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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-02138 to 363-02148.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-02138 to 363-02148
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Title
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"The Air-Conditioned Monk"
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Description
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Original title: "The Air-Conditioned Monk." Article by Keever about ThÃch Trà Quang's decision to leave the US Embassy. This article is part 4 of 7-part series reflecting on the overthrow of Ngô Äình Diệm
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Transcript
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deepe
article 4 of 7 article series
page 1
THE AIR-CONDITIONED MONK
monk in
SAIGON-For 64 days la st year, a frail, elfish-looking Buddhist
effron robe haben hibernated in the third-floor
air-conditioned conference rooms of the American Embassy.
During the 64 days of his political asylum following a crackdown
khaki-01ad American Mark Marine Guards lent him
onBuddhist pagodas,
radio, books, writing paper--and made certain he received three
vegetarian meals a day i prepared by an expert Chinese chef.
On November 4th, he left.
The major-if not the solo-nin American influence he took from
the Embassy was a yen for air-conditioning. He installed a unit
in his small room at his creme-colored, curve-roofed Buddhit Buddhist
Institute "so he can work better," his associates say.
He certainly has been.
Now, a year later, Thich (Reverend) Tri Quang is openly
labelled a Communist. Politic Police sources say that he x and other
powerful Buddhist leaders around him ha vo in the recent past met members
of the National Front for the Liberation of South Viet Nam, the political
arm of the Viet Cong guerrillas.
(More)
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deepe
article 41 of 7 article series
page 2
Even last year-as the politico-priest directed the celebrated
Buddhist crisis in which seven Buddhist clergy burned themselves alive-
a handful of Western officials in Saigon said he was a Communist "from
the top of his shaven-head to the bottom of his tippy, tippy toes."
But they were hooted down in the cries that later sparked the overthrow
of President Ngo Dinh Diom and his family.
Now after Thich Tri Quang directied his "demi-coup" of student
demonstrators who toppled. Premier General Nguyen Khanh from office
during late August-an increasing number of Saigonese, including fervent
Biñan accuse the graceful monk of being a Communist cedre. Some of the
highest-ranking officers, including Buddhist ones, who overthrew the
Catholic president are now calling Tri Quang a Communists
some of the
most forvent Buddhist believers who contributed heavily to the Buddhist
campaign to overthrow Diem hex are now disillusioned and admit "we did not
know they would lead us towards Communism.
Others say that while Tri Quang may not be a Communist, his
politi policies and tactics are openly aiding the Communists in subverting
the country. A recent declaration known to be written by him makes the
important but subtle point that Buddhism in South Viet Nam is not only
against against Communism but also against those that "esploit" the
fight against Communism. These "exploiters" are clearly labelled as the
The statement also implies the first onomy
Catholics and the Americans.
is the Catholics and the Americans--and then the Communists.
(More)
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deepe
article 4 of 7 article series
page 3
"It's stupd stupid to ask if Tri Quang is a Communist or not,"
one irate Vietnamese government official exploded. "You can look and look for
a Communist Party card on him, but you will never, never find it.
But his policy is to make the government so weak it can not fight the
Communists and this is the politicy policy of the Communists."
The small-framed monk radiates a magnetic spell over those who
have met and talked with him.
“Tove moi Ho Chi Minh," one former Communist explained. "I've
met Gen. Vo Nguye Giep (head of the North Vietnamese Army who defeated the
French). But I think Tri Quang is tougher than both."
One official, after a long conversaz conversation with him said,
"His face is pale-without blood-you might say cold-blooded. Even before
I had spoken a ak sentence, I felt he already knew what I would say.
"He's very logical and talks better than a Communist cadre.
Ho mixes his language with Communist and Buddhist terminology."
One Vietnamese after seeing him said "Tri Quang was born a
prince--he was born to have authority; he was born to give orders."
Instead of being born a real prince, however, Tri Quang was
born of middle-class landowners.
His aunt, after the loss of all family
properties during the Communist revolution, reportedly set fire to the
family house and leaped into the flames to commit suicide.
Almost twenty
years later, Saigonese recalled this incident and noted a striping
striking parallel to Tri Quang's tactics of having Buddhist clergy burn themselves
alive in protest against the Diem regime.
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deepe
article 4 of 7 article series
page 4
One of Tri Quang's elder brothers is an important political cadre
in Communist North Viet Nam.
