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KHE SANH, SOUTH VIRTNAM, OCTOBER 9-The American Marines returned to once-besicged Khe Sanh combat base with mixed emotions.

The generals were jubilant. Commanding the return to the minum base abandoned 92 days before, Maj. Gen. May Davis eaid the ground operation into and around xix Khe Sanh symbolized "the major shift in the relative power between the Allies and the North Vietnemese" operating along the demilitarized zone.

"The Harines have been squeezed into a smaller erea," the commander of the Third Marine Division—which new operates along the western two-thirds of the 40-mile-line. "And this has increased our combat power many fold." In addition, the general said the Marines "have just thrown the last of their (North Vietnamese) elements back across the Ben Hai". The Ben Hai river runs through the middle of the six-mile-wide DMZ, which separates North and South Vietname.

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khesanh 2 (normass/deepe)

Other generals talked of how the new and successful Marine tactics of increased mobility and flexibility had blocked Communist movements around Khe Sanh with much more effectiveness than when 6,000 Marines were once besieged there for 77 days beginning January 21.

But, middle-echelong staff officers were cynical—and they may have reflected in a nutshell the over-riding significance of the return to Khe Sanh.

"The Marines are being used as a political pawn to dramatize how good the situation is up here before the American election," one officer grumbled. "This whole Khe Sanh operation is political. "There's not enough Morth NVA (North Vietnamese Army) ground troops around Khe Sanh to worry about. They should let the Marines do what they're designed to do—get the NVA. Stick around—things will be alot more interesting after this gee—whiz Khe Sanh deal frow is over."

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khesanh 3 (normass/deepe)

Intelligence sources had assessed that a North Vietnamese battalion-highly fragmented into small units—was operating around Khe Sanh as a screening force to protect Communist trails and transhipment movements into the area. Other sources talked of more lucrative targets for operations—where up to five North Vietnamese battalions were thought to be masse concentrated.

There were not many of the "old hands" left who had endured the agonizingly character 77-day siege of Khe Sanh that began on January 21.

One, however still along the DNZ, however, was the Navy doctor who had helped treats the 2000 two thousand wounded/and evacuate the 250 dead sustained during the siege. Sitting in a sunny, comfortable bunker west of Khe Sanh, the doctor reminisced:

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khesanh 4 (normass/deepe)

"There was a time during the siege when I wondored if I'd get out alive. I still can't bolieve the whole thing. I kept a diary—and now I wondor why I wrote down & some of those things."

The younger troopers who had errived in Vietnam after the harrowing days of Kho Sanh had possed were either blase or else apprehensive about returning to base.

Cpl. Bruce Miller, a 20-year-old native from of Dellas, explained:
"Most of us have forgotten about Khe Sanh. Many feel the Marines age
should not have pulled out of it because it gives 'Charlie' (the Communists)
more ground to fight in."

Standing in a helicopter lending some waiting to be lifted into the operational area, he continued:

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khesanh 5 (normass/deepe)

"I don't mind going into —but I'm not happy about it. I'd rather stay back—I have 52 days left (in Vietnam). The other troops are worried too. We're losing to many men over here. Our younit hasn't been hit too bad, but my brother-in-aw law is in another regiment and it h has been hit pretty hard all the time."

Lt. Jack Hart, a 26-tear-ol 26-year-old plate on leader from Atlanta, Ga., with a unit about to be helicopter into the Khe Sanh area explained:

"Some people are looking forward to returning to the Khe Sanh area—but some aren't. They're afraid of 'incoming' rounds from that artillery the NVA might still have in Laos. Intelligence showed alot up there (in the Co Rac mountains of Laos) last month, but our rev I made a visual reconnaissance of the area and it showed nothing."

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khesanh # 6 (normass/deepe)

potent 130 mm millimeter field artillery the Communist had buried in the modern of the Co Rac mounts in Leos. Some officiers believe the artillery pieces are now being shuttled around to unknown gunpositions in Leos—but others fear the ou tubes are being towed further south, even into South Vietnam proper, where they would not be immune from Allied ground forces. The last time the American officers know that the Communist the last of the 6,000 artillery in Leos has been fired was July 6—on the day marine. The Marines "de-ectivated" or abandoned the Kne Sanh base.

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khesanh 7 (normass/deepe)

The return to Khe Sanh began October 4, when in a well-coordinated,
45-minute helicopter shuttling operation, Kilo Company, 3rd Battalion of
the 4th Marines was landed several hundred yards from the northern end of the
old Khe Sanh runway. Their landing zone had been-during the 77-day
siege period—the bunkering position of the 1st Battalion of the 9th
Marines on a finger-like \*\* knob directly everlooking the combat base. The
troopers of this unit—responsible for securing and moving air-doppe
air-dropped supplies from the drop zone at the end of the runway—had
convinced themselves they had heard Communists tunneling under their
hill-knob with shovels sweddled in burlep sacks. The Communists never did
blow up the hill and Marine positions, but when Kilo Company landed their
there last week, the know knob was hardly recognizable because of the
Marines' demolition and bulldozer work as they departed.

