"The War of Termites and Shadows"

Item

derivative filename/jpeg

363-02115 to 363-02127.pdf

Digital Object Identifier

363-02115 to 363-02127

Title

"The War of Termites and Shadows"

Description

Original title: "The War of Termites and Shadows." Article by Keever on the Viet Cong backed shadow government. This article is part 2 of a 7-part series reflecting on the overthrow of Ngô Đình Diệm

Transcript

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Deepe
article 2 of seven article series
page 1
THE WAR OF TERMITES AND SHADOWS
SAIGON--While American sergeants and Vietnamese
lieutenants are being killed on the military battlefied,
a higher level of the conflict is being waged between the
American-backed national government and the pro-Communist
"shadow" government of the National Front for the Liberation
of South Viet Nam.
The Viet Cong Communist guerrillas, actually called
the "Liberation Army" are on the surface the armed guerrilla
units fighting in support of the "shadow" government of
the Liberation Front.
maintains
This "shadow" government operates its own schools,
its own strategic hamlets (called combat hamlets, complete
with anti-helicopter defenses), collects taxes,
hospitals and first aid wards and broadcasts regularly
from a clandestine radio station.
The 40-plus provinces of South Viet Nam have in
reality two province chiefs, one representing the Saigon
government and one representing the "shadow" government of
the Liberation Front.
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of seven article series
page 2
The Liberation Front is directly controlled, organized--
in fact, created--by the Communist Party of South Vietnam
(People's Revolutionaby Party), which has a separate identity
from, but yet is directly linked to the Communist (Lao Dong)
Party in North Viet Nam. Behind Hanoi, at least psychologically
are other members of the Communist camp--including
if not more,
both Moscow and Peking.
Moscow and Peking, for all their
verbal conflicts on peaceful co-existence have expressed no
disagreement on "wars of national liberation." In fact, Russia
supported one in Cuba.
While newspaper headlines regularly relate military
actions in the blood-ridden rice paddies, little is known
about the invisible, underground political struggle.
But it is of greater importance.
one
"We could have a total victory in Viet Nam,"
Western diplomat explained, "and we still lose the country
politically in five minutus."
For the Communists all military actions are only a
means to a political end--in this case first a "neutral and
independent" South Viet Nam, with the prerequisited of
American troop, withdrawal, and then an eventual Communist
government. A military attack by a Viet Cong battalion must
be approved by the Communist political commissar in the unit;
the individual guerrilla is first a political expert and second
a guerrilla. He is taught Communist doctrine before he is
taught how to shoot a gun.
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of 7 article series
page 3
Unlike the Viet Cong guerrilla, the American GI is
conditioned to keep out of politics and to keep politics out
of the military. It is a vital difference, too late to change
in Viet Nam but one for which potential guerrilla wars of the
future in Venezuelas or Congos demand adjustment of American
military thinking.
Although no government has fully recognized the
Liberation Front, the organization maintains representatives
in Havanna, Prague, Algiers, Djakarta, Peking plus a press
agency in East Berlin and a "people's representative" on the
Afro-Asian Solidarity Council in Cairo.
"The Front seems to be concentrating on non-Asian
countries, mainly in Africa,"
one Western diplomat explained.
For the first time in its four-years of existence, the
Liberation Front has been reported by ranking national government
officials to have the capabilities to establish a rival
government on Vietnamese soil. This would pave the way for a
diplomatic offensive--which preluded a political settlement
favorable to them. It is, however, reportedly unknown whether
they have the intention of establishing the rival government.
The Front--which appears non-Communist to the population--
Associations (Peasants,
is organized into three broad groupings:
Youth, Women and Workers are most important); Political Parties
(Democratic and Socialist Party, both non-Communist, and the
Communist Party); and the Youth League (comparable to Komsomol
in Communist nations).
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of series of 7 articles
page 4
These organizations are created by and infiltrated by
the Communist Party, presumably for three reasons: to cloak the
activities of the Party hence giving the appearance of a
spontaneous people's uprising instead of organized Communist-
directed subversion%3B to recruit members from the Front and train
them for Party membership%3B to gain cooperation of non-Communist,
but anti-government intellectuals, workers and other elements.
To the side of the Front is the "Liberation Army," now
The Communist
the world's most successful guerrilla movement.
Party is the dominating part of Front and the Liberation Army
in terms of leadership, but not necessarily in terms of numbers.
The face of the Front is open to the population, but not to the
government; the face of the Liberation Army is open to the
population--and to the government in battle;
the Communist party
is secret, their activities clandestine to both the government
and the population--and sometimes to members themselves.
It is totally underground.
The organization of the Front's associations and
