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people 1 (normass/deepe)

(This is the first of a three-part series on the multi-faceted war in South Vietnam, as Washington-Hanoi peace talks begin).

talks on Vietnam, the Communists at the rice-roots level continue to fuel up their people's war.

molding, sh twisting, bending the suburbanite and peasan rural peasantry peasantry to carry forward their war to a more bloody and bloodier andf fiercer dimension.

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people 2 (normass/deepe)

A two-line Vietnamese Communist jungle is herry racing like a flash-fire through the population in the provinces outside of Saigon; the English translation of the jingle is: "Blood will flow in May. Peace will come in June."

"The third phase of the war will come soon and the people should be ready for it," the Communists are reportedly telling the Vietnamese peasants and i suburbanites in Gia Dinh province, the donut-shaped province surrounding Saigon.

"This Tet offensive is a six-month campaign in 1968," the Communists are reportedly saying. "These six months of continuous offensive is to prepare for the future revolutionary government by the people."

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people 3 (normass/deepe)

Reliable sources indicate the Communists are telling the Vietnamese population in Gia Dinh that the first phase of the Tet offensive was the physical attacks upong the cities beginning in late January; the second phase of rocketing and shelling installations has now passed; March is t was the month of I preparation for the third phase—and now the third phase, without descript description of the form it would take, is soon to be begin.

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people 4 (normass/deepe)

These developments appear to be a Vietnamese enactment of Mac Tse Tung's dictum that "political power comes out of the barrel of a gun." Si And, significantly, since the Tet offensive the Communists have moved and maintained their guns closer to Saigon and other urban centers without returning to their frontier base areas. reliable sources report. The Western standard Western observation that "the Saigon government does not have the support of the people," already appears ap passe, as the goternmen government at the rice-roots level is either accomodating. In in exile because of increased Communist military pressure, or is accommodating with the Communists in a sort of state of co-existence. or else has been outright executed strong hard-line anti-Communist officials have been executed outright. Reliabel Reliable sources report the Communists are attempt attempting t-with some success-to chop6 off the Vietnamese government's organization and officialdom at the rie rice roots level, and then bending incomminately mentionen setting up its own administrative machine to bend the will of the populationto suit their purposes.

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people 5 (normass/deepe)

In other cases where the local Vietnamese government officials still administer the edicts of Saigon, the population appears to get caught in a corrs crossfire of between contradictary instructions from the government on the one side and the Communists on the other.

One example current example is reported by reliable sources
to involve the cutting of palm trees around canals and streamlets, and
clearing out the brush, where the Communists often seek cover. Recently,
local government officials in Gia Dinh pro i province ordered the population
to clear out these vegetated areas, since these areas could not be
defoliated; the Communists countered this orde by ordering the
people not do it saying "we'll shoot anyone who dares to cut and clear
this area—and in particular do not touch the nipa palm trees because
we have our men in their and there and they'll shoot you," reliable
sources report.

In Gia Dinh and other provinces, all dogs in the villages have

been ordered to be killed, to forestall the possibility they will bark
at strengers passing through the area—the Communist troopers—passing
through the area. This practice was also emppl ordered by the Viet Minh
during the French Indo-China War more than a decade ago.

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people 6 (normass/deepe)

For weeks, the population w in Gian wa Dinh was also caught in another squed squeeze play in what amounted to a low-level rice battle between the government and the Communists. The Communists had forbidden the population to seel the sell their rice unmilled rice padi to the government, and the government had forbidden of the people to vimil the un raw padi, which would make it edible not only for themselves, but also for the Communist troops. The Communists pushed the population and the rice millers to protest against the government, saying their lives were being disrupted. But. the Communists lost this round and then reportedly ordered the p various familyl to construct individual rice grinders from hardened clay slabs enclosed in rattan siding. Evidently, this did not work; in early April, the Communists advised to sell the peasants to sell their padi for the government, since there was not shortage of rice in the cities because of the American import program. However, the peasants were specifically forbidden to sell any other produce any other produce into the cities their chickens, pigs, e vegetables, in order to strangle economically the government-held areas. And to multifux placate the worried peasants, the Communists promised them that when the Communists attacked the goternme goternment eres ag again, they would capture the American rice warehouses and distribute the rice free to the people-a feat they a performed in the Chinese-held section

of Saigon During the tet AHAcks.

yy ljp
people 1 7 (normass/deepe)

In the other cases, however, the Communist policy and the government's execution of its own program a programs are not in direct conflict-in fact, they rather compliment each other. For example. on the question of trenchlines besides dug by each family near their homes. The government has ordered the people not to dig trenches in Gia Dinh, knowing it indicates the government has failed to provide adqua adequate security-but the local officials, knowing the population is afraid, is lenient in letting them dig shallow trenches. The Communists have then through propaganda and word-of-w word-of-mouth messages. begun a sort of civil defense course, advising the people to dig zigzag trenches, or L-shaped, or cross-shaped ones, which offer better protection. Still following the government's within the government's allowances for shallow trenches, the Communists have then advised the peansa peasants to stock pile banana tree logs, mud and water nearby so that when fighting breaks out. they can quickly build siding and a roof above the shallow trenche. Communists have also advised the people that they should watch for smoke grenades. which signal American fighte bombing strikes, and run for their holes then-other wise they should not worry too much about American bombing and helicopter gunships.

