Deepe

Inserts to American Marine series.

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Insert article one of Marine series after page three:

Vietnam, which was a distinct possibility a year ago; the arrival of American combat units has forced the Viet Cong to de-escalate into guerrilla bands in the areas secured by the American troops; the American troops have upset the Viet Cong timetable by at least as much as a year—possibly more, and this has caused a upsurge in the optimism of official statements. However, the danger is much more subtle now..." of being politically sucked out of Vietnam, because of weariness with the war of attrition," as one counter-insurgency expert explained.

"The Viet Cong can't defeat the Marines or push them out of Vietnam," one reliable source explained. "But by small pricks of mosquito bites all over-by constant harrassment and knocking off small Marine patrols—they can kill the American political spirit to stay in Vietnam."

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A second key discrepancy also arose between the official versions and the battlefield versions on the discri description of the battle itself. Official briefings sought to pa portray the battle as "World War II, with helicopters added"—that the Marines had forced the Viet Cong to stand and fight a conventional set-piece battle.

Descriptions by ground commanders indicated, however, the Viet Cong had employed effectively against the Marines the classical mobile warfare tactics that lead the French forces to defeat and more than a decade ago.

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Consistently, throughout the operation, serious discrepancies arose on key points between the official statements and the eyewitness accounts

Marine Corps privates, sergeants and unit commanders and regimental officers on the battlefield revealed in two days of interviews by this correspondent.

of a Marine Corps spokesman that an amphibious tractor was lost and burned in the fot battle; both the Associated Press and the New York Herald Tribune had photographs of the burned-out vehicle contained two charred Marinehm bodies.

the Viet Cong dead had actually been confirmed by body count. The first official Marine Corps statement made after the first day of fighting was "we haven't had timoto sort it (Viet Cong casualties) out, but it will run in the hundreds." The next morning, Western correspondents at the regimental headquarters were told there were 552 Viet Cong confirmed by body county, which an official spokesman defined as "American Marines on the ground counting 552 dead Viet Cong, mostly from air, naval gunfire and artillery."

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This statement, however, appeared to be without validy validity, for officers at the regimental level—which collected the facts—said the basis of their reporting was all only an estimate of 600 Viet Cong dead and was not a body count. In They said the ground forces had barely begun to sweep the battle area.

Besides officially stating the 552 bodycount initially, the Marine Corps spokesman also announced an estimated 1000 Viet Cong property wounded. After Western correspondents had written this for more than two days, another spokesman for the American command in Saigon announced "this estimate has not been finalized;" and shortly later the Marine Commander in the Pacific, who had visited the battle, announced the Marines had no right to make the estimate in the first place.

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The official Marine Corps briefings sought to proportary as of the dox transferred conventional warfare the battle of the 5000 Marines long a frontline arcing 6000 meters by 4000 meters.

But, battlefield commanders are said that the hottest battle occured only within a 1000-meter pocket along this lighting irregular frontline. Based on their descriptions, it appeared the fighting within this 1000-yard pocket was the sec scene of a murderous meatgrinder operation, in which an unrealistic battle plan and defective command decisions cost some, but not many, needless American lives.

An invisible enemy first pinned down and chewed up two Marine infantry companies and two columns of tanks, anti-tanks and armities amphibious tractors. Then, instread of sending in massive reinforcements, the Marine ground commanders piecemealed them in—another armored column and another infantry company—only to have them pinned down and chewed up.

Outside this 1000-yard pocket, the remaining 4000-plus ground forces made little contact with the Viet Cong and suffered "practically negative neglibible" casualties. However, within this 1000-yard ring of violent fighting—which one tank officer called hell's valley"—the 700-strong Marine force escaped annhiliation because the Viet Cong disappeared in the darkness. They were not defeated.

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