Article about fighting in Khe Sahn

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363-04103 to 363-04111.pdf
Digital Object Identifier
363-04103 to 363-04111
Title
Article about fighting in Khe Sahn
Description
Original title: "Khe Sahn", Keever's title: "Communist Assault on Khe Sahn Vanishes." Article about fighting in Khe Sahn, and the lack of a materialized Communist/Việt Cộng offensive. Written for the Christian Science Monitor
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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- Page 1
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zozo sag
yy ljp
khe sanh 1 (normass/deepe)
SAI GON,
APRIL 12-An escalation towards heavier fighting is expected
soon in the battle around Khe Sanh.
But,
the form of the fighting by both sides has changed tactically,
reliable sources report.
The spectre of a massive Communist ground assault in the setpiece
fashion of Dien Bien Phu has vanished at this point, these sources said.
First,
because of the immensity of American military power and mobility there,
second, because the American command is reportedly turning the base
shifting the holding power of the base from American Marine to Vietnamese
regulars--and even these regulars Vietnamese forces could be withdrawn. Third,
The significance of Khe Sanh for the Communists has consistently been measured
by official sources as a hinge dramatic hinge to swing the American
political party conventions,
if not the election, which meant their grand
assault should have come in July, when the monsoon rains also began to shift in
their favor. But, President Johnson's April 1 eliminated the American
conventions and election as the pinet decisive point in the Communist timetable--
and hence the political in significance of the sec Khe Sanh also vanished
from the Communist viewpoint these sources report.
==more reuter
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zczc sag
Jy 1jp
khe sanh 2 (normass/deepe)
base,
In the wake of the 320,000-man Allied operation around the combat
the Communists have reportedly shifted from positional warfare,
to mobile warfare of
sed to besiege the former Marine base,
harrassing and briefly contesting the Allied forces.
once
In short, they
have shifted to a mobile, momentary frontline, rather than a
rigide one encircling the base camp.
American tactics have also shifted from the Marine concept
of holding a static, fixed position--a concept ordered by their
superde superior headquarters--to the Army concent of highly mobile,
heliborne operations covering wide
expanses quickly and
with more flexibility. The Army ooreet concept is essentially the classical
throughout VIETNAM.
search-and-destroy operation General William C. Westmoreland has espou
implemented consistently attempt to employ here.
==more reuter
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
khe sanh 43 (normass/deepe)
military
The relative mildness of the contacts thus far--relative
compared to the spectre of Dien Bien Phu-has lead to the conclusion
among many leading vitae Vietnamese salon salon politiciant
politicians here that diplomatic a tare tacit diplomatic de
deal had been made between Washington and Hanoi to militarily
This view while widespread in
disengage in the Khe Sanh area.
sophisticated circles here--however appears to be
initiate D
puersten by
pro-French, if not pro-Communist jelements striving to widen the
misunderstanding and suspect suspicion and cleavage between the
American offfell officialdom here and the Vietnamese government.
The gist of this line is that Washington and the Communists have already
made a deal for a pre-cooked peace, in which South Vietnamese would be
sold out by the Americans. This line of reasoning appears to be an
Lethal, AllAcious
propaganda circulating in Saigon,
extension of the
and other cities during the Tet offensive,
Hue
intimating that the
American command had deliberately let the Communist troops
into the
cities as a means to force the government of President Nguyen Van Thieu
The result of this whirlwind of in propaganda h has
to negotiate.
been a net lack of confidence on the part of Vietnamese leaders in
the Americans, a great deal of confusion in the man minds of pro-American,
Saignificantly, neither the American command nor mission
anti-Communists.
spokesmen are countering this prope propaganda,
saying they are not
- dicuss diplomatic dEVELOPMENTS.
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zcze sag
yy 1jp
khe sanh 4 (normass/deepe)
However,
more studious and informed sources here believe
that no tacit Hanoi-Washington understanding had been reached about
four
Khe Sanh for these time reasons:
1. The Communist strategy is not to de-escalate the
military war while negotiating--but to escalate it.
This position)
clearly expressed in a mammoth captured Communist document,
states that "Fighting continues until the emergence of a situation
where both sides are fighting indecisively.
