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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04787.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04787
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Title
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South Viets Identify GIs With Colonialism
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Description
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Second of a series of four articles published in the New York Herald Tribune about the war in Vietnam in 1965 and prognasticating its outcome in 1966, page unknown
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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VA
Viet Nam: Past and Prospect
South Viets Identify GIs With Colonialism
This is the second of a series
four articles reviewing the
war in Viet Nam during 1965
and assessing the prospects in
1966.
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
The buildup of American
combat troops in Viet Nam
during 1965 produced a visible
buildup in anti-Americanism
among the Vietnamese popula-
tion.
A significant date between
the Feb. 7 bombing of North
Viet Nam and the March 8 ar-
rival of the first American
combat units was the Feb. 20
mutiny against commander-
in-chief Gen. Nguyen Khanh
by his generals. The net effect
of Gen. Khanh's overthrow
was to fragment the anti-
Communist power in Saigon,
while the Viet Cong had seized
partial control of the country
at the village level.
As commander-in-chief, a
more important post in war
time than that of prime min-
ister, Gen. Khanh had domi-
nated the anti-Communist
scene-and had been ac-
claimed by Secretary of De-
fense Robert S. McNamara as
America's strongman for Viet
Nam. But by late 1964, Gen.
Khanh grew bitter toward
U. S. Ambassador Maxwell D.
Taylor, who demanded politi-
cal stability, while Gen. Khanh,
was aspiring to the Presidency.
FALSE COUP
Twelve days after the bomb-
ing of North Viet Nam, a false
coup was led by Col. Pham
Ngoc Thao, who was openly
acknowledged to be associated
with the U. S. Central Intel-
ligence Agency. The next day
the generals forced Gen.
Khanh out of the country.
The 600,000-man Vietnamese
Armed Forces were turned
over to a weak commander-
in-chief. Finally, the post was
abolished, leaving the armed
forces virtually leaderless.
Prime Minister Phan Huy
Quat ran into trouble. After
three months in office he called
for support from the Viet-
namese generals, who prompt-
ly tossed him out of office. A
Vietnamese military junta
again took on the job of gov-
erning the country while at-
tempting to defeat an enemy.
Amid instability on the anti-
Communist side, the Reds
could exploit the first Amer-
ican combat units who ar-
rived without solid political,
economic, or social battle
plans. The instincts of the
Vietnamese, traditionally xen-
troops would have eased the
situation considerably.
It was widely known in Sai-
gon that the Vietnamese-in-
cluding Prime Minister Phan
Huy Quat-learned of the date
of the arrival of the first
Marines in March from foreign
press announcements made in
Saigon and Washington. The
Vietnamese feared they might
win the war but lose their
country. Outbursts from offi-
cers, students and intellectuals
charged that "the Americans
were running the whole show."
THE DOLLAR
No sooner did the American
troops land in the northern
provinces than the medium of
exchange became the U.S. dol-
lar rather than the piastre.
With no restrictions on the
amount of available dollars, an
American private had purchas-
ing power once held only by
Vietnamese generals. Cokes,
beers and wash basins were
purchased in villages with
nickels, dimes and quarters. In
at least one instance, a Viet-
namese village chief, backed
up by his popular force pla-
toons, attempted to invade the
village of another chief and to
seize the villagers American
dollars at an unfair rate of ex-
change. Six months after the
arrival of the first American
units, American officials abol-
ished the use of dollars in Viet
Nam. Replacing them was mil-
itary scrip, which now has he
items in Viet Nam. Women.
Few Vietnamese appreciated
the loss of their women-or
the fact that illiterate females
could earn ten times a man's
pay. Gradually, in any city
or village bordering American
units, drugstores, villas, and
furniture stores quickly gave
way to bars and brothels.
WAGES
The build up of American
forces also brought demands
for more housing, runways,
offices and other facilities.
Wages for skilled labor, and
cost of building materials and
transportation brought infla-
tion. "The Vietnamese econ-
omy is in horrific shape. This
could ruin the whole cam-
paign against the Viet Cong,"
one Western diplomat said
recently.
The Viet Cong sabotage of
roads had also produced in-
flation on items such as rice,
charcoal and fish sauce. The
American economic mission
reacted by importing con-
sumer goods to sop up the
excess purchasing power-and
financed the emergency im-
port of 250,000 tons of rice.
While the Saigon price of rice
dropped, in the provinces rich
merchants continued to charge
what the traffic would bear.
The Vietnamese hurt most.
by the inflation were not the
Communists, but the govern-
ment's own officials and
troops, paid mostly on fixed
salaries
shoeshine boy on the street that the Marines had mali-
and asked to have their photo- ciously fired into the pagoda.
graph taken together. The The Marines also were accused
little boy barked an obscenity of having deliberately broken
at the fatigue - clad Senator a Buddhist statue and strewn
and added: "Go home!" An human excrement around the
American official with Jack- pagoda.
son blanched and said: "Well,
that's pretty much the feel-
ing around here."
man was
In the city of Da Nang, an
average of three or four
fist-fights a week break out
between
GI's and teenage
Vietnamese gangs, popularly
known as "cowboys." One
American service
beaten up and lay in a back
alley for two days. Though
Vietnamese shopkeepers saw
the body, they did not report
it to police. The American
military police finally located
it.
By the beginning of 1966,
it became apparent that the
Buddhist bonzes, as well as
the Viet Cong, could easily
exploit Vietnamese national-
ism and anti-Americanism.
One incident used by the
Buddhists occurred when the
American Marines fired two
tank rifles rounds into a pa-
goda from which they claimed
a sniper was firing at them.
The word immediately spread
among Vietnamese peasants
The Buddhists, widely con-
sidered to include neutralists
and pro-Communists, previ-
ously had successfully toppled
two administrations in Viet
Nam: President Ngo Dinh
Diem in November, 1963, and
Gen. Khanh in August, 1964.
"If the Buddhist priests do
turn anti-American, the war
will change into a new dimen-
sion which we can't even yet
imagine," one source said,
looking foward to 1966.
At the beginning of the
year, rural Viet Nam was
half-conquered by the Viet
Cong, and the urban portion
was in a state of semi-insur-
rection. As more American
troops arrived, resulting anti-
Americanism vastly compli-
cated the prospects for eco-
nomic and political stability.
The next article in the series
will deal with the problems of
pacification of the countryside,
and the military role in the
process of seeking stable local
institutions.
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Date
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1966, Jan. 17
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Subject
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Nguyễn, Khánh, 1927-2013; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Public opinion--Vietnam (Republic); United States--Relations--Vietnam (Republic)
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
