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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04130 to 363-04138.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04130 to 363-04138
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Title
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Article about American distrust of the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "soliloquy", Keever's title: "Americans Mull Credibility Gaps and Shifting Objectives." Article draft about civilian Americans' views on the Vietnam War in 1968. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
soliloquy 1 (normass/deepe)
SAIGON, APRIL 20-A short while ago,
an American general
reportedly received a letter from his teenage daughter named Becky.
She asked him why he and the U. S. soldiers were fighting the war for the
He wrote back a rather passionate reply explaining the
Vietnamese.
war was as important to the United States as to Vietnam and it was
Vietnamese.
The general's wife
America's duty to help the Vru
reportedly replied, "That was a beatu beautiful letter you wrote Becky,
but she thinks you're biased."
The general, involved in a personal credibility gap with his own
"We're in this fix today
daughter, reached the simple conclusion:
because the American people don't understand this war. They don't
understand the nature of the enemy. Maybe if they spent more time
stuyding it, then they would understand it's not just a Vietnamese war.
more reuter
2020 sag
yy 1jp
soliloquy 2 (normass/deepe)
And, the general's reported high-level, net judgment: "Never
in American history have the stakes been so high-or so much in doubt."
More and more in the provinces, senior officers and officials
are practicing almost Buddha-styled introspection about the broader
dimensions of this conflict. It is as though they suddenly viewed the
war as an inter-crystallization of the political, psychological, economic
and military facets, no longer as separate compartments of the war,
as a solid, integrated whole.
more reuter
but
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- Page 2
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2020 sag
yy 1jp
soliloquy 3 (normass/deepe)
These meditative soliloquies cover new dimensions of the military
aspects of the Vietnam conflict, profound contemplation on the political,
economic and psychological facets of it--and re-thinking about the
Western press corps. In and of themselves, these soliloquies would
probably not be considered worthy of coverage in either news stories
or in official dispatches to Washington. Yet, they are grieviously
etched in the minds of leaders who may be making policy decisions for
America in the coming decade.
This process of introspection began for the field leadership
echelon with the Communist Tet offensive in late January and it was compounded
by President Johnson's peace offie offensive two mentah months later.
more reuter
zozo sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
soliloquy 4 (normass/deepe)
These senior officials in the prone provinces believed they
had won a smashing military victory during the Tet offensive--but lost the
political-psychological side of the battle.
"The peace offensive (by President Johnson) is an outgrowth of
the Communists' psychological advantage or benefit,"
one high-level
source explained. "The enmy has given the world the impression of much
greater capability than he actually has.
All he has to do now is hurl
three B-40 rocket rounds at the American Embassy and he will get
headlines all over the world and everyone will fear he's invaded Saigon....
more reuter
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- Page 3
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
soliloquy 5 (normass/deepe)
the source continued,
All he
"If the enemy (the Communists) negotiates,"
"he'll go to the conference table with his strongest hand.
has to do is to attack. Even if he fails in the attack, he succeeds
the fact the fella
in making a point. Though his force may be wiped out,
could attack makes an impression on the World War II-type of mind.
American people had deserted us in the Battle of the Bulge,
here, I don't know what we'd have done....
If the
like they did
more reuter
zczc sag
yy 1jp
soliloquy 6 (normass/deepe)
Before the Tet offensive,
the enemy.
"the Allies went through a period of
deluding ourselves," another source explained. "We da didn't understand
For one thing the enemy has its initiatives we forget about.
Sometimes he's like a made dog. Someon people ask me to guess the
intention of Grap Giap (Gen. Vo Nguyen Giap-commander of all North Vietnamese
forces). This is an exercise in futility. There's no way for me to get
on the same wave length with him. I can assess his capabilities-but, his
intentions-well, that's a real never-neverland. The enemy will take
We
great casualties and this is an initiate he has and you must give him this
credit.
