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MIGH, OCTOBER 30-Worldwide speculation of an impending American bombing halt over North Vietnam and a subsequent "blits peace" began on Outober 12 16, then American Ambassador Ellsworth S. Bunker visited the South Vietnamene Independence Palace at six in the morning and was kept uniting by President Eguyen Van Thieu for forty-five minutes. Since that first conversation at such an undiplomatic hour, the two-some has met a total of ten times in fifteen days-thus indicating that thatever problems washington has in reaching agreement with Emei, it also has difficulties with its Allied government in Seigen.

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From that very first day, the South Vietnamese officialdom disagreed with the American Ambassador on accepting the three conditions from Hanoi in exchange for a bombing halt—and in subsequent meetings this disagreement has expanded into the proper status and roles of the South Vietnamese government's delegation and the National Liberation Front delegation in the post-bombing **Di** peace talks.

While the face-downs with Bunker have been conducted almost entirely with Thieu alone-the exceptions being several occasions in which he was joined by his flamboyant, hard-line Vice President, Nguyen Cao Ky, Thieu has received the unsained unanimous backing of the National Security Council. With Vice President Ky serving as the most vocal member, the other which Echo the U.EWS of Honerican Action, Theother members of the council and also presented hard-line views, The Council includes:

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Prime Minister Tran Van Huong, Chief of the Vietnamese Armed Forces Coneral Cao Van Vien, the Minister of Defense General Nguyen Van Vy, the Minister of Interior General Tran Thien Khiem, the Foreign Minister Tran Chanh Toman and the heads of the Vietnamese two-house legislature-Nguyen Van Huyen, president of the Senate and Nguyen Ba Luong, Speaker of the lower house. Subsequently, Thieu was further backed by a "show of force" vote for the government by the two house legislatures. No other bodies in the government-including the Cabinet-was Consulted as a proup, thus insuring an unusual degree of state secrecy.

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The objections of Thieu and the National Security Council on the first day were that the three conditions Hani Hanoi would reciprocate in exchange for halting the bombing were hallow concessions. Specifically, on restoration of the demilitarized zone an senarating North and South Vietnam- this was not repeat not a concession since Allied troops has had beaten back Communist thrusts across the line in a series of heavy encounters since the beginning of the year. Furthermore restoration of the DMZ, different mental which is a very narrow corridor only 40 miles. did not repeat not prevent Hanoi from shuttling down more men and supplies through their Laotian trails further west. On the accord dessation of attacks on South Vietnan's cities-this involved only artillery zet many and rocket attacks, which the Communists were militarily incapable of doing **t** effectively and which were politically detrimental to them. If the number of cities were expanded to include the 44 provincial capitals and 250 district capitals throughout the countryas well as cessation from any future ground attacks-then Henoi might be giving up something, it was argued, but not repeat not the present concession.

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The third so-called condition at from Hanoi of admitting the South Vietnamese government into the next phase of the peace talks was not repeant not a concession at all-since the South Vietnamese government was sovereign and legal and hence beyond to to its representation was beyond negotiation.

Another point of " immense controversy was Hanoi's counter-condition that the American and South Vietnamese government must sign a joint communique announcing the halting of the bombing-but this communique must mention the two governments agreed to an "unconditional" cessation; as Hanoi has consistently and officially a demanded. The South Vietnamese flatly refused this, wording, saying that if the American and outh different "unconditional" cessation, then it would prove Hanoi had won a major victory, that Hanoi had been right all along, that the Americans had been the aggressor and that the South Vietnamese were simply puppets of the Americans. This would set off a disasterous chain-reaction throughout South Vietnam; the government could not repeat not guarantee public order that the Vietnamese arm d forces would continue fighting, "I would give the Allies a black eye throughout Asia, if not repeat not the rest of the world.

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In subsequent meetings, discussion arose on the status and roles of the two Southern belligerents at the expanded peace talks in Paris. The South Vietnamese government had long held the 1 National Liberation Front could be represented as part of the Hanoi delegation; they government held to this position—but wanted additional assurances that the NLF would be in allowed to speak separately from the Hanoi delegation. The government could foresee the time then discussions of a ceasefire and arose and Hanoi would and nod to the NLF to answer. Seigon was opposed to the NLF talking se interventy independently from the Hanoi delegation, even if it was technically an integrated part of the Norm vietnamese delegation.

The more serious confrontation with the American Ambassador, however, centered on the Fore of the ant Allied delegation. Thieu announced—and thus far held to—his maximum bargaining position of a so-called "three-legged conference table." The south Vietnamese delegation would be sopr separate and independent with its own oh irman; the same for the Americans and the merged Hanoi-NLF delegation. The Americans officials pointed out to Thieu and Ky that this would unacceptable to Hanoi; that if the South Vietnamese government had a separate delegation, then the NLF would demand the same. As of the The delegation, this argument had not repeat not changed any minds in the upper-chambers of the Vietnamese government and the Thieu reportedly s held to his position.

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Because of governmental warnings and some iron-fisted moves of oroging er suspending Vietnamese-language newspapers, most at political groupings stuck to the government's line-or maintained a tougher one. "The hawk line is the safe line at the moment," one political figure said. But, there were notable executions and ato potentially significant exceptions on the left-wing side of the political spectrum. One was veiled editorials in the militant Buddhist publications that President Thieu should step aside and make room for others-presumably meaning General Duong Van Minh, who has also been making anti-government ar remarks to close associates. Also, a meeting of some 300 labor unionists at the in a pagoda of the militant Buddhist left called for a ceasefire and a lasting peace. And Tran Van Don, leader of the National Salvation Front and a close friend of General Minh concluded that if the bombing was halted -- then it could be assumed that Hanoi had an made cand concessions to Washington. But. Thieu Inc. was not repeat not willing to make such and assumption, and even so, he did not they did not repeat not like the concession supposed concess be los concessions Hanoi had yet to agree to make,

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