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thieu 1 (normass/deepe)

SAIGON, NOVEMBER 2—President Nguyen Van Thieu's sensational refusal
to send a delegation to the next session of the Part expanded Paris peace
to talks—because it would lead to a coalition government in South Vietnam—
was considered here a direct, refa retaliatory rebuke to President Lyndon
Johnson.

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"In effect, Thieu said LBJ double-crossed him," one long-time Asia observer said. "And Thieu is pretty nearly right."

Thieu's bombshell speech seemed taxxix here to indicate that President
Johnson, ignoring Saigon's vehement objections, had given in to the
long-held Communist demand that the National Liberation Front—or the Viet
Cong—be allowed to sit as a separate delegation at the peace talks. The
Thieu government—and previous Saigon governments—have vowed for years it
would never agree to official talks with the National Liberation Liberation
Front because it would lead to a capit coalition government in South
Vietnam and eventual surrender to the Communists.

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Thieu's speech before the encent on television before a joint session of the two-house legislature becomes incoming the past two weeks of discussions about halting the bombing. Initial indications where that Thieu's enceth highly nationalistic speech brought him a great deal of internal support within the government, the legislature, the militant anti-Communist Catholic community and thus far from the Vietnamese armed forces. Thereby: The initial exception was the dovish militant Buddhists who had been vocalizing for a bombing halt without conditions of specifying any conditions from Hanoi and for an immediate ceasefire. However, as long as Thieu maintains the support of the armed forces, he is in a strong position to deal with civil disorders—and only the armed forces can pull off a section of the successful coup d'etat.

Both Americans and Vietnamese officials seemed saddened at the Washington-Saigon confrontation.

"I can see why Johnson did what he did," one American veteran official here explained. "But, I can see why Thieu did what he did too, for because of his own internal are pressures."

"This is a very difficult time and time is important," a Vietnamese general a said. "President Johnson can be an American patriot—but please plant let President Thieu be a Vietnamese patriot in the said.

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thieu 3 (normass/deepe)

"Please tell President Johnson, " he continued, "to think of the American who have died here rather than about his friend Humphrey. Americans and South Vietnamese died to save Vietnam—not to give it away."

Staunchily pro-American diplomats-interested in seeing that the U. S. and the # West is not repeat not defeated in an South Vietnam-were extremently apprehensive about the new turn in the whole and negotiating set-up in Paris.

"I'm afraid Johnson looks like a sucker so far," one cathered pro- And control outspoken diplomat explained. "How else can you classify him with these victory broadcasts from Hanoi and with the North Vietnamese same committing themselves to sit at only one more session of the peace talks.

"Why should Thieu and his government add their names to this The farce.

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They are being sold down the river and they know it. This whole thing stinks like Czeckoslovakia of 1938; people don't like to hear it and say is Fascist but it is true this time, I'm afraid. Thieu will have a hard time carrying world opinion with him because of clever Communist propaganda. But public opinion is wrong this time because Thieu is standing up against peace at any price.

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thieu 4 (normass/deepe)

"Everyone knows that Washington has been trying to steamroller Thieu for the past two weeks," he continued, "and the last minute. Well, he didn't.

Whatever you think about Thieu and his crowd, you have to admit they stood for something—even it if it costs them their necks. And it well may. I once thought that Washington would never dump Thieu because it would be a catastrophic defeat for the Americans. Now, I think the last minute. Well, remove Thieu and Ky.

"Washington was silly to make these optimistic predictions that Thieu would send a delegation at the last minute. Washington had no repeat no mandate to speak for either Saigon or Hanoi—and it has got itself in a terrible fix by trying to speak for both of them."

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"Why shouldes This and his government add

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thieu (normass/deepe)

The three immediate implications of Thieu's speech are:

1. In what must be considered another major victory for Hanoi, the American-South Vietnamese alliance is more strained now than at any time since the American commitment of combat troops in early 1965. it is a major confrontation to the point of minimum in the alliance is now half- split half-way open. Whether a furtime full split comes is now up to Washington, which has the trump cards of being able to cut Harar the vast American economic aid or to order a premature withdrawal of American combat forces. / Even more, warrin Western diplomats who predicted the U. S. could never withdraw support from the elected and constitutional government-which President Johnson urged to be created-are now predict predicting that Washington will will drawn inspire a goo- coup d'etat against Thieu. The dovish, left-wing militant Buddhists-who have toppled several governments in the past-are rapidly spreading numers about the taken destructive rumors that a crass coup is in the making to topple Thieu and his government, or that Thieu will resign. Themenument These left leftitets leftists are clearly pushing to the forefront General Duong Van Minh, the leader of the first military junta whom \$ American officials advocated returning from four years of exile beginning in early October.

"If we have to fight both the Communists and the Americans, then we are finished," one Vietnamese ultra-nationalist said. "But remember, if Thieu goes, it is an American defeat too."

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thieu & (normass/deepe)

2. The Thieu government inclassifuncian has played the heat "very cleverly," and observers agree. The Life is and it is clearly gambling on the election of Richard Nixon for president. Word has been filtering back here from official and unofficial Vietnamese delegations, the thieurement who Maranam profess to have seen Nixon aides, that it when the GOP condidate wins the Presidential election, he'll back Thieu's firm position. Whether true or not, Thieu and other senior government officials have been known to believe that Hanoi would profess at tempt to wring concessions from President Johnson at the internam eleventh hour before the election—and I the Saigon government has little to leady lose by gambling that the saigon government has little to leady lose by gambling that are mark a loss consideriory American president will be marked elected next week.

If Nixon loses, Thieu has left other options open. Despite his bombshell announcement about not repeat not sending the delegation to the next session—he did not repeat not say he would not send one to the second or third sessions. When Hanoi has conveniently left it open that it might not whether or not repeat not it would attend.

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thieu 4 (normass/deepe)

Also, Thieu's committees speech, while highly emotional and nationalistic, does not repeat not carry any other insurmountable conditions for Hanoi. And, some face-saving arrangement can be worked out, such as merging the Allied delegation the South Vietnamese-American delegation, with Saigon being chairman, and merging the Hanoi-NLF delegation. The latter would take another concession from Hanoi-which it would willkely the resist making. Or Fuel A the Angular Conference to be resist making. A Square one might be Agreebale to alle, Some SA

3. In the view of the Thieu government, the Paris peace talks can proceed in a meaningful manner with the Saigon delegation, since the first substantive item on the adg agenda would still be the American-Hanoi S. Multaneones discussion on bilageral troop withdrawals. The only thing the South vietname two Southern belligerents -- the Saigon government and the NFL WAR NLF-Week would be needed for would be to approve the four-way ceasefire while the foreign troops withdrew. Even the troop withdrawals, however, can be effected without a ceasefire. Once this is decided, then Hanoi and the Americans would walk out of the conference anyway, thek argument goes, NOSE-TO-NOSE WITH a nd Saigon would be facing the NLF-which it has nothing to talk about, since the only topics of discussion would be Viet Cong inclusion into the gav a coalition government. This Saigon refuses to accept. Instead, Saigon has given the Viet Cong another alternative-again at President Johnson's insistence-the "one-man, one-vote" principle whereby if they lay down

their weapons, they can express their political views at the ballot box.