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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-05526 to 363-05540.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-05526 to 363-05540
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Title
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Article about arguments within US AID
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Description
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Original title: "aid", Keever's title: "Policy Differences Bedevil U.S. Largest Economic Aid Mission," Article about arguments over doctorine within US AID and the resulting resignation of personnel, published by the New York Herald Tribune
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Transcript
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deepe
aid-1
pr.10.
pu
SAIGON- A major policy dispute over "doctrinal differences"
for the administration of U. S. economic aid and the role of U. S.
economic field representatives in the fight against the Viet Cong
Communist guerrillas has developed in America's largest and most
unorthodox economic aid mission in the world.
Reliable sources indicate that the battle has grown so
sharp that the No. 3 man in the economic mission, Dr. George K.
Tanham, a widely reput known counterinsurgency school scholar, is
considering submitting his resignation with the week in protest against
the views of his boss, mission Director James S. Killen. (FYI: source is
Tanham himself).
A spokesman for the American Embassy said "there's no conflict
between the two men, though there may be i differences of opinion as is
usual between two people."
Reliable sources report that the conflict is a complex one
involving differing viewpoints on the administration of economic aid
ECONOMIC
the role of American provincial representatives in Vietnam's 45 provinces,
personality differences. It is also considered to reflect dissension
VoluntERED
between American non-career officials whoh have been drafted to work for
the economic aid mission during the anti-Communist war and the orthodox
career economic official
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aid-A
The outcome of the dispute is considered to determine the
det degree of American involvement and economic support for the
cupeia crucial pacification program,
suhrhlamblausnahms fortified hamlets
in the countryside on which America's hopes of helping win the anti-Communis
war are based.
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aid--2
With a staff of nearly 500 American employees and a budget of
$241.6 million ending June 30, 1964, the United States Operations Mission
(USC) is the largest maintained by the United States Agency for
International Development (USAID).
explained.
"The two men have a difference in concept," one reliable source
"Killen has the conventional approach with omphasis on
economic development as a means of strengthening the government, which
serves as a means to prosecute the war.
"Tanham's appora approach is a program designed for support of
counterguerrilla warfare with emphasis on operations and more
emphasis on the role of the Americans in the provinces." (FYI Source is
speaking unofficially without American
attribution.)
As current discussions on Vietnam's budget are being held
between USQI and Vietnamese government officials, it is still undecided
whether Killen's viewpoint would entail a shift of U. S. aid from the
rural to the urban areas.
"Sometimes I think U. aid will be shifted from the provinces
and sometimes I think more money will be added to the budget for urban
areas,"
one reliable source indicated. (Source is Tanham).
Killen's viewpoint is considered to represent the traditional
government-to-government dealing between US and the Saigon government
ministries in an attempt to develop stronger economy and more efficient
administrative machinery.
(More)
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aid
-3
The USOM budget of fiscal year 1965 beginning July 1, however,,
fiscal
is expted expected to incri increase to between $250 and 300 million. One
reliable source indicated "that money has never been a major consideration
for USOM."
Killen's viewpoint is considered to represent traditional-,
government-to-government dealing between USOM and the Saigon government
ministries in an attempt to develop a stronger economy and more efficient
administrative machinery. Killen's approach is considered to emphasize
improvements in the urban centers--Saigon and the provincial capitals-
such as more job opportunities and installation of electricity. USOM
has also "crashprogrammed" the training of low-level government
administrators and is an assisting the training of 60,000 policemen
in ten centers throughout the country, which later will be responsible
for the internal security of the urban areas.
Reliable sources
sgive
also indicate tha t Killen is more prone to cutback on #ig "give"
"giveaway" aid, thus making the Vietnamese responsible for relying on their
own resources.
This government-to-government approach, in his view, would
enba enable a more effective prosecution of the war. The USOM division
of Public Health, for example, would deal directly with the Vitnamese
Ministry of Health which would be responsible for allocating and
sending U. S. medical supplies to the provinces. This is in general the
method af in which USM USOM operates in other countries and the way it
operated in Viet Nam until 1962.
