Is Asia 'Domino Theory' Passe?

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363-04783
Title
Is Asia 'Domino Theory' Passe?
Description
Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about an analysis of President Johnson's decisions at the Honolulu Conference. The article addresses the ways Johnson's decisions undermined "Domino Theory", the end of support for military juntas in South Vietnam, and the administration's desire to end the war instead of getting a total victory, page unknown
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
Transcript
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Is Asia 'Domino Theory Passe?
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
President Johnson's key
decision at the Honolulu
Conference-to press for
elections in South Viet Nam
as quickly as possible-could
well become the turning
point of Viet Nam's post-
colonial history.
Oversimplified, the gist of
that decision was this: The
Johnson
administration
would be prepared-or possi-
bly forced-to accept a po-
litical settlement which,
though not quite capitula-
tion, is far short of victory.
It meant the President is
more interested in attempt-
ing to end the war than in
attempting to win it.
On this analysis, military
sources of high realiability in
Saigon believe the Adminis-
tration now considers the
"domino theory" passe. And
they fear that by failing to
hold a hard line in Viet Nam,
the United States will prove
that the Communists have
found a successful, low-cost
method for seizing power in
other small nations.
IMPLICATION
Prime implication of Mr.
Johnson's decision for elec-
tions is that America's posi-
tion is shifting from one of
support for a powerful group
of staunchly anti-Communist
generals to one which is will-
ing to back a government run
by civilians who, at best, would
be largely neutralist.
It would be reasonable to
expect that such a civil ruling
group eventually would merge
in some degree of political co-
operation with the National
Liberation Front, the political
base of the Viet Cong army,
the sources believe.
These military figures say
that the election decision
means that the United States
tacitly has agreed to let the
Communists negotiate their
way into a real say in South
Viet Nam under the legitimacy
of recognized domestic poli-
tical institutions.
This, they argue, is a jump
from the pre-Honolulu Ameri-
can position that the Com-
munists would have a say only
"around the table" in a
multi-nation conference in the
general pattern of the 1954
Geneva Conference.
Reliable South Vietnamese
sources report that at Hono-
lulu Mr. Johnson proposed to
Premier Nguyen Cao Ky that
elections for a national leg-
islative assembly be held this
June-shirtly after
a new
constitution had ben drafted
and run through a referen-
dum.
Gen. Ky agreed on the prin-
ciple but not on the schedule,
the sources said. He wanted
two years to broaden the area
and population in South Viet
Nam that could be insulated
against Communist domina-
domination-and thus Com-
munist victories at the polls.
The two men compromised
roughly splitting the differ
ence and setting an electic
[Apr 1;1966]
day target for sometime early lative body-citing President
in 1967.
Johnson as support.
At Honolulu, it was empha-
sized that Mr. Johnson was
throwing his prestige behind
Gen. Ky-the man, the ad-
ministration, and the 10-man
junta.
But in fact, the President
backed only the man. His
decision to press for elections
undermined the foundation of
the junta, the only solid base
of power on which Gen. Ky
can rely.
As Gen. Ky and his delega-
tion to Honolulu, accompany-
ing Vice-President Humphrey,
returned to Saigon in mid-
February, the word quickly
spread: President Johnson
wanted elections as soon as
possible.
Murmuring in the back-
ground was growing. South
Vietnamese resentment of the
handling of things at Hono-
lulu. The Hanoi radio propa-
ganda line said "Ky went to
Honolulu to report to his
American boss." The short
notice for the conference, and
its announcement in Wash-
ington rather than both capi-
tals, made the Hanoi line
credible in Saigon.
Soon after Honolulu, religi-
ous and political opposition
forces began secret consulta-
tions. For action, they needed
only the proper pretext.
That pretext turned up on
March 10, 27 days after the
Honolulu conference ended,
from its membership Lt. Gen.
when the junta voted to oust
Nguyen
dynamic
Chanh Thi, the
former paratroop
commander who had led an
abortive coup d'etat against
the Diem regime on Nov.
11, 1960.
Two days after Gen. Thi's
ouster, the Buddhist leader-
ship began, at a press con-
ference, a campaign to under-
ine the junta by rushing
ction of a civilian legis-
"In fact, the Buddhists
pulled a lulu on the Presi-
dent," one Vietnamese po-
litical source said. "They took
his words at Honolulu and
pinned him to them."
These same Buddhists led
anti-government
the
drive
against the late President
Ngo Dinh Diem, and in
November, 1963, with un-
official American backing,
toppled his regime. Since
their
then,
strength and
suspicions about their move-
ment-have grown.
In Saigon yesterday, some
2,000 Buddhist students
marched through the streets,
executing in effigy members
of the junta and demanding
installation of a civilian re-
gime. One leader, speaking to
the rally, said: "We do not
accept an anti-Communist
struggle if the sovereignty of
iVet Nam is lost."
During the demonstrations,
leaflets bearing the name of
the National Liberation Front
and urging support of the
Buddhist agitation were cir-
culated.
PENETRATION
The Buddhist movement-
especiall its central Viet Nam
elements-is considered deep-
ly penetrated by Communist
agents. Some anto commu-
nist Buddhists estimate that
from 50 to 70 per cent of
these organizations are in-
filtrated. And it is that cen-
tral element which is strong-
est.
The behind-the-scenes lead-
er of the central Vietnamese
wing is Thich Tri Quang-an
anemic Buddhist monk whose
title Thich means Venerable.
He was given political asy-
lum in the American embassy
here during the Diem coup
crisis, in the first tour of duty
of Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge.
Acclaimed as one of the
most astute politicians in the
country, Tri Quang is widely
considered to be a Commu-
nist, although there is eub-
stantial dispute about what
kind, with many putting him
in the Tito mold.
In his early years, he stud-
ied under Thich Tri Do, now
head of the North Vietnamese
Buddhist Association. He
thus can argue in the best
Marxist terminology as well
as Buddhist theological lan-
guage.
While badly splintered, the
South Vietnamese Buddhist
movement can be unified
quickly with invocation of the
common enemy: the Roman
Catholics. In this lies the
significance of recend Bud-
dist demands for the purge
of Gen. Nguyen Van Thieu,
chairman of the junta and
Chief of State, a Catholic
convert.
Part of the Buddhist cant
against the Catholics is that
they are tainted with "an im-
ported foreign religion"-
which is widely identified
the colonial French regime.
They also are accused of com-
plicity in Diem-era persecu-
tion of Buddhists. But the
Catholics are the most firmly
anti-Communist of the South
Vietnamese.
by attacking
Thus,
Catholics-and the Americans
-the Buddhist movement is
abetting the ambitions of the
National Liberation Front. For
all their demonstrations
against the Right, the Bud-
dhists have yet to raise a
placard against the Commu-
nists.
the
It is increasingly difficult
to determine whether the
Buddhists represent a legiti-
mate protest movement or are
a Communist front organiza-
tion.
Date
1966, Apr. 1
Subject
Honolulu Conference (1966 : Honolulu, Hawaii); Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Johnson, Lyndon B. (Lyndon Baines), 1908-1973; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace; Vietnam--Foreign relations--United States
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Container
B4, F6
Format
newspaper clippings
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English