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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-02266 to 363-02272.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-02266 to 363-02272
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Title
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Article on Viet Cong attack on American jet-fighters
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Description
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Original title: "bien hoa." Article by Keever analyzing Viet Cong attack on the B-57 American jet-fighter bombers
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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doope
bien hoa-l
RI SAIGON-The Vit Viet Cong Communists multi-million dollar
attack on the B-57 American jet-fighter bombers a wool: ago is conc
considered significant for two reason. reasons.
On the Viet Cong Communist side, observers consider the
attack a brilliant tactical suse victory, but a strategic miscalcuation
by then. On the Amorioan side, observers believe the attack will not
directly precipitate a major American post-olcction policy change, "but it
will shorten the time in which a policy decisions can be postponed."
The attack on the major military installation at only eighteen
(More)
milos from Saigon is
considered to have highlighted to the world-
and Washington-hat Americans here had long sensed: The t the
milis anti-Communist military and political war was boing lost. American
officials had long believed that with proper execution the presont policies
more of the same type philosophy-could turn the tide against the Communists,
But Bien Hoa appears to have shortened the time period which
this philosophy could be advocated at either the Saigon or Washington level.
The question raised by the Bien Hoa attack is area, what policy
(More)
change might appear--if any and would it be soon enough.
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deepe
Bon hon
The attack on November 1 either demolished or damaged more than
a quad squadron of American jet-bombers, carryi capable of carrying
nuclear weapons, plus inflicted the heaviest American casualties tolls
* of a single incident in the war-four killed and 72 wounded.
While Peking, Moscow and Hanoi radios are hea heralding the
atta ok attack as a "great achievment", observers hore predict that the
Communist strategist behind the attack will not receive any medals for the
feat. While tactically sucessful, successful, observers believe
the attack created a py psychological shock to Americans and Vietnamese
hore-created the impression "The Communists can take over the country
now--but why don't you?" Observers predict the effect may well mean
the Communists may lose some of their mass support by "promising" something
that is still years away in reality.
Hence, the Bien Hao Hoa attack is consored considered too
early it was a tiny Dien Bien Phu without the hope of final military
or political victory.
Observers believe that the Communists are still a long way
away from a take-over in the country. First they must i officially
announce a government in officially known liberated areas which
will become the ba a basis at for a coalition government with
American-backed Saigon government--and this would pave the way for
a neutralist settlment with the prerequiste mi for Anorionn troop
Milita rily, the Communists must be able to operate
withdrawal.
in divisions before a military victory ca
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doope
bien hoa 3
Militarily, the Communists must be able to operate in
divisions before a military victory can be assured for them.
Observers here believe that the attack was obviously timed
as a spectacu spectacular "act of heroism" on the first anniversary of the
fell of a former president Ngo Dinh Dion, they also k note that it was
carried out six days before an important Communist holiday-ovember 7th
the anniversary of the October Revolution in Russia. A inconto
lat large von conference is scheduled for to be held in Moscow this wool-ond
for the celebrations. Hanoi Radio has announced that the North Vietnamese
dologation is to be hoaded by Premier Phom Van Dong, considered here a
pro-Chinese loader-but significantly the most pro-Soviet of the pro-Chinese
wing of the Party. Ho is considered, in effect, a compromise candidate.
The target of the American B-57 is also considered significant,
but the reasons for choosing them as a ta r target is opon to two schools
of speculation. The first in school believes that the attack against them
specifically is direct retaliation for American bombing of North Viet Nam
in on August 5. The jot bombers were rushed to Viet Nam on the t date
as defensive protection- the though they had flown no combat
operational missions in South Viet Nam, they were a heavily armed at the
time of the attack in an event they were given omorgoney orders to bomb
North Viet Nam.
The second school believes the B-57's wore chosen as the target
because of their nuco nuclear capabilities--and that the fact they wore destroyed
highlights the Poking achievement of exploding a nucea nuclear dovico
tion several weeks ago.
(More)
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deepe
bien hos-4
"Bien Hoa has made the Americans madder," expla inod
one reliable source. "But it mens also means that the Americans have
not yet reached the point in time that thoy a re willing to say their
current policy is a failure. But Pien Hon makes that point in time comes
come closer. The Americans have not yet decided to change their strategy
but Bien Hoa attack makes that a time come closer. This is the
significance of the nk attack."
