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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-04859B to 363-04860.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-04859B to 363-04860
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Title
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Viet Timetable-Fateful Days Near in War and Saigon Shifts: A Tightening Up
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Description
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Articles published in the New York Herald Tribune about the predicted length of the war and Nguyễn Khánh's seizure of power as president, page 1 and 4
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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Viet Shakeup:
Fateful Days
Near in War
TIMETABLE
TIGHTENING
By Beverly Deepe
A Special Correspondent
SAIGON.
"The pessimists here said
the war was lost eight months
ago when the first military
junta didn't succeed," a West-
ern diplomat explained, "But
we still have a slender hope
of winning. Now the question
is-how long can we hold that
hope?"
The end of the timetable
of the Viet Nam war is in
November, as if a pact had
been signed by all concerned.
-America, South Viet Nam
and the Communists. For
America, November marks the
Presidential elections, the re-
sults of which will help to
decide the fate of Viet Nam.
For South Viet Nam's newly
named President, Maj. Gen.
Nguyen Khanh, November
marks the end of a "truce"
with some of his own fellow
generals who once threatened
a coup against him. Despite
his elevation yesterday and
the Cabinet shakeup still to
come, he must prove by No-
More on VIET-P 4
VUNG TAU.
South Viet Nam.
Maj. Gen. Nguyen Khanh
took over yesterday as Pres-
dent of South Viet Nam in
a government shakeup de-
signed to consolidate power
in his hands.
Gen. Khanh, who has ruled
as Premier since seizing con-
trol of the government in a
military coup last Jan. 30,
was overwhelmingly elected
to his new post by the Mili-
tary Revolutionary Council,
the ruling junta of 58 South
Vietnamese generals and
colonels, at a meeting in this
seaside resort 40 miles east
of the South Vietnamese
capital of Saigon.
At the same time, the
council approved a new, 12-
page constitution, switching
back from the European-style
system of a strong Premier
and figurehead President to
the American-type setup of
a strong President and no
Premier at all-the system
More on SAIGON-P4
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- Page 2
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New York Herald Tribune
Monday, August 17, 1964
-D
Viet Timetable-Fateful Days Near in War
(Continued from page one)
vember that he is strong
enough to govern his people
and eventually to win their
war against the Viet Cong.
For the Communist guer-
rillas, November marks the
end of the rainy season.
After the monsoons they
can use their known capabil
ity of jumping into Phase III,
the final decisive phase in
which guerrilla tactics are
converted into conventional
warfare, with a solid but
mobile front line.
The effect of the Tonkin
Gulf incidents and subse-
quent American air strikes on
North Viet Nam was simply
to stop the clock-to neutra-
lize time. No reliable observers
here are willing to guess for
how long. Few believe, how-
ever, that the clock has
stopped indefinitely.
QUESTION
The Tonkin incidents pin-
point the question raised by
the Johnson administration
several months ago. Will air
strikes or naval blockades on
North Viet Nam win the
counter-insurgency war in
South Viet Nam? The answer
depends on the basic assump-
tions about the war, which
fall into two categories.
The first school views the
South Viet Nam war as a
civil war, with citizens within
the country rising against the
government. This school notes
that most of the guerrilla
fighters are from South Viet
Nam and most of their
weapons and supplies are
captured from the govern-
ment. These observers be-
lieve that even direct war
against North Viet Nam
would still not win the war
in the South.
MORALE
The second school led by the
American State Department,
is that the South Viet Nam
war was caused by direct
aggression from Hanol, since
thousands of political and
military cadres infiltrated
form North Viet Nam during
the last four years. Persons
accepting this view concede
that attacking North Viet
Nam would not substantially
help to win the war in South
Viet Nam. But they believe
that counter-insurgency in the
South would be inconsequen-
tial in the context of "bigger
limited war."
U. 8. Ambassador Maxwell
Taylor considered the air
strikes against North Viet Nam
"morale booster" for Ameri-
cans and South Vietnamese.
Actually the air strikes rein-
forced the long-standing fear
of the Vietnamese govern-
ment that America is in the
first stage of planning to
negotiate a settlement with
Communists. Government
officials and Vietnamese in-
tellectuals expressed the view
that America was taking
strong measures against Hanol
to win a better bargaining
position.
One American adviser re-
ported, "My Viet Nam coun-
terpart was so mad about our
bombing he would not speak
to me. He does not want this
war escalated."
However, the Tonkin inci-
dents also caused Hanol and
Peking to reevaluate their
"paper tiger" slogans and
their assessment that Amer-
ica would not act during
these pre-election months.
The North Vietnamese inci-
dents forced the Viet Cong
guerrillas in South Viet Nam
into a temporary lull of ac-
tivity, presumably until new
er instructions are issued.
