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derivative filename/jpeg
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363-07969 to 363-07989.pdf
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Digital Object Identifier
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363-07969 to 363-07989
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Title
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Article about the military, political, and diplomatic situation in South Vietnam
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Description
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Original title: "Vietnam", Keever's title: "Military Improvement but can U.S. win with Diem?", Article draft with a detailed look at the military, political, and diplomatic situation in South Vietnam, for Newsweek Magazine
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Transcript
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Beverly Beepe
Saigon
Vietnam-1
Two years ago this month, General Maxwell Davenport Taylor
arrived in Viet Nam to view a war that was being lost.
All of Southeast
Asia was in turmoil. Nine months before, a young captain named Kong Le
had seized Laotian capital of Vientiane, then fled to strategio Plain of
Jars in coalition with pro-communist Pathet Lao,
In Cambodia, the
polioy of neutralism continued. In the Republic of South Viet Nam,
Communist guerrilla forces had for three years sapped the strength of
the government of President Ngo Dinh Diom.
Gen. Taylor returned to Washington and submitted a thick (nine-inches,
I think, but check Steinberg's story in Sept. 12x 1962 issue)
highly-classified report.
Taylor's report urged a massive U. S.
commitment to South Viet Nam to stop the march of Communism.
The effects
of that report and subsequent decision are what we see in Viet Nam today.
U.
Two months later (Dec. 61 and Jan. 62) and for months to come
mon, material and mon y pured in o the sanl small Vietnamese republic.
Mor)
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Deepe
At first, disorganisation reigned. American signal sergeants were
sent to the provinces, but their signal equipment did not arrive for wocks.
An American à captain was sent to advise a battalion, but his counterpart
did not speak English and the American spoke no French, the second language
of Viet Nam. Men were bedded in tents, but sometimes their was a shortage
of tents and more often a shortage of beds. But summer of last year, however,
the bits of Jigsaw foll into place illustrating the notable administrative
and logistical enpail capabilities of the U. S. armed forces.
By June July there was a dramatic surge in the war effort against
the Viet Cong. It began to look more and more as though the war would not be
lost. However, the question remained whether it could be won.
Today, two years after the report, more than 15,000 U. . servicemen
are stationed in 150 locations throughout the country.-i. G.
therexixxx are
unit of U. S. troopers mix in each of 42 provinces. They
have been and are stationed in places French never visited. Z on the side
of material, all the necessary items needed to win the war are in the country.
Future shipments will replace only losses by attrition. (Source: col. in
charge of military assistance program here.)
(More)
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Deepe
Vietnem-3
Besides the million and half dollars a day spent in military
end economic assistance directly to government in of Vietnam, there is
considerable more money spent which is never calculated. The salaries
of U. s. servicemen are not included. The value of U. S. items here,
their maintenance and fuel is not calculated in this amount. For example,
in December, 1961, the two granddaddy helicopter units arrived
the 8th Helicopter Co. and the 57th Helicopter Co.--about 40 min H-21
troop carrying helicopters. There are now more than
helicopters
in the country including the swank "Cadillac of helicopters" the à turbojot
HU-13. The salaries of these their men--cooks, laundry boys, crewmembers
maintenance and administrative staffs are not included in $1.5 million a day.
Themenhold The H-21 troop carrying helicopters cost
about $200 en hour to operate and require 14 menhours of maintenance of all
kinds of EVERY hour the chopper is in the air. As an example of their
parts coste an H-21 has six rotar blades which propells and lifts the
aircraft through the air. These are constantly being hit or being damaged
when hit tree or pole in landing--and a set of these cost
11400.
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deope
vietnam-4
On the strictly military side of the picture the most notable
program is the training of Vietnamese-from reguler army units to
volunteer village militia which act as a local fire brigade against Viet Cong
incidents. The military joined with the civilian mit administrative channel
to institute a massive and impressive program of STRATEGIC HAMLET building.
Mixed between civilian and military also is the MONTAGNARD TRAINING program
in which the mall primitive ethnic groups are resettled in the strategic
highlands bordering Laos.
on the
(MY file through past year contains separate articles on
helicopter companies, on the U. 3. Som Special Forces training,
strategio henlet program. You might look through these if you're interested
in daxx detailed description, quotes and color.)
