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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-08204 to 363-08212.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-08204 to 363-08212
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Title
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Part one of an eight article series on Danang
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Description
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Original title: "wrapup- article 1 of 8 - article series", Part one of an eight article series on Danang, for an Unknown Publication
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AI Usage Disclosure
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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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U
deepe
wrapup--article 1 of 8-article series
page 1
august 10, 1965
DANANG, SOUTH VIET NAM--The concept of the Johnson
Administration to use American combat Marines to fortify this
strategic enclave here along the eastern seabord of South
Viet Nam is beginning to fail before it has barely begun.
Unless there is a drastic change in American military
tactics, and more important, unless there is the dramatic,
immediate formulation of an American political strategy for
South Vietnam, American faces the prospect of a total and
humilitating defeat in the coming years.
Before the arrival of the American combat Marines--
following the February bombing raids against North Viet Nam--
the American political-military position acted in support of
the Vietnamese government and Vietnamese armed forces. With
the arrival of the American Marines, however, the total
American prestige military and political prestige was laid on
the line--for the whole world to see--in an attempt to win a
war that was progressively being lost.
Now the gamble of using American combat Marines here,
in the most important of enclave areas is itself failing.
(More)
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- Page 2
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deepe
wrapup-article 1 of 8 article series
page 2
The orders from Washington to the U.S. Marines in this
enclave area are neither to win the war nor to secure the
villagers, but to defend the Danang airbase, which is of
strategic importance since a number of the bombing raids to
North Vietnam are launched from here. However, the Marines are
literally "knocking ourselves out, " as one of them explained,
to win the war, secure the people and to defend the airbase.
More than 9000 US Marines--are responsible for defending the
200 square mile perimeter around the airbase.
Yet, there is no total security. Last week, a U.S.
Marine sentry at the Marine headquarters at the edge of the
Danang airbase was shot twice through the chest from a house
across the street. He died.
"The security must be total," one reliable source
explained. "Security for 364 nights a year is not enough;
it must be for 365 nights or else the Communist terrorists
will assassinate the government officials and intimidate the
villagers."
Even more difficult than securing the people, is
finding them. In village after village which the U.S. Marines
sweep through only the elders and children remain. "We have
lost the middle generation," one Marine captain explained.
In one village south of Danang, the population dropped from
1200 to 400 once the Marines arrived and attempted to secure it.
(More)
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- Page 3
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deepe
wrapup--article 1 of 8 article series
page 3
The one most basic fundamental which makes the war
in South Viet Nam different than a conventional wars of the
past pivots around the role of the people. In World War II
and in the Korea war, the indigenous populations were neither
a military nor a political factor in the war. In the war in
Vietnam, however, the people are of primary importance--
the non-opposition,
if not support, of the people allow
without being
the Communist guerrilla bands to
detected, allow them to live off the land without a complicated
logistical systeme, and on the political front, allow the
Communists to forme demonstrations, political crisis and
economic hardship which has causes marked deterioration of
the Vietnamese government strength.
Some American military commanders and advisors describe
the difference between Vietnam and Korea in terms of guerrilla
tactics, the lack of a solid frontline and the hit-and-hide
techniques of the Viet Cong Communist fighters, But these
tactics become applicable and effective only if the Communist
fighters maintain the acquiessence of the people, primarily
the rural peasants.
(More)
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- Page 4
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deepe
wrapup--article 1 of 8 article series
page 4
an
In effect, the rural peasant becomes a shield for the
tool for the Communist guerrilla fighters and political cadre.
Officially, Washington announcements blame the sharp deterioration
of the war on the increase of infiltration from North Viet Nam.
There have been, according to reliable military sources,
increase of at least 10,000 Morth Vietnamese born soldiers ffrom
the People's Army of North Viet Nam. There battalion and
regimental-sized attacks present a conventional, Korea-like
to the war--but this is these attacks occur only occasionally,
at the chosing of the Communists, and without a stationary,
permanent frontline.
"Because the Americans have never understood the role
of the people in the war here, they have never understood
the ground war," one Western counterinsurgency expert explained.
(More)
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- Page 5
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deepe
wrapup--article 1 of 8 article series
page 5
The failure of the French in their war here two decades
ago was also the failure to understand the significant role of
the people. The French maintained two pillars of support in
Viet Nam--they controlled the cities and the armed forces.
They attempted to control the countryside by building small
turreted outposts or forts, in which the troops remained
inside to defend roads and bridges, while the Vietnamese
people remained outside to go about their farming. The
Communist guerrillas--then called Viet Minh--simply overpowered
on a one-by-one basis each of the individual forts.
