-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-07185 to 363-07204.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-07185 to 363-07204
-
Title
-
Second article about the state of the Vietnam War
-
Description
-
Original title: "COMMUNIST", Keever's title: "Communists push 'People's War' for Countrywide Offensive", Second of a two part series of articles about the state of the Vietnam War focussing on the communist side, for the Christian Science Monitor
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
2020 086
uu-ljp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 1 (Normess/Deepe)
(This is the second of a two-part series explaining why
the Communists are optimistic about the course of the ground war
in South Vietnam. The first article elaborated on the equally
optimistic views of General William C. Westmoreland "s command here).
SAIGON, December While General William C. Westmoreland
has portrayed his enemy as sliding towards defent, the Communists view
themselves as re-escalating the ground wer in South Vietnam towards
"decisive victory."
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
5020 886
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST (Nomass/Deepe)
The Communist leadership recently issued orders for a precise
EL STRATEGIC
escalation by jumping from the "wer of attrition" to the "ger of
Per post
ennbiliation." This up-grading in their tactical military objectives
moon they are but one step away from their ultimates perfection of a
Vietnamese blend of classical Meo-ist guerrilla warfare in the countryside
and orthodox Soviet-styled Revolutionery uprisings in the cities. This
would prefbym presumably mean a synthetic way to seize power and en
an American defent in Vietnam.
MODO Reuter
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
2050 026
-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 3 (Normans/Denpe)
The summer of 1967 marked the beginning-only the beginning-of
the climax of the military conflict; the end le months, if not years,
away. The bitter battlos of the DHE, Loc Ninh and Dak To nezked the
prelude to the most monontous period the ground-war the route to the pp
pinnacle will enteil its bloodiest battles.
The strategic drama behind the headlines of these future battles
will unravel the answer to the crucial questions will the Communist
ground-oconlation suceed or fail?
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
2020 386
uu-ljp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMURIST 4 (Horanss/Doope)
While General Westmoreland has statistically portrayed his
onomy as suffering such hoavy menpower losses that en Anerioen troop p
phase-out is envisioned, the Communist high command has demonstrated it
has amassed bigger end bigger units to fight increasingly-intense battles
for more and more days on an over-inorossing number of battle-fronts.
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
2020 Sag
uu-lip
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 5 (Noxanas/Deepe)
How orn both the Amoricen and Communist military leadership
simultaneously be claining progress?
How on n both commends strategically appraise the state of
the military ver in diametrically opposed evaluations?
Are bothe commands oven talking about the sene wer?
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
Boso ong
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 6 (Normass/Deepe)
The commends of General Westmoreland and the Communist
leadership are talking about the same military war--but different
fragments of that war. And they are looking at it from different terms
of reference-different fremes of perspective. It might be pictured as
though General Westmoreland's command were looking at the war through
a rosy-colored telescopic lens and the Communists peering at it through
equally rose wide-angle lense lens. Or the American command watching
the war unwind from a bleak-white-grey filmstrip onto a conventionalised
military screen Communists see it in technicolor on a cinemascope.
General Westmoreland's commend sounding out the war off a mono-aural track
Or
and the Communists from stereo.
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
3030
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 7 (Normass/Deepe)
Or that General Westmoreland's commend judgment of the
American headquarters is based on the science of statistics and the
Communist evaluation is based on the science of trigonometry. Both
have established scientific evidence for their appraisals (perhaps not
accurately projected to the public) but they employ different sciences.
The Commmunists have, in short, added a new dimension to
warfare. They are fighting a 3-D war. This new dimension, the orucial
ingredient, is the native population. Hence, their term, "the peopääs
War".
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
2000 586
u-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 8 (Normann/Deepe)
This 3-D war might be visualised an a
nearly-completed
pyramid three triangles slapped together with their common peak
not yet in place. One of the three triangular faces of the pyramid
represents the political faoot of the wors the neocnd face represents
the socio-economic aspect, the third face represents the military
aopost. The military fece of the pyramid is slanted to the
outdo world; it is the visible, dramatic, moving plane that
Amoricens road about in the newspapers or coe on le nightly
two
tv nowefilms. Yet, the other triangular planes,
generally
invible cuted de Vietnam, aro equally import and solidly integrated
into the Communist structure. If one or both of these
triangular faces wore to fall away or buckel buske buckle, the
pyramid pyramid whole pyramid would become unstable or wear
en crumble.
