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coalition 1 (normass/doepe)

(This second article in a series discusses the prospects for peace in 1968 from the Communist viewpoint. The third and last article deals with the role of the South Vietnamese government headed by President Nguyen Van Thieu.).

cards this year to as leftist Reman Catholic laymen in this harried capitol. A former Vietnamese government district chief, once on a Viet Cong black-list, last year received a lumar new year card from the Communist cadre—and he expects another one in several weeks as the holiday again approaches.

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coalition 2 (nromass/deepe)

In Saigon's pagodas—curlesque-roofed enclaves of government dissidence—the Buddhist monkslin robes the color of tengerine or chocolate clandestinely advise their followers to study the Viet Cong's 14-point program, police sources reported. In Cambodia, special air-mail editions of the 14-point program, printed on thin, high-quality paper, were available for Western journalists covering the recent visit of Jobie Jackie Kennedy.

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coalition 3 (normass/deepe)

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The talk of the town among some politically-conscious Saigonese, including a few in the government, reveals a new mood of first-person fear, cynicism and near-distil despair as they look ahead fer the next year. Their bleak picture of the future resembles a closi glorified Santa Domingo extravaganza, with Viet Cong artillery and mortar bombardments added. They envision street fighting, economic strikes, black-outs of electricity, violent anti-American demonstrations, airbases ablaze with from rocket attacks and suicide squads and Viet Cong shelling of Saigon or other major cities. In Can Tho, the capital of the Mekong Delta, the Viet Cong have warned housewives to stockpile non-perishable foods in preprations for their upcoming attack within the next three months.

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coalition (normass/deepe)

The new mood is light years away, but not necessarily contradictory contradictory to, the optimistic evaluations of American military commanders. These commanders believe Communist forces within South Vietnam are slipping towards defeat to such an extent they must shift their strategy to other radical these radical lovest 1. call for Chinese Communist volunteers in either the North or the South, or get other military fixtures from East European countries in order to escalate their military effort. This is not considered likely here by serious serious American or Vietnamese sources.

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coalition (normass/deepe)

2. either negotiate or else simply is "fade of away."

This is the current optimistic official American line, but even high-placed Vietnae Vietnamese government sources verse publicity Voice akepticism about it.

political and economic warfare in the urban centers. This strategy tactic would be lether, and potentially catastrophic; to the south Vietnamese government as well as the American position. Since the government's pacification program has consistently failed to get off the ground, the Communists have succeeded in encircling the cities; a political-economic thrust throwing the cities in chaos, combined with military attacks into the neon-lighted storefronts would sink seriously jep jeoperiz jeoperdize the Allied position. The American officialdom are not talking is not talking much about this possibility—at least publicly, but the Vietnamese, are

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coalition 6 (normass/deepe)

"Negotiations at gunpoint"—as distinct from compromise at the conference table—is what well-informed Vietnamese nationalists believe the Communists are aiming for these gunpoints include pistols for political intimidations and uprisings in the urban centers as well as Soviet-made rocketfire in the suburbs and the periphery.

The Viet Cong aim in their viewpoint is a "coalition government a la Communist"—then "peace" or a Communist victory of sorts will come to South Vietnam.

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coalition 7 (nomass/deepe)

The nationalists' fears spring from the 14-point program broadcast in the Viet Cong in September, which is regard regards they interprete as an all-out declaration of war against the newly elected constitutional government headed by President Nguyen Van Thieu and the warning bell that the Communists would be an all-out political offensive against it. He Howard -

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coalition 8 (normass/deepe)

Captured Communist documents would seem to indicate
this trend of events for 1968 is not far from wrong. The Communists
no longer speak of a "total victory"—i. e. militarily "pushing the
Americans into the sea." Instead, they specify a "decisive
vei victory"—welding together military attacks and a political—
economic uprising for coordinated for a critical moment.

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coalition 9 (normass/deepe)

Communist documents here do not specify whether this decisive moment will enfold before or after the American Presidential elections in November. This is one of the two pivotal questions the Communist may answer in 1968, with the second question being whether answer they succeed or fail in this coordinated campaign.

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coalition 10 (normass/deepe)

This joint coordinated military-political at mi Communist strategy is a natural progression of past developments. On December 20, 1960, the National Liberation Front for South Vietnam—commonly called the Viet Cong—was founded by issuing a virtual declaration of war against the pro-American government of Ngo Dinh Diem, plus the transfer supporting supports.

on November first, the Central Com Committee of the Liberation

Front decided to the ask for a ceasefire and to enter negotiations (such as with those factions that overthrew Diem, car perticult perticularly the influential Buddhist priests, and the military junta.). This negotiation, which would have & paved the way for a coalition on their terms, specified as preconditions second a withdrawal of American advisors, an end to "mopping up operations which kill the people," and a cart curtailment of American economic aid.

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coalition 11 (normass/deepe)

This decision of the Central Committee was ratified but their proposed coalition never developed.

took place three years later in August, 1967, from which they issued theel their 14-point program. This 14-point program, is he in coheral a carbon company of their 1960 program; more significantly, its animal and its animal and its animal and its animal animal and its animal animal animal and its animal animal animal and its animal ani