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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07763 to 363-07773.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07763 to 363-07773
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Title
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Article about lack of coordination between American civilian agencies and military services
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Description
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Original title: "snafu", Keever's title: "U.S. Bureacratic snafus hinder anti-communist war effort", article about lack of coordination between American civilian agencies and military services, for the New York Herald Tribune
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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deepe
sna fu-page 1
january 7, 1966
SAIGON-A bureaucratic snafu and lack of coordination
between American civilian agencies and military services here has
snarled the progress of the anti-Communist war, according to
highly reliable sources.
The Central Ente Intelligence Agency operating in the
provinces has also come under criticism for "failing to get on the
American team," according to reliabel sources.
"If the American effort supporting the Vietnamese government
is not cinched up, we're going to lose this whole war," according
to one highly reliable source.
(More)
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deepe
snafu-page 2
The American snafu--centering around the complext economic-social-
political-military Vietnamese pacification plan-has become so critical
that the Johnson Administration in Washington has called next week
(Jan. 10-15) a top-level strategy session. The ranking heads of
all the American civilian and military agencies associated with
pacification have already flown to Washington to participate im
this conference.
Officials here described the conference as a "routine review
of the entire American effort." But diplomatic sources considered
the meeting virtually unprecedented-never could they recall so
many American officials from Saigon being called to Washington.
Officials here speculated that President Lyndon B. Johnson would
meet his Saigon officials, although the actual working sessions
were believed to be scheduled to involve Secretary of Defense
Robert McNamara, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, heads of various
agencies plus White House advisors.
Reliable sources here said the decisions made in the
Washington cou conference could well determine the future direction,
if not the final outcome, of the Vietnamese war.
(More)
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deepe
snafu-page 3
The American officials from Saigon participating in the
conference include:
Deputy Ambassador William J. Porter; Phil Habib, political
counsellor of the American Embassy; COD Con Gordon Jorgensen,
Gozdem
special assistant to the Ambassador (known to head the Central
Intelligence Agency); Charles Mann, director of Agency for
International Development (AID); Sam Wilson, AID director of
rural operations (involving pacification); Barry Zorthian, director
of Joint United States Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO--an offshoot
of U. S. Information Agency); Edward Lansdale, special assistant
to the Ambassador for pacification; Brig. Gen. J. L. Collins,
special assistant to the American Military Assistance Command.
Unlike the purely military aspects of the Viet Nam war,
problems of pacification cut across the jurisdictions and
assing assignments of all American civilian agencies plus the Americam
military command. These agencies function in support of the Vietnamese
government and armed forces by providing logistics, advisors,
material, training and direct or indirect funding for Vietnamese
government cadre who make the actual contacts with the Vietnamese.
villagers in an attempt to gain their support.
the
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deepe
snafu- page 4
The Vietnamese government and armed forces has been plagued
with its own outdated administration, in-fighting, intrigue and
an official American survey
counter-intrigue.
On pacification,
discovered there were thirty nine different kinds of pacification
cadre working in the villages, each getting money, material, advise
and support from differing American agencies. For example, the
Joint United States Public Infx Affairs Office (JUSPAO) supports
armed propaganda teams im selected villages; the American.
Central Intelligence Agency (operating under the name of Controlled
American Sources) helps traim cadre for "special activities;"
USAID supports an abundance of cadre ranging from village health
workers to field police forces. Theoretically these cadre
operate under the control of the chiefs of the 43 Vietnamese
provinces.
"But the province chief has all the responsibility and none
of the power to do the pacification program," according to one
reliable American source in the field. "To pacify, he first
needs troops--but he can't order a division commander of higher
rank to move a regiment anywhere. Then he needs pacification cadre--
but he doesn't have the power to hire and fire these people.
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deepe
snafu-page 5
All of their loyalties are to--and their paychecks are from--
different ministries in Saigon. The Vietnamese have such a
complicated administrative system that we have eight separate
budgets in one province. I can tell you-if we don't get these
bureaucratic problems straightened out, in three years we'll
be flying American military governors in from Okinawa. And
then it's too late."
On the American side, at the Saigon level, "there has
always been a strong divergence of opinion over the respective
roles of the American civilians and the American military," according
to one reliable source. "Maybe in the Washington conference
they'll decide who the hell does what.
"The American chieftains here have not-up to this time-
put on one sheet of paper the aims, the methods and doctrines of
what to do internally in Vietnam. They can't agree on this and
they can't agree on how it should be done.
a big row going on over basic methods.
There's evidently
The basic judgments which
must be made have never yet been sorted out and adhered to.
(More)
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deepe
snafu- page 6
The source continued, "The first basic question is on the
PRIMARY
military side. Will American troops be used totally for offensive
operations chasing down hard-core Communist units in the jungles? Or
will they be used primarily in "clear and hold" operations to secure
the population in conjunction with the pacification program.
quite evident that the Vietnamese government does not have the
troop strength needed for pacifying this country."
It's
Sharp differences of opinion are known to have flared up
between the M American Marine Corps concept of running the war and
the U. S. Army concept. The Marines view their primary responsibilities
in the northern provinces as securing the population as a means to
secure the strategic Danang airbase-within their assigned areas
with Vietnamese government cadre npmming doing pacification work
in the rear areas. Of samyminen kancam To mount offensives
against the Viet Cong, the Marines use seaborne reserves, rather
than leaving a Zacc vacuum in their ground security. The
U. S. Army operating in the high plateau and near Saigon, however,
maintain an almost purely offensive role with "search and destroy"
operations, which leaves the population insecure and unprotected.
