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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-06099 to 363-06105.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-06099 to 363-06105
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Title
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Letter from Beverly Keever to Mr. Rosenfeld about a Marine Corps article
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Description
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Letter from Beverly Keever to her New York Herald Tribune editor, Mr. Rosenfeld, about an article she was sending on a battle where Marine Corps supply tanks fell into a Viet Cong trap. The letter discusses the battle, Keever's sources, the Marine Corp's efforts to control the story and distract the journalists, other war correspondents who wrote about the baqttle, and the recent footage captured by CBS News correspondent Morley Safer of U.S. Marines burning Cam Ne village
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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Saigon
August 25, 1965
Dear Mr. Rosenfold:
I'm onoloning this long critique of the big Marine battle. I
understand vory well on the basic of your recent cables what you don't
want, and it is not my intention to countormand these instructions.
You don't want sories; you don't articlos of more than 1200 words;
you don't want cabled material.
But, please understand what we have to put up with. Battles
are not fought in 1200-word chunks. You said in New York you
wanted the nignificance of the nows, an interpretative of the mont
basic, essential problems in the Vietnam problem. The Marine battle
ae by for the most significanco for in a long time...ond it was the
first which made it nows, oven though we're getting it to you lator.
And it revealed & graphically the most essential military problem of
the var that the Americans and the Victnomono govornmont chore
consistently to fight a conventional war, and that they fail by doing so.
But to explain all the details of a complex oporation, to put thom
into some sort of order from which to draw conclusision,
ono must
also write the foots, oven though the wire services have already
published a bite and pieces of thom.
I have therefore, included alot of the first-hand quotes from
people in the battle, which can easily be chopped out in New York,
but unless I include thon in the original copy, the conclusiohe
lose their validity. The article is written in chunks actually,
because we had to play the official version against the ground onog
the conventional var versus the mobile waz.
I shall attach a complete listing of the people I talked with,
and their positions-in come cac00, I didn't get their nemos.
I should also inform you of some of the behind-the-sconos
nows managements, how the Denong press corps covered the story,
how I covered the story--and how the olomont of luck ontore in.
On Tuesday, Aug. 17, the Marine information officero notified
the press corps in Deneng there would be a Marine operation to Cam No,
the scene of the CBS house-burning incident. Everyone wanted to co,
but I refused because we were still pushing on the scories. Late
in the afternoon, Conoral Nguyon Chanh Thi drove up in his Morcodon
to the press conter and begged the press people to go with bin on
his operation in Quang Tri province, who e the B-52 jets had struck.
I still anted to work on the norios, but decided to go with Thi's
field trip the next day, because we suspect Thi will be the next
primo minister and we wanted to talk with him more.
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50% the next day, Wednesday, I wont with This all the other
correspondents wont to Com No, which was a nothing story. But both
the Thi trip and the Can Ho trip were a divorsions the Marines didn't
want correspondents on the Chu Lai trip. By late Wednesday,
tho
battle casualty figures were filtering in-ith more then 100 wounded, and
20 some killode
The only correspondent to cover the operation me a young freelancor,
Tim Pago, whom AP had commissioned to cover for him thon. That night
in Deneng the highest headquarters in Danang gave a summary of the
operation; the Marine commanding general in Vietnam--Gen. Walt
was there and came out with some very rah-rah quotes. Also the
Marine commander of the paolo Pacifione prosont and ho also came
out with some rah-rahy statements. This was the first load of the iron,
except for Time Page's eyewitnesses, which described only one operational
area.
There were also som odd coincidoncos in the Danong press corps.
Both AP and UPI had just brought in new mong while they were competent
Journalists certainly, they didntix hadn't boon on Marine operations.
The AP man, Cecor Coorgo Bapar, had just come of the New York domestic
wire deck; the other AP man was Eddie Adams, who has boon on alot of
operations, but ho in first a photographer and second a raportor, but
doos both very well. The Routore man was inx gtranded in some outpost
and nover did got to the operational aronhich also moont that the
New York Times in Saigon had to rely only on the Saigon briefings for thoir
own copy. (The Times works out of loutors offico and they cover for onch
othor).
There were alot of other journalists too, Asian cameramon etc.,
but this was the hard-core of the reporting types. That night (Wed.)
late, the AP chaps and I thought wo hoard mortars on tho Danang
airbaso, raood out thoro, guts took a hours driving around, at which
time, the two AP mon and I decided there were alot of things in
the first official Marine briefing that wos vore soptical of. For
example, it notror was clear from the briefing how all the Marinos were
killed and wounded.
So, the coverage & of the most first day of the operation--and the
only day of fighting-doponded on Page's eyewitnessor and the Marine
briefing.
The next day, Thursday, about 30 correspondents were taken b
by plane to the Chu Lai airstrip, where they waited for two hours
for the helicopters to carry them into the operational aroa 12 miles away.
