plans for their "third climaxing
phase", presumably the third general offensive.
While the documents
clearly unveiled the intention of the Communists to attack Saigon,
geve the exact date of the attack.
er However,
none
several
stated then varying times when the Viet Cong troops were
be ready to move for the attack on Saigon.
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attack 5 (normass/deepe)
The documents included an exchange of lettors between the 1st Viet
Cong regimental commander and his political commissar, WC which said
the troops movements were to begin the last week of July. The
diary of the regimental chief of staff said the movements should start
August 1 and the diary of the deputy political commissar of the regiment
said "re should be ready to move on August 5."
When the U. S. Navy
raided the headquarters, the regiment fled without any maj even a minor
skirmish, leaving behind their dooumonts. However,
executive officer was captured.
one battalion
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The 1st Regiment is a composite force composed of three separate
battalions now in currently operating under a regimental command.
These three battalions are the 4th local force battalion of Thu Duo,
the 2nd battalion of the 274th Regiment of the Viet Congh 5th Division
BATTAlon
and the 5th battalion of meni reconnaissance, commando and mechanized
After
tack its May attack near Saigon, this regiment was
royally criticized by its superior headquarters for its poor performance and
the regimental commander was removed.
seized,
Significantly, themed documents dovetailed neatly with the
capture fix four days earlier of the eu executive officer of the
4th Thu Duc battalion, Le Ngoc
Die
He was captured on July 17 after
having completed a moonni reconnaissance mission covering the Newport
dock area outside Saigon, the Vietnamese Naval Headquarters on Saigon's
waterfront and a radio station in the 9th precinct of Saigon.
He
said in his interrogation that in early June his unit had received
orders that it would attack Saigon between July 19 and August 1.
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WELL-OR ChottED,
The offensive plans were broad in scope and a covered a diversity
2
of targets and modes of attack. The battle plan for the lot Regiment
called for two-thirds of the unit to spearhead into the 9th precinct of
Saigon.
the 3
and the nearby supit hidden of the Saigon city
limits. Relatively lightly populated, it lies across the Saigon river
from the oity propor and is comprised of a mixture of rural huts and landscape
as well as urban slums.
Employ
There is some activit Toro related to unloading
PLUS
ships and transporting goods and a great deal of smuggling and illegal
activities. It would th be one of the easiest precincts to attack militarily
downtown Saigon AND
and from there, the Saigon port across a narrow canal would be highly
vulnerable as well at the
Part of the pre-battle preparations included alerting underground
elements in the 9th precinct. Also, within the past week, Tiet Cong
leaflets have shown up in the 4th precinct of the port, calling for the
port workers to be the vanguard of the revolution,
and in the nearby Thi
WARNE
Nghi pection và colong near the Be Bien Hoa highway, want Vietnamese
Dents
VIETNAME
there to refrain from listening to government radio and television r
there
broadcasts.
Some Vietnamese, publicly known as anti-Communists, have movd
moved from those areas several months. ago.
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A July 13 entry in one document captured by the Navy stated that the
1st Regiment was to break through the 9th precinct on the first day of
the offensive;
this was to be accomplished either by infiltration of
separate small elements of regulars or an all-out assault on the precinct.
documents said the units were to hold their positions for two days,
but others, not specifying the areas, mentioned a full month of fighting.
of the on Regiment.
Some
These two battalions were also to attack the west side of the
AND
Bien Hoa highway
district
Thu Duc by (which contains the generators supplying
electrical power for Saigon).
And, in a unique move,
the 5th
Recon-commando-se mechanized battalion was to attack the Thu
academy
Duo: sommommissioned officers sey and a Vietnamese army installation
at Long Thanh Themed Viet Cong men mechanized units
were to attempt to seize the government's armored vehicles and drive them
off. During the Tet offensive,
the Communists also planned to seize
Allied armor and trucks-but never came close to succeeding.
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The 1st Regiment itself was to push 800 m infantrymen into the attack;
which was a very low number for gi an infantry regiment; 180 men
from one battalion was to attack the 9th precinct; another battalion of
operate
gunners,
250 men was to nation with a group of rocket perts, a 200-man
sapper (sabotage) unit and an 80-man autonomous sapper company.
Also
OPERATING
special units tote with the headquarters in the 9th precinct area
were listed as initing a 65-man company of anti-aircraft weapons,
45-man company of 75 mm. recoiless riflemon; a 55-man company
a
of 82 mm. mortarmen; a 50-man company of engineers; a 25-man company
of signal corpamen; a 35-man reconnaissance company; a 35-man transportation
company and a 20-man company of medical corpamen. The Viet Cong transport
Company companies are generally composed of human porters or sampan-drivers
who supply rice and ammunition during the battle; the engineering companies
are responsibile for destroying--not stating constructing-roads and
engineers include frogment and underwater
bridges,
and these
demolition experts for blowing bridges and Sinking Stips.
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The sub-region-four plan also sedin coordinated the e 1st Regimental
attack with is a sister regiment--the 274th Regiment of the Viet Cong
5th Division.
This unit was to counter-attack Allied units rushing
towards the 9th prese precinct and the Bien Hoa bridge area
other
down/American and Vietnamese units outside the city.
and to tie
While these two regiments were at work, the Viet Cong High
Command was to direct attacks at the giant U. S. Army complex of Long
which includes the ammunition depot,
Headquarters of the
the Bien Hoa and
So Binh,
Vung Tau airbases, the U. S. Army 9th Division headquebears (which
would have been in rushed in to reinforce Saigon)--and most i
significantly, the 1st precinct of Saigon,
《
which includes major
government offices and the Fifth Avenue of Saigon, called Tu Do Street.