But reliable sources here pre-
dict the lull will be only tem-
porary and the guerrillas will
once again launch intensive
and extensive military opera-
tions, as they were doing
days before the Tonkin inci-
dents. Military sources here
are exceptionally watchful of
the increased numbers of
North Vietnamese troops in
the provinces south of the
17th parallel, which divides
the Communist North from
anti-Communist South.
The Tonkin incidents and
the bombing of North Viet
Nam created the kind of
crisis atmosphere in Saigon
that gave Gen. Khanh the
moment, the means and the
Justification to launch what
he has described as "my own
coup."
Phase I of that operation
began almost immediately-
the increasing militarization
of the government. Phase II
was accomplished yesterday
-the concentration of more
power in his own hands,
RESTRICTIONS
Gen. Khanh launched his
Phase I two days after the
bombing of North Viet Nam
by clamping on a state of
emergency and authorizing
more restrictions on civilian
life in Saigon. While Viet
Nam has been in a "state of
emergency" by declaration of
former President Ngo Dinh
Diem since 1961. Gen. Khanh's
announcement was backed by
strong measures of imple-
mentation, especially in Sal-
gon. Then last week, in an
unprecedented move, he
pinned a fourth star on
moon-faced Gen. Tran Thien
Khiem, Minister of Defense
and Commander-in-Chief of
all armed forces. This gave
39-year-old Khiem higher
rank than Khanh himself or
Chief of State Gen. Duong
Van Minh.
"The generals Kh" is &
term which Khanh once used
to describe himself and Gen.
Kheim, a label attached to
the two in 1957 when both
were field commanders in the
battle-ridden Mekong Delta
area. In their early twenties,
the generals were classmates
at a French-operated military
academy. It was Gen. Khiem
who planned and executed
the Jan. 30 coup in Saigon
which moved Khanh from a
commander in the northern
provinces to Premier in Sal-
gon.
In recent weeks, rumors
in Saigon indicated that
Gen. Khiem, at the instiga-
tion of the Dai Viet political
party, would launch a coup
to unsent Khanh. Khanh's
own security advisers repeat-
asked
edly
the Premier
whether Khiem could be
trusted. "Always the reply
was 'Gen. Khiem is my very
good friend.'" according to
one of Khanh security
officials.
In Phase II of Gen.
Khanh's own coup, Gen.
Khiem remains as Defense
Minister and may well get
more power himself when the
revolutionary junta gets
around to naming a Vice-
President. He actually got
Saigon Shifts: A Tightening Up
(Continued from page one)
that prevailed under the late
President Ngo Dinh Diem.
President Diem was over-
thrown and slain last Novem-
ber in the first of South Viet
Nam's two military coups,
and the strong-Premier sys-
tem was adopted then.
The new constitution also
provides for a reorganized
Cabinet; an appointed, 150-
member provisional National
Assembly with only advisory
powers; a separate judicial
branch, also appointed, and
certain guarantees of indi-
vidual rights.
CONSULTATION
In Washington, it appeared
that the Administration
would be agreeable to Gen.
Khanh's assumption of his
new post, where he will re-
main under some curbs from
the military junta. Gen.
Kha was reported to have
consulted at length with U. S.
Ambassador Maxwell D. Tay-
lor before making the
changes.
American officials said Gen.
Khanh acted only after try-
ing hard-and failing utterly
-to weld dissident political
parties and religious groups
into a national coalition, all
of whose members would be
represented in the Cabinet.
The various factions could not
agree among themselves or
with the regime, the officials
said.
Asked whether Gen. Khanh
might now be more open to
charges of being a dictator,
the U. S. officials replied that
South Viet Nam is giving its
citizens a fair degree of free-
dom compared to other
Southeast Asian strong-man
regimes like Cambodia, Thai-
land and Burma-not to men-
tion Asian Communist gov-
ernments,
NO ELECTION
Gen. Khanh himself was
asked the same question at
a press conference following
his election. He replied that
"real democracy" was pro-
vided for by the division of
the government into execu-
tive, legislative and judicial
branches and a commitment
to eventual free election of
the National Assembly-
though he made clear that
no such election could be
held during the current war
with the Communist Viet
Cong.
Moreover, the general in-
sisted, he is by nature non-
authoritarian. "For six
months, I have been head of
a totalitarian regime without
being totalitarian," he said.
"I can head a dictatorial
regime without being a dicta-
tor."
All cabinet members and
other key officials resigned
but will stay at their posts
until a new government is
formed within a month. New
ministry appointments, how-
ever, are expected to be
made as early as this week.
A new Vice-President will
also be named by the junta.
