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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08464 to 363-08471.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08464 to 363-08471
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Title
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Part one of a five part series on the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "SERIES- article one of five - article series", Keever's title: N/A, Article draft about part one of a five part series on the Vietnam War, for The North American News Alliance
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Deepe
With Series-biographical data
Beverly A. Deepe, 30, has served as a war correspondent in Vietnam
for five years-longer than any other American journalist. Arriving on
Valentine's Day, 1962, she found Saigon of slow pacod little tom with
Paris-styled sidewalk cafes; today, it is a big city with New York-type
traffic jams the sidewalk cafes have faded into rock 'n roll bars
with anti-grenade grilling on the windows.
In 1962, she covored the 3000 American advisors, some of whom lived
in dusty, remote provincial capitals; today, American brigado and division
headquarters for the 380,000 American troops dot the same towns. Vietnamese
troops were then ferried into battle in the forty antiquated "banana boat"
helicopters in Vietnam; today more than 1500 of the world's most modern,
electronically-equipped 'copters
shuttle in American GI's. In one month
Vietnamese troop casualties in one month in 1962 were less than one day's
NE YEARS
mericanar casualties in 1967.
native of Carleton, Nebraska, Miss Deepe attended the University
of Nebraska,
raduating as a Phi Beta Kappa in 1957. She then attended the
Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, gradu ting with honors
the following year. She was previously associated in Vietnam with Newcok and
the now-extinot New York Herald Tribune.
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Deepe
With Series-Photos
beret.
Photos of Beverly Deepe in camouflage helment and Vietnamese airborne
Please return the negatives to Beverly Deepe; % JUSPAO; APO 96243;
San Francisco, California.
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severly Ann Deepe
64A Hong Thap Tu
Saigon, Vietnam
January 14 1967
SERIES article one of fivo-articlo sorios
pago I
FOR RELEASE: FEBUARY 7th.
SAIGON--Two years ago today, American fighter-bomborn plunged, through tho
overonst, mid-afternoon akties of Vision and roided
The bombing raids, which continued relentlessly since were followed five weeks
later by the arrival of the first American ground unto into South Vietnam.
Today, two years later, the pivotal question is: om merion on her allies
win the war and thus save South Viola from future Communist control?
The crucial over is to be found in the fluid events of 1967--the your
of decision in this which-way war.
Cant"
Some senior Western diplomatic sources have already proclamed to their
home capitals that Vietnam is a on win" war. Other informed source all it
"the un-winnable, un-loseble" stalemate wer. High placed American sources, usually
with some conditions and uncertainty, maintain the war can still bo on, other
American Bay Vietnam is already lost. From the best information available to
this correspondent, one may safely deduct that the mr question is still unanswered
and that the koy gasessment is to be made by ranking American and South Vietnamese
loaders during 1967; this assessment will determine with untold rifiontions
the future not only of Vietnam, but also of non-Communist Asia as well as the
outcome of subversive-guerrilla wers or "Revolutionary s" yet to be fought
on other continents.
(More)
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deopo
Dage "2
SERIES article one of five-article series
To the outside world, the controversial American motion-the bombing of the
North and the introduction of American combat troops in the South-initiated the
Unitol states acanlation of the Vietnam conflict. Within South Viotaan, the action
was viewed as Anorion's counter-escalation to the long years of Communist subversive
guorrille uerfero and to late 1964 the "invisible invasion" of well-armed companies
and battalions from orth Vietnen.
The effects of this counter-escalation can be summed up ass a negative sucess
51
one which stoved off the Communist inevitable out not necessily immediate seizure
of power within the Southern republic.
Yet, the bombing of the north initiated in 1965, while it made more difficult
the infiltration of troops and supplies from North, Vietnam, failed to slow down
the rate infiltration. In fact, Communist strength imported from North Vietnam, is
still mushrooming, from the average of 3,000 men a month in 1965 to mon
month in 1966 and may be higher in 1967.
10.000
Tho introduction of American combat troope within the South Vietnam, ile
U.S
it averted the eventual Communist take-over, achieve neither their mility objectivo
of crushing even denting the Communist organised meinforge white, nor of rogaining
and expending the anti-Communist politionl control in the countryside. The
American combat troops, softened, but did not solve the military problems within
South Vietnam; and more significent they created addition-l politiael, mooi-l ad
economic problems which may be beyond solution. In short, vilo they provented
South Vietnem from going Communist, they have for from scouried its victory. Two
yours later, the Vietnamese countryside is still largoly for Con unist rule;
the urban centers in a state of latent anti-AmerionVeurrootional.
