Beverly Deepe 6 4A Hong Thap Tu Saigon, Vietnam December 10, 1966 Sur to Pethsburge vin P.11. Dea. 23/66

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WITH THE KOREAN "TIGER" DIVISION, SOUTH VIETNAM—During a sustained surveillance operation one mile from the Cambodian border, weit a I300 man. South Korean battalion, flanked by American units, dug its foxheles and interlooking trenchlines eight feet deep into the red fudge-like case. Each command post and fighting bunkder was roofed with three tiers of huge legs made to withstand withering Communist mortar barrages.

An American helicopter pilot, delivering supplies into the battle zone, exclained, "This looks just like the old Japanese pillboxes of World War II."

He was so impressed he started filming with his home movie camera. "This really makes our troops look sick, doesn't it?" He said. The I ve flown the American and the Australian troops around but the ROK's are by far the best."

The troopers from the Republic of Korea are commonly called ROK's by the American GI's; some Koreans affectionately call each other ROK-heads.

One Korean officier explained proudly, "We know the American troops don't dig in—but we do. We can never find the American trenches." He laughed mode stly, "but sometimes when we leaves an area we turn over trenches to the Americans."

(More)

In Saigon, one Western diplomat explained, "The Koreans are the same army that kicked the British out of Singapore and Burma in World War II. They are the old Japanese army—with an American veneer."

The mission of the ROK Tiger Division—which reached the Yalu River during the Korea War—is to secure and keep open the infamous Route I9, the major artory for logistical supplies from the South China Sea to the Communist—infested jungled highlands near Cambodia. In early 1965, the Communist, for the first time in the history of the current Vietnam conflict, established a twenty five mile frontline along the highway—thus severing Vietnam in half—and held it for several days. This was the lowest obb of the Vietnam war.

Today, a measure of the Tiger Division's effectiveness is that the square mile area of their responsibility is the only major chunk of the country that un-escorted, un-armed jeeps can drive the reads at night. Even in the Saigon area, American troops drive in armed convoys once they greath the city limits of the semi-besieged capital. More than sixty miles of reads are open to day and night traffic troughout the Korean-secured area; this correspondent note with the Vietnamese province chief throughout the tiniest of village reads without escort. Vietnamese population that has returned to government anti-Communist control has increased by eighty percent.

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Crities of American military tactics within Vietnam believe more emphasis should be placed on deploying American units to defend Vietnamese villagers, as the ROK's do, rather than lauching large-scale offensive operations into non-populated, Communist-controlled jungle strenghelds.

If the Tiger Division has quickly earned the reputation of being the most effective unit in Vietnam, it is also often accused of being the most "ruthlese" not only to the Viet Cong, but also to the Vietnamese population. This widespread accusation was articulated by one American officier who explained matter-of-fastly.

"If the ROK troops receive a single shot from a village on an operation, that village is gone. The Vietnamese villagers are terrified of the Koreans. On one operation in February, the ROK's were sent up north to secure the road. Once the villagers along the road heard the Koreans were coming, they all bugged out—no one would stay around to see what happened. But, if the ROK's go into a village and do not receive fire, they greet that village with open arms."

Koreans officiers hotly deny they mistreat the local population during the heat of battle, and the division headquarters staff has leached a massive psychological warfare operation saying that the Korean troops have come to heap the Vietnamese villagers.

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The total 45,000 Korean military commitment to Vietnam, beside the Figer

Division of I4000 troops includes in other parts of Vietnam the White Horse

Division, one Marine Regiment, one engineering battalion, and one surgical unit.

To date, since their arrival in March, I965, Korean forces have killed 5459 Communists, captured I439 prisoners and I226 weapons and detained 362I suspects. Total Korean casualities were: 518 killed, I398 wounded. In short, for every Rok soldier killed in action, ten Communists were killed.

"My regiment has killed we Viet Cong," Col. Shin Hyun Su, commander of the Ist Cavalary Regiment explained. "May be some number of innocent people are included in this figure. I'm very, very sorry; very, very sorry, but war causes this.

"I've lost alot of Korean soldiers too. When the tiger Division left Korea, the wiwes of many of men came to me and pleaded that I take good care of their husbands. Now, I'm about ready to go home and at night I worry what I can say to these wives of my dead soldiers."

But, it is in civic action for the Vietnamese villagers even more than their military operation that the Koreans clearly outshine other allied troops in Vietnam. With great modesty, Korean officiers explained that, "we are Asian like Vie tnamese and we have the some traditions, customs and philosophies."

While the Koreans have spent much more time than the Americans attempting to learn Vietnamese language, the old Korean sergeants communicate with the grey-bearded village chiefs by writing Chinese characters on pieces of of paper or the palm of their hands.

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Korean troops, many of them rice-paddy farm boys, often volunteer to help Vietnamese villagers plant or harvest rice or weave the thatch roofs for a new village to be re-built. The Korean form of Karate, called Tao Kwen Do is taught to hundreds of Vietnamese soldiers and students. Medical aid stations, made of ammunition boxes, are constructed in the popular Oriental design of eight-sided buildings. It is a little-known fact that extensive guerfilla warfare was also fought behind the lines in the Korean War—and Korean officiers and men, unlike American commandiers in Saigon, see a wast difference between the conventional aspects of the Korean War and the guerrilla warfare aspects.

Almost incessently during one's stay, Korean officiers repeat, "You know Mao Tse-Tung's doctrine that the people are the water and guerrilla are the fish. So, if we segregate the civilian from the guerrillas, and secure the area for a certain period, the Communist will become dried fish."

extravagance of the American offert, is an impressive part of their all-Asian civic action program. The 60th Artillery Battalion, for example, built a dam of used artillery boxes, expended artillery shells, and American-donated coment.

Each Korean trooper donated 200 grams from his daily rice ration to pay Vietnamese villagers for their labor. As a result, \$ 5000 Vietnameses farmers could raise the three crops of rice a year instead of two.

In another example, troops of the Capital Regiment collected all the Scrops of blown-up bridges, and downed airplanes, and ammunition casings that had bender the Route 19 during the French-Indo-China War and the current one. (More)

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Col. Shin explained:

"Your remember the French Group Mobile IOO was annihiliated along Route
I9, and the hard-care of that Group included the Korea Regiment—the French troops that came from the Korean War direct to the French Indo-China War.

Now Korean troops hold the road which the French troops from Korea lost. It is very strange for us.

The Korean troops used the collect of steel screp souvenirs of many previous buttles to construct a statue of a single soldier.

"This is a monument to the dead," Col. Shin explained. "All the soldiers of all countries who died along Route 19."