Article about arguments within US AID

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363-05526 to 363-05540.pdf

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363-05526 to 363-05540

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Article about arguments within US AID

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Original title: "aid", Keever's title: "Policy Differences Bedevil U.S. Largest Economic Aid Mission," Article about arguments over doctorine within US AID and the resulting resignation of personnel, published by the New York Herald Tribune

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Draft transcripts were automatically generated via Google Document AI and are currently under review. Please report significant errors to Archives & Special Collections at archives@unl.edu.

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deepe aid--1 Dec. 10. SAIGON--A major policy dispute over “doctrinal differences” for the administration of U.S. economic aid and the role of U.S. economic field representatives in the fight against the Viet Cong Communist guerrillas has developed in America’s largest and most unorthodox economic aid mission in the world. Reliable sources indicate that the battle has grown so sharp that the No. 3 man in the economic mission, Dr. George K. Tanham, a widely [XXXX indicating deletion] known counterinsurgency [deletion: school] scholar, is considering submitting his resignation within the week in protest against the views of his boss, mission Director James S. Killen. (FYI: source is Tanham himself). A spokesman for the American Embassy said “there’s no conflict between the two men, though there may be differences of opinion as is usual between two people.” Reliable sources report that the conflict is a complex one involving differing viewpoints on the administration of economic aid, the role of American [deletion: provincial] economic representatives in Vietnam’s 45 provinces, [insertion: and] personality differences. It is also considered to reflect dissension between American non-career officials which have [deletion: been drafted] volunteered to work for the economic aid mission during the anti-Communist war and the orthodox career economic officials. deepe aid--1A The outcome of the dispute is considered [insertion: likely] to determine the degree of American involvement and economic support for the crucial pacification program, [XXXX indicating deletion] fortified hamlets in the countryside on which America’s hopes of helping win the anti-Communist war are based. deepe aid--2 With a staff of nearly 500 American employees and a budget of $241.6 million ending June 30, 1964, the United States Operations Mission (USOM) is the largest maintained by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). “The two men have a difference in concept,” one reliable source explained. “Killen has the conventional approach with emphasis on economic development as a means of strengthening the government, which serves as a means to prosecute the war. Tanham’s approach is a program designed for support of counterguerrilla warfare with emphasis on operations and more emphasis on the role of the Americans in the provinces.” (FYI Source is [XXXX indicating deletion] speaking unofficially without American attribution.) As current discussions on Vietnam’s budget are being held between USOM and Vietnamese government officials, it is still undecided whether Killen’s viewpoint would entail a shift of U.S. aid from the rural to the urban areas. “Sometimes I think U.S. aid will be shifted from the provinces and sometimes I think more money will be added to the budget for urban areas,” one reliable source indicated. (Source is Tanham). [deletion: Killen’s viewpoint is considered to represent the traditional government-to-government dealing between USOM and the Saigon government ministries in an attempt to develop a stronger economy and more efficient administrative machinery.] (More) deepe aid -3 The USOM budget [deletion: of] for fiscal year 1965 beginning July 1, however, is expected to increase to between $250 and 300 million. One reliable source indicated “that money has never been a major consideration for USOM.” Killen’s viewpoint is considered to represent traditional, government-to-government dealing between USOM and the Saigon government ministries in an attempt to develop a stronger economy and more efficient administrative machinery. Killen’s approach is considered to emphasize improvements in the urban centers--Saigon and the provincial capitals--such as more job opportunities and installation of electricity. USOM has also “crashprogrammed” the training of low-level government administrators and is [XXXX indicating deletion] assisting the training of 60,000 policemen in ten centers throughout the country, which later will be responsible for the internal security of the urban areas. Reliable sources also indicate that Killen is more prone to cutback on “giveaway” aid, thus making the Vietnamese responsible for relying on their own resources. This government-to-government approach, in his view, would enable a more effective prosecution of the war. The USOM division of [deletion: Public] Health, for example, would deal directly with the Vietnamese Ministry of Health which would be responsible for allocating and sending U.S. medical supplies to the provinces. This is in general the method [deletion: of] in which USOM operates in other countries and the way it operated in Viet Nam until 1962. deepe aid 4 In 1962, however, in an attempt to