(Following is a statistio in and substantive description of the
training, the strategic hamlet program and the montagnard program.)
TRAINING.
At end of 1961, the armed forces of Viet Nam included seven
infran infantry divisions, some crack units of airborne, marine and special
presidential regiments, a handful of poorly trained and poorly equipped
village militis, a small airforce and navy. TODAY THERE ARE THE EQUIVALENT
OF SIXTY DIVISIONS IN THE COUNTRY. (SOURCE HARKINGS STATEMENT RECEIVED FROM
ANT INFORMATION OFFICER.) THERE ARE ENOUGH ARMS IN THE COUNTRY FOR MORE THAN
FIFTY DIVISIONS. (Also harkins statement received indirectly. In some
cases 2-3 mon are trained, but issued only one weapon.)
(Mere)
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deepe
vietnam-5
The Vietnamese total armed cum forces is a meandering, complex
organization with an inexact chain of commend. Satha The regular
army units are under army division and corps commanders, who theoretically
The
have supreme military authority in their areas. However, their are also
provincial units and looal militia (called Self-Defense Corps) who are
under the command of the province chief in each of the 42 provinces.
division commander is generally a lt. col. or col.; the province chief
is generally a major or lt. ool. However, in many cases the province chief
is
a close friend of the president with a direct telephone line to the palace.
If his military superior-a colonel say issues an order the province chief-
a major, for example-does not like, he simply calls the Palace. Military
tactics and strategy has nothing to do with the decision.
Division and corps commanders are also selected on political
loyalty to the President rather than their military talents. One striking
example is a "genuis" general (Australian military attache description),
maylanh. Dai Gon Tuong Voa Minh, olled wig linh" Son the military
assistant to President miem. He has no command authority and no troops.
The story was told about hims (told by Australian military attache to
me) "Minh sits in a big office in the Palace, behind a big desk, with three
big telephones on it. And where do the telephones lead? NOWHERE.".
(More)
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deepe
vietnam-6.
ARMY OF VIETNAM. Jan. 62, the Army of the Republic of Viet Nam (Called
ARVN), had only seven divisions. They were poorly trained by American
(strongth of ARVE
standards and equipped with old French weapons. Now there are nine divisions
all of them equipped with most modern American arms.
division is supposed to be 10,000, but most of them hit only 8,000).
In 1962, the best of the Army officers were pulled out of their divisions
to train the local militia. "1962 was a year of training; we've had to rob
rifles companies from the divisions...the foxhold or fighting strength of
the army was reduced as much as 50%. Yet ARVN intensified their operations
last year."
(Inof Informatively MMAG CHIEF GEN. TIMMES.) By the end of
this year,
the training phase will be passed; however, there will re-training
of AKVE unite-some of them have not been trained in three years).
CIVIL GMAX GUARD. These provincial units are similar to U. s.
National Guard; are given 12 weeks training by Vietnamese and by American
thon are issued fairly high-powered U. %, weapons of carbines,
.60 mm. mortars, automatic rifles and machineguns. They are issued the same
Theteniment One civil guard company
weapons as the the regular army.
advisors
is in assigned to each district in each province-they run (generally walk;
they are not issued trucks) to assist village militia when a village or
hamlet is attacked. There are now 425 civil guard rifle companies of
this totals about
130 men each that have been trained or are in training.
55,000 men. Their intensified training program will continue through 1963;
then taper off.
(1910)
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deape
vietnam-6
Civil Guardesmen operate only within their home province and are under
the command of the province chief.
SELF-DEFENSE COEPS.
The self-defense Corps-called Dan Ve in Vietnamese-are lowest
rung of the PAID armed force structure. They are the local fire brigades
a rice paddy farmer who is paid to protect his own village. They bear the
brunt of the night Viet Cong attacks and sots of terrorism. Their function
is to protect the outside of the hamlet by patrolling and not to sit inside
it until it is attacked. Sometimes they just sit inside heny anyhow; sometimes
they sleep when they ate are on guard duty.