When linxxx Tri Quang was 13, he reportedly studied for the
Buddhist priesthood in the old imperial capital of Huo, 400 miles north
of Saigon,
now the Buddhist stronghold area. Ten years later in 1945,
after the Viet Minh Communist guerrillas seized power from the Japanese,
Tri Quang went a to Hanoi, where, he later reportedly told a friend,
"I studied Marxism." At the outbreak of the French Indo-China war
he fled to a Communist stronghold where he made two close friends,
Hoang Trong Ba and Nguyen Dang, both of whom would be important
several decadr decades later.
in Hue,
Last year at the time of the bloody May 8 Buddhist incident
which touched off the Buddhist crisis and overthrow of Diem,
Ba was the closest advisor to Diem's bör brother in Hue.it Dong
as chief of province reportedly ordered government troops to fire on
Buddhist demonstrators in front of radio station on Buddha's birthday,
although his deputy for security was tried and executed for the incident.
The two-year-old friendship between Tri Quang, Ba and Dan
wo-year-old
Dang and the presence of all in Hue at the start of the Buddhist affairs
has led some sources to believe that there was a pllot between them to
plot
provoke intentionally the radio station incident in which eight
Buddhists were killed.
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deepe
article 4 of 7 artiole series
page 5
Reliable sources say in 1951, Tri Quang again travelled towards
Hanoi, staying afew months in the village of Dien Hok Ho, known as a
meeting place for Viet Minh cadres on their way to infiltrate into the
French-held areas of the country. Reportedly, he stayed in the village
several months and received some training and instructions x from the Viet
Minh guerrillas before proceeding to Hanoi.
In early 1952, Tri Quang was reportedly invited to be a
delegate to an international Buddhist confernce, but the French "Surete"
refused him an exit permit on the grounds he was believed to be a Communist.
He had previously been arrested by French authorities.
Later the Hanoi Central Committee of the Buddhist as Association
sent Thich Tri Do to Hue to open the first class of High Studios
of Buddhism. Today, Thich Tri Do is one of the most important
Buddhist clerics working with the Communist regime in Hanoi.
There were six students in Tri Do's first class.
One was
Another was Thich Thien Minh, now Tri Quang's "executive
officer" and chief lieutenant for student activities. Another
instructor was Le Dinh Them, then a medical doctor and now chairman of
the Buddhist Association in Hanoi.
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deepe
article 4 of 7 article series
page 6
In 1958, Tri Quang was a member of the Vietnamese Buddhist
Association to attend the Internationa
Tri Quang admitted to Diem's brother, Can, that he had been
a Communist, but had "since changed his ways." But last year during the
ole celebrated Buddhist orisis, neither Diem nor his younger intellectual
brothor u Nhu believed him.
Long-time observers of the Viet Nam situation, however, argue
that onemust investigate the policies of the Buddhist leaders themselves
which have had the effect of weakening the government.
They argue that the Buddhist movement is a political movement
of significant dimensions--and it is growing. Second, as a political
movement, it can su sustain and increase its mass support by being--and
temporarily remaining-a movement of protest. These observers argue that
the immediate enemy of the Buddhists is the Catholics, the Americans and
the Saigon government-and ANY Saigon government. However, according to
this line of reasoning, Buddhist leaders will paradoxically oppose the
government consistently-but not enough to make it entirely collapse-
until they are ready to become the Saigon government.
Third, by remaining an opposition element and hence weakin
weakening the Saigon government, the Buddhist policies are aiding the
policies of the Communists. Both the Buddhists and the Communist movements
are hence in parallel, both directing their fire at the a common enemy, the
Saigon government. The real question is whether or not the Buddhists are
directed by the Communists.
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deepe
article 4 of 7 artiole series
page 7
Fourth, based on this analysis, the American-backed Saigon government
must then consider the Buddhists as their "second enemy," for the Buddhist
government is out of the jurisdiction of the Saigon overnment.
To survive politically, the Buddhist state must declare war
on both the ag Saigon government and the Communist government. But it
can not fight both simultaneously. To continue grabbing mass support, the
Buddhists must maintain their identity separate from the other two states.
But the Communists and the Saigon government treat the Buddhists
as a separate state, because both are attempting to have its support. The
Viet Cong have not said that the Buddhists are part of their government-only
that they hope to help the Buddhists. The Saigon government also wanting
an alliance-do not accuse the Buddhist leaders of being Communist.
Especially at this time with a new Saigon government being formed and before
the American elections- no saigon official or American policymaker would
label the Buddhists as Communist. The new government desperately needs
the Buddhist support. For Americans to acknowledge this before the
Presidential election would imply that American policy decisions to
withdrew support from Ngo Dinh Diem last year-thus helping the Buddhists-
was a serious policy miscalcuation. It would also admit that the American
Embasssy here harbored a pro-Communist only a year ago.
The "first enemy" of the Buddhists was the Khanh government-
and possibly any future Saigon government; they have yet to declare
war on the Communists in the villages and it is doubtful they will
ever have the power to do so.