The attack came only days before a new Saigon government had
been announced--a govermont which American policy officially backs. "But
max the Americans are backing a week and inept government," according to
one reliable source. "I'm not saying its week and inept as a criticism.
It's a foot. "
The American policy is to think that the American concepts
of cont gantuating the political and economic war, of administering the
American aid program, of implementing the American-backed pacification
program that all of this must be done through the machinery of the
Vietnamese government. The choices facing the Americans are to continuo
working through this week goverment, to change that government or to
work around it, prinsipally by using the Vietnamese army and its loader
Gen. Ngayon Khanh se a substitute of the government apparatus. The upcoming
weaks should reveal which choice Washington makes, although American
policymakers may in effect officially support the curro newly-named
government.
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deepe
bien hoo--5
Officially now, the Ameruoan Amorioan view is to work for on
offic effective Vietnamese government-end build all pol policy on that.
However, as long as the Communist-oriented Buddhist movement is onpablo
of attacking ANY Saigon government, there appears to be little chance that
the country will ever have a strong govemment. Honce, there may well be
in the offing a shift in the American attitude towards the Buddhists-
the Vietnamese government may well choose to cradicdown on known Communiste
within the movement.
In the most gonoral torms, American policymakers are faced
with two sets of choicess to contain the conflict within the borders of
South Viet Nam or to enlarge the war by going outside the bordores and to
forgenthan admit defeat in the counterinsurgency war but to
attempt to save Viet Nam by making the conflict more of a conventional war.
There's fragmentary evidenco z already suggests that the conflict
will be on rried outside of the borders of South Viet Nam--and that tho
war will become more conventionalized, from the American viewpoint.
The arriva 1 of a high-ranking Filipino go foreign ministry official
in E Saigon this wook has increased speculation that Asian combat troops-
Filipino, Thai, Formosan and South Korean-might be the next step towards
onlarging the war. This may or may not mean that American troops
combat troops may be sont to Viet Nam, principally for garrison duty to
socure provincial capitals and min major military installations-thus relossing
South Vietnamese troops for offensive operations in the swamps and jungles.
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deepe
bien hoo--6
This decision would have the effect of making Vietnam a "little
Korea", with multi-national troops called in to support the anti-Communist
govermenta United Nations command without United Nations backing
Vietnamese observers also believe that American policy
sz changes may well include massive serial bombardment of Communist
supply ba soa in Laos outside the borders of South Viet Nam. This would
probably be centered in the southern-tongue of Leos sex which contains
the heart of North Vietnamese infiltration routes from North Viet Nam.
It may well also include bombardment 2 on Communist bases in Cambodia and
North Viet Nam, but would probably would not, at least initially. Observers
in Viet Nam believe this saliome to block infiltration from sot southern
Laos may well be connected with the right-mi offensive of right-wing,
anti-Communist troops against Pathet Lac forces on the strategie
Plaines des Jarros,
Observern here note however, that the Communists would "nover
make the mistake" of changing the war in South Viet Han from Its
nice charact the basic character of the war in South Viet Nam from
that of a counter-insurgency to that of a conventional war, until they
chose to do so. They note that the French concept of Dien Bien Phu
fort, sh
im was to force the Communist guerrillas to
fight a conventional war. But the Dien Bien Phu fort was attacked in
classical conventions 1 warfare by the guerrilla anybut when they chose to
do so.
Observers here believe rock honce believe that the Communists
would fight a conventional war-when they
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doopo
bion hon-7
Honco, observers believe that the Communiste would fight
a conventional war only when they choose to do co That time would bo
they have amma amassed the divisions to do so--and when the have a
Government that would form a coalition noutralist coalition with the
Saigon govermont.
The ultimate question is whether the Communists would do
to the Americans a s as they did to the French-boat them at their
own conventions 1 war war.
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Date
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1965, Nov. 5
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Canberra (Bomber); Jet planes; Bombing, Aerial--Vietnam; Antiaircraft artillery operations
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6297
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B19, F11
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