There are now 2400 PLATOONS of Self Defense Corpon in a
Vietnam with about 38-men per platoon or more than 90,000 total. They are
paid 900 pinstres for fighting man (mix slightly higher for commanding
officer) or about US$12 a month.
often wear no shoes.
FOLUNTEER MINUTEMEN.
Tehy weer black uniforms like peasants and
In the strategio hamlets that dot the countryside, platoons of
volunteers rice paddy farmers and village shopkeepers-are given brief
training and then issued weapons. they are assigned to protect their
own village for 8-10 hour periods; then he returns to rice farming and
another villeger takes over. These small forces are sometimes overwhelmed
by larger Viet Cong attacks and they surrender-sometimes without fighting.
Sometimes the Viet Cong launch the attacks only to get weapons;
their most
recent trick is to kill the minutemen who fire at them, judging by the used
cartridges in the foxholes. Minutemen who here no empy cartridges in their
foxholes are made Viet Cong heroess
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_0000
Vietnam -7
MONTAGNARDS TRAINING.
The Annamite chain of mountains---actually overgrown hills-meandere
down through North Viet Nam, Laos and into northern half of South Viet Nam.
Fri. 8ft paths, elephant trails and am a primitive road
network, which serves as a main Communist infiltration route called the
Some observers believe that whichever side controls the plateau
controls Fiat South Viet Nam. However, others point out that Diem could
win over and hold the plateau, but still lose the war for the war
is being fought among and by the Vietnamese people.
Inhabiting the plateau in small grass and mud huts and in wooden
longhouses are not the Vietnamese, but a smell/a varied non-Vietnamese
ethnic group generally called the Montagnards.
They are actually a series
of tribes and not a unified group. There m has been a long standing
hatred between the Montagnards and the Vietnamese. The Vietnamese call
them "Hoi", meaning savages.
The Montagnards are really Stone Age people of the most primitive
lot. They are animists-never thought much of Buddhism, the French missionaries
converted some of them th Catholicism. When a village has dysentery epidemio,
it sacrifices a pig or water buffalo to the spirits. When a black crow
flies overhead revealing certain bad omens, the entire village refuses
to plant rice that day. They are so primitive that in late 1800's a
French expedition took coupe of them to France to put in a 200.
Their supersitutions superstitions serve as problem in the war effort
in some cases.
(More)
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vietnam-8
The Montagnards disliked the Vietnamese whatever their political
philosophy, neither of which they understood. The American Specifi
Special Forces teams training and equipping them had to find peculiar
appeals that would make them fight. In one case, it happened to be
the grandfather's sould of the 2 village that inhabited a hollow tree.
If anyone touched that tree, the tribesmen fought. Hence, the pitch
was to protect the tree and not fight the Communists. (scurce informative
is Col. Layton who was formerly in charge of Special Forces work. They
* found out about the sacred hollow tree when they wanted to cut it down
to build an airstrip.)
In another case, a USCM representative wanted to distribute
fertilizer to the villagers to improve their crops. No, they said. It
disturbed the natural processes of the earth and the gods would be angry.
So the Uscit man rented the land from the villagers who fertilized, cultivated
it and later harvested much improved crops. The Gods were angry at USC,
but not the villagers--who got better corn and rice.
There are an estimated 680,000 Montagnards in the plateau. (This
is based on U. S. Special Forces - surveys, Original estimates ran
as high as 900,000.) of these 6x 680,000 £ 400,000 are under the
control of the government of Viet Nam; and of those # 400,000, 200,000
have been moved from their scattered villages into strategic hemlets, defended
villages and resettlement areas.
(More)
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deepe
vietnam-90
About 50,000 of these have been train d to fight and 2/3 of this
number have been given arms. (Since defenders operate in shifts, one weapon
can serve couple of soldiers). They also have been armed with good
weapons some old French stuff, but max also U. S. carbines, and submachineguns.
Now the problem with the Mongtagnard program is that it is and was
an an almost wholly American affair. An American x 12-man Specialf
Forces "A" team went into these villages, gave villagers medical care,
their kids soap and candy, and generally won their support. But when the
Amerionn teams turn project over to the Vietnamese, trouble happens.
