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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04824.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04824
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Title
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New Saigon Regime Is Believed Moribund at Birth
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about the poor prospects for the stability of the post-Ngô Äình Diệm South Vietnamese system, page 4
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Transcript
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New York Herald Tribune
Friday, October 30, 1964
New Saigon Regime Is Believed Moribund at Birth
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
South Viet Nam now has a provisional constitution. It
has a transitional chief of state. It has a transitional
Premier.
This set-up, which became effective Tuesday, has but
a whisper of a chance of lasting barely more than 49 days,
in the view of many Saigonese.
Some Saigonese, who possess both a sense of humor
and superstition, explain that the newly-announced pro-
visional constitution has seven chapters and 49 articles,
numbers which are symbolic in a Buddhist funeral. They
explain that when a Buddhist believer dies, his soul wanders
around helplessly for 49 days, when it becomes re-
incarnated.
"And that is the new constitution," one Vietnamese
business man explained. "It's soul will wander around lost
for 49 days and then it will re-appear in another form. It
already has the smell of death around it."
But at least at its inception, the new government, head-
ed by Phan Khac Suu, has the public support of the Ameri-
cans; the Armed Forces; the Buddhists, considered to be
penetrated at some levels by the Communists, and the
staunchly anti-Communist Catholics. This support is con-
sidered to last only if the new government makes conces-
sions to each power group.
Some observers believe that the new government, the
ministries in Saigon which supervise the provincial admin-
istration, may be a middle battleground between the two
most powerful groups on the natonalist side-the military
power of the armed forces versus the mass political power.
of the Buddhist movement, which has developed in the past
year into a significant, if not dominant, force. Instead of
having the armed forces vying with the civilian government,
as originally thought, it would appear that the armed forces
may be pitched against the political forces of the Buddhists.
During the next two months, the new government must
decide the new ministers, the new budget, the new province
chiefs, who are scheduled to be civilians instead of the army
officers now present. But, for example, will the new budget
be drawn up and implemented according to the needs of
the armed forces in their fight against Communist guerrillas
and secret agents, or will it be slanted to the social needs of
the civilian population in line with the "social justice" pleas
of the Buddhists?
THE FIRST ROUND
The current political maneuverings to decide on the
new government announced this week are regarded as the
first round in a long series of more to come. The next
crucial session is scheduled to be the selection-perhaps by
popular election-of a "National Congress," which would
act as the House of Representatives while the 17-man High
National Council would act as the Senate. The "National
Congress" would be responsible for approving the newly-
appointed government and for drafting the permanent con-
stitution to be finished some time next year.
Leaders of the Buddhist movement, which is considered
to have pro-neutralist and pro-Communist leanings, re-
portedly believe they have more mass support at lower levels
than any other political party or organized group-and
hence they can wind up with a majority of the votes in the
"National Congress." They already claim to have a ma-
jority of the votes on the High National Council-two of
their members are considered to have pro-Communist
leanings.
Current plans for the selection of the "National Con-
gress" are that the members would be elected in govern-
ment-controlled or influenced areas, but areas under Viet
Cong Communist control would not be accorded election
privileges. This arrangement, which may undergo many
Viet Nam a Year Later, No. 6
changes before the final decision is made, would be in
marked contrast to the legislative elections held throughout
the country only a year ago.
In short, barring unforeseen developments, such as
an escalation of the war in Southeast Asia, South Viet
Nam faces a glimmer of a prospect of having a de facto
coalition legislature of both anti-Communists and pro-
Communists based on an official recognition of a de facto
partition of the country into government areas and Com-
munist-held areas. A year ago, this prospect would have
been considered unthinkable.
Observers here believe that the strongman of the new
regime will not be a member of the civilian government,
but will be Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh, former Premier, who
is scheduled to be commander-in-chief of the armed forces,
the highest-ranking officer in the army and a member of
the important four-man High Security Council.
STRONGER THAN EVER
Some observers believe that, barring assassination, Gen.
Khanh, as chief of the armed forces, has more actual power
than at any time since he entered the limelight during the
Jan. 30 coup. He may be one of the few men in history who
sustained two "half-coups" and yet came out more powerful
than ever. For Gen. Khanh entered the Premier's office
Jan. 30 as a front-man for the powerful Dai Viet political
party and his long-time friend, Lt. Gen. Tran Thien Khiem,
who supplied the military power and plans for the coup.
In addition, Gen. Khanh was forced to ask Maj. Gen.
Duong Van Minh, leader of the first junta, to remain as
chief of state, which had the effect of draining popular
support from Gen. Khanh.
Hence, Gen. Khanh did not have total support of the
army or of his political party-and both turned against
him during the late August onslaught of pro-Buddhist
student demonstrations and religious rioting. But after his
270 days in the Premier's office; the Dai Viet party appears
to have been crushed; Gen. Khanh's military rival, Gen.
Kheim, is now en route to Washington to be South Viet
Nam's Ambassador, and after the final round of voting for
the new chief of state this week, Gen. Minh has at least
temporarily lost out to Phan Khac Suu-an elderly states
man-type whom Gen. Khanh willingly supports.
The important element for support for Gen. Khanh
was, of course, the U. S.
During a secret military conference of 40 armed
forces officers at the seaside headquarters of Cap Ct.
Jacques last week end, Gen. Khanh was given a sizable vote
of confidence to be named commander-in-chief of the
armed forces. According to reliable sources, he received 31
of the 40 votes cast; his nearest rival, with four votes, was
Maj. Gen. Tran Van Dom, former Defense Minister, whom
Gen. Khanh toppled in his coup, Gen. Khanh received
the votes although his young generals were openly irked
that he had re-instated the four generals he had toppled
Jana. 30 on charges-which he could never prove-that
they were pro-neutralist.
The basic problem facing the new Phan Khac Suu
government is the same one that faced the Khanh gov-
ernment and previous regimes-communism. But the prob-
lem has been greatly exagerated during the last year. It
has become obvious to observers here that its complexity
stems not only from the growing number of military
guerrillas in the countryside, but also from serious political
subversion within the nationalist ranks.
While it is often easy to criticize the nationalists for
divisions and in-fighting, for student demonstrations and
religious conflicts, observers here believe that Communist
subversion is a direct contributor to this condition.
Secret Communist cells are known to exist in almost
every high school in Saigon; one Communist-front organ-
ization was uncovered in a high school in the old imperial
capital of Hue, 400 miles north of Saigon. Some university
students and university professors in Saigon-and even
more so in Hue-are known to have pro-Communist sym-
pathies. Anti-Communist professors and students know
who they are, but seldom report them, for the difficulty is
to get proof of their activities.
Communist cells are known to exist in the Saigon
labor unions and newspaper offices-and individual agents
reportedly work within the government itself. Communist
agents are considered to play a part in the actions and
policies of the Buddhist movement.
The biggest question is how many agents have already
infiltrated the regular army, police and secret police-
pro-Communist agents and sympathizers have been picked
up in the regional forces. Since 1962 the People's Revolu-
tionary party (Communist) in South Viet Nam has main-
tained a specialized administrative section of "Action
Among Enemy Troops."
Another section specializes in "Action Among the
Civilian Population." Through the use of "people-divider"
teams (also called agitation and propaganda teams), the
Communists exploit grievances which already exist.
The concluding article in this series will appear Sunday.
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Date
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1964, Oct. 30
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Subject
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Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Vietnam (Republic)--History--Coup d'états; Nguyễn, Khánh, 1927-2013
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
