-
derivative filename/jpeg
-
363-08262 to 363-08269.pdf
-
Digital Object Identifier
-
363-08262 to 363-08269
-
Title
-
Part eight of an eight article series on Danang
-
Description
-
Original title: "political - article 8 of 8 article series", Keever's title: N/A, Part eight of an eight article series on Danang, for an Unknown Publication
-
AI Usage Disclosure
-
Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
-
Transcript
-
--------------------
- Page 1
--------------------
deepe
political--article 8 of 8 article series
page 1
august 28, 1965
DANANG, SOUTH VIET NAM--For years, politically
conscious American officials, including former Ambassador
Maxwell D. Taylor argued against sending American ground
combat troops to fight in Viet Nam.
These officials argued the Americans would be
closely identified with the former French colonialist position,
that the war could easily become an American vs. Vietnamese--
and racially white vs. yellow--struggle.
As the military situation in Vietnam continued to
sharply deterioriate, the need for American military strength
on the ground forced even Ambassador Taylor to reluctantly shift
his position.
Now,
seven months after the arrival of the first
American combat troops, some of these long-held political
fears are beginning to materialize in this U.S. Marine Corps
area of responsibility some 350 miles north of Saigon.
(More)
--------------------
- Page 2
--------------------
deepe
political--article 8 of 8 article series
page 2
The Marines currently are submerged in multi-fronted
political frictions with the Vietnamese civilians; with the
Vietnamese government officials from the highest level to the
village level; and with other American agencies. Seven months
after the initial arrival of the Marines, a special committee
of all the heads of the American agencies operating in the
Danang area has finally been formed. This includes the Marines,
the U.S. Army (advisorys to the Vietnamese), the United
States Information Service (USIS) and the American economic
aid mission, plus the American Consulate. No representative
of the Vietnamese government has yet been named.
"I went to an orientation session in Saigon where
all the leading American military, economic and political
experts in Saigon told us about the need for civic action
for the Vietnamese people," one Marine Corps officer explained.
"I asked them if the American leaders in Saigon had any
coordinated plan to use American tactical units for civic
action among the population.
"You'll flip when I tell you that these important
American officials said 'no,' the officer continued.
(Source: 1)
(More)
--------------------
- Page 3
--------------------
deepe
political--article 8 of 8 article series
page 3
One key area of conflicting approaches to the
political problem has arisen between the Marines and the
U.S. Agency for International Development/
"The USAID approach is to give American aid goods
to the Vietnamese government in Saigon and then this filters
down to them Vietnamese district chief and finally to the
village chief," one Marine officer explained. "But, the
Marines want to get the goods--especially for refugees in our
area--into the field immediately and we can do it quicker than
the Vietnamese government.
"USAID so far has refused to budge from their position,
so the Marines have to get all their medical supplies through
Marine Corps logistical system and this is about to run out.
We can't get American relief goods for the refugees from USAID
so we had to get them from the Catholic Relief Service--which
gets their emergency relief goods from the U.S. government too.
But even their supplies aren't enough to meet the refugee
problem--and furthermore it identifies the Marines with the
Catholic Church--and we're operating in a militantly Buddhist
(Source 1)
and anti-Catholic area."
(More)
--------------------
- Page 4
--------------------
DEEPE
POLITICAL--article 8 of 8 article series
page 4
Frictions between the Marines and the highest fanking
Vietnamese military--civilian military and government officals
centers around the expansion of the Marine Corps "tactical area
of responsibility." The Marines have a 200 square mile TAOR,
which has been defined as "a zone of action in which the Marines
are free to conduct tactical operations without further
coordination with the Vietnamese armed forces." (Source: 2)
But, to operate outside this TAOR requires prior
coordination with the Vietnamese armed forces, specifically
the I Corps Command, headed by Brig. Gen. Nguyen Chanh Thi,
who is considered a jealous, militant advocate of Vietnamese
nationalism.
In one instance, the Marines intelligence officer
received word that 400-some Vietnamese peasants outside of
the Marine TAOR wanted to come in behind the Marine lines,
but were afraid to do so because of Viet Cong terrorism.
The Marines conducted a military operation outside their TAOR
to rescue these peasants%3B but in the meantime, General Thi
specifically ordered his province chief not to allow the
operation, until the incoming refugees had first been
screened to eliminate the Viet Cong sympathizers.
(More)
--------------------
- Page 5
--------------------
deepe
political--article 8 of 8 article series
page 5
"The poor province chief was caught between a headstrong
Marine and his headstrong general," one Marine officer explained.