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khesanh 8 (normass/deepe)

Kilo Company had also been the last company out of the Khe Sanh area during the evacuation last July. Gunny Sere at Sergeant Raymond Hatchell, 38, of Florence, S. C. remembered well their departure from Hill 471, 500 yards away from the garbage dump road of the Khe Sanh combat base.

"Just as we were leaving, I was awfully busy," the senior sergeant in the company explained. "About 5 p.m. we got a radio message that we were to hold on Hill 471 that night. Then the helicopters came in and said that we'd have to evacuate that "It'll on five minutes native notice. When the NVA saw all the activity that we were getting ready to move out, they started mortaring us. They threw in 40 or 50 mortars on us and I had to move the company 400 meters away from there so the helicopters could come in. Then we were intermediate flown out. That's how we left the Sanh."

Last week, though, Kilo company landed unopposed on the position—w
"With not one shot being fired" and was followed by Marine engineers,
who with "back-hoe" machines dug out circular indentations for the
Marine and Vietnamese artillery that followed and trenchlines for the
andburks bunkering positions for the Marine troopers.

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khesanh 9 (normass/deepe)

This position has was codenemed "Nanking Fire Support! Base" and was actually a prelude to the infentry operation the next day, with the artiller It had been necessary to move the artillery forward in order that the ground in the stroops would consistently during the operation be moving under the umbrella of indirect fire support; Kilo company was tax necessary to protect the artillery position from/ground attacks. The ground operation that followed the next day was called the "Nanking Action" because only groun infantry units from the 49t 4th Marine Regiment were into involved—and in the 1920s, the 4th Marines were based in China. This bit of historical nostalgia did not mean much to the young Marines, however; on charts an official chart, one youngster had spelled 4t "Nan King."

"He probably thought it was the name of some one someone's girl friend," and elderly ser warm off warrant officer explained. "You never carn tell what these young Marines think about."

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kdhsenh 10 (normass/deepe)

Through-out the first day, Nanking had no contact with the Communists; one Marine wasseriously wounded, however, by accidentally stepping on a Marine land to anti-personnel mine.

roved at the con patrolled around the Khe san abandoned remains of the base—at one time, it bivouscked directly across the river from the base. The company commander, the company commander, Capt. Sidney E. Thomas, 31, said, "There's no problem for us returing to the sand. I don't feel I ever left Khe Sanh.

We've been patrolling southeast of here. We've been in a mobile posture and know the area well, so we have no fear in returning."

I have in April

Capt. Thomas had assumed his/commend of the company while it was in and since then,

Khe Sanh; Item deporting in July; the company moved to other patrol at Fortrot Ridge, bases, had been sent to assist a sister company in heavy contact, had found Communist base camps, and had says been assaulted on time 18th along his its frontlines carpine 18 by the Communists attro- ate attacking uphill.

Kilo lost 20 all killed and 20 wounded; the Communists left 70 dead behind.

Since April, the company has suffered 30 killed and 75 wounded.—roughly 75 per cent battle casualties in six months. "We've had our share of casualties," the captain said softly.

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khesanh 11 (normass/deepe)

One trooper with artillery unit had also been in Khe Sanh in Jube

June—after the siege was lifted on April 1, but before it was evacuated

on July 6. He was Sgt. Alan Bollings, 21, of Birminghal Birmingha

Birmingham, Ala, a section chief for the 105 millimeter how howitzers.

"I was glad to come back up back up here again," he said. "I like it up here. There's alot better weather, scenery and sunpositions up here. I was a little suprised in a way. I thought the sirstrip had been taken up—but it still looks the same as aw always.

"When I was here in June we were still taking alot of incoming. I remember we were positioned on the southern end of the runway and we were lowering our guns so we could fire point blank into a treeline 2500 meters away. Sinc After we left Khe Sanh, we began moving from one fire support base to another. Coming back to Khe Sanh is just like another operation. We have to be over here for such a long time it's just like moving into Landing and Eawk or Cates."

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khesanh 12 (normass/deepe)

The next day—the Marines called it D-Day—other elements of the

4th Marines were heli-lifted at 10 a.m. into two landing zone areas

north and south of Highway, near the old Special Forces camp of

Lang Vei—some 8000 meters to the west of Khe Sanh. Their missions

was to begin a sweeping and es extensive searching action—tewr towards

Khe Sanh and the Nanking fire support base. These elements landed without

opposition—and have had only sporadic contact to dt date.

when Khe Sanh was under siege and when the Allied units were framed on the battle of Hue during the Tet offensive. The camp was overrun with the introduction of Soviet-made PT-76 armored vehicles—the first used in the war. Intelligence reports had previously mentioned Communist armor in the area—but the Special Forces had not laid out anti-tank one mines on their perimeter, they were unable to stop the advance of the well pretected m p mobile pillboxes and the camp fell in a hectic battle.

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khesanh 13 (normass/deepe)

On D-Day plus La hattalien of the 1st Vietnamese Army Division
was helidropped without opposition onto Hill 881 South—the scene of vicious
fighting northwest of Khe Sanh in mid-1967. Heavy radar-controlled
air bombardments preceded the Vietnamese heli-lift in an area where
American helicopters had spotted Communists in heavily bunkered and
cam camouflaged positions.

Since then the 2500 Allied ground troops continue to search the and sweep the darea with only special light contact from the Communists.

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