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4
In 1962, however, in an attempt to re-direct the
American economic aid to the rural provinces and to support
the Vietnamese strategic hamlet program, USOM set up an unorthodox division
now called the OF Office or Rural Operations, xxxx@ankammam now
headed by Tanham, in which Saigon ministries were by-passed and the American
aid flowed directly through an American distribution system to each of the
country's 45 provinces. The individual province chief planned with the
S
USOM representative--now numbering more than 80-the requirements of
American aid locally needed, a joint contract was signed requisitioning
them and the American provincial representative checked the goods
were properly utilized and distributed.
The American provincial representative, because of his
bargaining position with American aid, served the province chief in more
of the capacity as a planning staff officer for economic development rather
than as an advisor, which is the case of the American military personel
in each province.
Tanham's view is this procedure should be continued and
broadened with emphasis on non-material psychological and social
development i development in the villages and hamlets, with a growing role
for American field representatives, although they would not act as "doers."
Killen's view is considered to be that the procedure should be curtailed.
As the result of the dispute, young provincial representatives
TWO
Tanham is now head of the Office of Rural Operations, with a title
of associate director, making him No. 3 man in the economic mission.
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5
Current discussions are being held over Killen's approach that
Office of Rural Affairs should be of the same rank as the other seven division
and Tanham should be demoted from associate directorship.
As the result of the dispute, young provincial representatives
now serving under Tanham have expressed the opeinip opinion they will be
de
given less and less authority and less and less control of provincial
planning and distritubtion of American goods--and will gradually be
phased out. (Source:
Killen's approach is considered to be the provincial representative
should act as "quiet, patient advisors," rather than supplemental staff
officers to Vietnamese province officials.
"Killen has
one source explained.
never been in a counterinsurgency situation before,"
"Tanham has spent a great deal of time studying
the stis situation and is much more aware of the problem."
(Source is
Tanham, 42, visited Viet Nam eight times during the French-
Indo-China War and the following yrars and years and is author of
Communist Revolutionary Warfare--The Viet Minh in Indo-China. Born in
Englewood, New Jersey, he studied at Princeton, Oxford and has his
Ph.D. from Stanford.
For the past nine years he worked for the Rand Corp.
in Washington, D.
C.
7
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Killen, 56, came to Vietnam after serving as USOM director
in three other countries-Korea, Yugoslavia and Pakistan. In 1947-48
he advised Gen. Douglas MacArthur on labor affairs in the Tokyo occupation
headquarters. Before jaing joining the government he was Vice-President
of the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers
of the United States and Canada (AFL).
Both Killen and Tanham arrived in Vietnam in mid-July shortly
after the appointment of Maxwell D.. Taylor as Ambassador.
In the current dispute, boserv observers note that "Tanham
has more sympathy, but Killen has more power."
Killen's viewpoint is considered to dovetail with
Ambassador Taylor's view that the Vietnamese must have their own
stable functioning government before any major American effort would be
of benefit in winning the war. This has given rise to one school of
thought about the prosecution of the war; the second broad school
that Tanham--and hard-line American military advisors--favor is that Viet Nam
is so important to the interests of the free world that American must
* assume more of the administrative, political and military responsibility
for the war.
"If American loses in Viet Nam' they'll lose 20 percent of the
battle in South American before they ever start," one foreign diplomat
explained. "Some say this is morm a Vietnamese war, but it is would be
America's defeat."
(More)
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W
deepe
aid-67
Killen is also considered to have the backing of USOM
USAID in Washington, which selected him for the job, while Tanham
was selected for his counterinsurgency background by high-level
State Department officials (William Sullivan, then head of Vietnam task force
Now
and named Ambassador to Laos). In mid-October, Tanham went to Washington,
officially to hire more qualified rural affairs experts, but presumably
Muster
also to must support for his viewpoint.
Reliable sources indicate he
was told en is running USQM." (Source is Tanham.)
conflict.
Personality differences are also considered a part of the
"Both men have different personalities that don't mix
particularly well," explained one reliable source who knows both men.