re-direct the American economic aid to [XXXX indicating deletion] the rural provinces and to support the Vietnamese strategic hamlet program, USOM set up an unorthodox division now called the OF Office or Rural Operations, [XXXX indicating deletion] now headed by Tanham, in which Saigon ministries were by-passed and the American aid flowed directly through an American distribution system to each of the country’s 45 provinces. The individual province chief planned with the USOM representatives--now numbering more than 80--the requirements of American aid locally needed, a joint contract was signed requisitioning them and the American provincial representative checked [insertion: that] the goods were properly utilized and distributed. The American provincial representative, because of his bargaining position with American aid, served the province chief in more of the capacity as a planning staff officer for economic development rather than as an advisor, which is the case of the American military personnel in each province. Tanham’s view is this procedure should be continued and broadened with emphasis on non-material psychological and social development in the villages and hamlets, with a growing role for American field representatives, although they would not act as “doers.” Killen’s view is considered to be that the procedure should be curtailed. [deletion: As the result of the dispute, young provincial representatives now] Tanham is now head of the Office of Rural Operations, with a title of associate director, making him No. 3 man in the economic mission. deepe aid--5 Current discussions are being held over Killen’s approach that Office of Rural Affairs should be of the same rank as the other seven divisions and Tanham should be demoted from associate directorship. As the result of the dispute, young provincial representatives now serving under Tanhman have expressed the opinion they will be given less and less authority and [deletion: less and less] decreasing control of provincial planning and distribution of American goods--and will gradually be phased out (Source: [deletion: [illegible], formerly Lodge’s favorite province representative in infamous Long An province.]) Killen’s approach is considered to be the provincial representative should act as “quiet, patient advisors,” rather than supplemental staff officers to Vietnamese province officials. “Killen has never been in a counterinsurgency situation before,” one source explained. “Tanham has spent a great deal of time studying the situation and is much more aware of the problem.” (Source is [deletion: [illegible]]). Tanham, 42, visited Viet Nam eight times during the French-Indo-China War and the following years and is author of Communist Revolutionary Warfare--The Viet Minh in Indo-China. Born in Englewood, New Jersey, he studied at Princeton, Oxford and has his Ph.D. from Stanford. For the past nine years he worked for the Rand Corp. in Washington, D.C. deepe 6 aid--5 Killen, 56, came to Vietnam after serving as USOM director in three other countries--Korea, Yugoslavia, and Pakistan. In 1947-48 he advised Gen. Douglas MacArthur on labor affairs in the Tokyo occupation headquarters. Before [XXXX indicating deletion] joining the government he was Vice-President of the International Brotherhood of Pulp, Sulphite and Papermill Workers of the United States and Canada (AFL). Both Killen and Tanham arrived in Vietnam in mid-July shortly after the appointment of Maxwell D. Taylor as Ambassador. In the current dispute, observers note that “Tanham has more sympathy, but Killen has more power.” Killen’s viewpoint is considered to dovetail with Ambassador Taylor’s view that the Vietnamese must have their own stable functioning government before any major American effort would be of benefit in winning the war. This has given rise to one school of thought about the prosecution of the war; the second broad school that Tanham--and hard-line American military advisors--favor is that Viet Nam is so important to the interests of the free world that American must [XXXX indicating deletion] assume more of the administrative, political, and military responsibility for the war. “If America loses in Viet Nam, they’ll lose 20 percent of the battle in South America before they ever start,” one foreign diplomat explained. “Some say this is [XXXX indicating deletion] a Vietnamese war, but it would be America’s defeat.” (More) deepe aid--7 Killen is also considered to have the backing of [deletion: USOM] USAID in Washington, which selected him for the job, while Tanham was selected for his counterinsurgency background by high-level State Department officials (William Sullivan, then head of Vietnam task force and [insertion: now] named Ambassador to Laos). In mid-October, Tanham went to Washington, officially to hire more qualified rural affairs experts, but presumably also to [deletion: must] muster support for his viewpoint. Reliable sources indicate he was told “Killen is running USOM.” (Source is Tanham.) Personality differences are also considered a part of the conflict. “Both men have different personalities that don’t mix particularly well,” explained one reliable source who knows both men. (Source is [deletion: [illegible]]). “George (Tanham) is a gentle soul who does not like fights; Jim (Killen) is an overpowering and dogmatic person who could see only himself as boss. Jim’s approach is to make a decision and lay down the law to the field representatives. They are different personalities with different approaches; you can pick one or the other