political parties, the Front itself and the Communist party
operate in tightly-knit paralleling units at five levels: central
committee; the inter-zone (about eight); the provinces (more
than 40); districts (more than 250)%;B the village (about 2500).
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of 7-article series
page 5
At each level in the organization of both the Front
and the Party, delegates elect an executive committee, and
from that a smaller leading or permanent committee is selected
to act as an administrative bureau. It is in these committees
that Communist cadre are important, though other members may
not even know they are Communists. Though the majority of
the delegates--like the privates and sergeants of the Viet Cong
Army--are probably not Communist Party members, the executive,
decision-making and administrative apparatus is dominated
by them.
Below the village committees,
the Communist Party is
organized in hamlet cells of three to five members each.
If there are six members, two separate cells are generally formed.
Conferences of delegates at various levels--maybe four
times a year--help the cadre at higher levels adjust their
policy to rice-root conditions; cadre at higher levels are
continuously sent to villages to educate themselves about local
situations. In this way,
the Party's policies appear to be
based on much closer rice-roots contact than are the decisions
and policies of the American-backed Saigon government.
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of 7-article series
page 6
While guerrilla warfare is commonly identified with
Communism,
neither the Communists nor any other revolutionary
invented it. It existed for centuries. Even Caesar encountered
civilians fighting as irregulars during the days of the Roman
Empire. The word entered the dictionaries after the Spanish
resistance to the Napoleanic invastion between 1808 and 1813--
but the guerrillas were royalists supporting the Spanish
monarchy rather than revolutionaries.
The Communist Revolution in the urban centers of
Russia in 1917 did not make significant use of guerrilla tactics.
It was Mao-Tse-Tung in China 25 years ago who systematized
guerrilla warfare by combining it with the revolutionary
appeals of Marx and Lenin.
But there are two basic differences between the Soviet
and the Chinese revolutions. The Soviet revolution was
concentrated in urban centers and drew its support from city
workers; the Chinese revolution was rural and drew its
support from rural peasants. Ho Chi Minh and his military
aides simply adapted the principles of Mao to local conditions
to win the French Indo-China War.
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of 7 article series
page 7
In oversimplified terms, the anti-Communist war in South
Viet Nam now appears to be neither totally Marxist nor totally
Mao-ist. The rural peasant support for the Viet Cong guerrillas
now appears to become visibly fused with political subversion in
the cities. The Communist Party has hence began to shift its
visible center of gravity from the rural areas to the urban
centers--from the armed guerrilla to the secret political agents.
This shift in Communist strategy is, hence, the beginnings of
a synthesis of the guerrilla tactics of Mao, plus the urban
It is a powerful
revolutionary appeal and tactics of Marxism.
packet of the Asian guerrilla and the European revolutionary.
The operative principle for Mao was "political power comes
out of the barrel of a gun." Consistently in his writing Mao
stresses the importance of the political factors which cushion
and condition all the decisions of the guerrilla fighter.
The political decisions of the Viet Cong guerrillas are
made by the Communist party cadre which administers through ten
"specialized sections," operating from the central to the village
level. These "specialized sections" revealing the emphasis and
Military Section (Liberation Viet Cong
scope of the Party are:
guerrillas); Action Among Enomy Troops (i.e. infiltration into the
Saigon national army); Action Among Civilian Population; Action
for the National Liberation Front; Propaganda and Cultural Affairs;
Training and Education; Organization Work for the Communist Party;
Economic and Financial Affairs; Communication and Liaison;
Security and Public Order.
(More)
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deepe
arbicle 2 of 7-article series
page 8
While the military section is given primary priority
in the administration of Party work, it is important to note
that there are nine other areas of Party interest, dealing
with significant political and administrative activities.
Hence, the Communists have organized an efficient,
highly-indoctrated political machine, capable of extensive,
invisible subversion, as well as one of the most successful
guerrilla armies in the world.
How does the inter-related guerrilla and subversive
work at the peasant level?
An example of their "termite warfare" is the
Vietnamese government strategic hamlet of Cana, situated
130 miles northeast of Saigon. It is peaceful seaside collection
of more than 400 houses for 1000-plus workers in the largest
of the French-operated salt fields.
A government road and railroad provide easy
communications and transportation; government scout a cars
frequently patrol the area; occasionally governmnet naval
craft slide in. The hamlet is ruled by an elected hamlet
chief and a hamlet council--part of the American "democratic"
prerequisites for supporting the multi-million dollar program
of fortified villages--the announced foundations for victory
in Viet Nam. The hamlet is protected by American-supplied
