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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06281 to 363-06290.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06281 to 363-06290
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Title
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Article about the Chu Phong battle and mobile warfare
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Description
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Original title: "Mobile", Keever's title: "A Long, Protracted War of Attrition Begins with Communists' Mobile Warfare", Article about the Chu Phong battle and mobile warfare
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Deepe Mobile--page 1 November 18, 1965 SAIGON--The [deletion: [illegible]] see-saw battle of [deletion: Plei Me] Chu Phong between American 1st Air Cavalry units and North Vietnamese regulars last week illustrates dramatically the Communists military tactics known as mobile warfare. Military experts predict that the Communists will employ mobile warfare tactics over and over again and that successive battles during the coming [deletion: mortars] Months will become bigger and bloodier. They believe that the Communists’ mobile warfare tactics, which are a transitional tactic between guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare, will become one pattern for large-scale operations as the Communists aim at a “long, protracted war of attrition.” Deepe Mobile--page 2 What is mobile warfare? Mobile warfare, also called “the war of movements,” is a transitional form of military tactics involving fluid, momentary battles lines instead of fixed battle lines designed to annhiliate the enemy as part of a long “contest of attrition.” Instead of a fixed battleline for conventional forces as in World War II, the the battleline erupts anywhere and then disappears into nowhere. Mobile warfare, in popular terminology, is often distinguished from guerrilla warfare by the size of Communist operation force in battalions or regiments, while the operations unit of guerrilla warfare is generally considered to be squads or platoons, However, this is only half-answer. Mao Tse-Tung, in his “Selected Military Writings,” explains that mobile warfare is the reaching of a higher stage, in which the Communist forces “gradually and consciously…become more centralized, more unified, more disciplined and more thorough in its work--in short, more regular,” One aspect of the Communist forces becoming “more regular” is their weapons system. While the Communist guerrillas in 1962 used antiquated French weapons, to capture more American weapons from the Vietnamese government units, the Communist forces now operating in a higher phase [deletion: use weapons which] are, at least partially, if not totally, outfitted with the most modern of Chinese communist weapons. These weapons, manufactured in China, are copied from the latest designs of weapons now issued to the regular army of the Soviet Union. Deepe Mobile--page 3 Mobile warfare is often identified with the [deletion: Soviet] Second Phase of the Three-Phase Communist warfare. Mao Tse-Tung wrote “this second stage (phase) will be the transitional stage of the entire war; it will be the most [deletion: frying] trying period but also the most pivotal.. It will be the second act in the three-act drama.” North Vietnamese General Vo Nguyen Giap, who engineered the defeat of the French a decade ago, defined these stages within their strategy of a long drawn-out war as: Phase 1--state of contention Phase 2--state of equilibrium and Phase 3--the general counter-offensive. Hence, the arrival of more than 160,000 American troops have tipped the equilibrium or balance of forces against the Communists--and they have been force in a lower operational strata of Phase 2. But as the Communists have not [insertion: totally] de-escalated into Phase 1 tactics of guerrilla platoons and squads, as American officials predicted. The seesaw battle around [deletion: Plei Me became] Chu Phong was the fifth major engagement in which the Communists employed mobile warfare tactics against American combat units. Military experts believe the Communists first used undisputedly mobile warfare tactics against Vietnamese government units in December, 1964, when the Communists--and not the government--initiated attacks against the An Lao outpost in the northern provinces. The first major turning point for American units to encounter this type of mobile warfare was the famous “Operation Starlight” in which 5,000 U.S. Marines stormed the Van Tuong peninsula south of the Chu Lai enclave. Deepe mobile--page 4 Significantly, the mobile warfare tactics against Vietnamese government units was employed in operations initiated by the Communists, but mobile warfare against American units were employed on operations initiated by the Americans. An appraisal shows that all five of these major engagements [insertion: against American units] share common features which illustrate the beginnings of a pattern of military tactics employed by the Communists. The common features of these five major contests are: 1. All five of the major engagements were initiated by American units in large-scale offensives within Communist stronghold territories within South Vietnam. But, [deletion: one] once inside the Communist-controlled areas, the Communist elements--either local Southern units or North Vietnamese regulars--sought to “destroy and annihilate” one or two specific [insertion: American] units. In most cases, the Communist partially succeeded--although they did not succeed to the extent that Radio Hanoi claimed--i.e. the wiping out 2,000 Americans and several American battalions. But, they also succeeded better than American military officials indicated in briefings--or the Western press. In these briefings, American correspondents are prohibited from printing the number of American casualties--they are instructed to use only the terms “light,” “moderate” or “heavy”--and although one company may be virtually wiped out, the American casualties compared to the total number of troops in the operation may be listed as “light.” Deepe Mobile--page 5 American military claims of high Viet Cong casualties are at best estimates, even though they are listed as "confirmed bodycounts.” 2. In all cases, the Communists held the strategic terrain dominating and overlooking the American ground troops below. 3. The Communists sought--and often succeeded--in limiting the effectiveness of massive American firepower--airpower, artillery and mortars--either by entrenching themselves in a series of well-concealed, well-protected bunkers or else by engaging in such close, hand-to-hand combat with American troops that American jetfighters or artillery could not be utilized for fear of killing American troops. (French commanders at times faced the same problem, and were forced to order French airplanes to bomb both the Communist and the French troopers.) 