article 10 of sories

WHE CHARGE VIBLEARS

SAIGON-Within this small republic the size of Idaho, there are really Three Viet Name.

There is a state within a state within a state—a government within a government.

the Communist Vist Cong and the American-backed Seigon government.

But on the political front all three states are fightin—for a third force has emerged in which the center of gravity lies in the Buddhist movement.

on the military front, the state boundaries are clearly visible, but fluid—they shift from minute to minute. On the political front, the boundaries are both invisible and fluid.

puring the past three years, the military wer has escala ted internally; both the Communists and the Seigen government has increased in military strength and influence. Both have increased their control over the "contested areas"—areas of mixed control, or as the Communists graphically describe them in peasant language, "the rice and been areas."

Hence the military war effort has polarised; the countryside increasingly became either black or white. A military statel stalemate in which neither side could win or lose was predicted.

(More)

deope article 10 page 2

Politically, he ever, a new aspect arose. A glant grey mass immersum energed between the black political state of the Communists and the white political state of the pro-Destern comp. This grey mass revolves around the Buddhist movement, but includes other elecations.

Unidebazila, zada mitanthoninilangan 60094600 member

The Communists maintain a shadow government which
parallels that of the Saigon government, reaching from the central level
to the inter-sene to the province to the district and lastly the
village. The Communist shadow government is etched in the politic
policies and sime of the Hational Front for the Idberation of South
Viet Ham, but the People's Revolutionary Party—tye Communist Party—
dominates it.

The grey mass of the Suidhiet movement is heatily and efficiently organizing a government to correspond to that of both the Viet Cong government and the Saigon government. Like both governments, the Buddhist hierarchy pyramids at the central level to the provinces, districts to buddhist associations in the Villages and the "All-Buddhist Families" in the healets. Individual buddhist families are being organized in each healet in the same manner that the government consus establishes "family and "inter-family" colls to check Viet Cong movements and penetration. The Buddhists are now issuing details of how to organize their records and registration, not unlike a military manner manner staff bureau.

deepo erticle 10 page 3

There are many things elect about the Buddhist movement and there are many unanawared questions.

Third, by remaining an opposition element and hence weakening the Salgon government, the Suddhiet policies are obviously adding the policies of the Communite. Both the Suddhiets and the Communist parties are in parellel, both directly their fire at the Salgon government, their common enemy. The real question is whether or not the Suddhiets are directed by the Communists.

Fourth, based on this analysis, the American-backed Saigon government must then consider the Buddhists as their "second enemy," for the Buddhists state is out of the jurisdiction of the Saigon government. erticle 10

on both the other two states. But it can not fight both simultaneously.

To continue grabbing mass support, the Buddhists must saintain their identity separate from the other two states.

Buildhists as separate states, because both are attempting to an elliance with it—to have its support. The Viet Cong never say that the Buddhists are part of their government—only that they hope to help the Buddhists. The Saigen government—also wanting st an alliance—do not accuse the Buddhist leaders of being Communist, though Buddhist believers do.

Bepecially at this time, only days before a new Saigen government and before the American elections—no Saigen official or American policymeker would label the Buddhists as Communist. For Khanh desperately needs

Buddhist support during the upcoming days. For Americans to acknowledge this before Presidential election would imply that American policy decisions to withdraw support from Ego Dinh Diom—helping the Buddhists—was a serious policy miscalcuation last year. It would also admit that the

The "first enemy" of the Buddhists is the Khanh government—
or any future Saigen government— they have yet to declare war on the
Communists and its doubtful they ever will. The Buddhist stratagy to
remain a protest movement means they must attack any Saigen government.

no matter what form it takes or who heads it.

deepe article 10 page 5

They will attempt to isolate the me Saigon government

from the foundations of its support. One tection is to drive a wedge

between the Americans and the national leader—and this is the significance
of their anti-American propagands. Like the Communists, the Buddhists

are clearly anti-American and will remain so. Another tection is

to drive a wedge between the Saigon government and the Catholics, as
they are doing under the disguise of ridding the country of the old

can bee party. Like the Communists, the Buddhist leaders are

enti-Catholic—and will remain so. And the Buddhists will attempt

to chip away the army from the Saigon government—which is the

significance of placing the three-man Buddhist committees
in army companies and battalions. Hence, the Buddhists penetrate
the national army on one side while the Viet Cong secret cadre

perform "Action Among Enemy Troop" subversion on the other hand.

Hence, the methodomic Salgon government realizes it has
the Buddhists are it second enemy." It must fight the Communists—
militarily and politically—at their bas of support, the hamlet and
village level. And it must fight the Buddhists—demikes politically—
as their base of support, the district and provincial level.