The province chief sided with the Marines, but he was
fired. And when the refugees came to the Vietnamese hamlets
within the Marine security zone, the Vietnamese village chief
refused to welcome them%3B 25 per cent of them returned to the
Viet Cong-controlled area.
In another instance, on the southern flank of the
Marine defensive perimeter around the Danang air base, the
Marines requested and received permission from the Vietnamese
authorities to send a reconnaissance patrol across the river
outside the boundaries of their TAOR. But the recon patrol
suffered considerable casualties and had to be reinforced by
two Marine companies, who also suffered considerable casualties.
"By then the Marine 16 attitude was we've been hit so
badly trying to take this village, we're going to stay here,"
one Marine officer explained. But General Thi said he opposed
this idea, since he had no authorization from the Vietnamese
government in Saigon.
After securing that village named
Duong Son, which the Marines hoped to turn into a model hamlet,
they attempted to take control of the neighboring village called
Cam Ne, which lead to the infamous house-burning incident
there several weeks later.
"I can tell you I have lots of headaches now," on local
(Source 6)
Vietnamese government official explained."
--------------------
- Page 6
--------------------
deepe
political--article 8 of 8 article series
page 6
In another instance, on the northern perimeter,
the Marines wanted to expand their TAOR by several thousand
meters to include an Esso oil storage area. The Vietnamese-
authorities and the Marines compromised; the Marines were given
security responsibility for two bridges en route to the Esso
depot%3B the Vietnamese reinforeed the Esso storage area with
two companies of local militiamen. But, then the Viet Cong
launched a diversionary mortar-internal sabotage attack and
blew up the costly Esso storage area; the Marines were still
confused as to whether the Viet Cong had slipped through their
patrol lines, or had skirted them, and fearing the two bridges
within their TAOR we would be blown up, had to reinforce them
with another Marine company. (Source: 4 )
the Marines,
A four-way political tug-of-war has developed between
the American military Command in Saigon, the
low-ranking Vietnamese officials and Vietnamese villagers. The
problem centers around claims to be paid to the villagers when
the Marines establish a fixed position, such as a company
headquarters, in the heart of a densely populated area.
(More)
--------------------
- Page 7
--------------------
deepe
political--article 8 of 8 article series
page 7
"The Marine battalion commanders feel that the Marines
should pay the villagers for leasing their land and for
inconveniencing them," one Marine officer explained (Source: 1).
"They believe these are the people that should be for us, rather
then shooting us in the back. So, the Vietnamese district chief
personally measured off the land with the villagers and they
submitted claims which the Marine Corps promised they would pay.
"The Marines want to pay these people on the spot,"
he continued.
"But Mr. (Robert) McNamara when he was here said
'We're not going to buy the battlefield,'
according to the
military officials in Saigon; and the Saigon command (Military
Assistance Command headed by Gen. William C. Westmoreland)
interpretes that literally and won't give us the money to pay
the villagers. So, the Marines promised the villagers the
claims money weeks ago; we still haven't paid and we now look
as inefficient to them as the Vietnamese government."
But the price listing the Marines told the Vietnamese
district they would pay is not the same as the Vietnamese district
told the villagers the Marines would pay--the Marines worked
through the district chief to deal with the villagers--and the
villagers were totally happy about the prices listings.
(More)
--------------------
- Page 8
--------------------
deepe
political--article 8 of 8 article series
page 8
The Marines promised to pay the villagers up to 500
piastres ($7) for fruit trees on the leased land and up to 1000
piastres ($15) for "clumps of bamboo"--a clump has yet to be
defined.
But, in the translation the villagers said they were
to be given only four piastres (seven cents) for a banana tree,
"But that's not enough because it takes years for a banana tree
to bear fruit and four piastres doesn't repay us.
One of the most basic complaints of the Marines,
especially those operating in the villages, is the lack of
competent interpreters; the Marines believe this is partly
to blame for the misunderstandings. "There's a real shortage
of interpreters at the company level where we have the most
contact with the villagers," one Marine company commander
explained. "There's not enough good English-speaking Vietnamese
to go around. Some of the Marines in my company took a two-week
crash course in Vietnamese before coming here, but it's not
good enough. In addition, most of the time we operate with
the Vietnamese irregular units, and few of them speak English;
while the regular Vietnamese units, like their Marines do
speak English. But, there's nothing we can do about this."
-30-
-
Date
-
1965, Aug. 28
-
Subject
-
Vietnam War, 1961-1975
-
Location
-
Da Nang, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
16.0545; 108.0717
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B5, F7
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Collector
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English