The President, Vice-President
and cabinet members will
make up a Cabinet Council,
which Gen. Khanh referred
to yesterday as a "war cabl-
net."
Gen. Duong Van Minh, who
became Premier following
the November coup but was
kicked upstairs to be figure-
head President by Gen.
Khanh in January, was de-
prived of a governmental
post in the new regime. But
Gen. Khanh said he would
continue to function as an
adviser to the junta. Gen.
Minh did not attend yester-
day's meeting. Gen. Khanh
said he was ill.
The battle-uniformed jun-
ta members first met pri-
vately for three hours in a
yellow hilltop villa, once a
residence of Vietnamese em-
perors, which is reputed to
be haunted by the ghost of
a Vietnamese maiden mur-
dered there centuries ago.
Then the doors of the
"haunted house" were opened
to newsmen and TV cameras
for the formal election, by
secret ballot, of President
Khanh. He got 50 of the 58
votes. Five ballots were cast
for Lt. Gen. Tran Thien
Khiem.
Minister,
and one each for Gen. Minh
and a field commander, Maj.
Gen. Do Cao Tri. One ballot
was left blank.
Defense
LIMITATION
Some observers saw signs
that the junta, to which Pres-
ident Khanh remains respon-
sible under the new system,
had denied him power as ab-
solute as he may have wished.
An original draft of the
new constitution gave the
President authority during a
national emergency to "make
all decisions and take all ap-
propriate measures." But this
section was amended to make
such Presidential action sub-
ject to the approval of the
Military Revolutionary Coun-
cil.
The new provisional Na-
tional Assembly, which is
scheduled to start meeting
Oct. 5, will consist of 100
civilians by the junta and 50
representatives of the armed
forces. The body can vote
resolutions on national policy
but its recommendations are
not binding.
Other sections of the con-
stitution prohibit arbitrary
arrest, imprisonment or tor-
ture and guarantee the "pri-
vate life, dignity and honor
of the citizen as well as his
family and his home."
five votes for the Presidency
in yesterday's balloting-far
fewer than Gen. Khanh, but
enough to indicate substan-
tial support behind him.
There is some possibility,
too, that the generals over-
thrown in the Jan. 30 coup-
including Duong Van Minh,
who was eased out of the gov-
ernment yesterday-may ac-
tually be sent out of the
country to keep them from
sowing dissension in the gov-
ernment.
PARTY
The importance of the
powerful, though fragmented
Dai Viet (Greater Viet Nam)
political party, who support-
ed Khanh-Khiem in the Jan.
30 coup and then thought it
could seize the reins of
power, will almost certainly
be diminished if not crushed
in the new government. Much
of the difference between ci-
vilian and military concepts
of how to govern the country
and prosecute the war had
in the past been fomented by
the Dai Viet party, as well as
less important political par-
ties.
The “Khanh coup” indi
cates a reversal for Ambassa-
dor Taylor, who came to Viet
Nam early in July with the
policy of increasing the po-
litical prestige and power of
Gen. Minh. Gen. Khanh and
Gen. Khiem rebelled as ten-
sions between American off-
cials and the government
rose. Two weeks later Am-
bassador Taylor reversed his
policy and told Gen. Khanh
on a field trip: "Nous restons
ensemble jusqu'a la mort."
(We remain together until
death.)
If the Tonkin incidents
and attacks on North Viet
Nam have given the Khanh
government "a brief respite,"
as one diplomat explained,
they have hardly eased the
pressures of problems within
the country.
WARS
The internal problems con-
stitute a war within a war.
A favorite pastime in Saigon
is to count the number of
wars going on in Viet Nam.
One visitor, who was in the
country only six weeks, drew
up a list of twelve separate
wars. Gen. Khanh himself
casually ticks off five wars....
the Buddhist - Catholic con-
flict, the labor-management
problems, differences between
various political parties, dif-
ficulties with students and
regional prejudices between
persons from the south, cen-
ter and northern sections of
Việt Nam.
While Gen. Khanh faces a
military war against the Viet
Cong guerrillas in the coun-
tryside, observers here believe
that the Communist political
subversion is partly respon-
sible for the unrest within the
urban centers. Gen Khanh
himself admits that Commu-
nist agents are infiltrating
not only the national army
but his own government.
"The Communists are at
our door and the door is open,"
one Vietnamese officer ex-
plained. "But we're too busy
fighting inside the House. We
must unite to fight the Com-
munists and settle our differ-
ences later."
He pondered a minute and
added: "But then maybe the
Communists are inside our
house, too. We must be more
clever."
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Date
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1964, Aug. 17
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Subject
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Nguyễn, Khánh, 1927-2013; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Vietnam War, 1961-1975--Peace
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Container
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B186
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Format
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newspaper clippings
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