barbed wire; it is defended by more than 20 American-armed
hamlet militia.
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of 7-article series
page 9
hamlets.
In government books, it is one of the most secure
But it is 100 per cent dominated by the Viet Cong
Communists--through invisible political subversion and
intimidation by their armed guerrillas.
The Communist guerrillas come into the village to play
soccer games--against the government's hamlet militia--some of
whom are blood relatives. The Communist political agents in
the Village agitate for and organize Kangaroo Courts against
those persons with "incorrect attitudes;" they once beheaded
the hamlet chief. When the guerrillas need weapons and
ammunition, they arrange a "Hollywood battle" with the
government militia--there's alot of noise, weapons are handed
over, but no one gets killed. When the Communists need
guerrilla recruits, they hold a "mock kidnapping" of the
hamlet's youth.
Regular "USO" shows are held by the Communist theatrical
troupe; students from the government school write the news
items and draw cartoons ridiculing the government for the
Communist weekly news-sheet--which is reproduced off a jelly-
like substance made from sea algae.
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of 7 article series
page 10
"For the government the hamlet is a bright spot--like
one Vietnamese explained.
"But inside
a shiny red apply,"
the worms have eaten all of it. It is completely rotten."
The Communists have used four separate, but inter-
related tactics to accomplish this: they have converted some
persons as political activitists and armed guerrillas, they
have made part-time sympathizers of others; the anti-Communists
are either neutralized ("You don't have to work for us--just
don't work against us") or else "liquidated."
Last year, the clandestine Communist cadre in the
hamlet initiated a Kangaroo Court against the hamlet chief,
throwing a "letter of first warning" into his house telling
him to "review his attitude." Later a letter of second warning
was thrown into his house along with a Viet Cong flag--red and
Then he received
blue with a large golden star in the middle.
a letter of third warning, along with another Viet Cong flag,
on which was painted a dagger. This was the sentence of death.
The villagers were agitated for a court in the center of the
hamlet. He was convicted and beheaded.
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of 7article series
page 11
Future hamlet chiefs, if selected by the people,
are considered pliable by the Communists--the people are
generally forced to side with the Communists. If the government
imposes a "hard-line" anti-Communist on the hamlet, the people
again "uprise" or simply "liquidate" him. But most of the
pro-government, anti-Communist persons have been neutralized.
"They're human vegetables and present no danger to
the Communists," one Vietnamese villager explained.
In 1961, the Communist guerrillas maintained a 12-man
squad. Two years later, they had two squads. Now--a year
later they have a 45-man platoon.
One of the means used to increase their guerrilla
strenth was the "Hollywood battle," in which Communists
first persuaded two or three young men to join them and then
set up "mock fighting" so their families were not punished
by the government.
openly
The Viet Cong platoon invaded the village,
fighting the hamlet militia (who had prior knowledge of the
attack). The militia called the district headquarters for
help, but knew it rarely came at night. Leaving behind
their weapons, they retreated.
(More)
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deepe
article 2 of 7article series
page 12
The Viet Cong "held" the hamlet for several hours,
"kidnapping" the village youth. The next day, the hamlet
defenders returned, reporting the loss of youth, weapons
and ammunition.
The district officials were suspicious, but helpless:
should they leave the hamlet undefended or issue more rifles?
They allocated more weapons.
"Nobody's going to rat on the Communists in the
village," one former villager from Cana explained. "Who would
protect their life and the lives of their relatives in the
village? They would be killed. Besides what can the government
do-take out the "rotten" village and move in another one.
That would have drastic economic effects. Anyway the new
village would probably be rotten too."
One Vietnamese regimental commander explained,
"It's always the quiet places where the most is happening.
The Viet Cong don't have to fight in the villages they
already control. Nobody sees them or hears what they're
doing. They just busy little termites."
Tomorrow: "Silver" Race vs. the "Black" Race
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Dear Mssrs. Wald & Rosenfeld:
This is a fairly long piece, and maybe a little
esoteric, but no one has written a piece about the political
organizations and its relationship to the Viet Cong guerrillas--
or the emphasis on subversion.I Think it's very important
and will become increasingly so in case the Party begins
a diplomatic offensive.
I've previously sent you some photos of V.C. prisoners
and some graphs that illustrate this article.
Sincerely
Beverly Deepe

Date

1964, Oct.

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Ngô, Đình Diệm, 1901-1963; Mặt trận dân tộc giải phóng miền nam Việt Nam

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6297

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B3, F3

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Collector

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections

Language

English