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 9
--------------------
un-1.jp
SAIBAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 9 (Normess/Deepe)
The Communists have built their pyramid systomatically
co that each of the three sidos re-inforces the other two. But they
currently asscess assess the two invisible faces--the political triangle
and the socio-economic trianglo- asboing neurer to complotion than
the military fnoc.
These Communist assessments 32 are made known not ou
only through their radio broadcaste to the outside world, but also
through captured documente sitt weiten written for their own
their officiel instruction and internal Communist
clasified uses,
consumption.
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 10
--------------------
2020 386
uu-13p
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMUNIST x 10 (Normans/Deepe)
From their standpoint, the recent elections for a
constitutional government in saigon--much lua lauded by the
American government-re not a defeat; they are a major
advantage. The Communists maintain the election was
American-ziggod. and hence the Vietnamese population is oven more
disgusted with and more removed from the "puppet regime" in
Saigon. The endemio inflation and corruption within the
South Vietnamese government apparatus, in their viewpoint,
has helped to build their socio-economic side of the pyramid.
More Fouter
--------------------
- Page 11
--------------------
sosc sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 11 (Normass/Deepe)
They view construction on the military side as
progressing more slowly and hence are putting moro of their
manpower to work on that side of the pyramid.
The current level of Communist optimism is based on the
view that the addition of nearly half-million American
combat troops into the war has not muhit
crushed
or destroyed their pyramidal structure--that they are still continuing to
mako progress by towards putting the last part-the pinnacle--in
place.
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 12
--------------------
2020 896
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMUNIST 12 (Normass/Deepe)
The construction of the people-pyramid x has taken the
Communist a number of yd years and hence progress for them is measured
in their own time-framo.
Initial construction began on the two invisible sides
of the pyramid--laying bricks on the bed of the peasant's political
Amorican-backed
and economic disillusionment with the central government in Saigon,
Ta This political-struggle process began in 1957 and by 1960
the Communist architects had convinced a chunk of the rural
population to take up arms against the saigon-based governmental
machinery. Thus, the guerrillad war began, born by the Comuns
Communist Party, but fought by the peasantry.
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 13
--------------------
2020 sag
uu-1.jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 13 (Normass/Deepe)
The guerrilla war was the beginning of construction of
the military face of the pyramid--and then the outside began to
take note of the formont within the South.
WAS
Consg Construction of the military triangular face was
systematically organized into three phases--and coordinated wi
simulte simultaneously with the building on the other two faces.
JespeHD
Military Phase 1 was im guerrilla warfaro-broad-bases
of small bands of part-time fighters and part-time farmers who had
the dual stuporeman strategic purpose of waging a war of attrition
S
against and annhiliating the Vietnamese government officialdom
and small platoons and squads. This phase has never ended-it is
still a a mini minute-to-minute part of tin today's war, although
largely ignored by more spectacu spectacular events.
This is still
the 'base of the military triangle and the Communists have simply st
stacked more bricks onto it to introduce Phase 2.
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 14
--------------------
2020 006
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 14 (Normass/Deepe)
In this second phase, larger Communist units of
companies and battalions, recruited from the Vietnamese
population, but cadred by Communist Party members, wagod engagements
along a fluid, momentary, mobile frontline to annhiliate the
government forces. Construction of this phase lasted until tionAL
Decambor, 1964. Thon, the Communists initiated Phase 3 with
a vicious regimental-sized engagement in the An Lao Valley
in the northern provinces-end still a perpetual hotp
SPOTO
trouble
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 15
--------------------
2020 sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 15 (Normans/Deepe)
Phase 3 accelerated quickly and the Communists
ED
a had virtually-succeeded in wiping out the Saigon government's
elite strategic reserve of Marine and paratrooper battalions,
were rushed to and from the battlefield while also suppressing
street one oires in Saigon.
who
By early 1965, the Communists had sus sued
progressing from the sub-he sub-phase of the "war of attrition"
to the pa "Higher higher sub-phase of the "war of annhiliation."
Cand defeated
In short, the Communists had virtually annhilisted the Saigon
forces
More reuter
--------------------
- Page 16
--------------------
8020 806
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 16 (Normass/Deepe)
In effect more and more brickor bricks were feverishly
piled on to build the military triangl)-they were almost ready
to plop the pinnacle atop the pyramid.