Because these important targets were tre directly under the control
of the Viet Cong High Command,
Alte
government sources believe special
be
rocket or artillery units were
to
used.xm
11
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Also in preparation for the assaults,
Storing
the Viet Cong were busily
engaged in transporting and og rockets and other munitions.
But,
AuthorizED the Sub-Region H
in general,
the full supply of weapons and munitions we not being received
in sub-region four. In June and July, the sub-region received
it was
but they
500 AK-47 automatic weapons,
were supposed to receive 800
of them. Up to the end of July, the sub-region had received 20 mortars,
but had wanted 28 of them.
June 4,
As of
Repeat 5,440
However, the weaponry received was still substantial.
sub-region 4 had oko stockpiled 0 5,440/ rounds of 82 and
50 mm mortars 2024 repeat 2024 rounds of B-40 rocket ammo; 1160 repeat
1160 B-41 rocket rounds; 645 repeat 645 rounds of 75 mm. roooiless rifle
of .122 and .107 mm. rocket ammo;
SEVEN
more than three tons
on July 12, the sub-region received
amoog
452 repeat 452 rounds
TEN
TEN
nearly we tons repeat ve tons of TNT and
of plastic explosives.
Later,
another shipment of 27 tons of ordnance supplies, including 57 complete
122 mm. rocket launchers.
Strategic
Successfully placed in cal areas,
this was enough ordnance and
explosives to literally blow on Saigon sky-high.
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The battle plan also was detailed enough to specify the amounts of
food and ammunition each soldier should carry into the attack. Each
trooper was to carry one compressed rice loaf, a three-day supply of
un-cooked rice and one quart of cooked, but dehydrated rice.
Also,
instead of his usual
each soldier was to carry three loads of ammunition,
two. During the peak of the attack, more ammunition would be resupplied
and each soldier would then be issued five loads.
One set of instructions indicated the fighting might last for as
SUPPLIERS
long as one month.
Instructions had been sent to the food supplies to
stockpile enough food to last for one month.
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It was this detailed battle plan captured by the Navy which seems
to have crystallized the Johnson Administration's predictions that the
Communists not only had the capability of attacking but also clearly intended
to do so,
And, hence the reluca reluctance of the Administration to
accept at face value the Dom Communist claims of de-escla de-escalation.
This battle plan for sub-region four also dovetailed with "hundreds and
hundreds of other pieces of first-hand evidence clearly revealing the
es Repor
Communist intention of attacking Saigon. These first-hand sources of informat
included prisoners of war, Communist defectors and captured documents--
but none were of which scope, clai calibre of or rank as the sub-region
four plan.
While Communist troops from sub-region four were busily attacking,
other units were also to be attacking in some of the other sub-regions--but
the information concerning these attacks is still sketchy. Preliminary
information from informed sources indicates that ixx all of the Viet Cong
9th Division was to be thrown into the battle. Two of its regiments-
the 271 and 273-were scheduled to move through Communist sub-region one
the northern part of Saigon to attack Tan Son Nhut airbase, Vietnamese
High Command and the Quang Trung boot camp. Simulton's Simultaneously, its
third regiment, the 272, now in sub-region two, would move from the
S south to Saigon's eighth precinct in the Chinese section ax which
was attacked during the May offensive. Once in dug in there,
Precinct 8 could have been used by the Communist regiment either as a
springboard to move deeper into the city or as a trensi berea to link
up with other Communist units in the Saigon prot port area or elsewhere.
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The division would have been joined by another regiment assigned
sub-region two the 328th Regiment,
North Vietnamese unit which had cought
in the battle of Ia Drang in Noh November 1965, at which has since moved
into Binh Long province. as a
Troops from sub-region three were reported to include an impromptu
regiment composed of the North Vietnamese Phu Loi 2 battalion, plus two
battalions from Long An province. They were to be assigned to pass through
the Nha Be petroleum farm areas, stopping to attack along with elements
for
of sub-region four troops, and then proceed onto Saigon u the attack
on Saigon's port. From Paint the Saigon port, ground troops would have
been in a pet position for a ground assault on the first ent
precinct of the downtown area, if the Communist rockets had not done tirety
PULVERIZED THE FIREA.
already
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East
North of Saigon,
operating from Communist sub-region give two l
Na LAND
regiments one of them being the well-known, Dong gi regiment,
Nai
to follow the left bank of the Dong Nai
n
Was slated
of a river until
it could spearhead its attack into the northeaster sector of Saigon.
The sixth Communist sub-region, called T-700,
gon, and
gia
ed T-700, is Saigon-Croton
BEEN
Cholon and Gia Dinh city, which would have not only be the battlegroun
would woulD
prime battleground, but which also have committed underground agents:
and terrorist units to the battle.
While the battle plan for Saigon and the Communist intention to
WAS
the time,
execuite the plan fs relatively clear! it still remains unter
Now
uncertain here whether the Communists will attempt some sort of an offensive
30.
into the Saigon area of elsewhere.
on three questions:
The situation would seem to hinge
can the Allied troops continye continue to spoil
the Communist attack?
Will the super-politics at Paris now preclude
the Communists from even attempting to attack?
Or will the Communists
simply postpone the offensive Tat until later, hoping to prepare
themselves better for a more decisive
phase.
-end reuter
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Date
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1968, Aug. 17
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Subject
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Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Intelligence services; United States. Navy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F38
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