(Source is
"George (Tanham) is a gentle soul who does not
like fights; Jim (Killen) is an overpowering and dogmatic person who
could see only himself as boss.
"Jim's approach is to make a decision and lay down the law to
They are different personalities with different
the field representatives.
approaches; you can pick one or the other of them--but not both."
A further complicating factor is that on November 22
Tanham and USOM deputy director, Alfred M. Hurt, who is also in disagreement
with Killen, were involved in a "regrettable" accident in which a
Vietnamese motorcyclist was killed.
(More)
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aid-78
"The two men never hit it off from the day they arrived,"
loc low echelon USOM employee explained.
"Killen has obly only
a high school education, but his subordinate was the scholarly Dr.
Tanham--and that makes a difference to a man like Killen."
As a result of the dispute, one rural affairs project
already cut was the job of an American woman, i with experience in
Malayan
the Malyan emergency in the mid-50's, who travels throughout one da
Mekong Delta province organizing Vietnamese women's classes on
improving health, hygienge and improving diets by better breeding of
ix livestock.
"Tanham's approach is teaching women better hygience might
help gain the support of the people," one source said.
"Killen's
one
approach says in effect this does not make sense so why not cut it out."
Another key project in the Mekong Delta this year was
scheduled to be digging of fresh water wells in the Mekong Delta provinces
where salt water is prevalent and fresh water is available only five
months out of the year. This was scheduled to be a joint project
Plus
with American technci technicians and equipment, but also allied
personnel and equipment of other friendly nations in an attempt to
get "more flags" of other countries into the provinces.
However, two weeks ago, one Western economic official who had
earlier promised to send personnel and equipment from his country was
called to USOM and told their services were no longer wanted as the
well-digging projects were being cut back. He was not only embarrassed
but annoyed.
(Source is
(More)
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aid-
While the majority opinion is syma sympathetic to Kant
Tanham's view, they note that Killen's approach is "out of step with the
times" and that "Killen's idea of having the Vietnamese run the show is
a goal for the future, but not a fact at the present time."
One economic aid official of a foreign embassy explained,
"Killen is wrong because they Vietnamese have shown they are not capable
of taking aid g and then getting on with the programs. They lack
low-level leadership."
Others note that the rural affairs division was set up to
expedite the flow of essential items to the provinces at a time when
Vietnam had a stable government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. During
LEADERSHIP
the past year, three changes of government has caused political
And aftArgs
instability, which produced many
inisters.
They note
that in the past year, The Saigon government has had four ministers
of Interior, which is responsible for administration of the provinces.
In the viewpoint of Tanham the political instability in
Saigon has not produced /political instability at the grass roots,
in large part, because the pacification program and the distribution
of economic aid by-passed the ministries.
A result Another result of by-passing the ministeries
in Saigon was also generally acknowledged to have cut out one layer of
corruption and red tape. Many observers believe American aid should
help develop a stremlined, honest government administration, but note that
it has not yet developed.
(More)
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Even thou those who agree with Tanham, however, believe
that there must be a closer scrutiny of the allocation of American aid
to the provinces and man tond to agree with Killon's skeptician of
"do-goodion" in the provinces. One foreign economic export that some
American fertiliser, inc insecticides and hybrid coeds are distribuned
in areas that are predominantly controlled by the Viet Cong Comunist
guerrillas, which serves to strengthen their resources. These experts
advocate extreme measures to jao placing an economie blockade around
these Viet Cong controlled areas forcing them to administer it politically
and provide for it economically. They julgo that a blockade stopping
goods from Saigon would in effect force rationing and hardship on these
Viet Cong areas.
Another foreign economic expert was shocked at the indirect way
in which U. S. military and economic funds indirectly contribute to
Viet ong strength.
"All the
aircraft gasoline for the big American helicopter
base at Soolrang onehundred miles southwest of here is taxed twice by
Viet Cong roadblocks," he explained. Then they pipe it in American
helicopters to kill Viot Cong. It does not make sense. It might have been
excused in 1962 at the beginning of American involvement, but in 1964
it is a cign of men k woakmoss."
