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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04804.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04804
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Title
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In Viet - The Military Coup That Became an Army Purge
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about a failed coup d'etat against General Khánh, page 16
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Transcript
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16
New York Herald Tribune
Wednesday, September 23, 1964
In Viet The Military Coup That Became an Army
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
If the abortive coup in South Viet Nam Sept. 13 was
not an attempt to overthrow Gen. Nguyen Khanh, neither
was it primarily organized as a pretext to purge the Army
-though this has been an effect of it.
The key leaders of the coup were all officially out of
a job and their replacements had been officially announced
in a government news bulletin. But their replacements
had not been officially installed in their new jobs.
Brig. Gen. Lam Van Phat had been removed from his
job as Minister of Interior and his replacement named, but
the installation was to take place on Monday morning.
Brig. Gen. Duong Ngoc Lam had already been replaced as
Mayor of Saigon. Brig. Gen. Nguyen Thieu was to hand
over his job as Chief of Staff of the Joint. General Staff
on Monday morning.
Another side effect-and perhaps a secondary reason
for the coup-was to smoke out anti-Khanh political lead-
ers. This was done when key political leaders showed up
for a meeting called by Maj. Gen. Duong Van Duc.
Also it revealed some of Gen. Khanh's own ministers
were against him. Gen. Duc telephoned one of Gen.
Khanh's super-ministers to ask him to become Premier and
to head the Khanh government but without Gen. Khanh.
INTRIGUE
The super-minister, Nguyen Xuan Oanh, who had
been a Harvard lecturer and Gen. Khanh's Vice-Premier
in Charge of Economics, accepted the offer to betray Gen.
Khanh. He called a meeting of Gen. Khanh's Cabinet and
four other ministers showed up at the Prime Minister's
office. Many suspect that both Gen. Duc and Mr. Oanh were
simply agents provocateurs, who were setting a trap for
the others, but in the meanderings of Oriental intrigue, it
will never be known. The effect of these maneuvers was to
crush the Right-wing Dai Viet party which helped Gen.
Khanh, but also the Buddhists.
The primary purpose of the coup now definitely ap-
pears to have been a flimsy effort to solve the Buddhist
The blur of political forces at work in South Viet Nam came momentarily into clearer focus
during the abortive army coup Sept. 13. In this second of two reports special correspondent
Beverly Deepe analyzes the motives behind the coup attempt and the very different results it produced.
situation and to pull Gen. Khanh away from a pro-
Buddhist position.
The Buddhist situation, obviously the most critical
problem in the country, involves not only the Buddhist
movement, which is the center of their orbit of power,
but also pro-Buddhist students and Buddhist-dominated
politicians and professors. It involves the threat of the
northern provinces seceding from the central government
and the possibility that a neutralist "buffer zone" will be
established between Communist North Viet Nam and anti-
Communist southern provinces. There are many in Saigon
who suspect the British and the Americans will approve
this plan in the future, and the Paris talks by Laotian
leaders are being closely watched as a prelude to future
developments in Viet Nam.
ALTERNATIVES
An increasing number of persons in Viet Nam now
suspect the Buddhist movement to be pro-neutralist or
pro-Communist. This was the main argument of the coup
leaders, plus appeals for a strong central government that
would block any hope of some provinces seceding from the
nation. Saigon observers are quick to point out that Wash-
ington announcements also used this anti-Buddhist inter-
pretation of why the coup was staged.
To deal with the Buddhist problem, the Vietnamese
government and Gen. Khanh, there are two total solutions:
Both are extreme alternatives to give the Buddhists the
government-or to crush them by raiding the Buddhist
pagodas as President Ngo Dinh Diem did. The first alterna-
tive is now considered totally unacceptable because it could
mean an eventual Communist takeover of the country.
The second is considered too radical at this moment-
it's a question whether that choice will ever be taken.
