-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-06291 to 363-06296.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-06291 to 363-06296
-
Title
-
Article about the American policy of keeping the political status quo
-
Description
-
Keever's title: "Edward Lansdale 'Tries to Make Haste Slowly' in Wooing South Vietnamese in Pacification", article about the American policy of keeping the political status quo in South Vietnam
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
Attn Ennex UPI Special for Gandy By Beverly Deepe Saigon, Vietnam, November 20190 (UPIS) As the Vietnamese military war relentlessly escalates into a new dimension, the internal political situation is suspended in a state of “rough equilibrium.” The current American-backed policy of maintaining the status quo has yet to give way to a dramatic political offensive. “American internal political policies are still frozen until key decisions are made for Vietnam,” one reliable source indicated. “Ambassador (Henry Cabot) Lodge did not come to Vietnam with a plan; he still does not have a plan. But he will have one soon. Until that time, the Communists, the Buddhists, the Catholics or the Vietnamese generals can upset the status quo.” While there is no surging political momentum, reliable sources said that the highest-ranking military officials in the Vietnamese government are slowly, [deletion: gradul] gradually moving towards long-term planning to [XXXX indicating deletion] establish a civilian government. The sources indicated that there has been “a slight acceleration” in this direction within the past month as key Vietnamese generals [deletion: earl] earnestly began holding more consultations with civilian leaders and political groups, But the target date for any civilian government, based on a constitution that has yet to be drafted and [deletion: is] then submitted to a popular referendum, is still at least a year away--if it develops at all. [XXXX indicating deletion] first add x x x develops at all. x x x The role of all American agencies is, officially and unofficially, to assist and support the Vietnamese government in its military and political efforts; the introduction of American combat units plus acceleration of Communist propaganda internally gives at times the distorted view that “the Americans are taking over Vietnam.” The American Establishment in Vietnam--the largest and most complex of its kind in the world--is more accurately described as six different agencies, each looking at six segments of the total war. These agencies are: the military assistance command, the American Embassy, the economic aid mission (Agency for International Development), the Central Intelligence Agency, the joint Public Affairs Office (an offspring of U.S. Information Service) and a talented braintrust headed by special assistant Edward Lansdale. Lodge is known to view his job as “braiding the economic, political, psychological and military factors together into a single [XXXX indicating deletion] strand.” He has clear-cut [XXXX indicating deletion] political authority over the heads of all American agencies--and can even countermand agency directives from Washington (this rarely happens). However, he refuses to consider himself a military authority and leaves strictly military decisions to General William C. Westmoreland, American military commander. second add x x x American military commander. x x x Every Tuesday morning, Lodge chairs a meeting of the heads of all six agencies or groupings, called the American Mission Council in which the American position on key issues is decided. Later in the week, on Friday, these key [XXXX indicating deletion] officials meet in the Joint U.S.-Vietnamese Committee in which Prime Minister Nguyen Cao Ky and his principal Cabinet members are seated. Within the meetings of American generals, directors and agency heads, Lodge acts “not as an umpire, but as a harmonizer when the [deletion: authorities] authority of one American agency impinges on that of another agency--and that happens all the time,” according to reliable sources. Other sources indicated that “Lodge rarely gives an order; he attempts to get a consensus rather than to issue an edict. He reportedly operates differently in this respect than his predecessor General Maxwell D. Taylor, who “listened to all opinions, made a decision and it was settled.” Some of the discussions within the American Mission Council meetings are known to have been heated, but Lodge does not maintain “a monolithic approach.” One discussion item recently centered on the proposed creation of field forces for the Vietnamese police. The AID representatives argued that Vietnamese police forces were essential in the provinces after the Communist military units had been cleared out. The American military officials argued that this function would overlap the para-military Vietnamese forces already in the villages. (The AID officials won.). third add x x x AID officials won. x x x Once an American Mission position on broad matters has been reached, then this is relayed to the Vietnamese government--without any assurances [XXXX indicating deletion] the advise will be followed.. In perhaps the most unorthodox situation in the world--with the greatest chunk of American prestige at stake--the American Embassy still [deletion: pro] performs the essential, but classical function of reporting on government-to-government matters to keep the United States officials in Washington informed. In undoubtedly the most active Ambassadorial post in the world, Lodge is called on not only to manage the inordinately complex American bureaucracy, but is also obliged to meet visiting VIP delegations, to sign rice agreements or to visit Vietnamese and American units in the battlefield. He performs an eight to ten-hour work day--plus an average of three [insertion: evening] diplomatic receptions a week. He is known to take home with him stacks of administrative material. He [deletion: fool] follows the advise of security officers to vary his arrivals and departures to and from his brown-paneled, fifth-floor Embassy office in an attempt to evade any Communist terrorist who may be planning to assassinate him. [deletion: Third] Fourth add XXXX to assassinate him. XXXXXXX With 160,000 troops in Vietnam, -and more expected- the American military commanders have the two-fold responsibility of commanding the American combat units plus continuing to assist and advise the Vietnamese armed forces. In most quasi-military, political cases, the military commanders are given first priority to take care of essential war-time needs--ammunition is transported [deletion: [illegible]] before rice or refugees, jet airstrips are built before low-cost housing. The economic Agency of International Development also has the two-fold responsibility of programming the necessary American economic aid to curb inflation, to maintain the Vietnamese economy, to assist the Vietnamese refugees program and to assist in pacifying the Vietnamese countryside once the [deletion: [illegible]] purely military actions have been completed. For pacification, Lodge appointed Edward Lansdale to take charge of pulling together all the American agencies and then advising the Vietnamese authorities in Saigon and in the provinces on the establishment and implementation of sound policies for the plan of [XXXX indicating deletion] pacifying the countryside. As head of a special American committee on “Rural Reconstruction, as the pacification program is now called, he is known to be tirelessly consulting Vietnamese officials on the future direction of the program. His procedure is “to make haste slowly,” since the program involves almost every ministry of the Vietnamese government and every agency [deletion: of] on the [XXXX indicating deletion] American side. (more) [XXXX indicating deletion] Fifth add xxxxto the American side xxxxxx In attempting to pacify the countryside, one key problem to which Lansdale and the Vietnamese are clearly studying is that of Vietnamese cadre. A recent official census lists thirty nine different kinds of cadre, totalling thousands throughout the countryside, with one kind paid by the Ministry of Interior, another type by the Ministry of Defense, another type by [deletion: the] Social Welfare -- and some of them not paid at all. Many of the discussions, ideas, for pacification are vaguely but invisibly [insertion: being] jelled [XXXX indicating deletion] as Vietnamese officials travel [XXXX indicating deletion] throughout the countryside to draw up the 1966 pacification budgets for each of the 44 Vietnamese provinces. One key decision has been [deletion: resulted] reached almost unanimously by key American and Vietnamese officials: American combat units have the capabilities of stopping the Communist militarily, but only Vietnamese [XXXX indicating deletion] cadre, teachers and police can seize the political initiative from the Communists in the villages. At this time, the plans are being made as to how this will be accomplished. The future for any “revolution” [deletion: and] or victory in the [XXXX indicating deletion] countryside depends on the form of the new plan -- and how well it will be implemented. -30-
-
Date
-
1965, Nov. 20
-
Subject
-
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Vietnam (Republic)--Government and politics; Lansdale, Edward Geary, 1908-1987; United States. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support; Diplomacy
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6311
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B187, F6
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Collector
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English