Logically in any military wer there are two solid camps of enemies, and everyone else is a satellite or neutral. Logically the Saigon Covernment should spend 100 per cent of its time fighting the Viet Cong—and vice versa. But the Covernment now must spend up to 90

deepo articlo 10 pago 6

percent imm during orucial moments fighting the Duddhisto instead of the Viet Cong.

in the ps opposition to the government, which means they must refuse to a become a significant part of the government. The Duddhists will continue this strategy until they are ready to become the government, when they have the political personalities to take it over. One thing to elears that time is not this year. A representative of their movement has already relinquished his right to be considered for the position of which of state; the Buddhists will not ask for the premierokly—to do so they become p the government and lose their identity.

to graller up the Salgon government, but one may suspect their ain
is the permanent constitution and permanent constitution to be
Sevenbor.

completed completed most year. For the Suddhiete like the Communists
operate in phases. Possibly the date to match is not November, 1964,
but November, 1965.

chairman of the central committees of the National Alberation Front
of South Viet Ram. Behind the NAT is the Communist Party of South Viet Ramand behind that is Renot. The "grey ond eminence" of the Buddhist
movement is a frail nork named Thich Tri Quang-it's yet unknown if onyone
is behind him. The Saigen government is new headed by Frenter Rauyon Ebankthe external force behind him is the American

deepe erticle 10 page 7

Fhenh is clearly the key figure within one of the Three Viet Neme. In the wrangling and maneuvering about the future constitution and the future government, one thing is highly probable.—Khanh will again emerge as the strongmen.//efter his government officially resigns on Tuesday, October 27.

what Khanh is titled, he will probably again in be the key figure.

He may be chief of state, he may be prime minister, he may be commander—in—chief. He may only be the chairman of a yet-unformed committee. But he will again be the strongest within one of the Three Viet Heme.

But the important point, it the size, authority and jurisdiction of his Viet Nam will have shrunk drastically. The "equare miles" it formerly within the number territory of his state will have employed to the Buddhists. For to emerge as the strongman, whenh will have relinquished part of the authority of his state to the Buddhists in the form of major concessions. It's too early to know that these concessions will be; budnitus buddhists in the state has sheah government will have made important summer concessions to its "second enemy."

They Buddhiste already have been given major concessions—and persum presumably they will went only more of the same. The Buddhists within the past menths have been usurping the powers of the Saigon government; they have made on block appointments of \$ military comps commender, or cabinet ministers—or prime ministers.

doope exticle 10 page 8

They have already requirem demanded from the government—and received—the destruction of police records on Buildhist leaders. This lead the Saigon police chief to gasp several menths agao, "It's the first time in my life I ever heard of a police official handing over police records to Buildhist bonses."

During recent weeks in provincial capitals, pro-Buddhist mobs have "arrested" Can Leo party members—and turned them over to the a provincial government for proscoution. Stranger The military cafeers of young district chiefe and province chiefe are no longer broken by their military superiors—but by Buddhist benness.

field to widen their influence over students; into the social welfare and cultural field to increase their influence over labor unions and other organisations.

In chort, on the one hand, the government has consciously made major concessions to their "second enemy" while on the other hand, the Communists have been effectively penetrating it at all levels.

This is the most crucial minimum factor in the detic deteriors
of the Fin cituation in Viet Nem in the past year.

According to this line of enalysis, once the Buddhists swallow the Saigon government, they should then declare war on their other enemy—the Communists. Theoretically, to do this, the Buddhist must move their influence 2 downwards from the district and provincial level to the village and hamlet level, which is the Communist base of support.

deopo a rticio 10 pago 9

pagedae have co-saisted with Communist codes without coming in conflict with them. Aims the Communiste, the Duddhiste proced family life, which is similar to Communist collectivies—while the American—backed government has been preaching individualism. The Duddhiste—like the Communiste—preach susterity to the villagors, while the Saigon government is preaching communic betterment.

The boy int infex of this co-existence is that colden in a Duddhist pricet billed by the Communicis; but Catholic pricets are often targets for Viet Cong terrorists.

encoco---df it extens they will erush it so they new attacpt to erush the government village chiefs a nd hamlet militia. But the Communists vill allow a possedul co-existence at the village level between Dyddhist because and Communist codes. This possedul co-existence, operating for years at the hamlet and village level already equates at the national a level on un-empounded state of asutuality. This is clear.

Homever, the question is whether or not the Buidhiet movement is not just as eccount front for the Communists as the Butienel Alberation Front for south Tiet Han is its first front.

That question must be enswered by an ensuic slocking ment mystericus ment nemed Thick Tri Cuang. Temperovs The Air-Sonditioned Mont.