of them--but not both.” A further complicating factor is that on November 22 Tanham and USOM deputy director, Alfred M. Hurt, who is also in disagreement with Killen, were involved in a “regrettable” accident in which a Vietnamese motorcyclist was killed. (More) deepe aid--7 8 “The two men never hit it off from the day they arrived,” one [XXXX indicating deletion] low echelon USOM employee explained. “Killen has only a high school education, but his subordinate was the scholarly Dr. Tanham--and that makes a difference to a man like Killen.” As a result of the dispute, one rural affairs project already cut was the job of an American woman, with experience in the Malayan emergency in the mid-50’s, who travels [insertion: [illegible]] throughout one [XXXX indicating deletion] Mekong delta province organizing Vietnamese women’s classes on improving health, hygiene and improving diets by better breeding of [XXXX indicating deletion] livestock. “Tanham’s approach is teaching women better hygiene might help gain the support of the people,” one source said. “Killen’s approach says in effect this does not make any sense so why not cut it out.” Another key project in the Mekong Delta this year was scheduled to be digging of fresh water wells in the Mekong Delta provinces where salt water is prevalent and fresh water is available only five months out of the year. This was scheduled to be a joint project with American technicians and equipment, [deletion: but also allied] plus personnel and equipment of other friendly nations in an attempt to get “more flags” of other countries into the provinces. However, two weeks ago, one Western economic official who had earlier promised to send personnel and equipment from his country was called to USOM and told their services were no longer wanted as the well-digging projects were being cut back. He was not only embarrassed but annoyed. (Source is [deletion: Australian [illegible] Embassy economist]). (More) deepe aid--9 While the majority opinion is sympathetic to [XXXX indicating deletion] Tanham’s view, they note that Killen’s approach is “out of step with the times” and that “Killen’s idea of having the Vietnamese run the show is a goal for the future, but not a fact at the present time.” One economic aid official of a foreign embassy explained, “Killen is wrong because they Vietnamese have shown they are not capable of taking aid and then getting on with the programs. They lack low-level leadership.” Others note that the rural affairs division was set up to expedite the flow of essential items to the provinces at a time when Vietnam had a stable government under President Ngo Dinh Diem. During the past year, three changes of government [insertion: leadership] has caused political instability, [deletion: which produced many changes in the ministers] and change in [deletion: Saigon] the country. They note that in the past year, the Saigon government has had four Ministers of Interior, which is responsible for administration of the provinces. In the viewpoint of Tanham the political instability in Saigon has not produced [insertion: undue amount of] political instability at the grass roots, in large part, because the pacification program and the distribution of economic aid by-passed the ministries. [deletion: A result] Another result of by-passing the ministries in Saigon was also generally acknowledged to have cut out one layer of corruption and red tape. Many observers believe American aid should help develop a streamlined, honest government administration, but note that it has not yet [insertion: been] developed. (More) deepe aid--9 10 Even those who agree with Tanham, however, believe that there must be a closer scrutiny of the allocation of American aid to the provinces and [XXXX indicating deletion] tend to agree with Killen’s skepticism of “do-goodism” in the provinces. One foreign economic expert that some American fertilizer, insecticides and hybrid seeds are distributed in areas that are predominantly controlled by the Viet Cong Communist guerrillas, which serves to strengthen their resources. These experts advocate extreme measures to placing an economic blockade around these Viet Cong controlled areas forcing them to administer it politically and provide for it economically. They judge that a blockade stopping goods from Saigon would in effect force rationing and hardship on these Viet Cong areas. Another foreign economic expert was shocked at the indirect way in which U.S. military and economic funds indirectly contribute to Viet Cong strength. “All the aircraft gasoline for the big American helicopter base at SocTrang onehundred miles southwest of here is taxed twice by Viet Cong roadblocks,” he explained. “Then they pipe it in American helicopters to kill Viet Cong. It does not make sense. It might have been excused in 1962 at the beginning of American involvement, but in 1964 it is a sign of weakness.” The aircraft fuel is purchased from petroleum companies which sublet the transportation of the gasoline to Vietnamese contracting companies, which in turn pay off the Viet Cong to get through their roadblocks, according petroleum company officials. (More) deepe aid--11 The Killen-Tanham cleavage is also considered to reflect differences of opinion between non-career officials in USOM and the career administrators. Tanham has [insertion: always] been employed in private business, except for military service. Killen is a career USOM official. Many of the employees of the Office of Rural Operations were recruited outside the USOM organization and