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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04844.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04844
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Title
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Viet Nam a Year Later-New Series Starting on Page 4; U.S. Tackling Past Mistakes in Weird War
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Description
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First of a series of seven articles published in the New York Herald Tribune about the state of the Vietnam War in 1964, page 4
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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October 25, 1964
D
Sunday, October
Viet a Year Later
U.S. Tackling
Past Mistakes
In Weird War
A year ago next week Viet Nam witnessed
the birth of a military revolutionary government
and the death of the Ngo Dinh Diem regime.
Tanks, paratroopers, Marines exploded on the
streets of Saigon-a phenomenon that was to
become increasingly familiar in succeeding
months.
Viewed from a distance, the continuing
conflict in Viet Nam sits the free world against
the Communist camp. Closer, it is the Amer-
ican backed Saigon government against the
Communist-led National Liberation Front. And
in the war-weary delta it is an American G. I.
and a Vietnawese trooper against Viet Cong
guerrilla.
In this first of a seven-part series Beverly
Deepe, the Herald Tribune's correspondent in
Saigon, assesses the nature of the conflict in
Viet Nam today and the strategems, myths and
riscalculations that shaped it.
By Beverly Deepe
Of The Herald Tribune Staff
SAIGON.
The weakness of Ngo Dinh Diem was not that he failed
in anything in particular but that he only half-succeeded
in everything. Viet Nam's tragedy is that no government
since Diem has even half-tried. Programs he implemented
-poorly-have since been only half-implemented or for-
gotten Diem's obsession was that his country would be
divided by Communists in Northern provinces. Now that
obsession is a semi-reality. His approach was to "beat the
Communists by being better Communists tactically." He
failed. But no government since has had a total policy of
beating the Communists at all.
The first alternative to Diem was a committee gov-
ernment of a military junta. The expectation was that tal-
ented military officers would "win support of the people"
while vigorously prosecuting the war. But Viet Cong inci-
dents reached an all-time high. The important "strategic
hamlet" program crashed bringing down with it the sta-
tistical illusion that the wa rwas being won.
There were predictions that the first junta of Maj. Gen.
Duong Van Minh would last 90 days. The junta lasted 89.
The second alternative to Diem was another strong-
man. When General Nguyen Khanh became Premier on
Jan. 30, Washington attempted to give him magical pres-
tige. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara came one
month; and Secretary of State Dean Rusk came the very
next month. In mid-August Khanh legalized his strong-
man position with an infamous constitution. He would
have succeeded if students in Saigon-had been studying
and Buddhist priests had been praying in their pagodas.
But they were not. And somewhere "invisible hands-
Communist subversives-appeared. After bloody demonstra-
tions and religious rioting Khanh vowed to step down by
next Tuesday. During the past two months Khanh's policy
has been simply one of survival. U. S. policy is simply
"backing every status quo in sight," according to one
Western diplomat.
FULL CIRCLE
Thus, one year after Diem's death Viet Nam has trav
eled full circle. A newly-and provisional constitution
mano 101 a single strong man like Khanh’s
and Diem's
-but that strong-man can be neither Diem nor Khanh
and probably no strong-man at all.
But if he will not be the strong man, informed opinion
still has it that Gen. Khanh will be the strongest around.
Yesterday at a brief garden reception he said his fare-
wells as Premier to the government, diplomatic corps and
foreign newsmen-without formally resigning yet. "I
count on all of you to continue to carry out our msision
to rid our beloved fatherland of Communists," he said.
It was being said yesterday that Nguyen Luu Vien,
presently Interior Minister and Gen. Khanh's cousin
would take over the Premiership. But evidence that Gen.
Khanh will retain perhaps preponderant powers was the
dismissal from the army of three generals and five colonels
who only on Friday had treason charges stemming from
a nattempted coup Sept. 13, against them, dismissedby
a court. And the Defense Department announced the
sentencing of these and four other officers to "fortress
arrest" for 30 to 60 days by an Army discipline council.
Under Diem there were two political and military Viet
Nams-his and the Comunists'.
Since Diem there has been two military Viet Nams but
three political Viet Nams-a state within a state within a
state-a government within a government within a gov-
ernment. The third political government is the Buddhist
movement that sparked the coup against Diem and the
demi-coup against Khanh.
