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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04850.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04850
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Title
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Viet Nam a Year After Diem - His Dire Prophecy Coming True
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Description
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Article published in the New York Herald Tribune about the aftermath of the coup against Ngô Đình Diệm and its effects on the war effort, page 14
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Transcript
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Sun. Nov.!
14
4964
Sunday now!
New York Herald Tribune
Viet Nam a Year After Diem-
His Dire Prophecy
Prophecy
Coming True
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
A year ago today, a military
coup d'etat brought down the
regime of President Ngo Dinh
Diem.
The theme song for the Viet-
namese generals toppling him in
the 18-hour coup was "The
Longest Day." Afterward, Sai-
gonese presented garlands to the
paratroopers and tank drivers,
and there wa dancing in the
streets.
But the dancing did not last
long, for one of President Diem's
predictions began to come true.
Only a month earlier, during
the flaming Buddhist crisis that
sparekd his overthrow, Mr. Diem
had predicted: "Apres moi, le
deluge."
Now, a year later, the deluge.
The military and political war
against the Communists is being
lost under Mr. Diem, too, but as
one Western diplomat explained
last week, "We are now losing it
more efficiently than ever be-
fore."
THE TRAGEDY
The tragedy is that the war
can still be won, but probably
will not be.
Several months ago, a leading
Saigon fortune-teller made an-
other prediction: that in the
ninth month of the lunar
cal-
endar the trends of the future
would become clear and Viet
Nam's "little war would become
bigger."
The ninth lunar month ends
Tuesday-Election Day in the
United States.
Saigonese and Western ob-
servers here are openly hoping
that U. S. policy becomes clearer
after the election. They feel that
in the past months that policy
has been to "back every status
quo in sight" and to "hold the
lid on Viet Nam until after the
election."
Observers view these days as
the turning point in the war, for
to continue to drift is only to
lose," according to one Western
diplomat. "This is the point of no
return." The pessimists say it is
already too late to reverse the
trends.
THE CLUES
The first clues to America's
post-election policy have already
appeared, Viet Nam's "little
war"
now appears bigger not only
be-
cause of the flareup of
Cam-
bodian incidents but also
because
of the continuous flow of high-
ranking Asian military delega-
tions to Saigon, which is in-
terpreted
evidence of
possible commitment of Asian
combat troops. The Chinese Na-
tionalist government's recent ap-
pointment of a general to serve
as Ambassador to Saigon
is also
considered significant.
as
&
In the last week of suspense
during the formation of the new
Vietnamese government-which
Saigon newspapers called "a la
Hitchock"-other clues about the
future U. S. policy also ap-
peared:
First, there will be no negotia-
tions. A last-ditch attempt to
prosecute the war will be made.
Second, the U. S. will again
attempt to back a strongman
ruler who will be the former
Premier, Maj. Gen. Nguyen
Khanh, now the Commander in
Chief. The civilian government
will be restricted in authority, if
it survives at all.
THE PROBLEMS
Based on talks with American
officials and experts on counter-
insurgency and communism in
Asia, this is the rundown on the
basic problems and possible solu-
tions facing the "Ong My"-Mr.
American, as the children in the
rice paddy villages call the
"white man with the big nose."
1. The basic American mistake
was to expect that Viet Nam
would be another Korea-to ex-
pect invasion instead of guerrilla
warfare and
subversion.
"The Communists won South
Viet Nam in South Korea
," ac-
cording to one Western
observer.
"There was a Korean
-type con-
ventional war atmosphere
here
until the American
buildup in
1962."
After that, the U. S. committed
20,000 milltary advisers,
but only
in the last four months
have the
U. S. Embassay and
Information
Service increased their
staffs to
keep up with the problems
of po-
litical subversion
and psycho-
logical warfare.
However, by mid-1956, the
Communists Viet
Cong shifted
from legal to subversive
political
struggle as their cells
in the vil-
lages and cities
went under-
When he was named Mayor of Saigon two months ago by
Premier Nguyen Khanh, 61-year-old Tran Van Huong was a dental
clerk earning $20 a month and suffering from high blood pressure.