By luck, the jeep I was in z ridding in with two Asian photographors
for UPI stalled; we couldn't get through the gate etc., missed the
press plane--and thon we made a dash to the helicopters which woro just
takon taking off. And, luckily, the pilot, a major, was from New York,
his grandfather had been a life-long reader of the Heralds Tribuno.
flow around with the
Anyhow, wo bypassed the Chu Lo, erat eventually I got off
choppers to the various units on resupply Funs
at the regimental headquarters long befo
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with their Marine PIO officers,
who had arrived with Kuulak-
before the other correspondents arrived,
the Chief one being a Col. Jim Williams,
hence he was the chief Marine PIO in the Pacific.
Whon I arrived at the rope hondquarters, I was introduced to Col.
Pontross the regimental commander. He immediately started talking with
mo about his trappod supply columns the ground units that morning wore
preparing to that trapped colum to rollove. He at had alrondy
said I could go with the headquartorg co. of the relieving battalion,
which would be accompanied by more thanks and a tank retriever. As 170
were standing around, one of the regimental majors told me to try to
thenomenonton talk with a Capt. Lamb, who was
bommander of all the tonks.
In the meantime, all the other correspondents arrived; and immediately,
PIO Col. Williams gave the VC casualties: 552 confirmed by Marinos
on the ground counting the dead--not pilot's estimate or anything. In addition,
1000 VC. estimated wounded. And that was the second day lead for all the
wires.
I then moved out with the battalion headquartore--the only correspondent
with them. Eddie Adams and a few other photographers were with the
infantry companies ahead of us, but didn't got to the tre ppod tanks.
The other correspondents wore put on helicoptereith specific persons
assigned to apocific hoa helicopters--and they got guided tours. And,
deliberately, CBS was loft on the ground without helicopter transportation,
because the Marines were still furious at that CBS house-burning film.
My unit stopped to look at the one burnod out tank and then we
moved onto the amall area where the tank unit à was trappedg it was
a mess with Marine bodies all around--the dead still had not been
ovacuated (I sent you photos of that). And-Poter Arnott of AP was there;
and wrote his fabulous story about the encirclement; he left the area
shortly aftor alex I arrived and returned to Saigon.
Based on this ecospade,
I wrote the tank
story which I airexpressed, knowing Peter would also filo.
The other wire service follows that day, instond of back-tracking
to get a detailed play-by-play of the first day's actions, more getting
mostly new faots and doteilas though UPI got some of the tank encircolomont.
Thon, that night in Donong, all the correspondents were told
that the operation would be phased out the next morning; the troops would
be withdrawn from the area and there would be nothing to see. This me
a lie! It's true that two of the battalions were being extracted from the
area but other elements fit from the 7th Floot more being brought in to
replace them.
So, the next day, on Friday, on 5-6 correspondents wont down to the
operational area. The New York Times, Newsweek had arrived and went downs
Eddie Adems of AP again, All Chang of National Georgraphic and a UPI
photographer. Saper of AP did not go down.
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I already know the story of the trapped tanks, and I know that the
rolief tanks going in to help them had also been hit. I decided I should
Just anoop around, and talk to so many low-ranking peoplo directly involved
as possible. That day Col. Pentross evaded the proang The New York:
Times concentrated on talking with General Karch, Marino Division
Commanders Bowmook was getting color. I ont down to talk with covoral
privato-end luckily two of them wore the radio operators at the regimental
level and they started telling me what happened, NYT left before noon.
Then, I again vont out with the same battalion a commander
I had gone with the first days I found out how their 12mm Co.
cot hits went to Ap Tho No. 2 with them, watched how the engineers
triod to a blow up some tunnels and couldn't oven budgo the top layor of
dirte
Then, the rest of the afternoon, I talked with a tank commander
who had boon with Hotol Companys an entreat commandors another
antrock: can. Thon, I & returned to the regimental commends Col.
Pestross was gones I talked with a Moj. Schults
was the key
operations man under Peatrons and who explained some of the chronology,
oxplained that Col. Poatross was gone during 1 hour of the battle oto.
I also talked with a Captain working under Sohults, Evon, after doing
all of that, the exact chronology was still unolong bobause events
happened so fast; vo still don't have an exact timetable of what
Hotel Co. mas doing thon India was doing something else oto. Thoro wore
even contradictions about some of the locationog the tank people didn't
know that was going on outside their unit--oith the unbix infantry
unit they were accompanying etc. Thilo o don't have an hour-by-hour
chen-chrongblo chronology, however, we did got the gist of what happened
the first day.
Then, on the way book, I started talking with the U. S. Army
helicopter pilot who was platoon commander the first day and he come
out with some good quotes.
Because of all these factors, the other agencies did not write
a recapitulation.