Then, a situation
where fighting and negotiations are conducted simultaneiously me
may emerge. In fighting while negotiating, the side which fights
more strongly will compte compel the a adversary to accept his conditions.
more reuter
"
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zczc sag
yy 1jp
khe sanh 5 (normass/deepe)
2. Both Radio Hanoi and the Liberation Radio i for the soutirox
(Viet Cong have commented at length about Operation Pegasus/Lam Son 207
which they call the "Flying Horse" operation. They have claimed
victories there, which seem exaggerated in Western eyes, and
Tho Their
to such an extent that it appears the lifting of the siege around
Khe Sanh has put them on the propaganda defensive.
broadcasts forc forecast more fighting and are especially vitrolic
about General Westmoreland.
The Liberation Front Press, similar to radio broadcasts from
Hanoi said, "The fighting and victories at Khe Sanh are a s/ big
slap in the mouth of defeated General Westmoreland when he left Vietnam
for Washington and boasted the military situation of the Americans in the
South has improved. With our trend of one victory after another victory
(around Khe Sanh), the people and the military forces in Quang Tri province
(along the demilitarized zone) will move forward to gain bigger
HND
victories, push the Americans to and their puppets down into an
abyss of ce complete defeat."
==more reuter
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zeze sag
Jy 1jp
khe sanh 7 (normass/deepe)
3. The classical Communist military tactici that they have used
for years has been to withdraw in the face of superior superior forces
or when the military disadvantages prevailed against their staying
partial
the vital Communist withdrawal
withdrawal
for
in some victorious manner.
Hene,
if in fact they have withdraw would
suit them better
political arrangement with Washington to militarily disengage.
Just how many Communist troops were ever around the Khe Sanh
base was ama matter of conjecture are even a month ago when and if they
have withdrawn and why is still a source of
near
The Marines
at Khe Sanh consistently maintained that two divisions were ne r the base,
and that they had captured prisoners and defectors
including some in Laos,
believed that only "elements"
Others, however,
who verified this.
of
two divisions were in the area.
The Washington statement by Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford
that the Communist divisions withdrew bezore President o
1 address
od here.
m because of overwhelming American firepower is also
more reuter
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
khe sanh a A (normass/deepe)
"We know there were two full (Communist) divisions around
Khe Sanh by March 30, with enough people to mount an on offensive,
whether they chose to assault or not,"
explained.
one high-ranking American officer
"We don't know where they've gone now--or even if they've
gone anywhere. But, if the xx anyone made them loavey it had
to be airpower and artillery. There was certainly no one on the ground
to make them leave before that the
moved in."
=more reuter
First Air Cavalry and Vietnames
the Ago
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zczc sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
khe sanh
(normass/deepe)
4.
For the Communists, Khe Sanh lost its political
political significance
with President Johnson's April 1 speech.
The prevailing view of officials in Saigon
was that Khe Sanh was
important to the Communists only as a hinge to swing the American
their attack grand
political
nominations or the elections.
Hence,
ground assault--if actually planned--would have been launched in July
or August, for maximum impact within America.
settlement.
But,
on April 1, President Johnson in effect assumed the
Soffline
Kennedy position by undertaking negotiations and pr proposing a political
And by refusing to accept a rem renomination for the Presidency,
Mr. Johnson increased the likelihood for Hanoi it would Hanoi might
be faced with a hard-line Richard Nixon as the next president, rather
than a soft-line Robert Kenney. Kennedy.
more reuter
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zcze sag
ᎩᎩ ljp
khe sanh 18 (normass/deepe)
leadership
Richard Nixon is much more important symbol to the Hanoi
than many Americans at home may conceive.
The Hanoi leadership
now the ones that fought the French nearly more than a decade ago--
American Vice President in 1954/
were aware that Nixon as Vice
advocated the that American atomic bombs be used in support of the
French at Dien Bien Phu, reliable sources report.
Hence,
as a means to stimulate political agitation,
Viet Cong propaganda agents in Huejare reportedly saying,
which has already been badly hit by American firepower,
saying,
are reportedly
"We just as well fight in the streets because the Americans
are going to drop an atomic bomb on Hue anyway."
There's
(Hank: my apologies for getting this to you so late.
I suggest
very little access to information about Khe Sanh from here.
that next week end I pop up to that operation for several days. I
Even if there's not a spectacular action story by
What do you
then, we can do a better job following and analyzing it.
think? Regards Bev).
==end reuter
Date
1968, Apr. 12
Subject
Khe Sanh, 2nd Battle of, Vietnam, 1968; Tet Offensive, 1968; Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; United States. Marine Corps
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Size
20 x 26 cm
Container
B10, F10
Format
dispatches
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English