MIDDLE
But between these two extremes lies a vast middle
ground of minor alternatives, none of which solves the
problem. One is to negotiate with the Buddhists and to
make concessions to them. This Gen. Khanh attempted in
late August, but they pushed him out of the Presidency and
forced him to set up the triumvirate of generals to lead
the country.
Another of these middle-ground alternatives was the
Sunday coup. It was a warning to the Buddhists that there
would be limits to the number of concessions-and that
the Buddhist priests must stop meddling in the nation's
politics.
For the Buddhists, Gen. Khanh was the carrot and
the coup makers were the stick," one Vietnamese observer
noted. "Now they've purged the coup leaders and have
mad the young officers (who saved Khanh) the stick."
Whoever was the "puppet-master" for the coup seri-
ously miscalculated the effects on the Buddhists and the
future forces that were set in motion.
For the Buddhists, the coup only meant they missed
one day of sermons," one Vietnamese observer laughed.
The day after the coup, associates of Gen. Khanh made it
clear to the Buddhists that they would have either to
abolish the anti-government committee threatening to have
the northern provinces to secede from the union-or to force
it to become pro-government. But few believe the Buddhists
wiii stop their "anarchistic" programs and declarations in
Viet Nam.
IT HELPED
Instead of harming the Buddhist position, the coup
helped them considerably. The coup attempt came at a time
when the Buddhists themselves were losing prestige and
popularity among the masses. For example, Buddhism was
becoming a political movement in which the mass support
came from opportunists, not from Buddhist believers. The
Buddhists were failing to capture the full support they had
last year under President Diem. Buddhists followers who
were refugees from North Viet Nam-and who helped
the Buddhist cause in the fight against Diem-began to
doubt the Buddhist leadership. They threatened they "would
join the Catholics" if the Buddhist political policies con-
tinued to help the Communists.
Army Purge
But the coup has now stopped this anti-Buddhist trend.
The coup attempt has had the effect of giving the Buddhists
more public sympathy. The population, already irked at the
role of the Americans in the coup, will give more weight
to future anti-American statements by the Buddhists.
But most serious of all, it will give the Buddhists an
excuse to play politics within the Armed Forces. They
reason: If the Catholic, anti-Communist officers and units
in the Army can take political matters into their own
hands, why shouldn't the Buddhists?
THREAT
The Buddhist borizes for weeks in the pagodas and in
their public announcements have been telling Buddhist
officers that if they are betrayed by their leaders "they
must lay down their weapons and go home." If the officers
and enlisted men-who are predominantly Buddhist in
religious composition-do this, it will mean the collapse
of the Armed Forces. It will make prosecution of the mili-
tary war against Communist Viet Cong guerrillas impos-
sible. But most significantly, it will hamstring the only
anti-Communist political power to balance the Buddhist
pro-Neutralist power.
During the last week of August, in the great theater
of Vietnamese politics, the Buddhists took off their masks
so to speak, and the Vietnamese people saw them for a
blurred instant as pro-Communist.
During the coup attempt, another set of actors came
onto the stage and for a brief minute also took off its
masks. Gen. Khanh became the great compromiser. The
commander in chief of the Army became the great betrayer
-his neutrality forced him to betray both Gen. Khanh and
his officers who made the coup. He has lost considerable
prestige in the Army, at a time he needs it most-and when.
the Army needs him. The chief of staff, Gen. Thieu, the
architect of the coup attempt, is considered to have be-
trayed not only his officers, but the political party to
which he had been loyal.
The Americans had never been trusted much here-but.
now they will probably never be trusted again. The little
sergeants and privates, the paratroopers and pilots, who
enacted the play on the streets of Saigon-thought they
were actually making a coup. They are now disillusioned.
When al the masks were removed for a brief instant
last Sunday, the real faces were revealed. And few of the
faces were very pretty.
Only the Viet Cong Communists and the Buddhists
applauded the performance.
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Date
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1964, Sep. 23
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Subject
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Nguyễn, Khánh, 1927-2013; Vietnam (Republic)--History--Coup d'état, 1964; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