rushed to Viet Nam on two-year contracts to assist in winning the war. Some professionals and specialists were also especially selected on two year contracts and assigned to the traditional divisions like Public Works, Public Health to beef up their staffs during the counterinsurgency. Now many of these two-year contracts are expiring and many of the non-career personnel are leaving Viet Nam. “There are two classes of people in USOM,” one young provincial representative explained. “There’s the older traditional bureaucrat who likes the government [insertion: [illegible]] villa, the 25 per cent extra living allowance for hardship post and is interested in his career. Then there’s the young gung-ho type who doesn’t care how much money he makes or if he lives in a pup tent in the provinces. These young gung-ho types came to do a mission and are now leaving. Of course, they don’t think they war is being won, but they can’t see they will be allowed to do any good in winning it. I’m leaving myself in three months.” deepe aid--12 One medical specialist, [XXXX indicating deletion] who had been in private business before coming to Viet Nam, expressed disillusionment with government service “I’ve been here for two years,” he explained “and I’ve seen three American ambassadors, three USOM directors and three division heads. Everyone who comes in thinks the first one [deletion: doesn’] didn’t know a anything and changed the policy. This happened to me consistently since the day I arrived. We'd be working on a project like building a dispensary and then I’d find out it was stopped a week ago. One doctor who is a friend of mine was selected to come to Viet Nam to teach medical specialists; without his consent he was assigned to oversee construction of provincial hospitals. “Another medical specialist I [XXXX indicating deletion] knew--the only one of his kind in the country--[deletion: was [XXXX indicating deletion] serving] volunteered [illegible] as a consultant for American GI’s at the American military hospital, just to help them out. [deletion: The] His division chief called him in and ordered him to stop it, saying it wasn’t in his job description. The American military doctor even wrote a letter saying my friend had saved the U.S. government thousands of dollars, but it didn’t matter. The GI’s now have to be sent to Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines for special treatments. “This is the American Mandarin system--dictatorial rule by personal whim,” he explained. “I’m not going to renew my contract for another two years of this.” (FYI--The source of this information is [deletion: Dr. Alice Palmer, who said] deepe aid--13 I could not reveal [deletion: her identity because her husband (the [XXXX indicating deletion] specialist now building provincial hospitals, is still in country. She gave up her professorship at a Michigan University, as did her husband, plus private practice and [insertion: they] sold their Ann Arbor home to come here to teach in the uni. and set up medical school at Saigon University. Little of this] was accomplished [deletion: and she’s totally] irked with the situation). Even if the Tanham viewpoint prevails [XXXX indicating deletion] within the USOM, observers believe it is but a good beginning in meeting the challenge of the Viet Cong Communists. “The Communists are the real organization man in this war,” one reliable source explained. “Maybe at the provincial level (where Tanham places emphasis versus Killen’s emphasis at the central government level) the government is as strong as the Viet Cong. But at the lowest level in the villages, the Communist party organization is 25 times [deletion: greater] more effective than that of the government. The Americans have not paid much attention to this; there’s no one agency in the American hierarchy of institutions that has the particular mission to root out that secret Communist organization; everyone agency has bits and pieces of the problem. And no one agency in the Vietnamese government is in charge of that problem.” (FYI only--source is [deletion: American general in charge of military operations).] Foreign economic experts note that during the early, crucial years of the development of the Viet Cong insurgents between 1955-60, American economic aid amounted to $1,302 million. (More) deepe 4 aid--13 But they point out only four percent of that American [insertion: [illegible]] directly or indirectly support agriculture, which 80 per cent of the population is directly dependent on for a livelihood. “Now Tanham is going to try to keep pushing for more [insertion: [illegible]] aid in the rural areas as USOM [insertion: [illegible]] has for the past two years,” the foreign economist said. “But he may be nine years too late.” (Informatively only: source named as foreign economic expert is [deletion: in Australian army] who [XXXX indicating deletion] is in charge of economic reporting here [deletion: [illegible] He’s lived here for 5 years.)]

Date

1964, Dec. 10

Subject

Vietnam War, 1961-1975; United States--Foreign relations--Vietnam (Republic); USAID/Vietnam; Economic assistance

Location

Saigon, South Vietnam

Coordinates

10.8231; 106.6311

Size

20 x 26 cm

Container

B187, F1

Format

dispatches

Collection Number

MS 363

Collection Title

Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers

Creator

Keever, Beverly Deepe

Copyright Information

These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.

Publisher

Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries

Language

English