Then, suddenly the American ground-troop build-up in
March, 1965. The Communists remained suspended in Phase 3. They
did not fade away,
to guorrilla warfare.
Phase
nor even cetim contemplate retrogressing solely
D.D RES
They moved from sub-phase "wer of annhiliation"
-the strategic purpose
Change D
But Not
back to sub-hase "war of crib attrition,"
woaring out the Allied forces out wiping thom out.
Construction
$/
stopped on the military face as the pyramid, and a fow layer of bricks th
Soug
wore lost as the Communists and
LES
BALA
ESTABLISH H
hastily reinforced from
THE Commun.STS
North Vietnam, recruited locally. Meantime, the guerrilla base
encircled the Allied forces around their installations in the
CommuniST
countryside and suburbs. etr regional forces sought
in their military Love
Loss
fleeing, short-time battles with the Allies, winning, in their
viow, a number of them. After all, they suffered my casualties;
the Americans were
principally political can
oreated a volit vollte volatile impact at homo.
More Reuter
which
--------------------
- Page 17
--------------------
2020 506
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 17 (Nommess/Deepe)
Then, in mid-1967, with the campaign along the IME,
the Communists again started to pile on the bricks; the pyramid
started again to inte. Strategically
9
Now
they shifted from
"attrition" onoo aggin to "annhiliation"-ot this time against
"puppet" troops, but against the most powerful nation in history.
tThey see the "puppet" army as increasingly ineffectual and
militant and an increasing cleavage between that army and the
American forces. They see the American military build-up of As
helping them accelerate the building of the political and socio-economic
faces of the pyramid, with growing dissensions between the Americans
and the Vietnamese government and population. They believe the
Perceus
Vietnamese people now buttevo what Communist por propagandists said
years ago that the aggressor Americans would seek to colonize
Vietnam in a more cunning and subtle way than the French.
More Reuter
--------------------
- Page 18
--------------------
2020 886
uu-10p
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 18 (Normass/Deepe)
Internationally, they see the American establisment
as more isolated from their allies and neutral countries, with
PEAC
growing dissatisfaction at home, not only front from students,
will
but average citizens who would pay the President Johns tax
BALL
hike of the "john #jo "Johnson clique" and are burying their
own sons and husbands.
(semamsax
Preservin
Honce, the Communists are optimistic for maintaining
their Phase 3 mm and, currently, for adding momontum to its
sub-phasos.
(More) Reuter
--------------------
- Page 19
--------------------
2020 006
uu-1.jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNIST 19 (Normass/Deepe)
Affairs
(some su students of Communist organization actually
S/Militar
believe the Communist are currontly in phase Phase 4. "The
Communists have h surpassed Mao's classical three phases," ono
of these students explained. "They have enterode phase
four by importing troops from North Vietnam. Nover
OUT-
Country
in history has an in a guerrilla war been won by forcing troops).
More Router
--------------------
- Page 20
--------------------
8020 986
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
COMMUNI @
(Normass/Deepe)
The advent of the return to the strategy of annhiliation
has peaked the Communist organization Stron strength at nine
AD
divisions, although General Westmoreland argues these divisions
are well below their 100 normal 10,000-man strength.
the DMZ, they have opened battlefronts in other significant
areas to t reaching to the Saigon defense perimeter.
And from
In the
captured Communist prisoners rooited
three-weak battle of Dak To
their now slogan of the war:
to fight fiercely, to fight continuously,
to fight everywhere, to fight for annhiliation.
If this construction period is successful, the
Communists will push onto the the all-front (political, military
socio-economic) general (country-wide) attack, with street
fighting in the cities and Mao-ist military exextram
tactics in the countryside. If they succeed, the political,
socio-economic and military triangles will be joined und mon
comented in placed. They will have completed the pinnacle
of their people-pyramid.
top
(Hanks I'll octu continue next week with military
FSC
pieces will Bob is working on the non-military pieces. I'll
Ma
file shorter pieces, however. Letter entroute on administrative details.)
End Router
-
Date
-
1967, Dec. 8
-
Subject
-
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Military leadership; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam; Vietnam (Democratic Republic). Quân đội
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6311
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B7, F5
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Collector
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English