=more reuter
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- Page 4
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
soliloquy 7 (normass/deepe)
"If someone comes up and hits you in the face, maybe you kill him.
But still the fact is you got slapped in the face--and everyone comes up
and asks you why you let it happen. But you can't stop it, even by killing
him later.
"We Americans have gotten tangled in our thinking," he continued.
"Wars are a big chaos. They aare always fought on matters of principle,
but individuals can't identify with the principles. How do you define
freedom while watching a Vietnamese house bu burning?
We are
"We identify with the superficial aspects of the war.
horrified at the house-burning--but for the Vietnamese owner maybe it means
being free of Communist taxation and terror."
ZCZC sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
==more reuter
soliloquy 8 (normass/deepe)
The source gave the example of Walter Cronkite,
the national
television news commentator who recently criticized American policy in
Vietnam. "Walter told me he had always come to Vietnam as a dove and left
as a hawk," the source explained. "Until the last time when he saw the
destruction of Hue. He asked me 'How can you justify this war when
you're destroying the people. We claim we are preserving Hue,
destroyed all the homes.
but we
"My answer was he couldn't identify with the principles involved.
He could
I said he was making his observations on superficial conclusions.
see the destruction but he had no idea of the freedom involved for the people.
For the Vietnamese, having their houses burned is awful--but they know if
the Communists take-over, they'll be shot.
==more reuter
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- Page 5
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zczc sag
yy ljp
soliloquy 9 (normass/deepe)
"In
"But what I said made no difference," the source lamented.
World War II, what the generals said was believed by the troops, by
the press and by the people. Now the generals have no credibility.
Who
"I can say I see a great groundswell of anomosity against the
Viet Cong," he explained. "But Mert Perry (Newsweek correspondent with
five years of reporting experience in Vietnam) says the opposite.
will believe me? Who will Ho Chi Minh believe? The press corps is a
factor in this war, in getting Ho Ci Chi Minh to change his mind.
Mert Perry is just as important as the generals."
So
===more reuter
zcze sag
yyl 1jp
soliloquy 10 (normass/deepe)
as another source expier explained,
"In the Tet offensive,
the enmyth enemy though he was going to win a military-political-psychological
the Vietnamese
victory. He thought he was going to bring down the government,
But it didn't happen.
army would disintegrate and rally to his side....
Still the enemy got the press carrying stories, emphasizing the
psychological factor. The guy is smart. He didn't plan or figure this to
the objective of his making this 36-city effort.
was just a bonus that came out of it...."
It
more reuter
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- Page 6
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Zozo sag
yy 1jp
soliloquy 11 (normass/deepe)
Another senior sources explained his view of another twist-around in he
public thinking. "There may be a misconception of what we" (the Allies)
we could win a military
are trying to do in Vietnam.
We have never said
victory in Vietnam. Neither the President (Johnson)
nor anyone else ever
said that officially. We did say we could convince the enemy he couldn't
win by force, and therfore he would have to seek a settlement by
political means through negotiations.
We ner never said we'd destroy
him. We said publicly we had no interest ing bringing down Ho Chi Minh
and his government. We were simply trying to get him to cease and
desist his invasion from North Vietnam.... The search-and-destroy operation
(the Allied offensive strategy) has also connoted a false impression of
Destroy doesn't mean a scorched earth
what we intended to do.
policy--but some erroneously think it has led to this."
==more reuter
zcze sag
Jy 1jp
soliloquy 12 (normass/deepe)
On the military side of the conflict's ledger,
showed a nostalgia for
the field leadership T
the black-and-white conventional wars a frustration
with this curious matulon
blend
of
ambivalence with the/policy of limited objectives.
gic guerrilla and conventional forces and an
==more reuter
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- Page 7
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
soliloquy 13 (normass/deepe)
"We have this idea of limited wars with limited resources and
limited objectives fought by certain rules," one source said. "We
think somehow the enemy is rational and he'll decide to quit. But what
happens when the enemy has unlimited resources (because of Communist BITC
bloc aid), unlimited objectives and unlimited war (using Cambodia
and Laos) and doesn't play by the rules?.... This light at the end of
the tunnel has a
serious aspect. Now things seem to be adrift.
