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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07811 to 363-07816.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07811 to 363-07816
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Title
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Article about the pressure of time on South Vietnam and its allies
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Description
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Original title: "Time", Article draft about how time is putting a major obsticle on the war effort for South Vietnam and its allies, for the New York Herald Tribune
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Transcript
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- Page 1
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verly Deepe
101 Gong Ly
Saigon
Time-1
Set any is
SAIGON The anti-Communist political-military war here has
clearly become a battle of time. The war is headed towards "a point of
no return", in the words of one Western diplomat,--a point in which the
last hopes of winning the War by any definition are clearly engraved.
"The pessimists here said the war was lost eight months ago
when the first military junta didn't succeed," the diplomat oxplained.
"But we still have a slender hope of winning. Now the question is-
how long can we hold a hope?"
The end of the timetable is November, as though a common pact
was signed by all sides concerned-American, South Viet Nam and the Communists.
For American, November marks the Presidential elections the results of which
will decide partially decide the fate of Viet Nam. For South Vietnamese
premier-General Nguyen Khanh, November marks the end of his "truce" with
his own generals who once threatened a coup against him. November marks for
him the end of the "point of no return" when he must prove he has the
dynamics for winning the war and goverme governing his people.
-more-
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deepe
time--2
For the Communist guerrilles, November marks the end of
the rainy season when they can use their known capability of prom
jumping in Phase III, the final decisive phase transitioning from guerrilla
tactics to conventional warfare with a mobile, but solid known but mobile
front line.
The effects of the Tonkin Gulf incidents and subsequent American
airstrikes on North Viet Nam was simply to stop the clock--to neutralize
time. No reliable observers here are willing to guess for how long. Few
believe, however, that the clock he s stopped indefni indefinitely.
Ambassador Maxwell Taylor considered the airstrikes against
North Viet Nam as a "moreale-booster" for the Americans and South Vietnamese.
It has has also caused Hanoi and Peking to stopbaze.chinatöem re-evaluate
their "paper tiger" slogans and their assessment that America would not
act during these pre-election months. For the Viet Cong guerrillas in south
View Nam, the North Vietnamese incidents forced the Viet Cong guerrillas
in South Vietnam into a temporary lull of activity, presumably until thin
newer instructions are issued. But reliable sources here predict the
lull will be only temeroary temporary and the guerrillas will once again
launch intensive and extensive military operations as they did were doing
only weeks before the Tonkin incidents. Military sources here are
exceptionally watchful of the increased numbers of North Vietnamese
troops in the provinces south of the 17th parallel dividing the Communist
North from anti-Communist South.
xx-more-
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deepe
time--3
Most significant, internally, the Tonkin incidents and bombing of
North Viet Nam created the pudo psu pseudo-crisis atmosphere in Saiong
Saigon which gave Premier-Gen. Khanh the moment, the meens and the
Justification to launch what he describes as "ow "my own coup."
of his coup is already underway!/////
Phase I
-the gradual militarization
of his government. Phane II is upcoming within the next ten days-a
government reshuffle in which he will become not only Pre remain not only
B Premier but will become chief of state.
Gen. Khanh launched his Phase I of his coup two days after the
bombing of North Viet Nam by clamping on a state of emergency, authorizing
more restrictions on civilian life in Saigon,. While the Viet Nam had
been in a "state of em-erm emergency" by declaration of former President
Ngo Dinh Diem since 1961, Khanh's hergency announcement put declaration
was backed by strong measures of implementation, especially in Saigon.
last week, in an unprecedented move, he pinned a fourth star on his Gen.
Tran The Thien Khiem, minister and de minister of defense and Commander in
39-YEAR-O
Chief of all Armed Forces, This gave Khiem one higher rank than either Khanh
himself or Chief of State Gen. Duong Van Minh possesses.
Then
"The Generals KH is a common term which Khanh uses once used to
describe himself and Gen. Khiem, a term which labelled attached to the
two-some in 1957 when both were field commanders in the battle-fiddon
Mekong Delta area.