The Buddhist movement is now widely considered a
political movement surviving only by being a movement
of protest. Instead of declaring war on Communists, how-
ever, Buddhists have said their immediate enemies are
Catholics, Americans and the Saigon government.
The Saigon government therefore has considered
Buddhists as the "second enemy."
Meanwhile, a popular myth about the "first enemy"
-about the war against the Viet Cong-appears to be
exploding.
The giant myth was to think of Viet Nam as waging
a counter-guerrilla war instead of a counter-revolutionary
action. Until the last several months, American policy
makers have not drawn the distinction between the mili-
tary guerrilla and the political revolutionary.
But
The Communist objective is clear. A takeover.
their strategists have advocated an interim solution, an
"independent and neutral Viet Nam." The prerequisite
for this is withdrawal of American military advisers.
To attain the political objective, the Communists have
consistently employed two means: Guerrilla warfare and
political subversion.
DISSIDENT MOVEMENTS
Long-time observers believe political subversion has
consistently been predominant, although not obvious. The
change in the last three months is that subversion has
shifted from the provincial rural areas to Saigon and the
cities in Central Viet Nam, making it more evident.
The administrative apparatus of the Communist party
is given over primarily to military affairs. But there are
nine other areas of activity, such as action among enemy
troops (infiltration of the government armed forces) and
action among the civilian population.
For the last three years, American military advisers
and Vietnamese field commanders have been bewildered
by the fundamental military problem-how to tell the
difference
between a Communist guerrilla and a rice-paddy
farmer. Now
this problem has become accentuated, as it
moves
into the political sphere. Vietnamese government
officials are openly worried about who in the Vietnamese
administration, army, student bodies, labor unions and
religious groups may be Communist cadre, or influenced
by Communist agents.
To counter the military threat, American military
advisers, special forces, support units (helicopters, air-
craft) flowed into Viet Nam, until the figure reached
18,000, with an additional 2,000 expected by the end of
1964.
(Yesterday, the American combat casualties, already
over 200, were feared to have increased by five, when a
C-123 transport, dropping ammunition and other supplies
to an outpost, was hit by Communist groundfire, crashed
and exploded. There were no signs that the Americans and
the two Vietnamese aboard had survived.)
But only during the last three months have the staffs
(Continued on next page)
In Idaho-sized South Viet Nam the government
holds compete control of relatively
little of the nation. The Communist
Viet Cong is dominant in the back area.
HAINAN
THAILAND
Penh
Yulin
LAOS
Hue
Da Nang
SOUTH
VIET
CAMBODIA
NAM
Phnom
South
China
SAIGON
Sea
200
Miles,
AREAS OF COMM. STRENGTH
(Continued from preceding page)
of American civilian agencies been expanded. In July, the
United States Information Agency doubled its strength
to reach about 50; the Agency for International Develop-
ment (AID) doubled, to almost 400. The American Em-
bassy staff rose to 125.
In simplest terms, a microphone used to arouse the
people in demonstrations has become more dangerous than
machine-guns mowing down government troops.
The story of the Communist political subversive warfare
in South Viet Nam began in 1954, After the French defeat
in Indochina the Geneva agreements of 1954 imposed a
cease-fire and separated Viet Nam at the 17th parallel.
Communist North Viet Nam was headed by President
Ho Chi Minh. The Republic of (South) Viet Nam shortly
afterward was headed by President Ngo Dinh Diem.
The Geneva agreements also provided that Communist
troops should be withdrawn to the North and the anti-
Communist Northerners could move to the South.
Likewise, the Geneva accords provided that in July,
1955, a referendum would be held in both sections on
re-unifying the country. President Diem refused to agree.
From 1954 to mid-'65, the open policy of the Communists
was to abide by the Geneva agreements in an attempt
to take over the South through peaceful reunification.
When the elections fell through, the Communists con-
tinued their political struggle, but shifted to subversive
tactics. They infiltrated the national army, not to convert
it openly, but to secure intelligence data. The Communist
cells in the villages-many Reds did not go North-became
secret societies; the party apparatus went underground.
In 1957, the Communists countered Diem's massive ar-
rests of Communists by systematically killing government
village officials. These assassinations were part of their
illegal political struggle, not the beginning of armed military
activity.
