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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07294 to 363-07307.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07294 to 363-07307
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Title
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First article on the prospects of peace in Vietnam in 1968
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Description
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Original title: "johnson", Keever's title: "President Johnson's Christmas Visit to South Vietnam Brought no Gift of Peace Prospects", First of a three part article series on the prospects of peace in Vietnam in 1968, focusing on President Johnson's diplomatic visit, for the Christian Science Monitor
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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zozo sag
yy-1.jp
johnson 1 (normass/deepe)
(This is the first of a three-part series on the
prospects of peace in Vietnam during 1968. This article deals
the American Position
with the viewpoint of President Lyndon Johnson and fr
The second deals with the Communist viewpoint; the third describes
the role of the South Vietnamese government headed by President
Nguyen Van Thieu).
Saigon, December 26--The Christmas visit of President
Lyndon B. Johnson to Vietnam dramatized his Administration's firm,
determined stand here--and the bleak prospects for a negotiated
peace settlement in 1968.
More Reuter
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zozo sag
yy-ljp
johnson 2 (normass/deepe)
The President, addressing American troops at
Cam Ranh Bay, alluded to he the bleak prospects for peace,
"I wish I could have brought
when he said rather wistfully:
you, too,
some sign that the struggle will soon be over--some
indication from the other side that he might be willing to let thi
suffering land heal its wounds."
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zozo sag
yy-1jp
johnson 3 (normass/deepe)
enemy
Then, the President spoke of victory: "the
cannot win, now, in Vietnam....I can bring you something more--news
of a victory that is being won, not on a battlefield, but in cities
and villages all over Asia. It is a victory of confidence... to those
who love peace."
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zczc sag
yy-1jp
johnson 4 (normass/deepe)
Tired-looking and helei clad, he spoke to the troops
not simply as their proud commander-in-chief, but also as the
HotLy - Contest
Democratic President facing an
homeland.
An election in their troubled
He promised the troops that their fellow Americans
"shall not fail you. What you have done will not have been done
in vain."
Western journalists overheard the President confide to
General William C. Westmoreland that he wished he had things as well
in hand at home as the general did in Vietnam.
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yy-ljp
johnson 5 (normass/deepe)
This statement of Presidential concern for
developments at home reinforced the mounting feeling of observers
here that the battle-lines of the Vietnam war are shifting to the
international, especially American, political arena. These
sources believe the American public opinion in 1968 may be more
decisive and significant than the bitter, chaotic events in
Vietnam itself that the fiercest battles in the jungles and
5/
thes potentially insurrection in Vietnamese cities are not
so important in themselves as they are for their "high
psychological impact" abroad.
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zC2c sag
yy-1jp
johnson 6 (normass/deepe)
This view is also known to be shared amongst at least
some of the key leadership of North Vietnam and in the Viet Cong.
Western journalists who recently interviewed high-placed Communist
officials in Cambodia indicated both North Vietnam and the Viet
Cong spoke of the decisive nature of international opinion in
an unconventional war, as well as their confidence of its
swinging to their benefit.
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johnson 7 (normass/deepe)
Hence, the President's words in Vietnam posed the
BY AMERICAS
decisive question to be answered/in 1968: will the hard, hawk-line
of American determination continue after the Presidential election,
no matter which party wins the White House?
Diplomatic officials who follow peace prospects
on a play-by-play basis believe there is little chance of
for Presidente.
negotiations until after the American election Pro-hawk
American officials here, speaking in private, have recently
been somewhat relieved and become more optimistic that even the
BEY
American elections may not be pivotal-for the Republicans
are increasingly sounding as hard-line as the Administration.
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zcze sag
yytljp
johnson 8 (normass/deepe)
Well-informed diplomatic sources and high-placed
Vietnamese officials here cite at least three reasons why the
PEACE
prospects of men's will remain dim at least until after the
November elections.
The first reason they cite at this time is the
continued disab disagreement between the Allied and Communist
side on the kind of government South Vietnam will inherit from the
Conflict
g negotiations.
Heart
This is the crux of current war and the
comber of the questions to be solved for peace their
current assessment is that the Johnson Administration wants
a Korean-styled settlement in which the conference table settles
essentially simply the wdrawal of Communist forces. They believe
the Communist side wants a "coalition" government une cook
axioms styled along Laotian
lines, but with even more advantages than that for themselves.
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zcze sag
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johnson 9 (normass/deepe)
As one diplomat explained s
"If the Americans weaken --probably through the election
A
elections, if at all-the Laotian-styled coalition government
in Saigon will still mean an American Embassy here, but with
a much reduced staff; there will still be an American a economic
mission, but with substantially less power; the American
troops would be either out of the country or else "on the we
wharfs," the Communists and their sympathizers would control at
least some of the government ministeries and departments--and they
would be the only cho cohesive political force in the country.
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johnson 10 (normass/deepe).
"But, if the Communist weaken, the Americans will
Pivot
South Vietnam into a second South Korea, with American
combat troops there to protect the borders, with a large military,
political and economic missions and with a government f
and country that is essentially anti-Communist in both domestic
and foreign affairs.
If neither the Communists nor the Americans
weaken on this crucial question,
then the war will continue at a
faster tempo."
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zcze sag
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Johnson 11 (normass/deepe
Until either side weakens on this essential issue,
then the bombing of North Vietnam is largely peripheral. North
Vietnam remains adamant that the American airstrikes cease
permanently before meaningful discussions begin; yet cessation
softening by
of the bombing raids without prior
m either side on the future South Vietnamese government would
not produce a peaceful settlement.
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zczс sag
yy-1jp
johnson 12 (normass/deepe)
The second reason dimming prospects for
peace before the American election is that neither side
views its respective military forces as losing badly enough
x to forsake their political objectives,
of
the future South Vietnamese government. In fact, the current
level of official American optimism here rests on the
assessment the Allied forces are winning the war and hence
can gain their Korean-styled settlement; but the Communists
are also conviened convinced their forces "are not losing,"
as one Hanoi source told a Western joks journalist in
and hence they are unwilling to give up
Cambodia recently,
their aim of a
Laotian-styled settlement.
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2020 sag
yy-1.jp
johnson 12 (normass/deepe)
thiệu
WFSE
Once the present on governments toppled-
PLUS
President Thiou, the constitution, and the two-house legislature-
then the Communists would "negotiate" with those non-Communists
in the cities who partiopated in
in the up
upheaval. This would be
a repeat performance of their or to negotiate with the
anti-Dein Diemists eight days after a Ngo Dinh Diom
was toppled.
This time, however, the negotio negotiations, from
Thes
their standpoint, would lead to a "coalition
a la Communists," which would in turn evolve into the upgraded
status of a provio "provisional government al a la Communist."
This tt transitional status government would probably
be in a position to demand direct talks with managem
Washington on a gracious exit for American troops, equipmont
and prestige,
End Router
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zczc sag
yy-1jp
13
johnson 12 (normass/deepe)
the second
The third reason these sources cite is associated with
thatgi negotiations are "premature"
until the political will or military strength or one or the
other side is decisively broken, although not necessarily defeated.
This view rests on the common acknowledgment here that negotiations
and heavier fighting run in parallel, that the closer to negotiations
the heavier the fighting--and that the current level of military
actions here have not yet reached
End
that stage.
More Reuter
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Date
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1967, Dec. 26
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Peace treaties; Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Visits of state; Strategy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B7, F5
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
