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weapons 1 (normass/deepe)

SAIGON, January 23-Reported Communist air attacks in Laos and South Vietnam, would dramatize, if true, a twist-up in the weapons escalation spiral in a rapidly expanding theatre of bitter combat.

The weapons escalation, and signified by/x the reported Communist air activity, appeared calculated for super-sonic psychological impact.

the war here without changing them; the air attacks changed the form (or maybe altitude) of the war, but not its character.

The nutshell trends in the South indicate the war is and has been becoming increasingly sophisticated and conventionalized.

On the personnel side, it is becoming increasingly more North Vietnamese, rather than South Vietnamese. On the weapons-supply side, increasingly more Communist-bloc rather than Vietnamese. (Even for rice, North Vietnam is becoming increasingly dependent on Soviet and Chinese imports, sources here report).

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weapons 2 (normass/deepe)

militarily, the alleged incidents involving sub-sonic MIG's and antiquated bi-planes, are considered comic here in the face of the preponderance of the and defensive American airpower. Even a sneak, kamikaze air attack on a major American installation or Vietnamese city might have high psychological value, but little military consequence.

In South Vietnam, the Communist air incidents erased the 17th parapp parallel above-the-jungles as North Vietnamese ground troops have been doing body below it since mid-1964.

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weapons 3 (normass/deepe)

whether the Communist air attacks over its neighbors is related in any way to peace-talk probing is a matter of wide conjecture here.

Militarily, however, & anti-Communist sources here are far more worried about two other factors associated with the incidents. First is whether the air incidents are an "harbinger" of an escalation into across-the-boundary Communist missile-power. Officials here have long feared North Vietnamese-based offensive sufface-to-surface missiles descending on either American-Vietnamese bases or cities in the South. The Communist capability of setting up the setting of the communist capability of setting the setting Saigon is the topic not simply of productions wild imaginations but official reports as well. And when a Soviet-made missile sunk an Israeli ship in the Middle East last year, the U. S. 7th Fleet off North Vietnam shader shuddered at the prospects of a repeat performance in Asia.

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weapons 4 (normass/deepe)

"The Communist option of wait weapons escalation infiming
probably doesn't look very interesting to them," one reliable source
explained last week. "They can use surface-to-surface weapons, but the Americans have lots of fancy new weapons too. The North must remember
that a little PT boat incident lead to the bombing of the North. If they
throw a few missiles at Danang, the U. S. will hit the Haiphong. Weapons
escalation might be a big mistake for the North."

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weapons 5 (normass/deepe)

here is the desired and reality that the Communists are importing into the South more and more of better and better infantry weapons and infantry support weapons. In the early 1960's, the wholly Southern Viet Cong movement sustained their momentum by capturing American—American—issued weapons from government defenders; these captured weapons were supplemental to their old cached stocks of antiquated, rusty French weapons discarded after the anti-colonialist war. American surveys of at the time estimated only two per cent of the Viet Cong weaponry was supplied by other Communist nations, including the North.

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weapons 6 (normass/deepe)

In mid-1964, the pattern pattern changed and weapons escalation began to infiltrate began. The North Vietnamese units, infility infility infility into the South as units, rather than individual cadre, and brought with them the best infantry weapons system of the Communist bloc-the K AK family of weapons, including riffer; assault rifles, submachineguns and machineguns, # which is now used to arm the framhhhmm borderline units of the Soviet army. Through the years this flow of weapons has moved southwards, from the northern provinces, to the po provinces around Saigon-and now are found in the set southern parts of the Mekong Delta. Also, this flow of weapons moved organizationally downwards-from the North Vietnamese units, then to the Southern-born Viet Cong main force units, then to the Viet Cong regional units-and now even to their village militia guerrilla militia. The Communist weapons supply is now so excellent that senior American officers admit their enemy does not even attempt to capture the best of American weapons. ==more reuter

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weapons 7 (normass/deepe)

By 1966, their arsenal in the South began including the lethal 122 mm. fin-stabilized rocket launcher and then the 1.4 rocket launcher, all mobile and destructive enough to inflame the American-protected Danang airbase several times. By 1967, long-range . 152 mm. howitzers were used across the Demilitarized Zone to paste the American Marine positions at Con Thien, Gio Linh and Khe Sanh. in the Mekong Delta, the local guerrilla forces have virtually imposed a weapons stalemate minimum upon America's new "little boat" Navy patrolling the major rivers. For the mortar and rocketfire from the UESSELS heavily armed s. Navy is not lowerful enough to wipe out the mud-baked Communist bunkers, a direct hit by 1.155 mm. howitzer shell s need to are route the Communist forces, and the re frequently used airstrikes are generally not close-in enough to hit the bunkerlines. # But, the local guerrillas, armed with the new Soviet-made B-40 and B-41 bazooka-styled rockets can pierce the armor of the American Navy boats with "heat-rounds" Hence, the ballistics but still are unable to sink the boats of m. war in the Delta is indecisively in-balance at this time.

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weapons 8 (nromass/deepe)

on the outpost-installation of Khe Sank, across the DMZ in South Vietnam, remains "shrouded in mystery," as one official explained. The American military command here suggests the plane was an American American F-4 Phantom which mistakenly rocketed the South Vietnamese Special Forces camp. The Vietnamese Joint Operations Center, which runs the wolfetnamese side of the war on a minute-to-minute basis, at first called the plane a communist MIG and then shifted to the term "unit would "unidentified aircraft," probably for "diplomatic reasons," one source state.

Suggested. Other Vietnamese military sources referred to roman remenants of a Communist cannon cartriage, which they said resu resulted from the a strafing attack on the camp, and indicated a heavier calibre weapon than American planes fire.

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weapons 9 (normass/deepe)

The reported aerial incident across the DMZ is probably less significant, because of the vagueness surrounding it, than the air attacks in Laos, which have been confirmed by the Laotian government and by the military command here. Laos is often the "trial balloon" battleground when either the East or the West wants to escalate the war, while minimizing the risks attached to doing so in the "short fuse" Vietnamese at situation. For example, the American bombing raids began in December, 1964, in the Laotian panhandle served approximation first as a warning to—another a prelude to—the bombing of North Vietnam intermediates.

The American emparation combat escalation but began then began—first immunication in the air—and arethen on the ground in the South. The Communists escalation began on the ground and now marks shifting to the air as well.

(Hank: this will end my filing until after returning from Seventh Fleet. Regards Bev).