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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08489 to 363-08494.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08489 to 363-08494
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Title
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Part five of a five part series on the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "SERIES- article five of five - article series", Keever's title: "Two Years of Boming North Vietnam Fails to Stop Infiltration in the South", Article draft about part five of a five part series on the Vietnam War, for The North American News Alliance
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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Beverly Ann Deepe
64A Hong Thap Tu
Saigon, Vietnam
January 14, 1967
SERIES--Article five of five-article series
Page 1
SAIGON-Since the American bombing raids against North Vietnam were
initiated two years ago this week, Communist strength within South Vietnam
has continued to skyrocket-and is expected to sora soar as dramatically in 1967.
"If the objective of bombing North Vietnam was to slow down the
rate of North Vietnamese infiltration into South Vietnam, then this has sm
certainly failed," one high-ranking source explained this week.
The dramatic incrase in the rate of infiltration from North Vietnam-
an invisible invasion-indicates that more and more of the Communist military
manpower is supplied by North Vietnam rather than local recruitment in South
Vietnam.
In
These are the official intelligence estimates: in early 1965, before
the bombing of North Vietnam, the rate of infiltration was estimated at 3,000
a month; following the bombing on February 7, the estimate immediately
jumped to 4,000 a month; two years after the initial bombing the estimates
had soared to a minimum of 10,000 a month-a threefold increase.
contrast the Communist military recruitment within South Vietnam hasremained
relatively constant; at the time of the bombing raids against North Vietnam
the estimate by intelligence sources was 3,000 a month; today, two years later,
the estimate was between 3,500 to 4,000 recruits a month.
(More)
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Doope
Series-article five of five-article series
Page 2
In round numbers, the Communists strength on February 7, 1965, when
the bombing raids began, was officially estimated at 117,000. Today, two
years later, the est mate is at least 280,000--an increase of nearly 240
percent.
American military sources say that obviously more American
and allied troops will be needed to maintain a favorable balance of forces.
Far more worrisome to American military commandors, however, is the
staggering inre increase in the Communist order of battle.
On February 7, 1965, there were no known Communist division headquarters
in South Vietnam; today, two years later, there are nine-seven predominantly
of North Vietnamese origin and two recruited in South Vietnam. A tonth is
considered by intelligence sources of being under ofruatio formation-on the
2 doorsteps of saigon city. In 1967, it is officially estimated that
at least 12 Communist division headquarters will fighting in South Vietnam.
In addition, two years ago,
the Communists maintained five known
autonomous regiments; today, they have forty; they are expected to climb
to at least a fifty by the end of 1967. Two years ago, the Communist had
formed roughly fifty autonomous mobile battalions; they current confirmed
figure is 180; by the end of 1967, the Communists are expected to have
organized 215.
Equally significant is the dramatic increase of the Communist
heavy weapons battalions--which shoot down American planes and helicopters and
mortar strategic airfields in South Vietnam. On February 7, 1965, six Communist
heavy weapons battalions had been officially confirmed in intelligence sources;
today,
two years later, the number was confirmed to be 70% the estimate by
the end of 1967 is nearly double-to 135. (More)
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Deepe
series articlo five of five-article series
Page 3
Despite heavy Communist casualties inflicted by American and allied
toop troops, the Communist strength, an officially estimated continues
to escalato. In 1965-66, 94,000 Communists were officially listed as killed;
16 16,000 were captured, 31,000 defected to the government side--a minimal
total of 141,000 confirmed losses. Yet they have still shown a not increase
of at least 163,000 men during the past two years.
The Communist escalation has also shown in up in improvements in their
arms, supplies and equipment. Intentiam Several years ago,
weapons captured
FR
from the Viet Cong guerrillas were mainly outmoded French rifles, Amoricon
weapons; only two percent were from Communist bloc countries.
Today, allied
forces are capturing more and more Che Czeck and Communist Chinese FILTE
machineguns, submachineguns and rifles of the so-called SKZ family of weapons-
used
the weapons now led to equip the Soviet frontline divisions.
Since the
American bombing of North Vietnam two years ago, allied forces have captured
30,000 Communist weapons-enough to equip nearly three Communist divisions.
Yet, for the first time in the war, the Communists are now able to launch
mortar barrages using as many as 500 rounds of ammunition; during 1967,
American field commanders expect the next round of escalation in weaponry to
include the use of Communist artillery.
(More)
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Doope
Series article five of five-article series
pago 4
In general, while the over-all military situation during 1967 appears
headed for the bitterest and bloodiest fighting to date in the war, the
military picture from the Communist viewpoint is not quite as favorable as in
late 1964, when at the peak of their relative strengths they were well on thei:
way to seizing power in South Vietnam. In late 1964, before the arrival
of American ground troops, the Vietnamese government strategic reserve had
been nibbled away; during fioroo ongagements, the South Vietnamese government
forces were unable to send in relief troops even to pick up their own dead.
Western businessmon openly predicted they would wake up some morning "to see the
some Western nowomen bogan sending out
Viet Cong flag flying over Saigon;"
of country their personal belongings; the Vietnamese paratroopers had prepared
maps for the evacuation of Saigon. The build-up of American forces boginning
in March, 1965, halted this systematic advance of the Viet Cong,
yet
reinforced with organized battalions from North Vietnam. During late 1964,
the Communists were in their final Third Phase of guerrilla warfare; tor-yes.
two years later shen nearly 400,000 American troops had hommik,
had failed to de-escalate them back into Phase Two, reliable sources report.
(More)
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Doope
sories article five of five-article sorios
Page 5
Simultaneously,
the
Throughout 1965 and most of 1966, the Communist deliberately--and
successfully--for the most part laid low while American combat units sought to
make contact with thom. The few bloody, spectacular, too-to-toe engeto
engagements were the exception rather than the rule.
Communist studied American military tactics and began to counter as well as to
akirt thom, while the continued to import and recruit in-country enough
Communist fighters to re-establish the balance of forces they had initially
lost with the American build-up.
By mid-1966, North Vietnamese President Ho Chi Minh announced on July
17th the partial mobilization of all civilian and military eloments in North
Vietnam, and three months later, one October 27th, the presidium of the
tax National Liberation Front for South Vietnam appealed to all the peope,
cadres and soldiers to launch a total campaign, called the fall-spring
campaign, in order to implemont their war of attrition and to inflict
enough casualties on the American and allied troops to "break the imperialists
will of aggression."
In this appeal, the presidium defined their strategy during the fall-
which ends in April, 1967:
spring offensive,
(More)
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Deepe
Series-article five of five-article series
page 6
1. The Viet Cong-North Vietnamose main forces to sorach soarch out
and engage American allied main forces far by using mobile warfare tactics.
2. The Viet Cong regional (provincial) mobile unite to assemble
deeply into the areas contented both by the government and the Viet Cong to
or in the government-controlled areas to attack the American and allied forces
and installations.
3. The Communist guerrilla forces to attack Vietnamese government
pacification programs, which are coreened by American units, and and to
carry sabotage against roads, rivers, bridges and allied installations.
4.
The political, economic, cultural and financial Communist cadres living
in the government-controlled areas, particularly the cities, to induce Vietnames
the Vietnamese population, army and government officials to rebel exx against
or to paralyze the Vietnamese government of Prime Minister Hyg Nguyen Cao Ky.
e
On this success or failure of the Communist campaign scheduled to
end in April of this year may well rest the key dank appese assessment
of whether
by American and Vietnamese poliomak pa policymakers
forces can win this agonizing, which-way war.
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believe the allied
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Date
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1967, Jan. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B118, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