Second, a Southern-born Communist named Le Duan
wrote a long study about the situation in the South. He
concluded that the Communists could not reverse the anti-.
Communist trend by political struggle alone, and advocated
military struggle.
PRO-PEKING WING
It took two more years for the Communist party to
ratify hic commendatives.
thank
general of the Communist party in North Viet Nam, and
became a leader of the pro-Peking wing of the party.
In 1958. the North Vietnamese sent an underground
mission to the South to study the situation. A year later,
Ho Chi Minh and the party decided to launch the armed
struggle.
In early 1960, Ho Chi Minh made a trip to Peking and
Moscow and presumably asked approval by the other two
major parties. After his return, the General Assembly of
the party legalized the previous resolution to support the
guerrillas in the South. This meant that Ho Chi Minh
had received the green light from Peking and/or Moscow.
Simultaneously, President Diem was running into
trouble. In early 1960, Communist troops routed a govern-
ment battalion, giving the government its first defeat. In
November an abortive paratrooper coup attempted to pres-
sure Mr. Diem into making social, economic, political re-
forms. He had previously formed a system of co-ordinating
various ministries; built up his own party, the National
Revolutionary Movement, to counter the Communist or-
ganization; developed his counter-Communist ideology
called Personalism, which neither peasants nor intellectuals
understood. Reform was minimal; he ignored his promises
to the coup-makers; corruption remained unchecked.
But the abortive coup attempt undoubtedly acted as a
catalyst for the birth of the National Liberation Front for
South Viet Nam (the front for the Communist party).
Forty days after the coup, the Front delegates met in the
swampy Plain of Jones southwest of Saigon and established
a provisional central committee. Thirteen months later,
the People's Revolutionary party was organized as the
Communist party of South Viet Nam, ostensibly separating
from the party in North Viet Nam.
Throughout 1961, more than 5,000 Communist cadres
infiltrated from North Viet Nam.
As the situation worsened for Mr. Diem, the American
government acted. In May, 1961, Vice-President Johnson
visited Viet Nam, promising increased American aid for
rural development. He also promised military aid to
Vietnamese
forces who would assist provincial police to
contain Communist
advances.
But this military assistance came five years after initial
pleas by the Diem government for systematic military
assistance. Observers here
believe this initial aid rejection
in 1956-
'57 was the most critical mistake of the American
policy makers.
GROUND WORK FOR AID
Several months later, in October, 1961, chairman of
the American Joint Chiefs of Staff Gen. Maxwell Taylor
(now Ambassador) visited Viet Nam and laid the groundwork
for massive American military aid. By Christmas, the first
American helicopters had arrived.
In February, 1962, the Americans formalized their
military operation into the Military Assistance Command,
Viet Nam, under the command of Gen. Paul D. Harkins.
Only days later, two Vietnamese fighter aircraft bombed
the Presidential palace, but President Diem and his family
escaped injury.
During 1962, both the Vietnamese government forces,
heavily supported by American advisers, and the Communist
guerrillas mushroomed in strength. The American strategists
and the South Vietnamese government initiated the
Strategic Hamlet program. Economic aid, guns, locally
trained militia and schools blossomed-but neither the
economic or military plans touched the Communist cells
in hamlets. Subversion remained unchecked, as more than
4,000 additional Communist cadres infiltrated into the
country throughout the year.
A slow deterioration began in 1963. It started Jan. 2
with the battle of Ap Bac, when Viet Cong Communist
guerrillas routed government troops and shot down a
handful of American helicopters only 40 miles from Saigon.
The political explosion against President Diem came in
mid-year. On May 8, a Buddhist incident in old imperial
capital of Hue led to the toppling of the Diem regime in
November.
Circumstantial evidence indicates political developments
leading to anti-Diem coup may have been influenced by the
Communists, but no one here knows to what extent.
Last Jan. 30, Gen. Nguyen Khanh "reshuffled" the
military junta which had toppled President Diem. He is
now facing almost seven years of unchecked political sub-
version by the Communists, plus increasing military
strength. The question is how extensive the subversion
has become through the years-and what action to take
to squelch it.
The next article will appear tomorrow.
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Date
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1964, Oct. 25
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Campaigns, American; Ngô, Äình Diệm, 1901-1963; Vietnam (Republic)--History--Coup d'état, 1963
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
