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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07163 to 363-07184.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07163 to 363-07184
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Title
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First article about the state of the Vietnam War
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Description
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Original title: "Military", Keever's title: "Gen. Westmoreland's Optimism Follows General U.S. Confidence", First of a two part series of articles about the state of the Vietnam War and American optimism, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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2020 sag
uu-ljp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 1 (Normass/Deepe)
(This is the first of a series on the two totally
divergent views of the state of the military war in Vietnam. This
article explains why General William C. Westmoreland's command
here is optomistic on the Allied side. The second article delineates
why the Communist side is equally optomistic).
SAIGON, December 7--The top optomism of
General William C. Westmoreland and his top subordinates here
on the progress of Vietnam's military war is based on simple
arinet
arithmetic and a teensy bit of miracle-mongering.
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2020 sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 2 (Normass/Deepe)
Con
This optomism,
WED
univered unveiled at length officially,
is relegated conveniently almost exclusively to the so-called
main-force war. This is largely the American sphere of the war
versus the North Vietnamese "invasion"
forces. This spectacular
confrontations between American and North Vietnamese units--sometimes
their divisions na nose-to-nose--is increasingly
assuming a conventionalized,
Korean-styled character;
Boiling
beneath
it excludes the volcanic armed military insurgency I
the surface.
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ZO ZO
sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 3 (Normess/Deepe)
The mathematical exercises performed by the American
HAVE
officialdom here been refined to a
quasi-sophisticated science
defined by scores of statisticians, human calculators and rather
tempermental computers (which immmmm are influenced by monsoon
rains and saigon's erratic electricity).
The arithmetic of General Westmoreland's command
runs something like this: a significant proportion of the North
Vietnamese regular army is tied down in their home country by the
threat of an American invasion and by their duties of keeping
open the heavily-bombed z logistical lines of communication.
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zC2C sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 4 (Normass/Deepe)
Add to this a sizeable chunk of the North's invasion forces
which has been or will be "ground down" in the South Vietnam.
Subtract the sum of these two from the total North Vietnamese
regular army strength. The remainder indicates that North Vietnam can
funnel into the South the same quantity it has already committed there
in the past three years.
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zczc sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 5 (Normass/Deepe)
out
In short, the allies have wiped at nearly half the North
Vietnamese regular army not
tied
down in the North, and the second
half yet to be committed the American command believes, can be eradicated
within the next year or so. Then a phased subtraction, of American combat
SUBTRACKon
troops can begin.
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zczc sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 6 (Nommass/Deepe)
(To outsiders, this mathematical exercise appears to be
an algebraic equation of unknownx. But for the military command, the
arithmetic figutionused are known estimates. These estimates, which
Te overall North Vietnamese order of battle, are classified. In
the early 19606s, however, the regular army strength of North Vietnam
was officially listed as 400,000 men-roughly 2,5 repeat two decimal
five percent of its total population. Since the bombing of North
Vietnam began in 1965, the Hanoi regime has called up its reserve
units to augment its regulars. It has also dramatically increased its
village militia.
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zozo sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 7 (Normass/Deepe)
(The American military command recently estimated
the to main co Communist main forces in the South totalled
more than half
118,000, of which thengxity
witymam were of North Vietnamese
origin. This estimate rate of 118,000 regular forces is
a reduction from the 127,000-man peak in September of last year).
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2020 sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 8 (Normass/Deepe)
600,000-M
The subtract-out of American combat troops, however,
requires a complete transformation, if not a re-birth, of the
Vietnamese armed forces to fill the resulting power vacuum.
Knowledgeable sources,ahoma both American and Vietnamese, regard this
as x demanding something close to a mini-miracle. These sources
believe the Vietnamese armed forces can still be re-organized, But
having heard such inflated promises and seen such meagre
performances in the past, they have adopted a cynical wa
wait-and-see attitude.
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zcze sag
uu-1jp
SIIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 9 (Normass/Deepe)
Indeed, the tantalizing question here is not so much whether
this transformation will occur, but whether the American troops will be
phased-out even if it does not. This school of speculation, discussed
by officials in hushed tones, suggests that the phase-out of American
troops, having virtually defeated the Communist main forces, would be
ATE
have garnered a rather glorious military victory, if the Saigon
vernment was still unprepared for the phase-out, it would be left to
its own if it meant the possibility of a Communist victory in the insurgency.