(More)
m
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deepe
SERIES-article one of five-article series
page 3
If the key assessment made during 1967 by Washington and Saigon in that the
wer can be won, high-ranking leaders here openly admit the ordeal will be a pro-
longed, bloody, costly struggle lasting for years; struggle in which the dicisive
successes will not come simply in militery victories and pinpoint bombing raida,
but also in quietly, undranatically re-establishing political-economic booi l-
and
stability progress in the South Vietnamese villages. And order in the cities.
If the kay sonment of 1967 is that the war on not be won, these are the
crushing alternativos opon to America end her allies:
I. Defest. In hushed tonen at the highest circles, Anerion officiel,
speaking in private, concede that the war and South Vietnam can be lost, thus
Events
touching off disasterous chain-reaction of adverse events throughout Asia as well
an other under-developed lands. "American on not te pushed out militarily," 料 one
senior official here explained. (Communist sources privately agree with this
judgment). "But the danger is being sucked out politically." A neat blend of
political-economic-military attacks--especially before the American Presenttial
election in 1968, when the country is most divided and unlooided-could conceivably
not the Communist a strategi victory in South Vietnen nd a crushing American
defent. Intelligence sources estinato, for example, that in the midst of political
which
upheavals in South Vietnam-such as the Buddhist crisis happened last spring-the
Communist could seize Saigon during a crucial period with a strength equivalent
to three divisions of combat troops or which already ring the capital city.
(More)
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eo pe
SERIESrticle one of five-article satios
page 4
2. Negotiations.
The most discusso and most probable alter tive of
negotiations opens up the passibility of a compromise military-political bottlement
something like this: the American troops withdrawal or de-escalation would give
the three world the appesence of a tik military victory, while admission of
Communist or pro-Communist londors into the Saigon regime at the central government
them
Lovol would give the future political power for a slow-motion take-over.
The
However, officials who stuly carefully captured Communist documents already warn
that the Vietnamese Communists have no intention of making the same mistakes
the Communists made in Indonesia: which was sending known Communist or ro-Communist
Failing
members into a coalition arrangement, but forting to maintain their secret ulver-
sive underground org nisations with which they will be capable of soining eventual
n total political ojot time, the objective of the Liberation
W
Front of South Vio tnam at would be achieved politically in slow-motion what
could not be robieved militarily on the battlefield: the oventu 1, ocle represent-
tion of the South Vietnamese people, and the re-unification of North and South
Viotn tho vozed objective of the Henoi regine--would be postponed five to te
years. Contrary to popular opinion, sources here believe that the beginning of
mean
west-Communist dicoussions do not necessarily negotiations;t the end of
nogotiations do not necessarily man peace-but could also f mean the introduction
of a nor type of political and miten var.
these sources lo note that the closer Vietnam comes to the Conference table
bloodior the battles will be on the battlefield.
(More)
the
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oope
UMRI-rticle one of five-ticle Bories
Fage 5
3. A bigger war-probably regional, possibly global nd nuclear. This
the
alternative preupposes that Communists believe they are winning, that they can
echieve a total Amorion-allied political-military defent, and hence reject
no otation. The morion sond horf1lios unable to scouro nogotiations and
un villing to coopt defeat, would then escalate from a limited to
not global war, with the objective offt hitting Chinese Communist nucloor
production plants with either conventional or nuclear ir power.
regional, if
The reverse argument within the alternative is th t the Communist bloc,
should it be on the brink of defont might choose, large cole land wer with
the An orican-alia troops in several countries instead of negotiations. In
this case, the United States would have not choice but to react with nuclear
OVERWHELMING
power to n Communist initiated push by none mimorous conventional ground forcos.
sinoe the American bombing of Borth Vietnam two years ago, this alternative
has grown in credence. Within South Vietnam * XE alone there is more talk
of a possible nucloer ver ond of a world-wide Communist-free world Conrontation.
Sultana
Sall factora sive use to those foors the escalation on the Communist side
in which Chinoso Consist labor and potential fighting forces have boon sent
to Worth Vietnam, the small number of Chinose Communist military cadre now in
outh Vietna, the frequent noknowledgement on radio Pazing that "orth Vietnam
rear base for South Vie them and Chinn is roer base for North Vietnam."
By the arme tot on the construction of three U.. air bec in Thailand
and one in South Vietnam capable of handling giant B.52 joto, which can deliver
Doriona auoler punch to Chin nd mom pro joated construction of nuclear
SPARRED CONCERN
subm rino base on South Vietnamese territory on alco opold Comore.
is
(More)
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doopo
Beries article one of five-article series
Fage 6
Comp
Somewhere within the vast range of these three alternative t the events of
1967 will probably begin to mold the outcome of this shiek Dempio fluid which
way ver.
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Date
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1967, Jan. 14
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B118, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