(The American teeme operated with the approval of the Vietnamese government
end a figurehend Vietnamese was in charge of each base location, called
detachment, but the Americans did everything from stringing the barbed
wire fences to doing the actual training.)
The Montagnards first loyalty was to the specific members of
Special Forces ten-generally the captain who headed the team, but also
the sergeant who served as medio. When that captain or sergeant was
transferred home six months later, the loyalty of tribemen became watered
down, but was still to the Americans.
Now, as the Americans have trained and equipped one area, they
move on, but the Vietnamese provincial authorities don't move in fast enough
with medical care, with continued contact with the people end with the
same enthusiastic enthusiame as the Americans. The result is the Montagnards
won't fight-or minia
Viet Cong when they attack.
just turn in their weapons to the
(1990)
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doope
vietnam-10
The American Special Forces test project was with the Rhade tribe
in an area called Buon ma Enso. From one village they expanded to a
complex of more than fifty villages encircling it. Couple of months ago
the American influence waned an Americans decreased their numbers. And
couple of months ago, the Viet Cong attacked five villages in the area.
Four of the villages were overrun without a fight. The fifth held. But the
Viet Cong captured 97 weapons, one third of them being a lethal machineguns.
Their is also the problem--especially when one-third of the Montagnard
population has been resettled of getting good intelligence information as to
which are Viet Cong, which are Viet Cong sympathisers. Some of the Vietcong
Montagnards in the government villages-undoubtedly with government weapons-
are known to be Viet Cong.
These am
amm examples are not
rampant at this point-but they are problems which are being investigated
and measures taken to prevent them.
Now, with this massive, impressive and in general highly successful
Montagnard training program, what has happened to Communistinfiltration
across the border?
It's a hard question to get accuracte information on because the
intelligence people x here are not about to tell us. However, one highly
reliable source (Informatively, Ausg an Australian colonel on Harkins staff)
ssid that 500 hardcore well trained Viet Cong come over each moth. month.
This is equivalent to a Viet Cong battalion entering each month-or more than
a division a year.
(More)
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vietnam-11
Other sources (Information officers) say the border is fairly
xact voll sealed off to prevent people coming in but material is still
crossing some way--they haven't yet figured out in what way. (ther
sources (different information officer) says that individuals still
coming across, but not in organised, identifiable units as they wore last
year.
But it seems unlikely that the border will ever be completely sealed
and it is a question of how effectively the government can impair
Viet Cong movement.
STRATEGIC HAMLET PROGRAM.
The strategic hamlet concept could be described as a series of forts
being pushed by American settlers into Indian terirety territory during 1800s.
(This is an airtight analogy, but might help to expel explain them.) They
are for villages fortified with bamboo fences, poisonous plants and som
monts lined with bamboo spikes. But more important than this external
defensive devices are that people within the hemlets are selected to be
trained to defend that village, issues carbines to help them do it. The
strategic hamlet also serves as a funnel to bring US aid--medical kits,
schools water wells, etc.--to the people.
Statistics: There are now 8,200 strategic hamlets completed and
another 1,200 under construction for total of 9,400. U. s. has approved a
total of 10,500 throughout the country to be completed next summer. But the
figure may well run over 11,200 by the time they are finished.
(More)
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vietnam-123
The 8,200 completed strategic hamlets represent 76 of the rural
population.
When the 10,500 are completed 90% of the rural population
will be in strategic hamlets. The rural population is 12.6 million of the
total 14.2 million in Vietnam.
U. S. #35 million huminan
brian OUT OF MILITARY
SSISTANCE PROGRAM funds have been alloted to build the 10,500 hamlets.
This does not include more than 850 million from USAID funds, and alot of
Vietnamese budget funds (part of them based on US counterpart funds).
The strategic hamlet has been described as "Brother Nhu's baby,"
the brainchild of the brother of President Diem, Mr. Ngo Dinh Nhu. He
analyzed it, compared Vietnem problem to that in Malays, conceived the
idea in September, 1961. The stratogio hamlet program was launched by
President Diem in Feb. 62) (Most of this information based on interview with
MAAG Strategio Hamlet colonel, USADD counterinsurgency assistant, Mr.
