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SAIGGI-The use of eirpower in the Viet Nam wer will be slightly

tempered in some cases to payv pave the way for Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge's program of social revolution in the countryside, according to

reliable sources.

"You can carry a military program so that is will am create political hatreds," one reliable source indicated. "We could win the war, hold a referendum and lose that." (Source 1.).

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American-piloted U. S. Navy, Marine or Air Force air fighter-bombers—
is considered necessary by American officials in the political field
to prevent possible advs adverse political repercussions among the
Vietnamese peasants in the countryside. In addition, the increased
number of American combat forces on the ground gives military commanders
the chance to follow-up airstrikes in on the ground in the "contested areas",
where previously only i slow-moving forward air controller aircraft
directed and appraised the minimum air operations. (Source 2).

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Observers here Neve predicted a full-scale clash between
the Lodge viewpoint, which is considered to be more sensitive
to the political repercussions of the airstrikes, and the viewpoint
of American military commanders who considered airpower as a
primarily means of basising crushing the Viet Cong large-scale
offensives, partly in late February before the arrival of
American ground units.

The Lodge viewpoint, succintly expounded by his top aide

Edward G. Lansdale, a retired U. S. Airford Air Force general,

when he wrote that the Communists hav had set loose a revolutionary

idea in Vietnam that would not be destroyed by bombs or bullets.

While this statement reportedly inked Pentagon officials,

reliable sources here indicate that "there is no conflict bet t

between the Lansa Lansdale am viewpoint and the military viewpoint

yet." (Source 1).

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three broad categories. The first, called "mass air attacks," mostly by Strategic Air Command B-52 bombers pound stronghold areas of hard-core Viet Cong concentrations. This program will be continued and intensified accelerated to almost one aix massive airstrike a day, according to reliable military sources. (Source 2). The second category of air employment is called close tactical airsupport which comes to the aid of trapped and encircled Vietnamese and American ground troops. Military sources had say this has turned the tide of many some of the battles in favor of the government and has prevented the annhiliation of some government units, especially before the arrival of American combat units. The military of

The third category is the most controversial. It is called "combet sorties" of fighter-bombers who hit which Viet Cong structures and troop concentrations—but unlike, the first category—the st airstrikes are not solely in Vieto Cong stronghold areas.

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Rarely do ground troops follow up the "combat sorties" to determine exactly that structures have been hit and who have to who has been killed or inj wounded, because or the circumstees; statistics are based mostly on pilot's estimates and not by confirmed evidence on the ground.

These missions are extract as exceptionally more difficult then strikes against the "death sone" areas here easy Viet Cong maken areas atronghold areas, which contain the sparsest of civilian population, except for the members of the Viet Cong femilies. The "combat sorties" are launched against small Viet Cong guerrilla bands, who easily and readily mingle with the civilian population.

The problems of the "combat sorties" mirror the most pressing

The Vietnamese government controls only a small fringe of villages surrounding each of the major population centers in the country; the remaining villages in the countryside are considered by counter-insurgency experts to be either partially or totally dominated or controlled by the Viet Cong—not only with guerrilla troop strength, but also by Communist political cadre.

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Reliable sources who have escaped from the Viet Cong-dominated hamlets said that the Communist political cadre, sometimes working underground, organized all the peasants—including women, children, and elders—into Communist associations, intelligence nets or liaison teams. In some cases, he explained, some small children act as guards and check the Communist credentials of other villagers.

Hence, to bomb the Viet Cong-dominated villages, which have in some cases been outside of the government control for two years when the strategic hamlet program collapsed, means to bomb both the Viet Cong activis military act and political activists as well as the pro-Communist sympathizers among the population, these senses indicated. (Source-3).

"The basic problem on our side is that we have not yet found the answer for guerrillas in small groups," one reliable source explained.

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"The basic problem on our side is that we have not yet found the answer to the Communist political cadro and the one-man terrorist. We will find the answer,

but we have not yet." (Source 1.)

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on the mass air attacks by B-52 bombers in the Viet Cong strongholds, one reliable source explained, "it is an achievment if we can keep the Viet Cong from becoming a regular army, or if we can hit them when they get in large groups, or if we can keep them from getting together in large groups." (Source 1).

One reliable military source implementation said intelligence of reports indicated that the increasing number of minimum 3-52 six-strikes had appearant forced the Viet Cong to infiltrate their headquarters elements into into the populous areas controlled by the government.

"This will cause the Viet Cong alot of problems," one reliable source indicated. "But it will cause us alot of problems too."