outpost-1

jan. 11, 1965

TAN BUU, SOUTH VIET NAM-Only ten miles from Saigon's gleaming white Presidential Palace last week, a Viet Cong Communist unit momentarily adopted Korean War-styled tactics of a miniature invasion instead of following their usual elusive guerrilla tactics.

The Viet Cong unit, part of the five-hundred-man reinforced battalion, scampered across the rice-paddy dikes ontside only fivehundred feet from this small outpost, carefully dug dozens of foxholes, moved into their frontline position lethal American-captured .57 ml mm. recoilles rifles and .75 mm. Chinese Communist recoilless rifles.

M government local militia squad, seeing the Viet Cong
moving across the fields, fled into the outpost—and old landowner's
milital French-styled villa,— only minutes before an onslaught of
shelling, which tore great gaps into American-supplied barbed wire
fences, ripped the franks through the front concrete wall and smashed
into the front door.

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Minutes later, the Viet Cong troopers sneaked through the holes in the wall, sending the government company and local mit defenders "retreating in blood," as om of them explained. An American officer was kill in near it the smeate semicircular foxhold near the front gate, after expending four boxes of at machinegun ammunition which tes delayed the Viet Cong advance.

An American sergeant, one of the 20 wounded, escaped by jumping into the river and hiding until the VietCong retreated two hours later.

battalion launched fairs three other sees diversionary attacks. More than 100 Viet Cong attacked another pacified hamlet north of Tan Buu, while others attacked seethern outposts harassed with morter fire two southern outposts on the south, and others mortaned thereare hitherance two southern outposts of deadly .81 mm. morter rands into artillery position in neighboring Binh Chanh district headquarters.

One round crashed through roof of the austere district headquarters and one exploded outside National Police Headquarters where 10 district police officials barely escaped injury. Several landed only 20 fears from the green temporary but of the five-man American advasory district advisory team.

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deex jan. 11, 1965

"It was a very gold bold, very well coordinated plan," an American field advisor explained. "You can't help but admire it."

raided the premises, stole all the weapons from the armory (an unknown number), so much ammunition they could not paddle it all down the river—and evenythe are Vietnamese company commander's boots and uniforms. They captured four heavy weapons and enough rifles it to equip a new company; three American—supplied radios, which gives them the capability of tapping government a radio listening to radio a communications of government forces, classified documents and even a government trooper's hammook. The proper while porters leaded the let loot on river rafts and paddled through the pineapple fields, other members of the battalion beat on the doors of the villagers—"but we were too terrified to open the door," the village barber explained.

"The Viet Cong now has the same weapons that we have," an American advisor moaned after the attack. "It appears we (the Americans) are equipping both sides, but we are giving advice to only one side." to see if the advice is offective."

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The Viet Cong attack, ris clearly audible in Saigon, sent weelshb wealthy businessmen a tossing in their beds, and the following day sent Vietnamese mix and American military commanders adding red dots (indicating Viet Cong attacks) to their maps in a 25-mile are around the capital city.

The attack, was made in the presumably pacified area of the strategically-important How For (Cooperation) Plan, designed by Gen. William C. Westmoreland, on Commander of the American Military Assistance Command, and approved by American Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara last fall.

"oil spot", calls for the gradual expansion of government authority into the parameters around saigon.

"There's no doubt in my mind that the Viet Cong will attack us more and more in the Hoo Top area," one American advisor explained.

olusters of hamlets and outposts that were in different provinces and districts. Within one and half miles, our border here intersects the neighboring province in six different places in the read and the canals. It adds to the confusion and hinders coordination as to who should send in reinforcements.

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"we know the VietCong are in this area and they will a ttack again," the American explained. "Buty they're not amm amm and emassed amassed in tents in the trees—we can't send tanks or fighter bombers af after them. We must defeat them with many night patrols done vigorously and continuously.

"We will lose many and people—good American and Vietnamese soldiers. The Viet Cong are hoping we will get discouraged because it is touch, "he explained. "But we have to keep plugging.

"We will lose people—good American and Vietnamese troops.

In two days I lost two of my good friends. Both were E Westpointers and one was a Rhodes scholar."