(More)
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deepe
snafu-page 7
The American Milita ry Command in Saigon has agreed that
the Marine concept is correct im the Marine areas and the U. S. Army
concept is correct in their areas; hence, the Marines are the
only American combat troops systematically implementing the
pacification plan.
"Once the milita American military makes i up it's
mind what it's going to do, then the next ba sic judgment is-is
the present stage of the Vietnamese administration and government--
even with American advice and support-good enough to lick the
Communists on the civilian front, especially on the problem of
subversion,"
according to the reliable source. "To
what extent is a greater degree of American direction in pacification
necessary? Some argue that the Americans can't pacify (because
of language, cultural and racial differences). Others say that
we won't get anywhere as long as the Vietnamese are spending more
time fighting each other rather than the Communists. Clearly the
Vietnamese government can no longer govern effectively with the war
at this level of intensity."
(More)
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deepe
snafu-page 8
If the Americans decide to assume more responsibility for the
war on the civilian front--and that the trend has been drifting in
that direction--the next question involves the degree of coordination
and the division of labor between each American civilian agency.
At this time, sharp differences of concept and method have
reportedly arisen between USAID director Charles Mann and Edward
R
Lansdale, homme As a special assistant for pacification,
Lansdale has been assigned the responsibility of advising the Vietnamese
government on pacification--without the assurance that government
will follow the advise and without the authority to give orders to
American agencies involved in supporting that pacification effort.
"The Lansdale concept is an unorthodox one to work from the
a
villages upward," according to one reliable source. "And the Mann
concept is the convention (way of working from Saigon through regiona l
ham and provincial staffs downwards."
From the Saigon level, the next lower mir
mikiny echelon on the American side is te the four military corps
areas of the Vietnamese army. As the AmEx Marines are the only
American combat troops involved in the pacification effort, the key
area on the American side is the ✓ five northern provinces of I Corps,
commanded by General Nguyen Chanh Thi.
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deepe
snafu page 9
"The first six months wax after we arrived, we didn't
even know who the other Americans were in I Corps and what they
were doing," explained one American Marine source. "At first we
had trouble with USAID, because we wanted to get medicines,
blankets and food from them and distribute them to the Vietnamese
people in our areas. But USAID insisted on continuing to work
through the Vietnamese province, district and village chiefs. Now,
we both have compri compromised happily.
"Then the Marines initiated a coordinating council of all
"But
the America n agencies in this area," the source continued.
the ne senior advisor representing the American military command
in Saigonan x Army colonel-wouldn't come because he didn't like
Marines. He would send only his deputy.
"The Central Intelligere Agency fellows wanted to come
but couldn't because of their regulations from Washington. The
JUSPAO fellow did come--but he was leaking classified and erroneous
information about the Marines to the foreign correspondents. That
was really subversive. The Marine g commanding general (Maj. Gen.
Lewis Walt) tried to get him fired, but Barry Zorthian (JUSPAO
director in Saigon) wouldn't do it. Finally,
up.
we got that all patched
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deepe
snafu-page 10
"Then the regional director of USAID, who has a 20-man technical
disagreement
staff, got in a fight with one of his staff members,
who wouldn't
follow ord ers. The regional director had no gum authority
Remove
MEMBER
to move a technical staff
Ich his boss is in Saigon. Only
because the director had a strong personality,
the subordinate was
on the next plane to Saigon. We Americans always criticize the
Vietnamese for poor organization--but our organization follows the
same pattern--the guy with all the responsibility does not have all
the power.
"Now the three best Vietnamese subordinates of General Thi
have joined the committee and things are being coordinated much
better than before. But the CIA must get on the American team..
Even with all of us unified, the Communistsare still moving faster
than we are."
The
effects of the CIA "not being on the team," were clearly
visible in the Five Mountain Village project, the top priority
pacification project for American troops in the country. Secr
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was briefed on it during his
last visit. The concept of the five villages-twenty square kilometers
ten miles south of the Danang airbase is to have American Marines
provide an outer protecting screen of security, while Vietnamese government
paramilitary forces and civilian cadre attempt to weed out the
Communist infrastructure and enlist the non-opposition, if not the
support, of the Vietnamese peasant.
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deepe
snafu- page 11
"However, the CIA-trained cadre (People's Action Teams called
PAT's) wouldn't take orders from the province chief," one highly
reliable source explained.
"
Trey for "The PAT's told the province.
chief 'we work for and are paid by the American Embassy. We're
not going to take orders from you'. So, we told the CIA to do
something about it, but they just shrugged and said the PAT's
belonged to the province chief. At any rate, one of the
five PAT teams (ten men per team) deserted them and the
province chief got so made at a
second team he kicked them out
of the area. So,
any good. They're not any good for anything. They won't
fight although they have better weapons than the Vietnamese
troops--because they say they were trained for political action.
But they aren't even good at political action. Now we're just
spinning our wheels-and if we can't win in this key project,
how can we win country-wide?"
now we have three PAT teams--and they're not
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Date
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1966, Jan. 7
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States. Armed Forces; Interagency coordination; Strategy
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B188, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