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Zozo sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 10 (Normass/Deepe)
the optimistic
American military sources said the Communists are
implementing a "border strategy" by building three big-unit
concentrations hugging the frontiers of South Vietnam. The se
sources believe the pattern of the main-force war has bounced,
like a hectic pinball machine, from one of these pivot areas
to the next--and that the American forces have masterfully won
each of these campaigns. They believe the big-unit war
will continue in the coming months to gyrate between these three
key arpass
the denied demilitarized zone on the north,
the three-border frontier where Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam
join and the Communists' war-zone complexes rumming
towaru Tayninh province and the Cambodian border.
ing
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20 20
sag
uu-1.jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY
(Normass/Deepe)
"These three main pressure concentrations will continue
CRIAL
to be importe in the future," one
SOURCE
offer explained.
American military
"The Communists are going to try to keep
thee
their main-forces alive, to keep using them as a threat, but
close enough to border sancu sanctuaries where fe can pump
them up, re-equip and feed them.
from these border concentrations,
casualties."
They will fight
but they'll try to reduce their
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zozo sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 12 (Normass/Deepe)
A rundown on these three R critical hotspots
Bogins with the
The DMZ. This is still the Communists' most significant
and serious military threat in the eyes of American military officials.
The Communists now maintain two divisions in and around the demilitarized.
from Con This to Leas
Key
zone
and has roads into the area over which he readily mover,
round-the-clock
American bombing, a wide array of artillery and rockets.
despite
The
DIZ campaign, recently quiet as the battle grounds k pivoted to
Loc Ninh and Dak To, is now beginning to flare up again. Recent
reports indicate Con Thie is receiving more than 100 rounds of
artillery and rocket-fire daily. This is still far below the peak
during September when 600 to 1000 rounds daily was sprayed along the
N
Con Thien area. The Americans countered then with 6000 rounds of
heavy artillery, more than eighty per cent of the B-52 strategic
durr
THE PERIOD
airstrikes and more than one ho 100 г fighter-bomber tactical
airstrikes daily.
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2020 sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 13 (Normass/Deepe)
This heavy firepower,
plus unseasonably bad flooding
along Communist supply lines, quieted the area in October until
December, but evidence now suggests the Communist forces are again
building up their units and ammunition stockpiles. This is one of
the pivotal reasons American military sources are so adamantly and
publicablly against an extended bombing pause during the upcoming
holiday season.
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2020
uu--1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 14 (Normass/Deepe)
American sources said the Communists have suffered
up to an estimated 10,000 killed along the demilitarized zone
during the past year, giving the American Marines a kill-ratio
of better than six to one. American military officials are
el particularly optomistic about the results of DMZ
campaign, ich besar Fy1966 and are confident that the
Marines, who have remained in position along the line, will
succeed again should the Communists £ venture down through the
uzman Beginning in July, 1966,
Duz again.
the
on-again, off-again grev DMZ actions have constituted
the longest, bloodiest campaign of the war to date.
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2020 sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 15 (Normass/Deepe)
"If the Communists come back down and am through
the demilitarized zone, there will be heavy fighting once again,"
"The Marines have retained their
one military source explained.
posture along the line to keep them out, and that will continue
to be our strategy. We have stayed south of the Ben Hai river in the
past and that also will continue to be our strategy."
The Ben Hai river is considered the dividing linenhng
natural dividing feature between the northern and southern half of
the six-mile wide demilitarized zone.
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2020
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 16 (Normass/Deepe)
and most immediately explosive
American officials consider the second area of
Communist threat to genter in the Communist base areas running
through portions of Phuoc Long, Phuoc Thanh and Tayninh provinces.
a large jungled concentration containing decades-old secret
American forges are quickly reinforcing this area.
bases called War Zone C War Zone D and Duong Minh Chau
The
recent battle of Loc n Ninh, the most axh clean-out Acr
Allied victory of the war, occured in this zone. Despite the
that Communist defeat, American sources believe
they still maintain a maximum of three divisions in that power-pocket.