The aircraft fuel is purchased from petroleum companies which
sublet the transportation of the gasoline to Vietnamese contracting companies,
which in turn pay off the Viet Cong to got through their roadblocks, according
petroleum
company official.
(More)
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The Killen-Tanham cleavage is also considered to reflect
differences of opinion between non-carre non-career officials in
USOM and the career administrators.
Tanham has been employed in
Killen is a career
private business, except for military service.
USOM official.
Many of the employees of the Office of Rural Operations
were recruited outside the USOM organization and rushed to Viet Nam
on two-year contracts to assist in winning the war. Some professionals
and specialists were also especially selected on two year contracts
and assigned to the traditional divisions like Public Works, Public
Health to beef up their staffs during the counterinusr counterinsurgency.
Now many of these two-year contracts are expirint an expiring and many
of the non-carr non-career personnel are leaving Viet Nam.
"There are two classes of people in USOM," one young
provincial representative explained.
"There's the older trea
traditional bureaucrat who likes the government villa, the 25 per cent
extra living allowance for hardship post and is interested in his
career. Then there's the young gung-ho type who doesn't care how much
money he makes or if he lives in a pup tent in the provinces.
young gung-ho types came to do a mission and are now leaving.
These
Of
course,
they don't think they war is being won, but they can't see
they will be allowed to do any good in winning it.
"I'm leaving myself in three months."
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One medical specialist,NX who had been in private business
before coming to Viet Nam, expressed disillusionment with government service
"I've been here for two years," he explained "and I've seen
three American ambassadors, three USOM directors and three division
heads. Everyone who comes in things the first one doesn' didn't know a
anything and changed the policy. This happened to me consistently since
the day I arrived.
"We'd be working on a project like building a dispensary and
then I'd find out it was stopped a week ago. One doctor who is a friend
of mine was slect selected to come to Viet Nam to teach medical
specialists; without his consis consent he was
Z
construction of provincial hop hospitals.
"
assigned to oversee
Another medical specialist I aw knew--the only one of his kind
Volur
in the country-was abpgm serving as a consultant for American GI's
at the American military hospital, just to help them out. The
division chief called him hi in and ordered him to stop it, saying it
wasn't in his job description. The American military doctor even wrote
a letter saying my friend had saved the U. s. government thousands of
dollars, but it didn't matter.
The GI's now have to be sent to
Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines for special treatments.
"This is the American Mandarin system--dictorial ru
dictatorial rule by personal whim," he explained. "I'm not going to
renew my count contact for another two years of this."
(FYI--The source of this information is
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aid--13
I could not reveal
was accomplished
USOM,
aigen Univers
irked with the situation)..
Even if the Tanham viewpoint prevails immemm within the
observers believe it it is but a good beginning in meeting the
challenge of the Viet Cong Communists.
"The Communists are the real organization man in this war,"
one reliable source explained.
"Maybe at the provincial level (where
Tanham places emphasis versus Killen's emphasis at the central government
level) the government is as strong as the Viet Cong. But at the
lowest level in the villages, the Communist party organization is 25
MORE
times greater than that of the government.
"The Americans have not paid much attention to this; there's
no one agency in the American hierarchy of institutions that has the
particular mission to root out that secret Communist organization; everyone
agency has bits and pieces of the problem. And no one agency in the
Vietnamese government is in charge of that problem." (FYI only--source is
Foreign economic experts note that during the early, crucial
years of the deveom deveo development of the Viet Cong insurgents between
1955-60, American economic aid amounted to $1,302 million. (More)
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But they point out only four percent of that American directly or
indirectly support agriculture, which 80 per cent of the population is
directly depondent on for a livelihood.
"Now Tanhon is going to try to keep pushing for more aid in the
rural areas as US has for the past two years," the foreign economist
said. "But ho may bo aka nine years too late,"
(Informatively onlys source named as foreign economic export in
ho stutinis is in charge of economic reporting hore
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Date
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1964, Dec. 10
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States--Foreign relations--Vietnam (Republic); USAID/Vietnam; Economic assistance
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B187, F1
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