Thompson of British Advisory Mission who advises Diem on strategic hamlets).
of the 10,500 hamlets when completed next year, 3500 will be
"A Zones" areas mostly under government control; 4000 will be in
"B Zones"-arens contested by government and Viet Congs about 3000
will be in "C Zones'-areas of VC control,
STRATEGIC HAMLET PROBLEMS.
L. The problem of strategic hamlets in the Mekong Delta will be
discussed on section on IV Corps.
2. I've mentioned the problem of VC infiltration into strategie hamlets
in the Montagnard section. This is also true in Vietnamese strategic hamlets.
(More)
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At the beginning of fun this year, the Viet Cong Inunched
the strategy which they called "attack from the outsides infiltrate the
inside" as their anti-strategic homlot compaign. The degree that they've
infiltrated in not really know, but it is definitely going on. In the
government strategic hamlets, officials make up a gene of the village
population, which incliuss a breakdom of how many of the villegers have
relatives either in North Vietnam or with the Viet Cong. One official
(assistant on rural affairs or counterinsurgency for USAID) estimated that
these figures would run from five percent to as high as thirty percent
of the population in each village.
only this month! there was a significant illustration of Viet Cong
influence in the villages. In one village only twenty five miles
from Saigon
AND JUST OFT THE EDGE OF FOUR LAND 666 MILLION DOLLAR
US BUILT HIGHWAY the Viet Cong in broad daylight (very unusual; most of their
attacks are at night) rode up in
logging trucks and
Lembrotta
"And the village guards handed the Viet Cong their
motor schooters,
one official explained. (source
weapons as they drove in the gate,"
10 MAAG Strategic hamlet man). The government lost
13
weapons.
On
"I know that I've got a
In one province--Kion Hon, a Vist Cong contest area with Viet Cong
in the Mekong Delta- Viet Cong incidents which includes
kidnapping, propaganda loour lectures,
as well as armed attack-occured in
41 strategic hamlets in ONE NICHT. The province has 203 completed strategic
hamlets completed. In short, in ONE NIGHT Viet Cong pressures were made in
20 percent of the province's hamlets.
(More)
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despe
vietnam-14.
One American corps adviser explaineds I know I've got Viet Cong
in every strategio hamlet in my corps (about 1/4 of the country). But
we'll win him over. Next year he won't be so hardcore and in two years
he'll be running for the National Assembly."
This is the point or the premise of the USAID program. Once the
village has been militarily cleared of VC units, then
strategio hmmlet is built, forces tanino-thon USAID comes in with their
"goodies" (As the British call them) to try to win win--i. c. to buy
the support of the people. "They play Santa Claus with fertilizer and baby
pigs and now sweet potatoes," one official explained.
In some strategio hamlets in Viet Cong stronghold areas, the governmen
is actually "babysitting" for the Viet Cong-i. e. the wive and kids get
government schooling, government rice, goverment medical care--but daddy
reusins on the outside fighting for the Viet Cong.
Thoxnin ultimate-que-tion is whether
One question iswhether these people can be won to the government
side, as the corps nov adviser was confident of. Some Vietnamese think not.
One Vietnamese government official maids The Viot A Viet Cong is a Viet Congs
he'll take your money and still be a Viet Cong.
A deputy to the National Assembly told of how he attempted to win
support of people in his constitute constituency by distributing surplus
food, old clothes, & candy eto. "But the people take the stuff, but still
won't support the government. I'm sick of the whole mess."
(More)
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vietnam-15/
There is a significant and influential viewpoint (Mr. Thompson
of British Advisory Mission who advises Dien--informatively only) that
government must control the people, but not necessarily win their support.
He argues that if you give the people security--which is their most pressing
demand--they will make economic and personal sacrifices for it.
THE MEKONG MUDDLE
All the area of South of Saigon is loosely called the Mekong Delta,
but more specifically is the IV Corps area. Many people think that the
war will be won or lost here; certainly if the Delta is lost, then the wer
would not bo won.
