In Viet - A Coup Designed to Fail

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Digital Object Identifier
363-04856
Title
In Viet - A Coup Designed to Fail
Description
Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about the failed coup against General Khánh, page unknown
Transcript
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Tuesday, September 22, 1964
New York Herald Tribune
In Viet-A Coup Designed to Fail
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
Viet Nam's bloodless Army
revolt on Sept. 13 has been
described as a "Hollywood
coup," "the
crazy-man's
coup" and a "puppet show."
As more facts have become
available during the last
week, the rebellion appeared
to be an attempt - and a
feeble one-to grapple with
the most important problem
in Viet Nam-the Buddhist
situation.
The rebellion did not indi-
cate as one would suppose
-the disintegration of the
Armed Forces. It indicated
the misuse of the Army for
political purposes. Both the
Army and Prime Minister
Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh
have
momentary
gained
strength and consolidation
from this rebellion. But the
coup attempt has unleashed
some powerful and poten-
tially disastrous trends for
the future.
The so-called abortive coup
also represented two initial,
but important trends about
American policy in Viet Nam.
First, by approving the coup
attempt American policy
makers assumed that the
military war against the Viet
Cong Communist guerrillas
was only a fraction as im-
portant as the political war
against potential pro-neu-
tralist and pro-Communist
elements in Saigon. In short,
it was unimportant whether
the Viet Cong overran a pro-
vincial capital. The war then
was clearly the political bat-
tle of Saigon and its future
government.
A DIFFERENCE
The second trend about
American policy here which
the coup attempt illustrated
I was that the United States
government, was distinctly,
but subtly moving away from
supporting Gen. Khanh.
Washington was supporting
Gen. Khanh fully-but not
exclusively. It was a trend
that had been set in motion
with the arrival of Maxwell
S. Taylor as Ambassador on
July 7, but a trend that was
unnoticed until the coup.
During the coup, Amer-
ican policymakers here did
support Gen. Khanh fully-
especially during the critical
hours
of negotiation with
coup leaders. But they sup-
ported Gen. Khanh when the
alternative was to accept
Brig. Gen. Lam Van Phat,
a Catholic of unstable tem-
perament, and his associates.
The Washington announce-
ments during the coup-as
interpreted here-indicated
that American support was
officially for the triumvirate
of generals-and not for the
government of Gen. Khanh.
This was a marked difference.
The American govern-
ment's choices in Viet Nam
were to set up a strongman
who would govern dictatori-
ally and efficiently or to set
up a balance of forces in
which no one has the power
to upset the others. The
American government has
attempted since the Jan. 30
coup to make Gen. Khanh a
strongman-which was the
point of the early spring visits
to Viet Nam of Defense
Secretary Robert McNamara.
in daylight hours gave added
advantage to the pro-Khanh
forces in Saigon-the Viet-
namese Air Force. A nighttime
coup, in which electricity as
well as the telephones were
cut off, would have seriously
reduced the effectiveness of
the Air Force to retaliate
against coup forces on the
ground.
Finally, the coup was not
taken seriously when Saigon
heard that one of the key
coup-makers-who controlled
most of the troops was
Maj. Gen. Duong Van Duc,
who is known by all Saigon-
ese as an alcoholic since his
wife left him and married a
sergeant years ago. The other
coup-leader was Brig. Gen.
Lam Van Phat, who is also
considered "mentally erratic."
Even Gen. Khanh, when he
heard about the coup-leaders
told one of his close aides,
"these are mad men-crazy."
PUPPETS
Since Saigonese knew these
two leaders did not have the
talent to pull off a successful
coup, it meant they were "the
puppets" of a more gifted
strategist-the Chief of Staff
Brig. Gen. Nguyen Van
Thieu, who had always been
As far as American policymakers are concerned, the key battlefront
in South Viet Nam today is coup-ridden Saigon rather than the
Communist-harried provinces, Special Correspondent Beverly Deepe con-
cludes. And the former all-out U. S. support of Premier Nguyen Khanh
now is being subtly qualified as he contends with both Army dissidents
and rampant Buddhists. This is the first of two reports on the tangle
in Viet Nam in the wake of the latest coup attempt.
closely identified with the
right-wing, predominantly
Catholic Dai Viet political
party. Gen Thieu like Gen.
Phat is Catholic.
But to organize the mas-
sive movement of 2,000
troops into the city neces-
sitated the "neutra ity" or
the approval of two other
forces: his close friend and
commander in chief of armed
forces, Lt. Gen. Tran Thien
Khiem, and American policy-
makers.
Indications are that he got
both. As the rebel troops
disarmed policemen
at a
in
checkpoint on the outskirts
of the city, Gen. Khiem and
his wife prepared to board
a plane to Dalat, ostensibly
to see their daughter
school. He and his wife met
Gen. Khanh in his villa
shortly after that, and he
told Gen. Khanh there was
an "incident" in Saigon be-
tween troops and police. But
by leaving the city, he dis-
associated himself from the
coup, he did not attempt to
stop-or to support.
Almost
every Saigonese
accused the Americans of
plotting the whole affair.
During the past week, anti-
American feeling has taken
a sharp upward turn-and
this in the future will help
the Communists, pro-Com-
munists and the Buddhists,
who have already begun to
make public anti-American
declarations.
FINGER ON U. S.
While the Vietnamese
people, editors, newspaper
men, and even close aids of
Gen. Khanh, have perhaps
exaggerated the U. S. engi-
neering of the coup, there
are signs that Americans
were involved. No one knows
to what degree or at what
A BALANCE
This has clearly failed.
