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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07616 to 363-07626.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07616 to 363-07626
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Title
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Article about President Lyndon Johnson's decision to hold free elections in South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "election", Keever's title: "President Johnson's push to hold free elections in South Vietnam pivots to negotiations not victory", article about President Lyndon Johnson's decision to hold free election in South Vietnam at the Honolulu Conference, for the New York Herald Tribune
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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deepe
election-page 1
march 17, 1966
SAIGON-President Lyndon Johnson'à key decision at the
Honolulu Conference to hold free elections in Vietnam "as soon as
possible"
touched off chain reaction of disorderly developments
And Buddhist- msp.RED demonster
now unraveling here.
This key decision could well become an historic turning
point not only im the evolution of the war here, but also im
the future American position regarding Communist-inspired
* "wars of liberation" in the underdeveloped Third World.
The oversimplified, git long-term gist of this key decision
is considered to be thiss the American position in Vietnam would be
prepared--or force possibly forced-to accept a political settlement
that is far less than victory but not quite capitulation.
It meant, in short, that the President was more interested
in attempting to end the war, than he was attempting to win it--
although the fanfare of the
conferences and the emphasis
OBSCO
press
on the "Other War," submerged this x key decision.
(More-Deepe)
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deepe
election
page 2
By extension,
this key decision would be the pv pivot point
affecting the the fur future direction of American capabilities
in dealing with the "war of liberation." According to the most
reliable military sources, it means "that America is no longer
a first-rate power; it is on it's way to becoming a second-rate
one for the Communists have found the limitations of one of the
I strongest nations in the world."
These sources believe that the Administration's "domino
theory" is passe, for the partial, eventual loss of Vietnam
would touch off future repercussions--not only in South East Asia-
but also thoughout the underdeveloped countries of South Americam
and Africa as well. By failing to hold a hard-line on Vietnam--and
against the Communist "war of liberation here--the United States
policy would only have conceded that the Communists have found a
productive, low-cost method to seize power in other countries like
Vietnam.
(More)
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deepe
election--page 3
These were the long-rang factors at stake for America
itself when the President mak made this key decision.
Within South Vietnam, the President's decision about holding
free elections here "as soon as possible" meant that the American
position internally was gradually shifting from supporting
aye govemment of Ford 11ne powerful group of generals offering
a hard-line, hawkish, pro-victory, anti-Communist policy to a
cive power based on civilian politicans who would be im the
majority proposing a device dovish, soft-line, pro-neutralist
policy.
This vague pro-neutralist civilian power bloc could or would
eventua 1ly evolve into an internal agreement with the National
Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam (NFLSVN)-the political
in the Coming
backbone of the Viet Cong army.
months OR
YEARS.
(More--Deepe)
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deepe
election--4
Reliable sources here believe there are two ways to
negotiate with the Com Communists. The first is an "around-the-table"
conference involving the major countries in the world, such as the
14-nation of Geneva Conference ending the F- French Indo-China
War here in 1954, and dividing Vietnam into a Communist North and a
an anti-Communist South.
The second way to negotiate is to arrange the inter
re-arrange the internal power structure within South Vietnam itself,
so that, through a gradual series of maneuvers,
interim governments
intrigues and
an eventual compromise may be reached with
the Liberation Front Communist-led Liberation Front.
The decision
Effect A
to have elections "as soon as possible" was to emp to shift into
this type of internal negotiation, reliable sources here believe.
(More-Deepe)
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deepe
election page 5
If these profound internal political re-arrangements are
an internal
made--and the Communists still refuse to accept
settlement
e in the coming months--then the Saigon regime
and the American position will be in a virtually hopeless
Rrd
position, with a powerful pro-neutralist
COVERT
possibly pro-Communist
eloments holding der the key elex reins of power without a/
strong anti-Communist forces to counter them.
Highly reliable Vietnamese sources have revealed here
that at the Honolulu Conference, President Johnson
first
for A
after a national
proposed to General Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky that elections
should be held in June of this year-ahortly
constituion had been hastily drafted and accepted at a referendum.
ASSEM
Prime Minister Ky disagreed-not on the election, but on the
Ky was previously on
timing, a ccording to reliable sources.
record in his two-year program to do just as the President proposed,
but believed that he needed two years instead of three months to
pacify enough of the countryside, both militarily and politically,
before the election pould be held. By government estimates, the
Currently
Saigon regime controls & roughly fifty percont of the population;
the Viet Cong control twenty five percent and the remaining twenty
five percent are considered contested.
(More-Deepe))
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deepe
election--page 6
National Pecification
At the end of the two-year program, Prime Minister
Ky is known to have estimated that seventy six percent of the
country would have beem controlled by the anti-Communist government
This would have
side--if the plan was decently implemented.
given him in the election a fairly anti-Communist legislative
assembly--since the junta had been responsible for approving the
election laws and the list of candidates."The legislative assembly
Coll
may have been responsible for naming the next prime minister--if
Adopted
that system of government was drafted in the constitution.
NALLY
the
However according to highly reliable sources,
Femminentnohnson Prime Minister Ky convinced the President
Johnson that elections for June were much too early and they
compromised for "as soon as possible, probably in early 1967,"
which was about nine or ten months before Ky's two-year plan
had been completed.
(More-Deepe)
the
So, throughout the fanfare of the Honolulu Conference,
world thought that the President was backing not only Ky the man,
his plan and his military junta. In fact, however, the President
backed only a man--but uide his decision on the election undermined
the plan as well as the survival of ye the ten-man ruling junta,
which was the only solid base of power behind Ky.