Yesterday he was confirmed by South Viet Nam's High National
Council to take over Maj. Gen. Khanh's job as Premier.
In his first speech, he promised to clean out corruption, to put
an end to the "terrible degradation" of youth, to bust red tape
and the black market, to keep politics out of religion. His major
goal: "To defeat the Communists and bring welfare to the people."
Said a U. S. observer: "This man looks really tough and really
honest. I get the impression we might see some big changes around
here, all for the best."
That changes are needed, no one disputes. But the observer's
euphoria is not shared by every one taking a long-range view of
mistakes made, problems faced and solutions required in the anti-
Communist war, as Beverly Deepe reports in this last of seven articles.
ground-and they have since
been organizing and effecting
subversion with the help of
thousands of party cadre who in-
filtrated from North Viet Nam.
While the Communist con-
ducted this invisible but ever-
present subversion, assassinating
local leaders and weakening the
government, the U. S. largely
neglected to strengthen and re-
inforce the government adminis-
trative apparatus, and looked
largely to fighting the armed
guerrillas.
The newly formed civilian
government, headed by Phan
Khac Suu, has a weak apparatus
with which to fight the Commu-
nist political organization-al-
ready eight years ahead of it in
stability and direction.
A much-discussed solution to
the problem of subversion is air
strikes in Communist - infested
southern Laos or air raids on
North Viet Nam as a means to
smother the significance of the
internal developments. Observers
here view this as a delaying ac-
tion to postpone defeat and to
attain aa better bargaining posi-
tion for negotiations. Instead,
they suggest a "political raid"
against Communist agents-
whether they be Buddhist
monks, student leaders or Cath-
olic priests.
2. The American approach was
to be liked rather than respect-
ed. "But you know Communists
do not care if they are loved in
Asia," said one Western observer.
Even Vietnamese generals say
the U. S. should interfere more
in Vietnamese affairs-but "you
do not have the courage to do
that. You are afraid of being
called a colonialist, but you will
be called that anyway. You
should force the government to
be honest."
The result was that the U. S.
acted neither with firmness nor
with diplomacy; Vietnamese
leaders were forced to read
minds and, more important, only
guess how programs should be
implemented.
An example: Shortly after be-
coming Premier, Gen. Khanh
appointed his brother-in-law as
consulate general in Hong Kong,
an important post not only for
intelligence but also for financial
dealings. The U. S. Embassy
cabled Washington that the
appointment would only remind
the Vietnamese of the nepotism
of the Diem regime. It did. But
the embassy did not even suggest
to Gen. Khanh that the appoint-
ment was unwise.
Observers believe that at the
highest level there should ini-
tially have been a formalized ar-
rangement between the two gov-
ernments-similar to an alliance
-with specific areas of respon-
sibility and authority for each
nation. Vietnamese generals and
Cabinet ministers should then
have met with American teams
regularly and formally to make
joint decisions and oversee im-
plementation.
Since the arrival of Ambassa-
dor Maxwell D. Taylor, such a
committee has met in emergen-
cies. But joint communiques
have nto been issued, which per-
petuates Communist propaganda
that Americans are taking over
command instead of advising the
Vietnamese.
Observers believe htat unless
these top-level Saigon meetings
are regularized, the strategists
are only in a position to react to
crises. Vietnamese intellectuals
accuse America of not having a
policy but instead it appears that
this policy is not co-ordinated
among all Vietnamese and Amer-
ican agencies.
3. As a corollary of this atti-
tude, the U. S. gave everything
(except nuclear weapons) to help
the Vietnamese with materiel;
its mistake was to demand noth-
ing in return.
Especially under Mr. Diem the
conditions of military and eco-
nomic aid should have been de-
mands for real reform in the
Saigon provincial and village
government. Instead, reforms
were postponed until after the
winning of the guerrilla war; but
the lack of these reforms only
refueled the war in the country-
side.
Since the end of the French
Indochina war in 1954, the U. S.
has given $3 billion in military
aid and $2 billion in economic
aid more than $300 per capita,
a year's salary for the lowest-
paid Vietnamese.