Unlike the mixxx predoman predominantly North
Vietnamese composition of the divisions along the DMZ,
the
Communist units in the complex north of saigon are mixed North
Vietnamese and indigenous Southern recrui Some of these
Key man
Communist units are totally Vietna North Vietnamese, but Northerners
are also sprinkled through some of the predominantly Viet Cong units.
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2020 sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 17 (Normass/Deepe)
Also, significantly,
the Communists have amassed this
coastal areas,
concentration by sucking back their regular units from the populated
which may weaken their guerrilla and political structures
concentrations, fre fresh troops
left behind. In the other
from North Vietnam have been introduced, which forced American
coastal
commanders to reluctantly shift from the populated areas while the opposin
Communist main force divisions have remained"
fluence the
Population @
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2020 sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 18 (Normass/Deepe)
The third ammmmmiff concentration is called the B-3
area-ti where the borders of South Vietnam, Loa Laos and
Despite losing an estimated 1600 troops in
three-week-long
Still
Cambodia join.
the bat recent /battle of Dak To, the Communists have organized
and maintained two divisions in the area.
Unlike the DMZ,
this area is not known to have roads leading into it and hence
the Communists have more difficulty in re replacing combat
losses and replenishing supplies.
"American, forces are still posed in that area for
Che Enemy
him,"
nows
one source explained. "While the battle zone is quiet
we'll have to keep our eyes on it."
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zcze sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 19 (Normass/Deepe)
POWER
Aside from these three potent border concentrations,
a string of inland pockets of less formidable Communist men
main force strength unravels from the DMZ southwards half
the length of the country. These inland blotches, of up to a
division in strength, lie in the Piedmont area between the populated,
The Tich-ti rice-rich coastal plains and the eastern rises
of the Annamite chain.
The Communists maintain these
miniams divisions--
but weak divisions--to sustain and support their guee guerrilla network
and political infrastructure as they attempt to wreck the government's
pacification program. Odixi.nemom West of the old imperial capital
of Hue,
the northernmost pocket of several regiments forms a base
in the rear of the American Marine bases stretching along the
DMZ. During the summer months, American Marines were engaged in
several sharp, company-sized engagements with these Communist units
but lately the pocket has been quiescent.
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2020 sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 20 (Normass/Deepe
Another pocket lies south of Danang where the Second
North Vietnamese division has been countered by a composito
American Marine-Army division equivalent.
Since the Communist
division arrived in April, American forces have killed more than
a
5000 of them, in one of the continuous, nomp sweeping operations
that has been overshadowed by the dramatic DMZ campaign.
Another pocket lics in northern Binh Dinh province,
whore the U. S. Army 1st Air Cavari Cavalry Division has been
targeted
pitched against the Third North Vietnamese Division in a series
of a sporadic, but un-spectacular firefights.
por:
Military sources
annnituxinhomimimmm another pocket lies further down
the seacoast in the province of Tuy Hoa where the Fifth North
Vietnamese Division, a rather weak one, has occasionally harrassel
harrassed the Korean forces with a peculiar kind of village fight
fighting. Mahinamymama American officials believe these
inland divisions, predominantly North Vietnamese, are having
difficulty getting supplies and personell replacements.
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ZCZO sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 21 (Normass/Deepe)
Here
Headquarte
American civilian officials agree with General Westmoreland's
command that "the Communists are taking a beating," but some
question of whether the beating is hard enough to be decisive.
Sême critics of the American military command hore believe the
13-has-
have at times exaggerated Communist battlefield a fatalities
so as to undercut the political impact of heavy American 1 losses.
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zozc sag
uu-1jp
SAIRAD
PROREUTER TOKYO
MILITARY 22 (Normass/Deope)
However optimistic i American officials appraise
the status of the war, the Communists are also confident of their
To comprehend the different viewpoints, one's
own victory.
frame of references must shift from the conventionalized
main force war to the "poople's war," in which the Communists
have added local populations as a new dimension and critical
ingredient to x military warfare. In short, if General
Westmoreland's optimism is partially based on arithmetic,
the Communists' optimism is based on
trigonometry.
(Tomorrows The Communists 3-D War).
End Reuter
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Date
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1967, Dec. 7
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Westmoreland, William C. (William Childs), 1914-2005; Strategy; Military leadership
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B7, F5
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