They were In their early twenties, they were classmates
at the French-operated military academy. In pa st weeks, rumors in Saigon
speculated that Gen. Khiem would launch a coup d'etat to
It was Gen Khiem who planned and
executed the Jan. 30 coup in Saigon which slipped Khan moved Khanh from a o mané vr
in the northern novinces to premier in Saigon.
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Deepe
time-4
iNDicated
In recent weeks, rumors in Saigon speculated that Gen. Khiem,
at the instigation of the Dai Viet political party, would launch a coup
REPEATED
to unseat & Khanh, Khanh's own security advisors freqhe frequently
asked the Premier whether or not Khiem could be trusted. "Aaby "Always
the reply was Gen, Khiem is my very good friend," according to one of
Khanh's security officials.
In the upcoming Phase II of Khanh's coup, Gan. Khiem would
Ministe
Dissident
A remain commander-in-chief Armed Forces and Minister of Defense, but
would certa also have an increase in actual reis reins of power.
Generals whom The generals that Khion overthrew in the Jan. 30 coup-five of
them exiled in mountain resort city of Dalat--would undoubtedly may be
exiled from the country.
Chief of State Gen. Minh, who sparked headed
the first military junta, but has refused to cooperate with the Khanh government,
may also be sent abroad. The toothless Gen. Minh, who enjoys immense popular
support, but has detracted from the cohesiveness needed by Khanh
to maintain a stable government.
Amportance of the
The powerful, though fragmented Dai Viet (Greater Viet Nam) political
perty, who supported Khanh-Khiom in the Jan. 30 coup and then thought they
if not crushed,
could seize the reins of power, will almost certainly be diminished in the
now government,
iimmam Much of the resentment between civilian and
military concepts of how to governs the country and prosecute the war
had in the past been formented by the Dai Viet party, as well as lesser
important political parties.
If the Tonkin incidents and attacks on North Viet Nam have given
the Khanh government "a brief respite," as one diplomat cabinem explained
they have hardly eased the pressures of problems within the country.
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deepe
time-5
VIETNA
The internal problems consit constitute a war within a war.
*
A favorite pastime in Saigon is to count the number of wars going on here.
One visitor, who was in-country six weeks, drew up a list of twelvel
separate wars. Gen. Khanh himself immediate ticks off casually ticks
off five wars.... the Buddhist-Catholic conflict, the labor-management
problems, differences between various political parties, difficulties
with students and regional prejuidices between persons from the Cmx
Center, South, Center and Northern sections of Viet Nam.
While, on the one hand, Khanh faces a military war against
the Viet Cong guerrillas on the one hand, observers here believe that
the Communist political subversion is partly responsible for the
unrest within the urban centers, the Con. Khanh himself admits that
Communist agents are infiltrating not only the national army but his
own government,
"The Communists are at our door and the door is open," one
Vietnamese officer explained.
"But we're too busy fighting inside the
house. We must atthemen unite to fight the Communists
and settle our differences later."
May BE
He pondered a minute and added, "But maybe then the Communists
are inside our house too. We must be more olever."
-30-
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deepe
time-6
insert to page four after para four x x x political parties.
The "Khanh coup" indicates a reversal for American Ambassador
Taylor, who came to Viet Nam early in July with the policy to increase
the political prestige and power of Gen. Minh, who was his tennis playing
Khanh and Khiem rebelled and
ak partner on frequent visits to Saigon.
SeTw
S
proceeded to convince the American officialdom here to reverse themselves.
Two weeks later ex Ambassador Taylor reversed his policy and told Khanh
on a field trip "nous restons ensemble jusqu'a la mort." (We remain together
until death.)
-30-
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Date
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1964, Aug. 13
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Subject
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Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Tactics; Strategy; United States. Armed Forces; Vietnam (Republic). Quân lực
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Location
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Saigon, South Vietnam
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Coordinates
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10.8231; 106.6311
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Size
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20 x 26 cm
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Container
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B3, F7
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Format
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dispatches
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Collection Number
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MS 363
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Collection Title
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Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
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Creator
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Collector
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Keever, Beverly Deepe
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Copyright Information
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These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
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Publisher
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Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
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Language
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English