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deepe
article 4 of 7 article series
page 8
The Buddhists have been and still are attempting to s isolate the
Saigon government from the foundations of its support. One tactic is
to drive a wedge between the Americans and the national leader-and this is
the significance of their anti-American propagand. Like the Communists,
the Buddhists are clearly abti-American and will probably remain so.
Another tactic is to drive a wedge between the Saigon government and the
Catholics, as they are doing under the disguise of ridding the country
of the old Can Lao party of the Diem regime. Like the Communists, t
Buddhist leaders are anti-Catholic-and will probably remain so.
the
An d
And the Buddhists will attempt to chip away the army from the Saigon
government which is the significance of placing the three-man Buddhist
committees in army companies and battalions. Hence, the Buddhists
penetrate the national army on one = side while the Viet Cong secret cadre
perform "Action Among Enemy Troop" subversion on the other side.
The Saigon government possibly realizes the Buddhist
leadership is its "second enmy." It must fight ka the Communists--
Communists-militarily and politically--at their base of support, the hamlet
and village level. And it must fight the Buddhists p91 politically-at their
base of support, the district and provincial level.
Logically in any military war there are two solid camps of
enemies, and others are sta satellites or neutral. Logically the Saigon
government should spend 100 per cent of its time fighting the Viet Cong
and vice versa. But the government now must spend up to 90 percent of its
time during crucial moments in given localities--fighting the Buddhists
instead of the Viet Cong.
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deepe
a rticle 4 of 7 article series
page 9
The short-term Buddhist strategy is obviously to remain
in the opposition to the government, which means they must refuse to become
The Buddhists will continue this
a significant part of the government.
strategy until they a re read to become the governmenty when they have
the political personalities to take it over.
is not now.
One thing is clears that time
No one knows when the Buddhists 11 d will decide to swallow up the
is the permanent
Saigon government, but one may suspect their aim
constitution to beoem completed next November. For the Buddhists, like the
Communists, operate in phases. Possibly the date to watch is not
November, 1964, but November, 1965.
The Buddhists already have been given major concessions by
the Saigon government--and presumably they will ask for more of the same.
The Buddhists within the past months have been usurping the powers of the
Saigon government; they can block appointments of military corps commanders,
or cabinet minu ministers.
They have already demanded from the government-and received-
the distr destruction of police records on Buddhist leaders. This lead
the Saigon police chief to gasp several months ago, "It's the first time
in the my life I have ever heard of a police official handing over police
records to Buddhist bonzes."
During recent weeks in provincial capitals, pro-Buddhist mobs have
"arrested" Can Lao party members and turned them over to the goverment for
prosecution. The military careers of young district chiefs and province
chiefs are no longer broken by their military superiors-but by Buddhist bonzer.
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deepe
article 4 of 7 article series
page 9
In short, on the one hand, the government has consciously
made major concessions to thier "second enemy" while, on the other hand,
the Communists have been effectively penetrating it at all levels. This is
the most crucial factor in the deterioration of the i situation in Viet Nom
in the past year.
According to ghi this line of analysis,
once the Buddhists
swallow the Saigon government, they should then declare war on their
other enemy-the Communists. Theoretically, to do this, the Buddhists
must move thier influence and organization downwards from the district and
provincial level to the village and hamlet level, which is the Communist
base of support.
However, for years, the Buddhist monks in village pagodas have
co-existed with Communist cadre without coming in conflict with them.
The key
index of this co-existence is that seldom is a Buddhist priest killed by the
Communists; but Catholic priests are often targets for Viet Cong terrorists.
For the Communists have never allowed any competition with the
masses--if it arises, they crush it as they now attempt to crush the government's
village chiefs and hamlet militia. But the Communists will allow a peaceful
co-existence at the village level between Buddhist bonzos and Communist
cad re. This peaceful co-existence, operating for years at the hamlt and villae
village lovel equates at the national level an un-announced state of
neutrality. This is clear.
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deepe
article 4 of 7 article series
pagelto
However, the fundamental question is whether or not the Buddhist
movement is not a second front for the Communists as the National Front for
the Liberation of South Viet Nam is the first front.
That question may be answered by the anemic-looking Thich
But after 64 days i as a house guest in the American Embassy,
American officials themselves declare he is stkl still an enigmatic monk.
Tomoor Tomorrows the Problems of Governme Governing.
-30-
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Date
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1964, Oct.
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Subject
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Vietnam, 1961-1975; Demonstrations; Protest movements; Buddhists--Political activity; ThÃch, Trà Quang; Diplomatic and consular service
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6297
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B3, F3
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections
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Language
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English
