

zcze sag

yy nmm

strategy 1 (normass/deepe)

(This is the first of a three-part series on Communist strategy for the remainder of 1968).

SAIGON, JULY 8—The Communist aim for the last half of 1968 is to end the Vietnam war—on their terms of victory.

For the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong, the eight-year-old Vietnam war has entered its most decisive phase, as they continue pressing for its ultimate pinnacling in military savagery and bloodshed, as well as internally expanding its scope to involve high-~~octane~~ octane political and economic ~~x~~ explosions.

Again, as during Tet, the Communists appear to be attempting to amalgamate their general (country-wide) military offensive with fresh moves at ~~spark~~ sparking a general political uprising.

—more reuter

SC20 sag

yy nrm

strategy 2 (normass/deepe)

The final phase of their 1968 short-range plan calls for the "liberation" of Saigon--the military occupation of the capital city and the political seizure of power from the constitutional government of President Nguyen Van Thieu. Allied intelligence sources report a ~~minimum~~ minimum of three and a maximum of five Communist offensives into Saigon can be expected by ~~the end~~ of the year in 1968 through the remainder of 1968; with perhaps the final wave expected to coincide with the American Presidential elections in November.

The short-range Communist objective: victory, although not one of the classical, ~~con~~ conventional-war mold. Unless the ~~Ameri~~ American dl delegation in Paris ~~concedes~~ to Communist ^{CONFEDS} their demands, the Communist plan for victory is to be secured on the many-faceted battlefield of South Vietnam, and then formally ratified at the conference table. The Communist plan call does not call for "total victory", which would mean militarily defeating the one-million-plus ~~Allied troop~~ ^{PLUS - m} one-million-man Allied troop force. It speaks of "decisive victory," involving enter inter-meshing political, economic and military actions during ^{POSTAL} critical time-phases.

--more router

2020 sag

yy nm

strategy³/2 (normass/deepe)

Informed sources have reached these conclusions after ~~stud~~ studying secret Communist documents from the Viet Cong High Command to its subordinate units and interrogation of high-ranking Communist prisoners of war and defectors to the Vietnamese government.

One captured document issued to the "command committees of all u subordinate units," and recently released to the Western press here by the American Mission, urged:

"Particularly emphasize the fact that whether the war ends or not depends on the military might of ~~our~~ our armed forces and not on discussions at the conference ~~gabl~~ table. This (conference) is but a minor part of our diplomatic activity, which itself is but one aspect of our political struggle. Therefore we do not view this conference as being of basic or principal importance (~~according to the contents of the~~ complementary political reorientation in 1967)."

--more reuter

2020 sag

yy nmm

strategy 4 (normass/deepe)

The two pivotal questions on which the Vietnam war here¹ hinges through the remainder of 1968 are: will the Communists actually be in a military position or politically choose to implement their ambitious plan, and second, if so, will they ~~succed~~ succeed or fail either on the military battlefield or in the psychological-political arena? If they ~~succed~~ succeed, the Vietnam war will end in something of close to a defeat for the Allies; COMMUNISTS If they fail, ~~the~~ in their victory" plan, they are maintaining the option of remaining flexible enough to carry on and "expanded and prolonged war", timewise, beginning in 1969, and geography-wise, into Cambodia, Laos and possibly Thailand.

--more reuter

2020: sag

yy mmm

strategy 5 (normass/deepe)

In one captured ~~of~~ document, the Viet Cong High Command has~~or~~ ordered its troop commanders to "consolidate and develop armed and political forces in the rear to gain more continuous and solid victories...with a spirit of urgency, while, at the same time, being prepared flexibly to face the expanded and prolonged war...."

With some urgency, the document calls for political upheavals, assassinations of leading anti-Communist government leaders, economic chaos, AND REVOLTS BY THE desertions of/Vietnamese gover government soldiers and cadre, S. integration crumbling of the Vietnamese government administration, as well as sustained military attacks.

--more router

2020

2020 sag

yy mm

strategy 6 (normass/deepe)

The captured document relates:

"According to the instructions of the military and political headquarters of COSVN (the Viet Cong high command), we must mobilize the whole P (Communist) Party and the wyo whole people so that the whole country will be determined to consolidate what has been won and to develop it and to urgently repair shortcomings in order to continuously attack the enemy and to motivate the people to uprising to take over the government. They have to put all their efforts to wear out and destroy as much as possible the American and puppet (South Vietnamese) living forces as well as their equipment, to maintain and develop the activity within Saigon and other enviroining cities, to control all the strategic traffic roads and waterways leading into the city and to build up the big rear in all facets...."

—more reuter

2020 sag

yy mm

strategy 7 (normass/deepe)

Clearly, the captured document unveils Saigon as the eye of the turbulent ~~atery~~ storm.

"We ~~must~~ b should be determined to hang on and fight very violently and continuously in all directions of the compass around Saigon," the document continues, "inside as well as outside the city and while being closely ~~in~~ knitted with the people's uprising to create the revolt among the ~~pac~~ puppet troops, to carry the economic struggle in order to first wear out and then exterminate or disintegrate one part after another of the puppet troops and the puppet government infrastructure, their defense system, and to annihilate the biggest enemy leaders and central nerve headquarters, in order to make the enemy more paralyzed every day.

The plan outlined in the captured document ~~st~~ states, "These above-mentioned actions will create the opportune time for us to move forward and to end the war. If we have ~~on-man~~ one man left, we have to continue the fighting...l(The soldiers) should fight against t the ideologicall attitude of peace, of waiting for negotiations....The more we have the diplomatic struggle, the stronger we must fight...."

The plan in the captured document clearly maintains that the "diet dien"—the final period of the Vietnam story—is to be written in Saigon.

Tomorrow: The Battle for Saigon.

--ond router