Obviously much of this went
into the defense budget. But no
economic program can be suc-
cessful without a well-function-
ing government machinery to
pass through, which Americans.
did not demand. The consequent
unplanned distribution systems
give the impression that aid has
gone only to the Mercedes Benz
class rather than into the pockets
of the rice paddy farmer.
In many instances America
took the easy way out in Viet
Nam: It made a half commit-
ment and treated the war as a
half war. Viet Nam appears to
be
a total
commitment - of
money, men and the blood of
more than 200 Americans killed
in combat. But in many instances
Americans themselves never took
the final systematic steps needed
to insure successful implementa-
tion of a program.
For months American leaders
here toyed with the idea of hav-
ing American advisers to Viet-
namese commanders in the prov-
inces stay more than a one-year
tour. But the painful decision-
unpopular with the GI's and
their mothers-was never made.
So even expert, Vietnamese-
speaking field advisers effectively
advise for a maximum eight
months and then are shipped
home. This is a symbol of the
half war.
At the beginning of the im-
portant strategic hamlet pro-
gram to fortify villages, the high-
est-ranking U. S. general here
was told that instead of pro-
ducing a socio-economic revolu-
tion in the villages the program
was considered by the peasants
to be an economic disaster. For
villagers were forced to build
strategic hamlets instead of
working on the cash crop of to-
bacco and were forced to make
fences from bamboo trees, their
cushion crop.
But the policy had been set,
and it was never changed. Con-
sequently for two years Amer-
ica's multi-million-dollar stra-
tegic hamlet program rolled
along to disaster until finally it
failed after the fall of Mr. Diem.
The strategic hamlet concept
is valid. The Communists proved
that when they swiped the entire
idea. They expertly set up their
own combat hamlets complete
with anti-helicopter poles and
trenches in houses for defense,
and their own hamlet militia
program as the government con-
cept called for. But they suc-
ceeded; the Americans did not.
THE FUTURE
Observers believe unity in the
American mission has improved
considerably under Ambassador
Taylor, but more steps are need-
ed. Possibly the fundamental
mistake of Americans and Viet-
namese is the same one made by
the French during their anti-
Communist struggle: Simply to
make the same mistake over and
over again. Clearly this must be
changed-if it is not too late.
Victory in Viet Nam must be
earned with back-breaking, pain-
staking efforts of working side
by side with Vietnamese. Viet-
namese troops must be held in a
province until the area is paci-
fied; government administrators
must systematically interview
each family to root out Commu-
nist agents.
This must be enforced with
determination and justice and
insisted upon by Americans. If
this painful decision is ignored
now, the result will be years of
drifting toward a neutralist solu-
tion and an eventual Communist
takeover. History may well say
that Americans were defeated by
Communist expansionists, but in
fact it appears they will be de-
feated by their own mistakes.
At the philosophical level, Viet
Nam is often viewed as a testing
ground between American de-
mocracy and Asian communism.
Some observers say that America
has not made its revolutionary
appeals relevant to Asia-especi-
ally its economic view of private
enterprise is seen as increasing
the wealth of the wealthy class
without aiding the poor. Others,
however, say that the U. S. has
not demonstrated its democracy
to Viet Nam.
"It is not a problem of philos-
ophy but of performance," one
Western diplomate said. "And
our performance has been bad.
The Communists preach our own
philosophy of honest, efficient,
just government to villagers-
they implement it. We do not."
The key lesson from Viet Nam
is that as one Western diplomat
explained, "the only good
counter-insurgency is the one
that is never fought because it
is never allowed to start."
Observers here openly suggest
that after the election the U. S.
will set up "a small elite task
force" of career civilian and mil-
itary officers from all branches
of service to deal with this "pre-
dictable type of war in the
future."
in
In short, America's test is to
win the counter-guerrilla and
counter-revolutionary war
Viet Nam at this "crucial point
of no return" and to win the
same type of war in South
America and Africa-before it
needs to be fought.
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Date
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1964, Nov. 1
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Subject
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Ngô, Đình Diệm, 1901-1963; Vietnam (Republic)--History--Coup d'état, 1963
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B4, F6
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