(More-Deepe)
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deepe
election page 7
No sooner did the Vietnamese delegation arrive back im
iN amid
Saigon on February
-along with Vice President Hubert Humphrey--
than the word spread like wildfire among the Saigon politicians
that "President Johnson wanted to have elections as soon as
press possible."
Politically, the the internal situation had been in a
HAD Grown
state of dormant ferment, Vietnamese resentmont grow at the
way the Honolulu Conference was handled. The "Radio Hanoi"
line was that "Ky had gone to Honolulu to report to his Americam
boss." Because of the short notice here--and the unilateral
announcement in Washington about the conference-most Saigone se
actually believed the Hanoi version.
PAST
Mistroically, the more
ed
closely alified the American administration has become at embracing
Vietnamese leaders--the more difficult it is for them to survive-
for the teek appear more pro-American than pro-Vietnamese
to their highly nationalistic citizenry.
(More-Deepe)
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deepe
elections--page 8
Vietnamese political and religious oppositions oppositionists
to the military junta soon after Honolulu began holding secret
consultations and open conferences. Is all they needed to move
was a proper prext pretext.
That pretext happened on March 10 (27 da
days after Honolulu
Conference ended), when the ten-man junta met at the & Vietnamese
High Command and sommerfym voted to oust on of the members named
Lt. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi, a dymanmic ex-paratrooper commander who
lead an abortive coup d'etat against the late President Ngo Dinh
Diem on November 11, 1960.
an occasional
The American Embassy is known to have been notified in advance
of this ouster--and did nothing to stop it, accepting Ky's version
that a prior agreement had been made with the powerful, militant
Buddhist leaders in Central Vertha Vietnam. Thi,
ally of the Buddhists, was born in their stronghold area of Hue-
Bild that.
and commanded the First Military Corps where the most extremist
elements wweilded ax immense power--and where, ironically, nearly
40,000 U. S. Marines are dying on th in their fight against the
Communists in the countryside.
(More--Deepr)
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deepe
election page 9
Two days later, the Buddhist leadership at a press conference--
BETRAYE!
while not be trying Prime Minister Ky by supporting Thi--began an
enormous
campaign to iigidamamihommikuhamymm weaken the military
junta byx and by calling for a "rushing-up" in the process to
have am an elected legislative body and civilian regime "as
soon as possible," as the President, too, had requested.
"In fact, the Buddhists pulled a lulu of on the President,"
according to one highly reliable source.
words of Honolulu and pinned him to them.."
"They took the President's
anti-government drive against
The Buddhists spearheaded the
the late President No Ngo Dinh Diem in and in November, 1963, with
unofficial American backing, toppled him. Since then, the
Buddhist strength--and suspicions about the movement-have grown
ever sinc
@
Especially the Central Vietnam wing of the Buddhists are considered
heavily penetrated by Communist agents; some Buddhist anti-Communists
estimate that between 50-70 per cent of that wing of the movement--the
most powerful element--is infiltrated by Communist agents or
pro-Communist cadre.
(More-Deepe)
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deepe
election page 10
The behind-the-scene leader of the Central Vietnamese wing
is the Venera ble Thich Tri Quang, the anemic monk who was granted
9
dur
political asylum in the American Embassy under the Diem crisis--
Tri Quang, ace acclained
when Lodge was here on his first tour.
to be one of the finest politicans in the country, is widely
considered to be a Communist,
though sources disagree on whether
he's a Tito Communisys
singum hational Communist,
such as
Tito. In his early years,
he studied under Thich Tri Do, now
head of the North Vietnamese Buddhist Association; tomy
hence, Tri Quang can answer questions in the best of Marxist
terminology as well as Buddhist theological to terms. Age
Nationwide
While, the countryside Buddhist movement is badly splintered,
it can be quickly unified by raising a protest against a common
enemy the Catholics-and this is the significant significance of
the Buddhist demands for the ouster of junta Chairmam General
Nguyen Van Thiou, who is a converted Catholic and also serves as the
political chief of state. Currently, other Catholic generals were also
d.
demanded to be oustered from the m₁ military junta and a their field
commands--and their positions taken over by other generals who were
dismissed in previous purges for being on charges of being "pro-French
a nd pro-neutralist."
(More-Deepe)
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deepe
election-page 11
Part of the Buddhist feverish emotionalism about the Catholics
is that they are "an imported foreign religion" which was closely
identified with the colonial French regime, as well as claimed
persecutions axhontmiram of the Buddhists by Catholic President Diem.
On the other side of the coin, the Catholics in Vietnam are the
most anti-Communist Vietnamese element and along with the Vietnamese
a rmy and the American army form the three pillars of anti-Communist
strength in the country.
Hence, by attacking the Catholics-and soon the Amerivans--
and by consistently applying an i-government pressure against
s some of the past regimes, the Buddhist movement is
directly or indirectly a betting the Communist Liberation Front.
While the Buddhists demonstrate en masse against the rightist,
anti-Communists, they have yet to dom demonstrate against the Communists.
While they eagerly discredit the right-wing Catholics, they have yet to
discredit in the streets the Communist atheists.
d
As Buddhist-inspired demonstrations accelerated in tempo ane
numbers in the center this week-and are expected to hit Saigon next
week--the it is increasing difficult to determine whether the Buddhists
a re a legitimate anti-government protest movement, or a second
front organization for the Communists, in the same way that the
National Liberation Front is the first one. primary one.
(Endit-Deepe)
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Date
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1966, Mar. 17
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Subject
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Vietnam (Republic), 1961-1975; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Elections; Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Peace-building
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B188, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