That's the nature of limited war. Budgetary-wise, the country's
(the U. S.) approach is that we must do within certain boundaries.
Suppose the budget allows for 500 new helicopters for Vietnam-but that's
not enough. The Vietnamese troops are outgunned and need helicopters
too--so they get criticized for not be being as effective as they
should be. Who's to blame? Not Westy (General/ William Westmoreland).
It's the nature of the beast...."
zczc sag
yy 1jp
more reuter
soliloquy 14 (normass/deepe)
explained: "pro"
one source
At the rice paddy level of the military conflict,
problem with our (Allied) strategy is dealing
with the nature of the enemy. We must bring maximum pressure on the
enemy from top to bottom (of his military structure). There's affumen
Co Viet Cong squad in most hamlets, a platoon per most villages,
company for each district and a battalion for each province. Before we
fought the main-force to the exclusion of the smaller forces--which lived
on the main force threat and could un-do everything.
==more reuter
a
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- Page 8
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zC2c sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
soliloquy 15 (normass/deepe)
he continued.
The Communist
"Nothing is decisive in the enemy's military structure,"
"and nothing will cause the whole structure of fall.
It is cellular.
organization isn't built that way.
k
If we wipe out
on the village next door.
enemy forces--and
a squad in a village, maybe it will have no effect
We are now trying to cope with the whole spectum of
this isn't an appealing strategy because it does not promise a surgical
type of thing cutting out the enemy's vitals....
"We would like to have a strategy like in Gener Germany-when
we defeated the enemy army,
to focus on in the enemy structure.
Here,
the war would be over.
there's nothing
It's like a cancer--as distinct
cured by a
We have to treat
the whole
from an appendicitis. It's an illness that can not be
simple treatment or surgical operation.
patient. That's what we are faced with here."
zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
more reuter
soliloquy 16 (or (normass/deepe)
As an example, the source explained that during and following the
Communists Tet offensive in the provinces around Saigon,
had suffered heavy casualties militarily.
the Communists
In one district, a 500-man
battalion was reduced to destroyed down to 50 men, the battalion commander,
executive officer and political commissar were captured;
the battalion
radios were destroyed and the remen remnants were short of food.
"When an Allied battalion is half-strength,
we wipe it off the books,"
he explained. "But, in this war fifty enemy in a district against a
30-man government outpost is still important. If they assassinate the
all these types of actions
village chiefs at night or destroy the bridges,
Even though the enemy force is militarily
are meaningful in this war.
ineffective, we can't measure enemy losses in conventional terms.
conventional terms, I'd say the enemy has suffered a tremendous military
defeat during and after Tet. But, here we can't make broad
sweeping st
statements like that.
In
=more reuter
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- Page 9
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zC2C sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
soliloquy 17 (normass/deepe)
"Right now, the enemy isn't capable of achieving a big military
success," he continued. "But that is the least troublesom. The
if I didn't say
Of course,
difficulty is the psychological impact.
that the difficulty was psychological,
any psychological gains."
then he couldn't make &
Lamenting the dilemna of both Vietnamese and American officers, he
explained, "Now, I get exhortations from all sides to fe forge ahead--
advance.
to continue the
But people forget I'm not on a frontline.
I'm in
the middle of
360 degrees--and anyway I move, I'm
advancing."
=more reuter
zczc sag
yy 1jp
soliloquy 18 (normass/deepe)
(Hank: I'm sending this in as a zeepager or any other way you
chose to use it. Regards 2 Bev).
==end reuter
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Date
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1968, Apr. 20
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Subject
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Tet Offensive, 1968; Public opinion; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Protest movements--United States
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B10, F14
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