4. In their attempts to destroy specific American units operating within the large-scale U.S. offensives, the Communists sought--and often succeeded--in separating each American unit from the next. They describe this procedure as “teeth of the comb” tactics to isolate one platoon or company from the next, and, specifically, to prevent reinforcing units from reaching besieged encircled units. Deepe Mobile--page 6 5. Western military experts suspect--but it has yet to be proved--that the Communists fed the American intelligence apparatus with information which lead to the circumstances in which American units could be virtually trapped or encircled. Thus, in the case of the Operation Starlight and an Operation of the 173rd Airborne Brigade, both operations were said to be launched to prevent an attack on American-secured airbases. But Western military experts suspect that the Communist never attempted to attack the airbases, but intended only to give American intelligence officers enough “hard” information to induce them into launching an offensive in which the Communists would be waiting for them. [insertion: Deepe mobile - 7] The first major contest in which the Communists spectacularly employed mobile warfare tactics against American combat units was the famed “Operation Starlight” on August 25. As 5,000 Marines-supported by massive firepower of air, artillery and naval guns--moved along a 5000-meter front pinching off the Van Tuong peninsula, the Communists on a [deletion: [illegible]] jungled hilltop chewed up two infantry [insertion: companies] below them and encircled for seven hours [deletion: on] one armored column. Marines commanders rushed in another company of reinforcements--the lead platoon of 40 men suffered 4 killed and thirteen wounded [insertion: in three minutes of combat]. A second armored column was pinned down and forced to turn back. From their strategic terrain the Communists effectively separated each unit from the next one, and then chewed up [insertion: the] several units. The Marines suffered the highest number of casualties in a single engagement--until three months later the 1st [deletion: Cav.] Cavalry action erupted near the Cambodian border. [insertion: Deepe mobile - 8] In November, however, the Communists accelerated the pace and level of their mobile warfare; within a period of ten days, the Communists had initiated four sizzling attacks, reacting to an American “Strategic offensives” within their stronghold base area. On November 7, one company of the 1st air cavalry division come pinned down by [insertion: lethal] mortar and automatic weapons from the Communist forces on the surrounding jungled hills. Fighting between American and Communist troops was so violent and close that hand-to-hand combat erupted--and American airpower and artillery was largely ineffective. A second American company [XXXX indicating deletion] rushing to reinforce the first crossed a river and a Communist unit raised in automatic weapons fire at their rear. The Communists attacked not only from the higher positions but from the double-layered canopy of the trees. During the nine-hours battle, American casualties in [deletion: [illegible]] the first company (180 men) suffered moderate [XXXX indicating deletion] casualties; in the second company, [deletion: were] heavy. A day later (Nov. 8) and 175 miles further south, the U.S. 173rd Airborne Brigade plus Australion elements in a search-and-destroy operation in D-zone met considerable resistance. At ten in the morning, one American company encountered withering machine gun from dug-in positions, [deletion: which] and were encircled [deletion: them]. [insertion: Deepe Mobile - 9] The American company broke out of the encirclement only to be encircled again. American artillery and aircraft were incapable of being utilized in the 30-yard distance been the American and Communist units. Two hours later, two other companies of the battalion arrived to reinforce the first--and all three companies were encircled twice. Four days later, (November 12) and 32 miles further west, elements of the U.S. 1st division were conducting an unrelated search-and-destroy operation along infamous “Bloody Route 13”. On the second nite, the head [deletion: fusetors] quarters company, a troop of M 113 armored personnel carriers, plus a battery of 105mm howizters formed a 200 meter defensive perimeter, strung concertina barbed wire around it and stopped for the night. At dawn, the [insertion: Communists] launched a three-pronged coordinated attack and a seven-hour battle raged. Five days later (November 17) and back at the 1st cavalry operation near the Cambodian border, one battalion set up headquarters in a helicopter [deletion: charing] landing zone of elephant grass which was dubbed “Albany landing zone”. at noon, such close fighting ensued that hand-to-hand combat was necessary [deletion: in] during nearly three hours of intense fighting. American units suffered some of the heaviest casualties of the war. [insertion: Deepe Mobile 10] Mao Tse-Tung in his writings clearly predicted battles such as the 1st Cavalry action and outlined a series of counter-tactics to deal with them. He wrote that when the enemy is in a period of “strategic offensive,”--[insertion: i.e.] when the U.S. 1st Cavalry Division moved into the Communist zones near the Cambodia border--the enemy frequently resorts to “converging attacks…When the enemy launches a converging attack in several columns, the guerrilla policy should be to smash it by counter-attack. It can be easily smashed if each advancing enemy column consists of only one unit, whether big or small, has no follow-up units and is unable to station troops along the route of advance, construct blockhouses or build motor roads. When the enemy launched a converging attack,..we should use our secondary forces to pin down several enemy columns, while our main force should launch surprise attacks (chiefly in the form of ambushes) in a campaign or battle against a single enemy column, striking it when it is on the move…After smashing one column, we should shift our forces to smash another, and by smashing them one by one, shatter the converging attack.” -30-
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Date
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1965, Nov. 18
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Attrition (Military science); Operation Long Reach, 1965; Strategy; Tactics
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B187, F6
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