That is the basic way I got the foots. I didn't even understand
what they moant until I sat down and started a going over this my
notos to understand what they meant. I put the 20 and 20 toco thor
and come up with 48 I do not have opecific quotes to documont my
judgments, but I'm sure they are accurate.
mo.
The Marinos on the ground did not know at that point-that the
Viet Cong had in foot conducted mobile warfare, in the most classical
tomma, acains thom. I figure it out on the bando foote the Marines told
The Marines didn't explain prooieely thoy moved in as a conventional
but on the basis of the tank novoments they clearly wore. Tho
Marinon did not say that it was a meatgrinder operation; but the I had
soon enough times how tho Vietnamoso made the oamo mistakes and I know
precisely, that unito reinforced the battle area and I had the facts
that they too # got pinned downe
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The Marinon rim on the round didn't toll mo their bottle plon
one wrong, but when you looked at the foots of what they wore attempting
to--to push to the son with a force ratio of 1.9 Marino to 1
entrenched V0, I concluded it no unrealistic.
I have thorforo civen you alot of oye-itness quotos of from
people on the grounds and on the basis of boing in Vietnam three years
and sooing this happen before, and writing about mobile warfare and III
Phaco stuff, I drew my own conclusions.
I'm attaching a rather complete listing of the people I talkod with.
Sincerely,
B
PS. Before sending this off, last nicht, Wod.
Auc. 25, there was
a proas cocktail party; Col. Williams as cleo there. In his
conversations, he explained the Marine Corps me against correspondente
she had previously itton "burcing" stuff against them. On Worley
Sefer's house-burning film, one of the lower-ranking Marines told
Williams, Don't worry about it. If the 303 comes out here again,
he'll never como book: alive." This woa noithor a joke nor a throat;
it mo a promino; and the CBS poople aro terified.
Iakovine, the Marinos are fuorio furious at Tin Tago's pictures of the
battle. Life Magasino is going to run six-color pages of dead and
dying Torino 0000. "That kid is professionally dead in this tomg
the Marinos aren't going to do anything for him anymore."
Also, the Marinos here were chewed out by some of the Marines in Tashington
(the commandent's offico) for Fotor Arnett's story about the trappod
Supply Column. I now the playbook of Potor's story; from hat I s
with the tanks, I would say it me ecurto-except that the supply
column didn't wandor off "doop in onomy tository". It wandorod botreen
two Marine companion who couldn't rooo it.
According to rotor,
the AP burent here in receiving lettere from AP
New York for "patriotic, moroslo-building copy-and they're pretty
dingusted with it.
Also, informatively, according to the Marino P10 Col. Williams, tho sofor
housobutning film caused such a stir that the family of one of the sorgoante
Safor interviered in the film vo ostracized by their neighbors in Lime
Ohio-the neighbors wouldn't talk to his family.
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SOURCES:
Source 1: Though I talked briefly with Col. Poatross, rogimental Commander,
he wo most useful for tips about the trapped tanks, but didn't give mo
enough detailed information.
Source 2: Maj. Schults, directing oporations undor Poatross.
Sourco 3# a Major Koovor, civil affairs officor for the Marine Amphibious
Force the highest Marino Headquarters in Viotnen, which Gon. Talt commands.
Source 4s The Hotel Company Commander in press conference said his
company strength was 141 mong others on battlefield listod strongth as 120;
normal Marine company is 220. India Company strength was about 1905
85 mon were non-oasualties after the battle. India Company source was a
Borgeant who had operatod with them overal times.
Source 5s a Catpal Captain at the rogimontal level, who worked directly
under Major sohults.
Source 6# Captain Koating, platoon commander of the U. S. Army flucys
on first day of operation. These Army chopper pilots had been in Viotnom
longer than the Marinos and had boon in the battle of Ba Gia and some
of the other big once in I Corpo, which they frequently eluded to.
Ho's related to son, Keating, is one pilot said.
Sourco 7s The tank commandor with Hotel Company, who got 200 yards
from the tropped entrocks before retreating.
Sourcoi Another Arny holicoptor pilot and company commander of all U. S.
Army aircraft in Danang area, Ilo's company commander of Sourco 6.
Source 9: Capt. Lamb
commander of all the tanko in the oporation, I
talked with off and on the first day, ae the tanko novod in to retrieve
the trapped supply train. The last time I saw him, he blurted, "The
colonel told no not to tell you any hing olne."
-30->
Sources talked with in the trappod supply train, and writton about in
the previous article, are not included. Likewiso, some of tho amtrac
and tank people identified by position in this artiolo immm are not
included,
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pross
tribune newyorks
29160 proaltmam air airexpressed friday panamerican 842
gan sanfranviso on waybill
deepe
administrative stuff
mots ajoutoss
mots rayos8
beverly deepe oarte no. 217
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Date
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1965, Aug. 25
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Journalists; Journalism; War correspondents; Government and the press; United States. Marine Corps
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B188, F1
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Format
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commercial correspondence
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