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people 7 (normass/deepe)

Communist monthly and annual production taxes in Gian

Dinh province have also reportedly jumped jumped in some villages from
fifty to seventy per cent since Tet on their surplus of goods after the

In pre-communist-held or contest areas of Gia Dinh, Communist a cadre have begun call, calling on the family stof government soldiers and officials, persuading or ordering them to have their relatives working for the government "cff" come back he home within ten days or you will be punished." The punishment form of punishment was not described, reliable sources report, and some leeway was given for explanations if the family failed to carry out the order.

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people 4 (normass/deepe)

However, "American are agents spying on the people"—the revolutionary development cadre, provincial reconnaissance units and census grievance team members—are to be "shot without discussion", the Communists have stated, according to reliable sources; and as a consequence, some of these operating even in provincial towns have begun sleeping in a different house each night. In some of the poorly-defended division headquarters cities, also, government civil servents, still shook up after the Tet attack and informed of Communist orders, are also known to / phide out at night in different homes.

In Gia Dinh, families of hamlet and village officials have been told by the Communists that their relatives should resign from their government post and our return home; Tif not the official will be killed; Tif he does, he will be granted a "guarantee of safety" by the Communists without any discussion of his past activities for the government, or "his crimes against the people." As a consequence, an estimated seventy per cent of the government's hamlet and village officials are considered "operating in exile," refusing to live in their assigned particularly at night; some return to te their assigned areas during the day; Some have set up their village office several thom miles away in the district headquarters, sources report.

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people (normass/deepe)

wherever possible in Cia Dinh, the Communists established six months before the Tet offensive a people-perti portering system, with very precise organization and regulations. Since Tet, mouth-to-mouth propaganda, as well as Radio Hanoi and Liberation Radio have praised the people who acted as porters during the p their country-wideroffensive.

The Communists have ordered that any family with five or more persons—men or women or children—between the ages 15 to 50 should make available two persons each as night that the cadre asks for porter help. Any family with four persons or fewer in the same age grouping should contribute the services of one member of the family.

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people 10 (normass/deepe)

These men, women, or of children's have been instructed to be in their homes following the 6 p.m. curfew, and are to be on call, at the cre u when requested by the cad village cadre, to work in six hour shifts, the either from 6 p.m. to midnight or from midnight to 6 a.m. For security reasons, these people-porter crews are if guided by a limited agent and are not teld where they would go; after carrying the supplies for six hours, another relay force picks them up and leapfrogs them on a progresses towards the destination, giving the Communists a tight security.

Villagers a have been specifically ordered that they can not hire anyone to stand in for them; "you must do this yourself to contribute to the revolutionary cause." reliable sources report.

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people II (normess/deepe)

In organizing this people-porti pore portering system, the Communists have reportedly led laid out very precise regulations.

For example, women are given lighter leads—generall a 22-pound case of ammunition. Men, whether 15 or 50, are instructed instructed to carry roughly 50-pound leads—four AK-47's or AK-50's hidden under a stack of rice straw, carried on their bak backs. Or each person, man or woman, is assigned two .60 mm. morter rounds or B-40 rocket rounds. Heavier and longer 122 mm. rocket shells are carried by two persons per shell.

These portering crews, maximum of 50 persons per crew, have been instructed to wear black japs pajems thetra traditional black-pajams costume and to walk along the top of a dike near the foliage covera covering in the area. If they hear American fighter aircraft or helicopter ben gunships, or if they become illimi illuminated with American high-powered flares, the porters are ordered to drop down on that top of the dike, and form a single line to melt into the lines ge configuration of the Ki dikes.

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people 12 (normass/deepe)

"If by chance an aff airplane swoops down and just starts shooting at you, just take it," the Communists have reportedly told the villagers.

"No one is to move; no one is to break the line. Even if you're hit, don't break the line. If you do, you can ben punished."

(Hank: I had intended to query you about this three-part series on the operation piece, but the military didn't release this operation until today. It was supposed to be released Monday, I-meant. Anyhow, I've tried to put in a series the three major components of the situation here, since we can't cover negotiations. Next piece will be on Communist military strategy countrywide, based on my weekend interviews, which I mentioned in my letter-memo to you. Third article, is Thieu and Vietnamese political side. But, these don't have to be run as a ser can be run separately, though I think the series gives more of a framework. I've gotten some high-level quotes on Khe Sanh, but am waiting for our weekly military briefing, which was supposed to be Tuesday, but now is Thursday. So, I'll file Khe Sanh interpretive Thursday, as well as se second article of sience series; with third article sent Truey or bled friday. Regards and some focus pieces over the weekend. Regards Bev).

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