There are really two geographic Vietnam--the plateau region of the
Montagnardo and the Delta region of the Vietnamese. A slender finger of
coastal plain leading north of saigon to the 17th parallel is another, but
small mren. It is in this coastal plain that the most intense feeling
on Buddhist affair arose and where four bonses and bonsesses burned themselves
alive.
The Mekong Delta is the most populous area of the country. Of the
12.6 rural population throughout the country, 5.8 million are in the delta.
It is the ricebowl of the country producing most of country's agricultural
necessities. It is a food surplus ares--which makes it difficult to deny
Viet Cong food there (unlike the mountainous areas of the country). It is of
course the area the Viet Cong want most and about half of their attacks
throughout the country are concentrated there.
(Mire)
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vietnam-7
In IV Corps alone, in May, June, July of last your, there were a
total of 288 Viet Cong attacks out of total of 647 Viet Cong incidents.
For May, June, July of this year there ware 314 attacks out of a total of
644 incidente. In short, during comparable period of the two years,
the Viet Cong incident rate is about the same, but the attack rate went upe
In the IV Corps area there are an estimated 50,000 Viet Cong of all
kind-hardcore, provincial guerrilles etc. Until last few weeks, there
were 80,000 government troops of all kinds-army, civil guard, selfdefense
corps and village militia. However, in last few weeks the 9th Infantry
Division has been moved into IV Corps to give it additional strength.
The IV Corps is definitely the toss arong Harkins said last week,
that in other I three corps the war was being won, but the difficulty was
in IV Corps. (SEB UPI interview).
The strategio hamlet program in the Delta has lagged for behind the
other areas. In northernmost I Cro Corps 80% of the strategio hm
hamlets are completed containing 80% of the population. In II Corps,
87% of the strategic haml to are completed containing mana
of the population. IN III Corps 80% of hamleta completed with
78% of population.
However, in IV Corps only 66% of the homlets are completed with
67% of the population in them.
Officials lay the blame on one reasons
inaga Gon. Thaynha
Van Cao, IV Commender. (Informatively ONLY MAAG Strategio hamlet colonel).
"Ceo loves to kill Viet Cong and does a good job at it--but he doesn't
like to build strategic hamlets."
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vietnam-18
Gen. Ono io Diom's fair-haired boy. During 1960 anti-Diom
coup, Cao's troops onme in from provinces and saved Diem.
But there are also other critical problems in the Delta. Many of
the strategic hamlets wander one-house doop along a cenal; the government
has simply strung a bamboo fence around it and called it a strategic hamlet,
although it's impossible to defend it. Some of the strategic hamlets
contain only 65 people, but 500 are needed to make it a self-sufficient
defensive area, In other cases, the province chief, under intense pressure
from Saigon to get his hamlets built, simply chalked up the hamlets zi
statistically without turning a spaceful of dirt.
Throughout the six country, but particularly in the delta, the most
difficult job is yet to come. For the strategic hamlet was started from
most secure government areas and slowly edged into the "C Zones" held by
the Viet Cong. The most important tack now lies in abongo moving
headlong into Viet Cong areas. As the Viet Cong are more consistently
denied contact with the people from whom they obtain food, information
and taxes, the fighting will grow fiercer and government casualties are
expected to increase at a higher rate than they now are. In other words,
it will cost the government more in lives to kill or capture one Viet Cong
than it formorly did.
Significantly, October is the peak flood period of IV Corps, which
gives the Viet Cong maximum amphipham mobility via sempan. expectations
are for fierce fighting in the next couple of months in IV Corps.
(More)
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19
THE ELUSIVE EY
Now let's turn from the admittedly impressive and energetic programs
on the government side of the ledger, to the Viet Cong side. Dospitos
impressive government programs, the Viet Cong have not really been considerably
hampered.
In Embux Jan. 61, the official American estiment estimate was
18,000 hardcore Viet Cong in organized units. Today the estimate is
about 25,000 by the Americans; 31,000 is the Vietnamese Joint General
Staff estimato used by Time magazine. However, this does NOT necessarily
reflect a decided increase in Viet Cong strength within the country, but
indicates more probably more efficient and refined intelligence methods
in detecting Viet Cong.