With the beginning of the American military build-up
in 1962, the Vietnamese government, with the aid and advise
of American military and political advisors attempted to change
this approach by initiating the strategic hamlet program.
the armed forces, mostly villagers,
Under this program,
attempted to remain inside the village,
isolated outpost,
rather than in an
to protect the people. At its peak,
officially, 8,000 of the 12,000 villages in Viet Nam were
somewhat under government control, protected by government
troops.
(More)
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- Page 6
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deepe
wrapup--article 1 of 8 article series
page 6
Following the fall of President Ngo Dinh Diem in
November, 1963, the local Communist guerrillas, backed up by
North Vietnamese Army units, shattered the strategic hamlet
program. By the most optimistic estimates, only 2000 viable
government strategic hamlets remain. The hamlet councils and
chiefs either fled or were killed; the government local militia
protecting the hamlets were either killed, overpowered or
defected to the Viet Cong or more secure government centers.
The Communists seized more and more control of the villages--
and the peasants--placing the major cities in a virtual state
of siege. The choice of the peasant was not to be pro-government
or to be pro-Communist%;B
the simple choice was to be a tool of
the Communists, to be dead or to leave the area; the different
villagers made different choices--some chose to be refugees,
even though the government's and American aid program is no
inadequate that some are virtually starving. Some were killed;
but most chose to remain in their home villages and do as the
Communists ordered.
(More)
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- Page 7
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deepe
wrapup--article 1 of 8 article series
page 7
By the time the American Marines landed in February,
1965, the villages in the countryside--even within four miles
of Danang city--were virtually lost. The people were
indoctrinated or terrorized into helping the Communists.
So that now, even the women and children are organized by
the Communists to conduct war against the Marines. In Danang
city, 10-year-old Vietnamese newsboys sell Time and Newsweek
magazines on the street and are suspected by reliable sources
of being a Viet Cong intelligence net. In one outlying outpost,
young Vietnamese children sold Coca Cola to the Marines--
and then secretly sketched the defense plan of the outpost.
In one sweep operation south of Dangng, a young Vietnamese
peasant boy handed a live grenade to an American Marine.
According to U.S. Marine sources, small Vietnamese
boys are organized to tend water buffalo in the villages--
and then to report to American troop movements.
Vietnamese women are organized as fighters,
agents or as provocateurs.
Young
as intelligence
(More)
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- Page 8
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deepe
wrapup--article 1 of 8 article series
page 8
Since the villagers were lost to the Communists
before the Marines arrived, the question remains whether
the people of the countryside can be regained. So far, there
has been some fragmentary improvements in the situation, but
there is no overwhelming momentum towards victory. With the
downfall of the strategic hamlet program, the Marines are
still perilously close to the tactical concept of the French-fort
with antennas of patrols radiating outwards. Politically,
the Americans position does not have the disadvantage of
being a colonial power--though this may be of marginal impact
upon the Vietnamese villager who, since the day he was born,
hated all foreigners. But, as a collorary of not being a
colonial power, the American political position lacks any
political control on the Vietnamese governmental administration,
the Vietnamese army, the Vietnamese police and intelligence
agencies--all of which were French-run under the French
colonial rule.
According to highly reliable sources, the most basic
difficulty in defeating the Communists politically and
militarily lies in Washington itself.
(More)
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- Page 9
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deepe
wrapup--article 1 of 8 article sèries
page 9
"The problem of Vietnam is not the problem ofthe state
Department, or the Central Intelligence Agency, or the Agency for
International Development or the Pentagon," the American official
familiar with both Vietnam and Washington explained. "The problem
of Vietnam fall beyond the jurisdiction of every agency. There is
no American political agency or nerve center which has the power,
responsibility or authority to meet the Communist exceptionally
subtle Communist political strategy.
"The American Embassy in Saigon follows the classical
diplomat function of reporting at the government-to-government
level," one American official explained. "The Central Intelligence
Agency reports intelligence information to Washington. The economic
aid mission in Saigon is the same as in any other country in the
world. The Pentagon and its military establishment are
traditionally ordered to keep out of politics. All of these
functions are necessary,
of course, but there are great gaps
between. There is no American political apparatus that welds
a dynamic political program with the Vietnamese government to meet
the Communist political threat.
"There's no use in looking fof the solution to the Vietnam
problem in Vietnam--the problem lies in Washington. We must change
and adapt our whole government structure to meet this Communist
problem on a world-wide basis." Until we do, we'll have defeat
in Vietnam, in Santo Domingo, in the Cong and Congo and every
other place the Communists chose.
(More tomorrow: The fire of the enemy)
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Date
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1965, Aug. 10
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975
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Location
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Da Nang, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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16.0545; 108.0717
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B5, F7
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