The latest attempt was to
set up a balance of forces
in which Gen. Khanh was
balanced off by the other
generals of the triumvirate;
in which the Army and the
Catholics offset the growing
political dominance of Bud-
dhists: in which the young
officers in the Army offset
the old ones; in which the
anti-Communist forces
no longer attempting to beat
the Communists-politically
or militarily but to maintain
a balance with them.
are
With luck-and a lot of it-
this scheme might maintain
the status quo in Viet Nam
until after the November
election. But it will not solve
the problems-nor will it
permit the effective prosecu-
tion of the anti-Communist
war.
More than anything, the
coup attempt represented
the end of one phase in Viet
Nam, and the beginning of
another. No one knows what
the new phase will bring, but
both the optimists and pes-
simists here predict it will be
disheartening.
Almost every indicator
during the past week showed
that the coup attempt was
not genuine-that it was a
coup designed to fail. The
first and only-action neces-
sary for success would have
been to seize American-
backed Prime Minister Maj.
Gen. Nguyen Khanh and
kill him. Only then would
the U. S. be willing and able
to withdraw its support from
the Khanh government and
recognize the rebels.
DISBELIEF
For several reasons the
Vietnamese in Saigon did
not believe the coup was gen-
uine even as the tanks and
troops moved into Saigon.
First, no serious coup-plot-
ter would select the 13th day
of the month. It's considered
unlucky by the very super-
stitious Vietnamese.
Secondly, the coup was
made in Saigon-and only
in Saigon-but the Prime
Minister was in Dalat, 150
miles north, in a mountain
resort villa. Thirdly, a coup
levels-and the facts will
probably become more ob-
scure and slanted as Com-
munist propagandists unleash
their version.
an-
Washington s first
nouncements of surprise
about the coup are widely
accepted here as insincere.
American intelligence agents
knew about the coup at least
18 hours before the troops
rolled down Saigon's tree-
ing, that too was reported
because of their tips to some
correspondents. When the
troops moved from the 7th
Division area south of Sai-
son at 4 a. m. Sunday morn-
ning, that too was reported
at that time, according to
American advisers this cor-
respondent talked with in
division headquarters in My
Tho.
The initial actions of sur-
prise by key Americans here
are also accepted as insin-
cere and part of the "puppet
show." American Ambassa-
dor Maxwell D. Taylor was
in Honolulu. Deputy Ambas-
sador U. Alexis Johnson was
hopping into his golf clothes
-and stayed in them all
day when he was first noti-
fied about the coup shortly
after 7:30-two hours before
the troops were in the heart
of Saigon. Gen. William C.
Westmoreland, commander
of the American military
command-Viet Nam, was al-
ready working in his office,
but he's generally at the
headquarters every Sunday.
However, his chief of staff,
who had just arrived in city
of Da Nang, 350 miles north
of Saigon, was telephoned
and immediately returned
to the capital
A WARNING
According to reliable
sources, Gen. Khanh was
telephoned in Dalat about 9
a. m. by a Vietnamese Army
major. The American high
command here did not directly
notify him, but some sources
say the American Embassy
wrote him a letter at 8 a. m.
However,
the Americans,
while not notifying Gen.
Khanh, did send at 9 a. m. an
American in civilian clothes
to the National Pagoda, who
warned the Buddhist leaders
of the coup and urged them
to go into hiding because of
the pro-Catholic feelings of
the rebel leaders.
It is the distinct impression
not only among the Saigonese
-but also among Gen.
Khanh's aides that the
Americans were helping Gen.
(
Khanh-and every one else,
too. This is perhaps unjusti-
fied, but it is a powerful im-
pression which American
policymakers must take into
account in future develop-
ments. Two American Air
Force generals worked during
periods of the coup with the
pro-Khanh resistance corps,
headed by a Vietnamese Air
Force general.
Early in the afternoon,
American civilians visited
Gen. Khanh in Dalat, and
Deputy Ambassador Johnson
was a powerful personality
during the late evening
negotiations. However, Gen.
Khanh's aides noted unhap-
pily that two Americans were
seen with rebel leader Gen.
Duc when he was the high
military command in Saigon.
Their names and agencies
they were assigned to will
soon be circulated in the
streets of Saigon-not only
by pro-Khanh officers, but by
the Buddhists and Commu-
nists. Four other civilian-
clothed Americans were seen
with Gen. Duc later in the
day. The American version of
this involvement is that the
Americans were liaisoning
with the rebels to prevent
bloodshed on the streets and
to plea with him to begin
negotiating with the pro-
Khanh forces.
And if true, as sources close
to the Buddhists asist, the
American alert to the pagodas
will be most difficult to ex-
plain in the coming months.
A second article tomorrow
concludes that the anti-
Buddhist coup paradoxically
helped the Buddhists-and
that Americans in South Viet
Nam may never be trusted
again.
Date
1964, Sep. 22
Subject
Nguyễn, Khánh, 1927-2013; Vietnam (Republic)--History--Coup d'état, 1964; Vietnam (Republic); Vietnam, 1961-1975
Location
Saigon, South Vietnam
Coordinates
10.8231; 106.6311
Container
B4, F6
Format
newspaper clippings
Collection Number
MS 363
Collection Title
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
Creator
Keever, Beverly Deepe
Copyright Information
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
Publisher
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
Language
English