Americans estimate there are 60,000 to 80,000 other Viet Cong
guerrillas andpart-time fighters besides the hardcore xx units. Other
estimates run as high as 300,000 Viet Cong guerrilla forces.
Despite the trickiness of using these statistion above, it in
known that Viet Cong casualties last year were 30,000 (killed, wounded
captured) and 14,000 the first six months of this year. YET THE VIET CONG
HAVE NOTEPTROT BE APPRECIABLY AFFECTED...AND ESTIMATES OF THEIR STRENGTH
CONTINUE TO RISE.
Military strength of the Viet Cong arises from two sourcess
infiltration
from the North and local recruitment. Diem's government would have us believe
that the Viet Cong are principally Communist invaders from the North. Their
leadership is; no are their political cadres (many of these are Southernors
who went North after Geneva Agreement, have been trained and are now returning
to their home areas). However, the actual support of the Viet Cong is
homegrown. It is obvious for every Viet Cong killed they can recruit another
one from the rice paddies.
(More)
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It is known that the Viet Cong are now recruiting like mad in the
IV Corps that their propaganda on the Buddhist question penetrated
areas in I and II Corps that had normally been quiet.
It is also significant that the IV where the main Viet Cong strength
is concentrated is furtherent from the infiltration route leading in from
the North.
To the Viet Cong, then, manpower is cheep; for every man killed
another can be found to take his place —and not always by impressment as
the government says. To the Viet Cong a weapons is more important then a men--
many times Viet Cong might attack in large group, but only small number of
then ere armed--the others have to capture their own weapons.
significantly, Communist bloc countries supply only 2 of the Viet Cong
arms. (This is based on samply a representative group of captured Viet Cong
weapon-done by MACVO, The remainder of their stock, according
to sample, is 30, American, 19 homemade and 50% French hand-me-downs.
Obviously, the best supplier of new Viet Cong material in the Americans
and not the Chinese or Russians.
An importent trend in the last few months has been fact that Viet Cong
are capturing about as many worpons as they are xx losing (last week the Viet Cong
got more then twice as many as they lost). And the government is capturing
old French stuff from then while Viet Cong are getting his highpowered
machineguns, mortars, automatio rifles and carbines.
The big question of the Buddhist-student-political situation iss
will the already easy task of x VietCong recruitment be made much easier;
vil hele
met plats in the
vile enth
the populace refuse to cooperate or pacif passively resist the goverment
--------------------
- Page 21
--------------------
deope
vietnam-21
Nobody really knows yet; it's doubtful that even McNamara can figure
it out. It will perhaps take time to determine it.
Many American advisors argue that a government troops
gan should be able to fight as well as the Viet Cong--but they aren't.
This argument is, however, like saying a railroad worker and a bank president
should fight equally well because they're both American. The Amerionn
rail worker will strike, go hunger, risk his life for featherbedding
clauses which the bank president thinks ridiculous.
The ultimate question
in Vietnam is whether the Viet Cong aren't willing toxitimax fight
forever for their cause; while the government trooper doesn't really
oare about his side.
The real question is a political one-on we win
with Diom.2
-
Date
-
1963, Sep. 1
-
Subject
-
Vietnam War, 1961-1975; Strategy; Vietnam (Republic)--Politics and government; Ngô, Äình Diệm, 1901-1963; United States. Armed Forces; Vietnam (Republic)--Relations--United States
-
Location
-
Saigon, South Vietnam
-
Coordinates
-
10.8231; 106.6311
-
Size
-
20 x 26 cm
-
Container
-
B2, F4
-
Format
-
dispatches
-
Collection Number
-
MS 363
-
Collection Title
-
Beverly Deepe Keever, Journalism Papers
-
Creator
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Collector
-
Keever, Beverly Deepe
-
Copyright Information
-
These images are for educational use only. To inquire about usage or publication, please contact Archives & Special Collections.
-
Publisher
-
Archives & Special Collections, University of Nebraska-Lincoln Libraries
-
Language
-
English
